Eris vs. Aemulatio

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Eris vs. Aemulatio

Valuing Competition in Classical Antiquity

Edited by

Cynthia Damon
Christoph Pieper

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Cynthia Damon and Christoph Pieper

1 The Omnipresence of Competition

Princeps litterarum Homerus. Pliny the Elder's assessment of Homer (*HN* 2.13) is broadly representative, but in the case of *eris* primacy goes to Hesiod. Although Homer offers some striking commentary on strife in his epics, it is Hesiod's *Works and Days* account of the two Erides, one harmful and one beneficial, that has been crucial for almost all later discussions.[1] By splitting the goddess into two separate (almost psychological) entities Hesiod presents her as the expression of polarisation itself.[2] The drive to differentiate between good and bad strife, and consequently between positive and negative evaluations of competition in a broader sense, is central to our volume.[3] Its title is 'Eris vs. *aemulatio*', but it would also have been possible to call it 'Eris vs. *eris*', for in the papers presented here competition appears in various forms that are differentiated not by their cultural context in the ancient world—Greek vs. Roman—but by their cultural value.

It is hardly necessary to argue for the relevance of the topic of competition in the field of classical studies. On the contrary, competition is everywhere in the Greco-Roman world. The following list, far from complete, suggests its range. The Roman aristocracy in republican times was endlessly competitive in pursuit of political authority and glory (in fact Caesar's famous dictum that he was 'harder to push from the first rank to the second than from the second to the last', quoted by Suetonius, *Iul.* 29.1, is not so exceptional within the superlative-laden self-presentation of Roman aristocrats).[4] Philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle developed critiques of the omnipresent competition in the society

1 For a general treatment of Eris in Homer, Hesiod, and the Greek historiographers see Thalmann 2004.

2 Darthou 2008, 272: 'une divinité construite en polarité et expression d'une polarité'.

3 See, for example, Oostenbroek 1977, who identifies two separate traditions of ancient discourse about Eris: a poetic one and a philosophical-scientific one.

4 Cf., e.g., Neel 2014, arguing for the centrality of doublings and dyadic competition in Roman historiography about the (early) republic as a means both to acknowledge and mitigate competition ('a way to think about competition that was at the same time free from competition itself', 237).

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that surrounded them; thus Plato's attempt to control strife by virtue, that is, to root out 'bad' Eris and to retain only the competition for *aretê*, fits the general interest of fifth- and fourth-century Athenian society, which understood the importance of competition for the functioning of its democracy but also feared the possibility of strife getting out of control and leading to internal struggle or even civil war (*stasis*).[5] Religion was an important place of agonistic rivalry, not only when new cults were imported (as is attested in Euripides' *Bacchae* or Rome's struggles with the cult of Magna Mater) but also in the combative invective deployed between pagan and Christian thinkers in late antiquity.[6] Literary texts from all periods struggled with their models in order to emulate them, which makes competition one of the most creative literary concepts of all time.[7] Greek drama is defined by its agonistic performance context and (if we think of Aristophanes' comedies) became an important medium in which to reflect on the social energy of strife.[8] Artists and poets competed with each other to win the favor of the audience and—more specifically—the patronage of the upper class or ideally the ruler.[9] Art itself was closely connected with the theme of competition: a substantial percentage of the numerous statues that stood in imperial Greek or Roman cities were those of successful athletes, another group being those of triumphant generals and other members of the elite who had earned them as prizes in their competition for glory.[10] Festivals and public games with their acclaimed contests are a well studied and obvious kind of competition with a primarily positive evaluation in antiquity,[11] but festival competition also served as a metaphor structuring discourse in other

5 Cf., inter alia, Ober 2008, esp. 80–117 (ch. 3: 'Competition, Scale, and Varieties of Knowledge').

6 See two recent volumes: Engels and Van Nuffelen (eds.) 2014, and Des Rosiers and Vuong (eds.) 2016.

7 See, among innumerable examples, Collins 2004, esp. 63–163 for an instructive overview of differences between rhapsodic and symposiastic competition, and the important study of Griffith 1990; for Roman poetry see, e.g., Barchiesi 1991. Ch. 5 in the seminal book by Hinds 1998 deals with authorial self-fashioning via intertextuality; ch. 5 (on 'writing as social performance') in Habinek 1998 is concerned with competitive self-fashioning through publishing one's texts. See also below on the creative and cohesive potential of competition in literary production.

8 On Aristophanes see Biles 2011.

9 See Nauta 2002.

10 See for a broad overview Smith 2012.

11 See, inter alia, Christesen and Kyle (eds.) 2014; Coleman and Nelis-Clément (eds.) 2012, and Fisher 2009 for a succinct summary of the infrastructure of competition and its development in archaic and classical Greek culture.

'arenas', among them sophistic rhetoric in classical Greece.[12] And the vectors of competition ramify when Greek and Latin intellectuals of the imperial period known as the 'Second Sophistic' compete with each other in the act of competing with the models of the classical period.[13]

Given the omnipresence of competition in the Greco-Roman world, its salience as a topic for scholarly investigation shows surprising fluctuations. If one searches for the English term 'competition' in the *Année philologique*, for example, 44 of the 368 hits date from before 1980, 269 are from after 1990. Christoph Ulf (2011), after sketching the huge impact the concept had on 19th-century philology,[14] shows how it lost the attention of 20th-century scholarship, especially in the English-speaking world, and only regained influence in the 1980s. In the last fifteen years, in addition to numerous studies on competition in individual authors, genres, institutions, or contexts (some of which are mentioned en passant in this introduction), several important collected volumes have appeared, which—like the present one—examine competition in broader temporal and spatial contexts and pave ways for a new understanding of the dynamics of competition in antiquity.

The volume edited by Nick Fisher and Hans van Wees (2011) is especially useful for the anthropological focus of Hans van Wees' introduction, which encompasses more than the traditional purview of classics and includes discussions of African societies and Neolithic large-scale architecture. He concludes that one can move beyond economic or political models in explaining the competitive structures of ancient societies, and suggests instead that 'competitiveness is essentially social, and that its primary goal is superior status' (24).

As its title *La pomme d'Éris* suggests, the volume edited by Hélène Ménard, Pierre Sauzeau, and Jean François Thomas (2012) concentrates on the conflictual aspects of competition as manifest in language, concept, story, and between and within ancient societies, Greco-Roman and beyond. A topic treated by many of the *Pomme d'Éris* papers of particular relevance for the present volume, with its interest in the mechanisms by which competition is constrained, is the return to harmony and *homonoia* after conflict.

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12 See Poulakos 1995, 32–46.

13 Schmitz 1997, 97–135 is seminal for the Second Sophistic. For a more critical, almost Platonic, view of the utility of competition in imperial Greek literature see Stadter 2011 (on Plutarch); on Plutarchan *philotimia* more generally see the volume by Roskam, De Pourcq, and Van der Stockt (eds.) 2012.

14 Ulf thinks that John Stuart Mill's utilitarian theories are foundational for this interest, a fascination that culminates in Jacob Burckhardt's influential *Griechische Culturgeschichte*, in which the concept of the 'agonal' is defined as the core of Greek society.

A decade earlier David Konstan and Keith Rutter (2003) edited a volume of studies on the emotions that trigger rivalry and competition, namely, envy, spite, and jealousy. Its essays explore these emotions in Greco-Roman philosophical doctrine, literary depiction, and oratorical deployment, and with attention to the question of their universality.

For a broad overview of how the concept of competition has been used in historical analysis one can now turn to *Konkurrenz in der Geschichte. Praktiken, Werte, Institutionalisierungen* (2014), edited by Ralph Jessen, to which Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp contributes a useful essay—both general and easily applicable to the ancient world—focused on competitive practices, *mores*, and institutions. Of particular note is the volume's interest in the spread of an economic perspective on competition beyond the market to other areas of human endeavor.

The first sentence of Hans van Wees' (2011, 1) above-mentioned authoritative introduction to ancient competition is 'Competition divides people'. This beginning might seem to imply that, no matter whether societies foster competition or discourage it (ibid. 28), the outcome is always a rupture of social cohesion. Yet it remains disputable whether this is true for all kinds of ancient competition and in all respects. Institutionalized competitions, for example, such as the dramatic *agônes* at Athens, or spectacular Roman funerals with processions and tombs that try to outdo those of other families, may divide the competitors, but they also display shared values and encourage a sense of community in the audience. Van Wees himself acknowledges this fully and eventually describes competition as part of the sociability of humans in general (ibid. 6).

When it comes to the classical Greco-Roman world, literary texts are the primary (but by no means only) sources that reveal the sociability that is achieved through competition. However, literature does not only (implicitly or explicitly) reflect competition, it is also profoundly competitive itself. So it is worth stressing that the interactions between texts and their 'surrounding' culture are not unidirectional. Instead, ever since Foucault's discourse analysis, literature has been described as a formative part of culture in that it is, in the words of Leslie Kurke, 'a domain of contest and negotiation.' Or, put differently: texts shape culture through discursive, contested patterns.[15]

Even within the boundaries of literature itself, competition helped position any author's literary product in the 'crowded market' in which many con-

15 Kurke 2011, 24, who continues: 'Thus texts of all kinds offer us the sedimented residue of moments in a dynamic process of struggle or contestation'.

flicting voices were fighting for attention (Barker and Christensen 2006, 14). Elton Barker and Joel Christensen haven shown in two important contributions (2006 and 2011) how intergeneric contestation is already visible in Homer.[16] Epic, sympotic, and cultic language and narrative patterns were interrelated from the very beginning of our written literary sources, and the interaction between them fostered literary originality.[17] Poets tried to develop their distinct 'personal voice' (Barker and Christensen 2006, 15) within a 'playful sympotic world' (ibid. 31). This means that already the *princeps litterarum* Homer is not only the target of literary *aemulatio* but also the protagonist of poetic *eris*.[18]

The competitive nature of literary infrastructure in early Greece was good for all parties: for the audience, in that the poet's rivalry produced innovative poetry, and for the poets, in that better poetry helped to foster and even augment the audience's interest in poetry. And emulative contestation remained omnipresent and fruitful in literature throughout antiquity. In cases where literary and personal rivalry overlap, the resulting competition may become slightly more complex but can still show astonishing cohesive effects.[19]

A telling example of this stems from the field of Latin oratory. When Cicero in 46 BCE writes his *Brutus*, a history of Roman eloquence, he compares two exponents for every generation of orators; the two 'compete' for primacy not only as individuals against each other but also as a pair against the oratorical reputations of previous and subsequent generations.[20] His own generation is represented by Hortensius and himself. In the passages dealing with Hortensius's rhetoric Cicero is rather critical of his rival, implicitly declaring himself

16 Jauss 1977, 327–358 is still worth reading for a theory of genres in pre-modern societies; on page 327 he stresses that vernacular medieval literature is an especially promising field of study in that the distinction between authorial singularity and collectivity has not yet been fixed ('[ein] Versuchsfeld …, das zwischen den Gegensätzen von Singularität und Kollektivität, von reinem Kunstcharakter und bloßer Zweckbedingtheit der Literatur liegt'). A similarly fluid infrastructure can be also assumed for early Greek poetry. On the utility of Jauss' genre theory for classical studies see Harrison 2013, 7.

17 Barker 2011 shows how Homer's *Iliad* engages with allegedly existing versions of the Theban cycle, incorporating and changing its material in order to 'build up its own [*sc.* the *Iliad*'s] pre-eminence' (38).

18 See also the stimulating book by Levaniouk 2011, esp. 324–325 on the challenging task of defining the 'context' for the dialogue between Penelope and Odysseus in *Iliad* 19: it is Homer's narrative, of course, but also 'a landscape of tradition, or rather, of many cooperating and competing traditions that contribute to the formation of the Homeric epic': other epic poetry, myth, cult, lament, etc.

19 Simmel 1992, 284–382 ('Der Streit') is still fundamental; see recently Hölkeskamp 2014, 34–38.

20 For more discussion of such fictive competitions see Ham, de Jonge, and Zadorojnyi in this volume.

to be the victor (and thus the culmination of oratory in Rome). Yet this competitive rivalry with Hortensius finds a counterpart in the preface of the dialogue, where Cicero stresses not the well known rivalry between the two but their close connection (*Brut.* 1). Indeed he suggests that Hortensius's recent death deprives him of a necessary condition of oratorical competition: a worthy competitor, 'not an adversary or detractor of my fame but rather a comrade and partner in a glorious struggle' (*non … adversarium aut obtrectatorem laudum mearum sed socium potius et consortem gloriosi laboris*, *Brut.* 2).[21] The simultaneous presence of and tension between divisive and cohesive effects visible in this passage and in many of those that are discussed in this volume is reflected in our title, *Eris vs. aemulatio*.

2 Defining and Evaluating Competition

Competition, in addition to being omnipresent, is also multifaceted, a factor that complicates its definition and evaluation; it will become clear that defining competition always requires two or more different perspectives on each of its main features, depending on whether it is viewed as primarily beneficial or harmful. In what follows, therefore, our cumulative definition of competition in the Greco-Roman world is interwoven with reflections about ancient evaluations of its characteristics.

According to the *Oxford Dictionary of English* (2010, ad loc.), competition is 'the activity or condition of striving to gain or win something by defeating or establishing superiority over others'. The lexicographer, like Hesiod in the famous passage about good Eris and bad Eris that is something of a leitmotiv in this volume, makes doubling central to the concept: activity or condition, gain or win, defeating or establishing superiority, others and (implicitly) self. The only singleton here is the prize, the 'something'.

The prize is a focusing device.[22] Xenophon expresses this well in the *Memorabilia*: 'thinking the same things beautiful and pleasant, they fight and oppose one another in rivalry over them' (τά τε γὰρ αὐτὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα νομίζοντες

21 Cf. Bakewell in this volume on Plato confronting the problem of 'how to transform an individual's striving for renown into something that will benefit rather than harm the broader community' and, more abstractly, the Platonic distinction cited by Marlein van Raalte (*per litteras*) 'between (A) φιλονικία between human rivals—in which case the one (party) may become the better of the other—and (B) φιλονικία as the (ideally) common strife to find the truth through dialectics, in which case victory is on the part of λόγος (e.g., *Grg.* 505e4–5)'.

22 For a sound treatment and for parallels in Vedic hymns see Pinault 2006.

ὑπὲρ τούτων μάχονται καὶ διχογνωμονοῦντες ἐναντιοῦνται, *Mem.* 2.6.21). In fact, Georges-Jean Pirault has stressed that the similarity of the Greek terms for 'prize', ἆθλον, and 'contest', ἆθλος, suggests that, in Greece at least, a contest without prizes would be unthinkable. But prizes come in all shapes and sizes. They can be quantifiable or symbolic (or both), winner-take-all or extensible, lasting or ephemeral, gained or won, and so on. Not surprisingly, the nature of the prize (especially, perhaps, its scarcity), and the nature of the competition itself (does it involve defeating or establishing superiority?[23]) are generally linked: for a philosopher such as Aristotle, for example, as Christopher Gill (2003, 36) has shown, the ultimate external prize, honor, should result from the highest internal quality, magnanimity.

The prizes discussed in the present volume range from the concrete (a vessel, an animal, a marriage, the spoils of war) to the conceptual (honor, status, pride, memory). The connection between the prize and the underlying ideology is particularly salient in the funeral games of *Iliad* 23, discussed by Bierl, where some of Achilles' awards complicate the meaning of victory and call into question the efficacy of competition itself as method of ranking. But it is also evident in the exhortation that concludes Plato's *Republic*, cited by Bakewell: Socrates urges his interlocutors to 'collect the prizes (ἆθλα) of justice and be led around like victors (νικηφόροι)' (621c7–d1); these are no ordinary prizes. Ideology is likewise fundamental to the 'moralized critiques of short-order wealth' discussed by Bernard. An unambiguously negative attitude towards prizes is on view in Kuin's paper on Aristotle's critique of a proposal by Hippodamus of Miletus to establish a competition to encourage political innovation: giving prizes for new laws, even if the innovation was beneficial, would destabilize the *polis*, regardless of the nature of the prize. The immaterial prizes that result from less structured competitions—the slightly malign pleasure one imagines in those responsible for the graphic or lexicographical 'capping' discussed by Steiner and Zadorojnyi, for example, or the family brand promoted by Tertia Aemilia in the female status competition discussed by Webb, or the cultural pride in seeing 'your' orator ranked above 'theirs', as in the fictive competitions between Demosthenes and Cicero discussed by de Jonge—seem to be less problematic for society.

Next, the competitors. In the simplest scenario the other is much like oneself. A hero vies with another hero one-on-one, for example, and a bucolic

23 See van Wees 2011, 2 for the prize as the distinguishing feature between competitions oriented towards gaining objects or goods and those oriented towards gaining superiority or glory.

singer with another bucolic singer. But other contests of like-on-like are multilateral: thus liturgists vie with liturgists, professionals with other professionals, their *antitechnitai*, and Roman elite men and women with their peers. Also relevant is the so-called N-effect, which captures the idea that the more numerous the competitors (= N), the lower the quality and intensity of the competition (Garcia and Tor, 2009).

Here again the papers in the present volume put pressure on the definition with useful results. Bierl, for example, acknowledges Homer's 'sportscaster-like' focus on one-on-one competitions in the chariot race but highlights the disconcerting effect of Achilles' award of prizes to heroes, such as Nestor, who were not competitors. Plato, as Bakewell shows, is even more sparing in his celebration of the competitors ranked 'golden' in Kallipolis, emphasizing instead the brotherhood of Kallipolis's citizens. Furthermore, the temporal reference of the gerunds 'defeating' and 'establishing superiority over' is remarkably flexible. In the elite status competitions discussed by Bernard and Webb, for example, the rivals are both contemporaries (such as the consuls of 293 BCE) and temporally disjunct generations (such as Quinta Claudia and Clodia Metelli); intergenerational rivalry is of course a staple of ancient thinking, as in the example from Cicero's *Brutus* mentioned above. The degree to which differences between competitors align with other social or cultural divisions has a major impact on the stakes of a competition, as Rosen shows in his discussion of the heated rhetoric of physicians' rivalry with 'religious healers, drug-sellers, and a variety of medical poseurs'. A specific category of 'different' is on view in the literary rivalries discussed by Baraz, Ham, de Jonge, and Zadorojnyi. Literary predecessors worthy of emulation are often temporally and culturally distant, but because the emulator wants to align himself with the predecessor, they are also close and significant, whether the emulation be direct or vicarious. Such rivalries are often therefore rather emotional, as well. Indeed in the bucolic genre, as Baraz argues, the frustrations of rivalry with generic predecessors generate an attempt to destroy the genre itself. The frustrations with the inherently unequal contest between patron and craftsman for architectural glory discussed by Siwicki, on the other hand, lead to ingenious and successful changes of venue.

The definition's 'activity' and 'condition' categories, too, cover a lot of semantic territory, ranging from the hotly contested chariot race discussed by Bierl, to the 'placement-dependent eristic word play' discussed by Steiner, in which each successive writer aims to have 'the last word', and on to the 'collaborative creativity' constitutive of the bucolic contests discussed by Baraz. The categories also need to make room for the indirection of contests such as those in Plato's Kallipolis, discussed by Bakewell, where competition was a form of

testing and the real winner was the *polis* itself, not the individual whose characteristic 'metal' was deemed to be gold.

So far we have mostly exemplified some features of competition highlighted by the *Oxford Dictionary of English*. Useful as the definition is, however, it elides several features that were important in ancient competitions. First the framework within which the contestants engage their rivals, be it institutional, literary, or social. Agreeing on rules means setting boundaries for otherwise unbounded competition. When *eris* is transformed and sublimated into an agonistic game, it is of crucial importance that the players agree on the following questions:[24] What are the rules of the game? How explicit are they? Are they fair? Are they binding? Is the contest recurrent or once-in-a-lifetime? Who is in the audience? Is defeat survivable? Furthermore, the legitimacy of any victory depends in large part on the framework of the competition, as does its impact on the community.[25]

A number of the papers in this volume consider the role and evaluation of ancient frameworks real and metaphorical. The dramatic competitions at Athens naturally loom large. Taplin looks at how Aristotle delegitimizes the civic framework, while Bakewell shows Plato using it as a metaphor for literary criticism when Adeimantus and Glaucon adopt the role of 'gatekeepers' to the competition, saying that they 'will not give a chorus' to an author whose work they consider harmful to the city. The potential for harm to the city likewise motivates Aristotle's rejection, discussed by Kuin, of a proposal to establish a formal competition in political innovation. A similarly conservative attitude towards the potentially disruptive effect of competition is discussed by Webb, who shows how an important field of women's competition, namely, 'the conspicuous display of elite female transport and adornment', was at one point restricted by law at Rome. The framework of the bucolic song contest is of central concern to Baraz's paper as she traces the increasingly explicit tension between amoebean exchange and the more adversarial real-world competitions to which the poems allude (single combat, trials, athletic games). Scodel, on the other hand, discusses some examples of socially constructive competition in Homer, where the rivalry is carefully bounded by pre-existing condi-

24 Hölkeskamp 2010, 103. Sublimation is particularly evident in the bucolic poems discussed by Baraz, in the which song contest proper is preceded by a free-form squabble: 'the contest is a means of resolving the conflict by providing transition to a different sphere'.

25 For the importance of consensus about the rules of political competition in republican Rome see Hölkeskamp 2010, 103. Whether one stresses competition or cooperation as the core of Roman political culture seems a question of taste; see Russell 2013, 101–115 for a nuanced view on the practical challenges and opportunities that the rivalrous mode of Roman politics inflicted on the plebeian tribunes in Rome.

tions such as relationships (Nausicaa and her attendants, Telemachus and his father) or circumstances (the imminence of battle); informal frameworks such as these, or the economic markets discussed by Scodel and Bernard, or the ethical codes discussed by Rosen and Zadorojnyi, are as important to consider in assessing ancient attitudes to competition as their more formal real-world and literary counterparts.

Another feature elided in the definition quoted above is the judges, whose importance was already stressed by Hesiod: Sonia Darthou (2008, 273) observes that in *Theogony* the verb *krinein*, 'to distinguish' or 'to judge', often appears in close connection to *eris*. The institution of judges can be seen as an attempt to control the forces of rupture and aggression by shifting the competition so that it is not (or not only) directed *against* the fellow competitor but (or but also) *towards* the judging third, making success in the eyes of the judges the ultimate aim of the competitor, not the wish to defeat the opponent.

Who, then are the judges? As the papers presented here show, some contests are judged by experts, some by authority figures, and some by the crowd—and the future is the ultimate arbiter. But the judges do not escape criticism; it becomes clear that they (and their critics) have their own stakes in the outcome of the contest. The clearest example of the expert judge comes in Zadorojnyi's paper on Pollux's *Onomasticon*, in which the sophist assumes the role of judge (but also competitor!) in the 'competition for control over language', a competition in which the philological prize often goes to 'the more ambitious usage'. The experts' stake is even clearer in de Jonge's paper on fictive competitions between Demosthenes and Cicero, a favorite exercise with critics, who, if Greek, subtly give the palm to Demosthenes, while Quintilian boldly promotes the claims of his fellow Roman Cicero. The critique of rival judges is particularly explicit in a passage from Aristotle's *Poetics* discussed in Taplin's paper on the philosopher's scorn for dramatic victories that were awarded on the basis of crowd-pleasing *opsis*, 'spectacle', rather than a play's other components, which Aristotle considered more germane to *poiêsis*. Aristotle, it emerges, sets himself up as an alternative prize-giver, one who can bestow esteem, if not victory, on playwrights he admires. The problematic audience returns in Baraz's paper on the development of the bucolic genre from Theocritus to Calpurnius Siculus. In the latest poems the audience has mushroomed from a passerby into 'the entire locality at every level' amid quarrels about the proper locus of aesthetic judgment. In his discussion of physicians' appeals for expert and popular approbation alike Rosen shows how the judges' task was complicated by the lack of clear criteria for success: the claims of medical efficacy, money, professionalism, panache, and altruism are all heard. Whereas Rosen's doctors are primarily focused on contemporary judges, Siwicki's architects, competing

with the political elite in a contest they could not win, turned to the future as the ultimate arbiter: viewers of the funerary monuments on which architects asserted their claims to renown for their buildings and, even more ambitiously, readers of the *De architectura*, a treatise in which Vitruvius gave credit to architects, not rulers, for notable buildings.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the emotions with which competition is associated.[26] Underneath the definition's terms 'striving', 'defeating', and 'superiority' passions roil. Hesiod mentions several emotions from the negative spectrum, including resentment and jealousy, and Scodel explains how they work in context, but competition can also generate positive emotions such as hope (in those who look to the future as arbiter) and even exaltation (some of Steiner's graffiti could have been printed with exclamation marks: 'Enpedokles carved these things. And he danced, by Apollo!' or 'Pheidip(p)idas fucked. Timagoras and Enperes and I—we fucked too!'). The ancients were attentive to the emotional concomitants of competition at its extreme: the anger of Antilochus, discussed by Bierl; the shame that Cicero, as Webb shows, wanted to (pretend to) arouse in Clodia Metelli; the hatred that one of Rosen's physicians actually did want to arouse against a rival quack; the personal abuse between sophists that, as Zadorojnyi shows, Pollux disapproved of; and the *furor* and *insania* mentioned by Calpurnius Siculus and discussed by Baraz. One can certainly find attempts to limit competition's social cost by moving the competition inward, or even by encouraging competition with an abstraction or with oneself instead of with others. As Scodel observes, 'it is the peculiarity of the competition in work and thus in success that the competition is mainly in the mind of the competitor'. Seneca, who draws an explicit analogy between athletic competition and the development of the inner self, shows something of the dynamics (*Ep.* 13.3): 'Thus, to pursue that analogy, Fortune often got the better of you, but you did not surrender; rather, you leapt up and made a more determined stand. For virtue, when challenged, makes itself greater' (*ergo, ut similitudinem istam prosequar, saepe iam fortuna supra te fuit, nec tamen tradidisti te, sed subsiluisti et acrior constitisti; multum enim adicit sibi virtus lacessita*). On a larger scale, *stasis* threatens, and, apropos of Plato's *stasis*-reducing provisions for Kallipolis, Bakewell argues that 'the city's success hinges on its ability to limit and manage competition on multiple levels'.

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26 See Thalmann 2004, 380 on the emotions: For 'rivalry, jealousy, and hatred are potentially by-products of any form that *eris*, seen as a unity, might take, from war to athletic or economic competition'.

3 Representational Competition

We can go a step further in supplementing the dictionary definition by considering the degree to which competition is real or representational, an aspect of competition that is often crucial for its evaluation. Being confronted with unregulated strife might be unsettling, but seeing it staged or perceiving it in artistic or literary representations can have a pedagogical effect. The contrast between representation (e.g., in the theater at Athens or at panhellenic festivals) and reality (e.g., the stubborn competitiveness of political leaders who led Roman citizens to take up arms against each other in the course of the first century BCE) is stark. The tension between these paradigms was at the core of philosophical warnings against competition such as those issued by Plato or, even more radically, by the Stoics and Epicureans.[27] Yet not even Plato can dismiss competition completely. Bakewell explores Plato's intriguing representation of competition in the *Republic* against the backdrop of Athenian society, especially the opportunities of social ascent for residents who by birth were not likely to become political players. On the other hand, real life can also make philosophers deeply skeptical about the usefulness of even institutionalized and representational competition, as Taplin shows with regard to Aristotle's critique of *opsis* in his *Poetics*.

What do we mean by representational? In a fascinating study Elton Barker (2009, 372) remarks with regard to the Athenian context that 'Representations of debate … reproduce dissent from authority and help construct an agonistic mentality by which one may perform as a citizen'.[28] His observation brings to the fore several important aspects of representational competition.

First, the notion of authority. Authoritative models from the past who engaged in strife can serve as legitimation and inspiration for later competitors in setting up their own agonistic game. In the field of literature, for example, Ham shows how Ovid reworked Hesiod's doubling of Eris in his *Metamorphoses* and *Fasti* and developed it as a source of poetic invention, while de Jonge's chapter on imperial rhetoricians concludes that their fictive *agôn* about the models of Greek and Roman prose invites the latter generation to respond in an emulative way to the challenges offered by past perfection. But contemporary authorities (both individuals and institutions), too, can legitimate competition. Who is authoritative enough to judge (or end) competition or to set its rules and boundaries? We have already seen that Aristotle presents himself as

27 See the useful overview in Gill 2003.

28 Cf. also Darthou 2008, 275: 'Si le conflit est une phase de rupture, il permet aussi de définir la place de chacun'.

such an authority in the *Poetics*. In Siwicki's paper we encounter architects who challenge the authority of political leaders on the field of representative architecture and claim their own aesthetic authority and responsibility, but we also find their wish to co-operate in a client-patron relationship. Within the boundaries of the text, Bierl's chapter shows how Homer's Achilles, in many ways the model of an *eris*-driven character, acts in *Iliad* 23 as a mild judge who encourages competition in clearly defined contests and settles any swelling emotions before they become dangerous personal enmity.

Barker also stresses the importance of the medium in which competition is represented: in what media do we accept strife, and where is it unwanted? Many chapters in this volume offer unusual answers to this question, including the rupestral inscriptions discussed by Steiner; the ceremonies in which, as Webb argues, Roman elite women competed with each other; and the lexica that Zadorojnyi shows to be a good medium for competition among philologically-inclined intellectuals. Furthermore, representation always involves adopting a specific role, an agonistic persona.[29] Webb shows this nicely for Roman elite women, whose competition is 'staged' according to *exempla* from the past. One might posit that competition becomes dangerous at the moment in which role-playing is put aside and unmediated emotions surface.

Third, Barker reminds us that representations of competition are dialogical in nature and therefore open-ended: they invite everyone who perceives them (as spectator, visitor, or reader) to replicate the spirit of good Eris for themselves. In fictional contests (Demosthenes vs. Cicero, Quinta Claudia vs. Clodia Metelli; competition with ancestors) everybody wins. As Seneca puts it, intergenerational rivalry increases humanity's patrimony (*Ep*. 64.7):[30]

> I admire philosophy's discoveries and their discoverers; it is a pleasure to be in the presence of, so to speak, the patrimony of the multitude. It was for me that these concepts were acquired and worked up. But let me play the part of a good head of household: let me multiply what I received. May a larger inheritance go from me to my posterity!
>
> Veneror … inventa sapientiae inventoresque; adire tamquam multorum hereditatem iuvat. Mihi ista acquisita, mihi laborata sunt. Sed agamus bonum patrem familiae, faciamus ampliora quae accepimus; maior ista hereditas a me ad posteros transeat.

29 For the importance of role-playing see Hölkeskamp 2010, 102.
30 See on intergenerational emulation in this letter Tutrone 2014, 248–251.

In the case of the intercultural rivalry between great orators, de Jonge argues that it benefits both the critics (Caecilius of Caleacte, Plutarch, [Longinus], Quintilian) and the critics' audiences, who are in effect supporting 'their' team, as in a sporting event; the literary contest between Greeks and Romans is more fun if you are participating. From this perspective representational competitions occur in an open-ended, discursive framework that stimulates negotiation about the status quo.[31]

The tension between real and representational competition is well illustrated by Lucretius. In line with his Epicurean values, he does not want to engage in the typical Roman competition for glory, as that would harm the balance of the soul and disturb his inner peace. Yet watching others competing for glory from a safe distance has philosophical utility, as it helps the spectator realize how agreeable it is to stay away from the struggle (Lucr. 2.7–13):

> But nothing is sweeter than staying in a lofty temple well fortified by the serene knowledge of the wise, whence you can look down on others and see them wandering widely and seeking a road in life's uncertainties, using intellect in their struggles and nobility in their battles, striving night and day with intense effort to win the greatest wealth and become powerful.

> sed nihil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere
> edita doctrina sapientum templa serena,
> despicere unde queas alios passimque videre
> errare atque viam palantis quaerere vitae,
> **certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate**,
> noctes atque dies niti praestante labore
> **ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri**.

Lucretius' language, replete with the terminology of competition, reveals a fascination with the competitive culture of the Romans, and can be read as simultaneously a critique of competition and a Hegelian 'sublation' (*Aufheben*) of it. The same nuanced evaluation is visible in Lucretius's attitude to his philosophic and literary models. On the one hand he declares that Epicurus reached a godlike status *qua* philosopher, and that his successors will only be able to retell what he has envisaged; in other words, Lucretius eschews *aemulatio* and

31 Cf. van Nijf 2012, 70: watching spectacles was 'a phase in an ongoing *process of social and political negotiation*' (our emphasis).

is content to be one of Epicurus's imitators. On the other hand, especially on the metapoetical level, he engages in an outspoken emulative process, combining (archaic) Ennianism with a clear awareness of modern Callimachean poetics: his repeated statements that he is the first who has dared to explain Epicurean thought in verse recalls the traditional Roman competitive discourse in which, as Bernard among others shows here, being the first or only one to do something is part of the quest for glory.[32]

Lucretius's limited acceptance of competition—as a path to literary glory, not knowledge of the universe—provides a useful caveat against the modern inclination to connect competition with (the wish for) innovation. For Greco-Roman antiquity innovation was not self-evidently desirable.[33] Scodel in her chapter argues that Hesiod, for example, shows no interest in innovation in farming and was perhaps not even aware that innovation in this area (as opposed to poetry) was possible. Aristotle's evaluation of innovation in politics, however, as Kuin shows in her chapter on *Politics* 2, is more complicated. While being skeptical about the value of political competition as such, Aristotle nevertheless tries to be innovative in his political program. But in order to be able to 'sell' the novelty of a political procedure, he invents a tradition to which he can connect it. Such traditionalism could easily be promoted as a philosophically superior model of behavior. It is certainly promoted as a philologically superior model by Pollux, who, as Zadorojnyi argues, prides himself on pursuing '[lexical] innovation by means of archaic vocabulary'. Not only in Greece but especially in Rome the past, venerated as *mos maiorum*, was thought to give legitimacy to present actions; '[o]n a functional level, it could serve to constitute identity for individuals, groups or even whole states', as the preface to a previous Penn-Leiden volume has put it.[34] No wonder, then, that not only the elite but also professionals had recourse to such conservatism. Rosen shows how Greek physicians defended their own authority in the field of healing not only with reference to their success in medical care but also through

32 On Lucretius' innovative (and self-confident) poetics, see Gale 2005 and Nethercut (forthcoming). For a Lucretian 'first' see the proem to Book 4 of *De rerum natura* (esp. 4.3–5: 'it gives pleasure to pick new flowers and to seek a distinguished crown for my head from a place whence the Muses have as yet wreathed no one's brow', *iuvat* ***novos*** *decerpere* ***flores*** */ insignemque meo capiti petere inde coronam /* ***unde prius nulli*** *velarit tempora Musae*); cf., e.g., the *laudatio Metelli* (quoted by Plin. *HN* 7.139, for which see also Bernard in this volume) 'who was the first to lead elephants in triumph after his victory in the first Punic War' (*qui primus elephantos ex primo Punico bello duxit in triumpho*).

33 Cf. van Wees 2011, 5: competition for superiority in antiquity was not always 'progress-driven'.

34 Ker and Pieper (eds.) 2014, 3.

the foregrounding of medically-irrelevant but traditional ethical concepts. On the other hand, one cannot deny that competition fostered innovation even in antiquity. Bernard's chapter among others shows how new economic realities changed the strategies used by the Roman political elites of the mid-republic in competing with each other.[35] And even Hesiod, however scant his interest in agricultural innovation, competes with predecessors and contemporaries—Scodel refers to his victory in the poetic *agôn* in Chalcis (*Theog.* 656–659)—in his attempt to write innovative poetry.[36]

Given the essentially representational character of most examples of competition discussed in this volume, it is worth asking whether cooperation, which is often taken to be competition's opposite, is in fact rather its precondition, as is suggested by Marcus Aurelius: 'we were born to work together, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like rows of teeth, upper and lower' (γεγόναμεν γὰρ πρὸς συνεργίαν, ὡς πόδες, ὡς χεῖρες, ὡς βλέφαρα, ὡς οἱ στοῖχοι τῶν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὀδόντων, *Med.* 2.1). However one evaluates competition—and the papers in the present volume show how complex that evaluation must be—it is good to think that the competitive and the cooperative are not mutually exclusive. The editors, at least, have a lively sense of how the overlap plays out in practice, as we indicate in the Acknowledgments below.

4 In This Volume

The above-mentioned omnipresence of competition in the Greco-Roman world means that comprehensive coverage of the topic is impossible in a volume such as this. Instead, the papers presented here focus on ancient *evaluations* of competition, starting in Part 1 with Hesiod's fundamental bifurcation of the earlier concept of *eris*, which had a largely negative value, into a pair of entities, one of which had a beneficial effect and was accorded a positive

35 See also Roller 2009 for an analysis of the innovative, non-martial way in which Appius Claudius Caecus tried to win his portion of public renown.

36 Not to mention the fact that later generations imagined that his rival in Chalcis would have been Homer. The story of the 'Contest between Homer and Hesiod' (an imperial text that, however, goes back to similar ones from at least the fourth century BCE) shows how deeply the later Greek imagination connected (creative) agonistic principles to the founding fathers of their literature; Koning 2010, 268 interprets the important role of the judges in the *Certamen* as reflecting 'the appropriation of the poets by all layers of society *throughout* antiquity' (emphasis is his) and thus as a metaphor for their ability to elicit constant emulation. Collins 2004, 185–191 reads the *Certamen* as reflecting the actual rhapsodes' ability to improvise hexametric verses, partly with the aim of epic parody.

value. The papers in Parts 2 and 3 then explore this bifurcation in a variety of ancient contexts, literary, philosophical, political, economic, artistic, and professional.

4.1 *Part 1. Eris Reimagined*

Hesiod's Erides are the subject of Part 1, which contains Ruth Scodel's discussion of the seminal *Works and Days* passage (*Op.* 11–28) in which Hesiod announces his insight that the harmful *eris* familiar from Homer and *Theogony*, a 'grievous goddess', has a beneficial counterpart, at least in the environment most relevant to the concerns of his poem, where she is an 'aid to men'. In 'Hesiodic *Eris* and the Market' Scodel examines Hesiod's psychological insight that competition for public respect might be a better motivator for farmers than the pursuit of food security. After reviewing the various forms of *eris* found in the Homeric epics, including some instances of win-win competition, she provides a detailed analysis of the famous passage on the two Erides in *Works and Days* (*Op.* 11–28), which she takes to be Hesiod's revision of the account of Eris given in *Theogony* (*Theog.* 226–231). Scodel discusses the particular relevance of good Eris for Hesiod's farmer, who participates in a market different in kind from the markets used by the other competitors mentioned by Hesiod (beggars, potters, bards), showing that the socially constructive Eris situated in the world of Hesiod's farmer had no place in the world described in the Homeric epics and therefore no dedicated word in early Greek.

4.2 *Part 2. Ambivalence, Critique, Resistance*

The second part of the volume opens with Anton Bierl's analysis of an extended episode of Homeric competition. In 'Agonistic Excess and Its Ritual Resolution in Hero Cult: the Funeral Games in *Iliad* 23 as a *mise en abyme*' Bierl offers an analysis of the funeral games for Patroclus, paying particular attention to how Achilles acts 'out of character' in restraining excessively agonistic behavior by concessions, arbitration, and generosity. The detailed description of the chariot race, in Bierl's reading, provides a *mise en abyme* reflection of and contrast to events that occurred earlier in the poem, and the games as a whole simultaneously 'affirm and undermine the central aristocratic ideology of being the best'. The episode also shows Achilles, once arch-competitor but now *agônothetês*, anticipating his future status as the object of hero cult. A different refraction of heroic competition provides the subject matter for Yelena Baraz's paper '*Certare alterno carmine*: the Rise and Fall of Bucolic Competition'. Baraz argues that bucolic competition, as the literary tradition develops, increasingly evokes more consequential modes of competition (military, forensic) and attracts an ever-larger audience. In Calpurnius' 6th Eclogue,

in fact, his competing shepherds are 'quasi-epic fighters' threatening to come to blows over aesthetic values before a crowd of spectators from the human and natural worlds. In bringing out the violence latent but never actualized in the earlier tradition, Baraz shows, Calpurnius renders the central conceit of bucolic poetry, the amicable singing contest, unstable and henceforth unworkable.

These two studies of literary instantiations of (at best) ambivalence about competition are followed by a pair—such 'pairing' was built into the original conference program—devoted to philosophical critiques. Geoffrey W. Bakewell, in 'Stasis, Competition, and the "Noble Lie": Metic Mettle in Plato's *Republic*', reads the *Republic* through the lens of competition established by the dialogue's narrative frame, showing that when justice is defined as 'holding and taking care of one's own, and of oneself' (rather than the more traditional 'helping friends and harming enemies') competition becomes almost irrelevant and 'victory itself undesirable', at least for the individual concerned, however beneficial it may be for society as a whole. As context for the philosophical argument Bakewell looks at the 'noble lie' of Plato's metallurgical analogy for social classes in relation to the social structure of contemporary Athens, showing that the desirability of the limited social mobility allowed in Kallipolis is exemplified in the dialog by Polemarchus, a metal-producer-metic who contributes significantly to the philosophical project. Competition, it is argued, has a legitimate—if narrowly circumscribed—function in Kallipolis in the sorting and testing processes necessitated by discrepancies between birth and character. Another nuanced treatment of competition is discussed by Inger N.I. Kuin in 'Competition and Innovation in Aristotle, *Politics* 2', which looks at Aristotle's critique of competition in the context of politics, focusing on his rejection of a proposal by Hippodamus of Miletus to foster political innovation by means of a competition for civic honors rewarding the discovery/invention of something beneficial for the state. An institutionalized honor, by providing a new incentive for innovation, would increase the frequency of innovations, which in Aristotle's view destabilize the constitution even if they are per se beneficial. Aristotle's own innovative proposal, Kuin shows, is carefully framed as a revival, not an innovation.

The next two papers focus on problematic aspects of real-world competitions. In 'Aristotle's *Poetics* and *skênikoi agônes*' Oliver Taplin sets Aristotle's comments on performance, *opsis*, against the background of contemporary performance practices in the Greek world, attested in a variety of sources including inscriptions, speeches, and Platonic dialogues. All venues involved competition, and in the fourth century actors came into particular prominence, including in Aristotle's one reference to his own experience of tragedy

in performance. Aristotle seems not to have approved of the resulting dramatic experience, which could be vulgar and sensational, as in the performances of Callipides 'the ape'. Furthermore, competition affected *opsis* more than Aristotle's other five dramatic *mere* owing to its capacity for pleasing the audience and festival judges, with the result that dramatic competitions designed to pick the best play ended up picking the most spectacular play, including some of Euripides'. In Aristotle's view, Taplin shows, the limitations of the audience limit the degree to which competition can be a spur to excellence. Ralph Rosen discusses competition in the ancient health-care marketplace, where physicians vied with one another and with other healers to establish their own credibility and commodify the service they provided. In 'Paradoxes and Anxieties of Competition in Hippocratic Medicine' he analyses competitive polemic in the Hippocratic texts, focusing on the tension between altruism and self-promotion, and argues that the texts attempt to establish values for the profession superior to those of the ignorant and unregulated marketplace: *philanthropia*, not *philotimia*.

4.3 *Part 3. Multivalence, Displacement, Innovation*

The final part of the volume develops Hesiod's idea that good Eris is 'in the roots of the earth' (*Op.* 19) with papers that explore a variety of ancient scenarios in which competition is artistically and/or socially productive. In 'Sleights of Hand: Epigraphic Capping and the Visual Enactment of *Eris* in Early Greek Epigrams' Deborah Steiner looks at early inscriptions that use 'graphic battles' to perpetuate a victory in one competition in a new competitive arena. First, the neatly incised inscription on the Dipylon *oinochoe* (perhaps the prize for a dancing competition), which is read as a cleverly allusive reflection of the delicate and victorious choral dance, is capped by a subsequent epigraphic performance that fills the empty space and satisfies the demands of symmetry. Second, grafitti from Thera, in which primacy goes to the best writer, despite the fact that the original arena of competition involved fornicating and dancing. Third, the painted inscriptions in which the painter Parrhasius, using the metaphor of an athletic prize for his technical prowess, claims *habrosyne* and invincibility and attracts thereby a rebuttal. Particularly notable here is the tendency of victors to extend their claims to primacy into new venues. The next paper, Christopher Siwicki's 'Roman Architects and the Struggle for Fame in an Unequal Society', takes us from multivalent to displaced competitions. Siwicki discusses the unequal contest between a building's patron and its builder for the glory of the architectural achievement. Architects bested in the contemporary status competition, Siwicki shows, aimed for victory in the future and often presented their claims not in the buildings themselves but in other venues such

as tombs and texts. The Flavian buildings depicted on the tomb of the Haterii, for example, constitute an 'iconographic *res gestae*' for Haterius Tychicus, who airbrushes out the imperial patrons by providing topographic rather than dedicatory identifiers. Vitruvius's basilica at Fanum is commemorated *sans patron* in the *De Architectura*, and Augustus is written out of several Augustan buildings.

These papers on competitions evidenced (mostly) in the material record are followed by a pair focusing on Roman history and elite competition, male and female, for status. In 'Political Competition and Economic Change in Mid-Republican Rome' Seth Bernard explores the economic dimension of political competition in mid-republican Rome, arguing that economic behavior was determined by social and political ideologies. More specifically, he looks at the rivalry between two forms of wealth—long-term symbolic wealth associated with the aristocratic class and short-term wealth obtained through military conquest—as it plays out in, for example, the dueling triumphs of Papirius Cursor and Spurius Carvilius (*coss.* 293 BCE), showing that the terms of the status competition change in tandem with the underlying economic realities. Bernard then considers the material record of market exchange, including coinage; the system of production for the urban market of Rome; and the availability of commodities, such as wine, associated with elite lifeways; and concludes that the rise of the competitive political aristocracy and the transformation of the mid-republican economy are best understood as parts of the same historical process. The following paper is devoted to the neglected topic of female status competition. Lewis Webb, in '*Mihi es aemula*: Elite Female Status Competition in Mid-Republican Rome and the Example of Tertia Aemilia', shows, contrary to Livy 34.7.8, that women competed in domains beyond those of *munditiae*, *ornatus*, and *cultus*. *Sacra publica* were a particularly prominent venue for female competition, but others existed, including euergetism and public funerals. After discussing the competitive 'moves' made by the well born and well married Tertia Aemilia (d. 163/2) and the contrasting behavior of Papiria, who did not have the wherewithal to compete and so withdrew, Webb argues that elite female status competition was a form of gentile 'brand-management'.

The volume concludes as it began, with literary competitions. Charles T. Ham's 'The Poetics of Strife and Competition in Hesiod and Ovid' offers an analysis of the fertility of discord in Hesiod, whose Erides are interpreted as a discordant doublet of the concordant Muses inspiring 'competition, contradiction, and dissent', and in Ovid, whose doubling of *lis* in *Fasti* and *Metamorphoses* both nods to and vies with Hesiod's conceptual innovation. The productive literary rivalries sketched here make a striking contrast with the

bucolic competition discussed by Baraz, a genre in which the literary form proves unable to sustain the rivalry it generates. In 'Demosthenes versus Cicero: Intercultural Competition in Ancient Literary Criticism' Casper C. de Jonge fulfils the promise implicit in our volume's title, considering directly a competition between Greece and Rome. He analyses the multiform metaphor of the 'author A vs. author B' contest in ancient literary criticism, devoting particular attention to *synkriseis*, specifically the *synkrisis* of Demosthenes and Cicero. Four versions of this fictive contest are treated here, three Greek (Caecilius, Plutarch, Longinus), one Roman (Quintilian). These comparisons, de Jonge shows, are simultaneously competing with other comparisons of the two orators and engaging their audiences in a lively and contemporarily-relevant intercultural contest. Like its two predecessors, the last paper in the volume is concerned with an author who simultaneously discusses and engages in literary *aemulatio*. In 'Competition and Competitiveness in Pollux's *Onomasticon*' Alexei Zadorojnyi looks at the *Onomasticon* as a repository of cultural values, including those pertinent to competition, against a background of Second-Sophistic *philotimia*. He argues that Pollux sees himself as engaging in intellectual euergetism, since his lexicon illustrates ways of using lexical prowess in pursuit of *timê*: an expression that is 'more ambitious' (φιλοτιμότερον) will serve his readers well in their lexical contests with fellow sophists. Zadorojnyi suggests that these ambitious usages involve innovations on classical precedents.

We suggested at the beginning of this Introduction that on the topic of *eris*—as, indeed in the 'Contest between Homer and Hesiod' cited by a number of our authors—Hesiod takes first place. As it turns out we can give him the last word, as well, in the context of the Penn-Leiden series, since the tenth Colloquium moves up Hesiod's genealogical tree from Eris to her mother Night (*Theog.* 225): 'Between Dusk and Dawn. Valuing Night in Classical Antiquity'.

5 Acknowledgements

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PART 1

Eris *Reimagined*

CHAPTER 2

Hesiodic *Eris* and the Market

Ruth Scodel

1 The Problem of Good Eris

Since competition is a competition for what the participants regard as goods, how participants and observers evaluate it socially and ethically will depend on various factors, such as how the competition is regulated ('is it fair?'), how the observer values the goods at stake, and—the particular interest of this paper—whether it is a zero-sum competition. Scholars of Greek literature are prone to forms of the zero-sum fallacy, the false assumption that a particular good is inherently limited (and is recognized as limited). One famous form of this fallacy is the 'lump of labor': many assume, for example, that immigrants take away jobs from a population without considering that they also increase the size of an economy and so create jobs (Black and Hashimzade 2012, 191). Although 'fixed-sum' is a more precise term for situations where rewards are positive but predetermined, so that increasing anyone's share decreases the share of anyone else, 'zero-sum' (properly a situation in which anything one party gains leaves others at an actual loss, so that the outcome is zero) is also commonly used for fixed-sum competition (Schelling 1960, 89).

I argued in *Epic Facework* against a common belief that the Homeric competitions for fame, *kleos*, and for honor, *timê*, are always zero-sum (Scodel 2008, 7–9).[1] Indeed, they are not even truly fixed-sum. There is no lump of *kleos* to be shared. By performing heroic deeds Homeric characters generate narrative material and, as a consequence, *kleos*. The supply is not fixed. To be sure, real-world *kleos* must ultimately be fixed-sum—there is only so much storytelling time in the world—but the epic tradition does not acknowledge that collective memory cannot accommodate everything. It does not treat *kleos* as a limited good. Similarly, while public displays of deference (an important form of honor) are limited, the less tangible forms of honor are not, and the entire elite class may be more or less respected by non-elites. So, again, honor is not an entirely limited good. Furthermore, even battle competition is not quite

1 For an explicit argument for a 'fluid, zero-sum' honor competition see Wilson 2002, especially 36–37.

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winner-take-all. Fighting creates *kleos*, and the winner gets most of it, but the loser also gets some. Hector, for example, wishes to die 'not without *kleos*, but having done some great thing for even those to come to learn about' (*Il.* 22.304). This paper will argue along similar lines for a more complex view of the economy imagined by Hesiod's *Works and Days*. We cannot understand competition in Hesiod without understanding a tension in his work between activities that produce fixed-sum goods and farming, whose products do not belong in a system of commercial exchange.

Hesiod famously opens *Works and Days* by proclaiming a good Eris, a kind of competitiveness beneficial to both individuals and communities. Hesiod marks his proposal of two goddesses named 'Eris' with οὐκ ἄρα μοῦνον ἔην Ἐρίδων γένος, 'it turns out that there was not a single family of Strifes' (*Op.* 11). This good Eris is marked by ἄρα and the imperfect ('of a truth just realized', Denniston 1934, 36–37) as entirely new to his thought. His original and only Eris, as he presented her in the *Theogony*, was unquestionably bad. She is a daughter of Night, and while not all Night's children are unpleasant, Eris comes immediately after Old Age (*Theog.* 225). The catalog of the children of Eris herself conveys her nature (*Theog.* 226–231):

> But hateful Eris bore painful Labor, and Forgetting, and Famine, and tear-filled Miseries, and Fights, and Battles, and Slaughters, and Homicides, and Quarrels, and Lies, and Arguments, and Disputes, and Disorder and Disaster, who live together, and Oath …[2]

> αὐτὰρ Ἔρις στυγερὴ τέκε μὲν Πόνον ἀλγινόεντα
> Λήθην τε Λιμόν τε καὶ Ἄλγεα δακρυόεντα
> Ὑσμίνας τε Μάχας τε Φόνους τ' Ἀνδροκτασίας τε
> Νείκεά τε Ψεύδεά τε Λόγους τ' Ἀμφιλλογίας τε
> Δυσνομίην τ' Ἄτην τε, συνήθεας ἀλλήλῃσιν,
> Ὅρκόν θ' …

There is nothing attractive about this goddess. So a good Eris is immediately perplexing, and she quickly becomes more perplexing still. Hesiod has barely introduced her in *Works and Days* before apparently exemplifying her working in lines that attribute negative emotions to various categories of people (*Op.* 24–26):

2 All translations are my own.

> This Eris is good for mortals. And potter resents potter and carpenter carpenter, and beggar begrudges beggar and bard bard.
>
> ἀγαθὴ δ’ Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν.
> καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων,
> καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ.

Translators and interpreters have often tried to fudge these terms. The problem was recognized already in antiquity: the Proclan scholium on lines 25–26, probably dependent on Plutarch, says that they refer to bad Eris (Blümer 2001, 42–50). Nowadays, it is the general consensus that Hesiod wants to refer to good Eris, which drives competition and so the farmer's and craftman's effort to do his work as well as he can, even though he does not formulate the lines in a way that marks this Eris as good.[3] However, *kotos* is long-term resentment, and *phthonos* is a desire for another person not to have a particular good, and Greek literature in general does not evaluate these emotions positively.[4] They are negative not just because they are unpleasant to experience but also because they typically lead to socially harmful behavior. In Homer, for example, *kotos* typically leads to acts of revenge after a perceived injury (*Il.* 1.82, 8.449, 13.517, *Od.* 11.102), which is appropriate on the battlefield but not in routine competition among craftsmen. *Phthonos* does not appear in Homeric epic, but the denominative verb φθονέω does. The corresponding entry by W. Beck in the *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos* defines it as 'refuse … w/connot. of the irrational, unjustifiable, or senseless' (*LfgrE* 4.916). These emotions are appropriate only when their object is *undeservedly* successful, and Hesiod has just said that the good effects of good Eris take place when a man observes another who is prospering deservedly, because he works hard. Verdenius argues that the emotion in good and bad Eris is the same and that the difference lies only in the result. That Hesiod says that you would praise the good Eris 'when you perceive/recognize her' (νοήσας, 12) indeed implies that the two might be hard to distinguish immediately. Yet the two Erides are said to have a different θυμός, which surely means that they have different dispositions, and so people engaged in one kind of *eris* or the other should also have a different θυμός (Verdenius 1985 ad loc.). It is certainly possible that those influenced by the different goddesses experience the same underlying emotion but express it differently because their other disposi-

3 West 1978 ad loc. ('not in the spirit of the good Eris, but the idea of rivalry makes the lines relevant enough for Hesiod'); Canevaro 2015, 52–53; Pucci 1977, 131; Gagarin 1990, 174; and Wilson 2000, 188–189.

4 For *kotos* see Walsh 2005; for *phthonos*, Bulman 1992.

tions are different. It is also quite possible that an observer cannot distinguish them in another person without seeing the result: that is, whether the envious person tries to improve his own performance and stands by his own effort or rather denigrates or harms his rivals. That only behavior shows whether Eris is good or bad, however, does not mean that the motivating emotional and cognitive force is the same in both cases. If Hesiod really believed that they were so similar in their influence, we would expect that he would not have recognized an entirely new goddess but a benign aspect of a single Eris. Ercolani suggests that Hesiod used the 'wrong' verbs because the alliteration was irresistible, and this is also surely possible (Ercolani 2010 ad loc.). But no explanation is entirely satisfactory.

Another oddity: having explained that there is a good Eris, Hesiod abruptly turns to warning Perses against the bad Eris (*Op.* 27–28):

> Perses, lay these [instructions] away in your heart, and may Eris who delights in evil not hold your heart away from effort.

> Ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα τεῷ ἐνικάτθεο θυμῷ,
> μηδέ σ' Ἔρις κακόχαρτος ἀπ' ἔργου θυμὸν ἐρύκοι.

This would not be peculiar if he had not just emphasized that he has only recently realized that the good Eris exists. Furthermore, he has not explained how he came to this insight. Indeed, *Works and Days* later mentions a single Eris who is the mother of Horkos (804), as if the good Eris has not been completely integrated into his thought. In any case, Eris, even divided into two goddesses, does not look like the best possible term. We might ask why, in so competitive a culture, Hesiod did not have another word or goddess to represent the positive competitiveness he wanted to praise.[5] Why did he choose *eris*?[6]

One caveat: we must not import our own beliefs about the value of competition into Hesiod's world. Because Hesiod mentions craftsmen when he introduces good *eris*, the modern reader is likely to import into Hesiod the common modern belief that competition spurs technical innovation and improvement.

5 ζῆλος does not have a consistently positive sense in Hesiod. The positive sense is sustained in lines 312–313, εἰ δέ κεν ἐργάζῃ, τάχα σε ζηλώσει ἀεργὸς / πλουτεῦντα. This ζῆλος is probably entirely without malice. Unfortunately, at 195 ζῆλος is unmistakably bad and κακόχαρτος just like bad Eris at 28.

6 Gill 2003 argues that those philosophers who denied value to the conventionally valued external goods—Plato, Stoics, and Epicureans—also denied any possible positive value to the rivalrous emotions, while Aristotle, for whom external goods matter to the good life, gives them a place, while acknowledging their dangers. See Bakewell and Kuin in this volume.

Hesiod, however, whatever he thinks about *eris*, does not believe that competition is good because it leads to innovation. The poem shows absolutely no interest in improving tools or methods. The good farmer works in accordance with traditional best practice. Craftsmen could presumably compete on skill, price, or service, but Hesiod does not consider innovation.

2 *Eris* and Competition in Early Greek Poetry

To begin, we may consider the general semantic field of *eris*. The noun ἔρις appears in the Homeric poems fifty-five times, its verb ἐρίζω twenty-six times. It is overwhelmingly Hesiod's bad Eris—a force behind combat or a synonym for quarreling that turns members of the same social group into antagonists and threatens social order. Most often the noun is paired with πόλεμος or νεῖκος or has a distinctly negative epithet: it can be κακή or θυμοβόρος. But it does not require an epithet to be negative; Agamemnon complains of Achilles, '*eris* is always dear to you, and wars and battles' (*Il.* 1.177), while Achilles wishes Strife would perish from the world, ὡς ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο (*Il.* 18.107). *Eris* is generally found where people see themselves in a zero-sum situation. When Achilles in the embassy scene insists that Agamemnon pay him back all his *lôbê*, he evidently thinks that restoring his honor requires that Agamemnon lose equivalently. In cursing *eris* Achilles recognizes that what he imagined as a zero-sum competition has become, even apart from Patroclus's death, a lose-lose. Battle creates good *kleos* that the heroes then divide unequally; in the embassy scene, however, Achilles and Agamemnon have generated and divided an undesirable narrative.[7]

Twice, in the expression ἐξ ἔριδος, *eris* appears to refer to the competitive emotion of a hero who responds to a challenge (for a similar use of the preposition cf. *Od.* 3.135, μήνιος ἐξ ὀλοῆς, of Athena's anger). At *Il.* 7.111 Agamemnon tells Menelaus not to fight with a better man, Hector, ἐξ ἔριδος; at *Od.* 4.343 Menelaus wishes Odysseus would return to fight the suitors as he once stood up to wrestle Philomelides, moved by *eris*, ἐξ ἔριδος Φιλομηλεΐδῃ ἐπάλαισεν ἀναστάς. While in the first of these instances Agamemnon believes that Menelaus's urge to fight Hector is to be resisted, the second is one of the few attestations of positive *eris*. The emotion responds to a challenge from an outgroup that establishes the game. If nobody in a group accepts it, there is a zero-sum outcome in the truest sense, and the challenger gains at the cost of the challenged.

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7 See for this aspect Allan and Cairns 2011.

Once the challenge is accepted, the game is more-or-less fixed-sum. Because Philomelides is outside the social group, Odysseus's victory generates solidarity among the Achaeans. The verb ἐρίζω also appears in athletic contexts, as in Odysseus's statement that he would not be willing ἐριζέμεν in archery against Heracles or Eurytus. The dangers of athletic *eris* in Homer, however, are beyond the scope of this paper.[8]

In a few examples the noun refers to a benign competition. Proper suitors, according to Penelope, compete against each other (*Od.* 18.277). Antinous describes Penelope's suitors as competitors (*Od.* 2.206, ἐριδαίνομεν). Courtship is winner-take-all, but the losers would often have sisters or (later) daughters, so that they would eventually become beneficiaries of the system. Even such competition, however, like athletic competitions, can easily break into violence, as the *Odyssey* shows.

But benign competitions do not necessarily get out of hand. Nausicaa and her maids at *Od.* 6.92 turn the trampling of the dirty clothes into a contest: στεῖβον δ' ἐν βόθροισι θοῶς ἔριδα προφέρουσαι, 'they stepped quickly in the troughs, displaying *eris*' (*Od.* 6.92). No winner is announced. This contest is unusual in Homeric competition, because the winner's effort actually benefits the losers, since the work is done more quickly, so that there is a win-win.

More typical is the agricultural contest that Odysseus (disguised as a beggar) imagines taking place between himself and Eurymachus, the first step of which is mowing (*Od.* 18.366–370):

> 'Eurymachus, I wish there could be an *eris* in work between us, in the springtime, when the days are long, in the grass, and I could have a curved sickle, and you a similar one, so that we could test our work, not eating all the way until twilight, and there was grass available.'
>
> 'Εὐρύμαχ', εἰ γὰρ νῶιν ἔρις ἔργοιο γένοιτο
> ὥρῃ ἐν εἰαρινῇ, ὅτε τ' ἤματα μακρὰ πέλονται,
> ἐν ποίῃ, δρέπανον μὲν ἐγὼν εὐκαμπὲς ἔχοιμι,
> καὶ δὲ σὺ τοῖον ἔχοις, ἵνα πειρησαίμεθα ἔργου
> νήστιες ἄχρι μάλα κνέφαος, ποίη δὲ παρείη.'

This seems to be a zero-sum competition, since neither will actually get any benefit from the work itself, and Odysseus is clearly boasting that he will be so far superior to Eurymachus that the latter will be humiliated. The beg-

8 See Bierl in this volume on the funeral games in *Iliad* 23.

gar, though no longer in the prime of life like his opponent, has experience, skill, and stamina. Odysseus then takes a second step by imagining that Eurymachus sees him plow and then fight a battle (*Od.* 18.371–380)—Eurymachus now seems to be a mere spectator, not a competitor.[9] The episode reaches its climax when the angry Eurymachus throws a jug at the beggar. The suitors complain (*Od.* 18.403–404):

> 'Now we are quarreling over beggars, and there will be no pleasure in the fine feast, since the worse wins'.
>
> 'νῦν δὲ περὶ πτωχῶν ἐριδαίνομεν, οὐδέ τι δαιτὸς
> ἐσθλῆς ἔσσεται ἦδος, ἐπεὶ τὰ χερείονα νικᾷ'.

An *eris* that begins as an imagined zero-sum contest between two men produces a negative-sum outcome.

When the Homeric narrator or a character asserts that someone holds supremacy in a particular domain, he often uses the verb ἐρίζω together with a negation. There are many examples: Aeneas says that nobody competed with Pandarus as an archer (*Il.* 5.172); at *Il.* 11.325 nobody is as fast as Achilles; Antenor says that nobody could compete with Odysseus as an orator (*Il.* 3.223), while Odysseus himself says that nobody can compete with him (that is, the beggar) in housework (*Od.* 15.321) and that nobody can compete with Odysseus in κέρδεα (*Od.* 19.286, or in μῆτις at *Od.* 23.126); no woman, Odysseus says, can compete against goddesses in beauty (*Od.* 5.213), although Achilles would not marry a daughter of Agamemnon even if she did (*Il.* 9.389; but of course she did not). Menelaus is not sure whether any mortal could compete with him in possessions (*Od.* 4.80); nobody could compete in dancing with Halios and Laodamas (*Od.* 8.371). A few passages lack the negative: for example, Nestor alone was a competitor of Menestheus at getting ships and warriors in order (*Il.* 2.555). Nobody ever contests these hierarchies.

An interesting exception to the usual pattern is the introduction of Thoas (*Il.* 15.283–284):

> Few of the Achaeans could defeat him in the assembly, when young men engaged in *eris* over significant speech.

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9 In this scene Odysseus both evokes and modifies the real *eris* that he plans; see Murnaghan 2006 and Steiner 2010 on line 366.

ἀγορῇ δέ ἑ παῦροι Ἀχαιῶν
νίκων, ὁππότε κοῦροι ἐρίσσειαν περὶ μύθων

This is unusual both because the competition has actually happened, more than once, and because the character in whom the narrator is interested is not the unquestioned best—indeed, he is clearly not the best. According to Agamemnon, Nestor is best in the category of μύθοι (*Il.* 2.370); Nestor's main rival is obviously Odysseus. Thoas, however, is presumably younger than the best speakers, and it is a sufficient distinction to be among the best.[10] Again, after losing the footrace to Odysseus, Antilochus says (*Il.* 23.791–792):

> It is hard for the Achaeans to compete with you in running, except for Achilles.

ἀργαλέον δὲ
ποσσὶν ἐριδήσασθαι Ἀχαιοῖς, εἰ μὴ Ἀχιλλεῖ.

Antilochus tells his horses not to try to compete with those of Diomedes (*Il.* 23.404–405):

> I am not urging you to strive against the horses of fierce-minded Diomedes …

ἤτοι μὲν κείνοισιν ἐριζέμεν οὔ τι κελεύω,
Τυδεΐδεω ἵπποισι δαΐφρονος …

To be sure, if Antilochus tried to compete against Diomedes, he would simply lose, both because Diomedes has better horses and because, as Antilochus recognizes, he has divine support. However, Antilochus urges and indeed threatens his horses to try to defeat Menelaus—and this actual competition leads to a potentially very nasty argument.[11]

It is striking that where a competition defined as ἔρις is not socially destructive, it is usually imaginary. Furthermore, it is limited in scope—it is about being better or best at a particular domain, so that losers may be winners elsewhere. Most heroic competition is not zero-sum and may not even be fixed-sum—if Thoas is exceptionally good in the assembly, nobody else has

10 Since this is praise of Thoas, these *mythoi* are not exactly 'the object of dispute' (so Martin 1989, 68–69); the introduction precedes a speech that persuades everyone.
11 See Bierl in this volume for a longer discussion of this scene.

to be bad, while the total amount of wisdom may increase. In any case, it is clearly important that there is no real cash-out. Even when Penelope's suitors compete against each other with gifts, the winner does not immediately appear. The competition in the assembly may have good results if it leads to good counsel, but the quarrel of *Iliad* 1 shows that it is also potentially disruptive.

The Homeric poems represent bad *eris* as a frequent consequence of even formally institutionalized and limited competition. The tensions are worst in insider-outsider competition. At *Il.* 4.387–398 Agamemnon tells the story of how Tydeus visited Thebes on an embassy, challenged the Thebans in athletics, and defeated them in everything; they then sent an ambush of fifty (!) against him, but he killed all but one (McHardy 2008, 91–92). Odysseus, asked by Laodamas whether he would like to compete in the games, tells the Phaeacians (*Od.* 8.209–211):

> That man is foolish and useless who offers strife in contests with a host in another community. He interferes with all of his own good.
>
> ἄφρων δὴ κεῖνός γε καὶ οὐτιδανὸς πέλει ἀνήρ,
> ὅς τις ξεινοδόκῳ ἔριδα προφέρηται ἀέθλων
> δήμῳ ἐν ἀλλοδαπῷ· ἕο δ' αὐτοῦ πάντα κολούει.

The outsider is in a very difficult position. If he does badly, he loses prestige. But if he is better than his hosts, he humiliates them.

The entirely good *eris* of Nausicaa's laundry contest may not be an exception, but it is an outlier at one end of a continuum, as even 'good' eris has the potential to create social disharmony. The contest among Nausicaa's maids may be entirely benign for a variety of reasons: it has an end other than the competition itself, from which all participants benefit; there is no audience; there are no meaningful stakes; the hierarchy within which the competition takes place is fixed and the competition will not change it (it does not matter if Nausicaa is not the fastest); the participants are already well disposed to each other. An *eris* that would be expected to be bad can thus be benign in certain other conditions. Garvie (1994) cites as a parallel for the Nausicaa-episode the incident near the end of the *Odyssey* when Odysseus admonishes Telemachus not to shame his ancestry in the fight against the suitors' families. Telemachus is offended and answers angrily (*Od.* 24.511–512):

> 'You will see, dear father, if you want, that I don't shame your family when it comes to my spirit, as you assert'.

> ὄψεαι, αἴ κ' ἐθέλῃσθα, πάτερ φίλε, τῷδ' ἐπὶ θυμῷ
> οὔ τι καταισχύνοντα τεὸν γένος, ὡς ἀγορεύεις.

Laertes rejoices because his son and grandson are quarreling over *aretê*, and although he uses the word δῆρις, a δῆρις is always an ἔρις.[12]

Telemachus here closely echoes what his father says in response to Agamemnon in the *epipolesis* (*Il.* 4.353–355):

> 'You will see, if you want and if you care about these matters, the dear father of Telemachus mingling among the forefighters of the horse-taming Trojans. This is wind you are talking'.

> ὄψεαι, αἴ κ' ἐθέλῃσθα καὶ αἴ κέν τοι τὰ μεμήλῃ,
> Τηλεμάχοιο φίλον πατέρα προμάχοισι μιγέντα
> Τρώων ἱπποδάμων· σὺ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀνεμώλια βάζεις.

Odysseus is unmistakably angry, and most commentators think that Agamemnon has made a serious mistake (Martin 1989, 70–71). It may be a calculated risk, however, since Odysseus's anger will prompt him to fight ferociously.[13] Similarly, Laertes can be happy because Telemachus's anger proves his heroic mettle, while the situation—battle is imminent—will not allow the quarrel to develop further, and the fixed hierarchy of father and son will control it.

3 Hesiod's *Eris* and the Market

The Homeric material thus shows that Hesiod is not entirely original in recognizing that *eris* can be good, but he gives good *eris* exceptional prominence and makes the good Eris an entirely different being rather than an occasional aspect of the already familiar personification. Good Eris is distinguishable from bad Eris when the observer looks properly (*Op.* 12–16):

> One you would commend when you recognized her, but the other is blameworthy. They have different temperaments. One increases cruel

12 Compare the uses in *Op.*, where at line 10 it is paired with πόλεμον and at 33 with νείκεα. See the entries in Hofinger 1975 and *LfgrE* 2.280 s.v. δῆρις (R. Führer) and 2.701–703 s.v. ἔρις (R. Führer).

13 But see Lentini 2016, § 7.

> war and contention, nasty. No mortal likes that one, but from necessity, because of the plans of the immortals, they honor burdensome Eris.

> τὴν μέν κεν ἐπαινήσειε νοήσας,
> ἣ δ' ἐπιμωμητή· διὰ δ' ἄνδιχα θυμὸν ἔχουσιν.
> ἣ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμόν τε κακὸν καὶ δῆριν ὀφέλλει,
> σχετλίη· οὔ τις τήν γε φιλεῖ βροτός, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνάγκης
> ἀθανάτων βουλῇσιν Ἔριν τιμῶσι βαρεῖαν.

Mortals do not generally 'perceive' goddesses directly. Although the workings of each Eris depend on her disposition (here θυμός), the mortal recognizes the divinity from her effects; it is not entirely clear whether the observer recognizes Eris in himself or in others.

Hesiod says that no mortal loves bad Eris (although Agamemnon says that Achilles does, *Il.* 1.177, on which see above). Eris does not receive cult, and Hesiod, who speaks abusively of her, can hardly think of her as an ordinary goddess, whom it would be dangerous to blame so openly; τιμῶσι (*Op.* 16) must mean 'fear the power of'. Indeed, Zeus put good Eris 'in the roots of the Earth' (γαίης ἐν ῥίζῃσι, *Op.* 19), where she is both powerful and immovable. Bad Eris is part of human life 'because of the plans of the immortals', an expression that resembles the 'plans of Zeus' prominent in the Pandora-story (*Op.* 71, 79, 99). Probably bad Eris, like the evils released by Pandora, attacks individuals unpredictably.

Bad Eris operates through the θυμός and has some power over mortals, but she can be resisted: 'and may Eris who delights in evil not hold your heart away from effort' (μηδέ σ' Ἔρις κακόχαρτος ἀπ' ἔργου θυμὸν ἐρύκοι, *Op.* 28). Like bad Eris, good Eris, too, is a psychological force (*Op.* 20–24):[14]

> … who rouses even the helpless man to work. For someone who sees another man wants work, a rich man, who hastens to plow and plant and to order his household. Neighbor envies neighbor as he hastens towards wealth. This Eris is good for mortals.

> ἥ τε καὶ ἀπάλαμόν περ ὁμῶς ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει·
> εἰς ἕτερον γάρ τίς τε ἰδὼν ἔργοιο χατίζων[15]
> πλούσιον, ὃς σπεύδει μὲν ἀρόμεναι ἠδὲ φυτεύειν

14 The closest Homeric parallel for the psychological dimension of Hesiod's Erides is the expression ἐξ ἔριδος, discussed above.

15 The line is textually difficult; I am convinced by West 1978 ad loc.

> οἶκόν τ' εὖ θέσθαι· ζηλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων
> εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ'· ἀγαθὴ δ' Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν.

Although the lines present textual difficulties, there is a small but significant development that is not especially open to dispute. In lines 21–22 the man who is the object of someone's gaze is already wealthy as he makes haste to do his work. In the next sentence, however, where the viewer and viewed are specified as neighbors, the object of ζῆλος, 'envy', is apparently not 'being wealthy' but 'hastening towards wealth'.[16] Although the repetition of σπεύδω makes the two formulations seem synonymous, I would suggest that they are not exactly the same. Hesiod imagines a man who is ἀπάλαμος, probably 'helpless' like the ἀπάλαμνος man at *Il.* 5.597, who is confronted with a river too high and fast-flowing for him to cross. Hesiod's man may be lazy, but he is also perplexed—he does not know what he needs to do in order to improve his situation (the poem will tell him, if he has nobody handy to observe). A rich man is an obvious object for his attention, and he sees what the rich man does and wants to do the same. Then he sees a neighbor who may not be rich but is quickly improving his economic situation, and he not only knows how to do better, but also feels an urge to compete with the neighbor who is rapidly becoming wealthier. The good Eris described here is unidirectional—the wealthy man does not feel competitive towards his peers or the less successful.

When the inner effects of Eris are manifest in behavior, the difference between the good one and the bad is obvious. Both affect a man who sees that others have goods that he desires. Good Eris prompts him to work so that he too can obtain them, while bad Eris makes him try to take them away from the legitimate possessor or otherwise to harm him. The basic competitive urge is the same, but the resulting behavior and the attending emotions are different. So the man who feels *eris* must pay close attention to her effects on his θυμός and on the actions he contemplates under her influence, at least if he wants to avoid being driven to contentiousness by bad Eris while being impelled to self-improvement by good Eris. It is the peculiarity of the competition in work and thus in success that it takes place mainly in the mind of the competitor.

Because the distinction in behavior and psychological effect, though so fundamental, does not seem manifest in the initial competitive urge, the antagonisms among craftsmen are hard to assign to one Eris or the other (*Op.* 25–26, see above): 'And potter resents potter and carpenter carpenter, and beggar begrudges beggar and bard bard.' This *eris*, however, is probably reciprocal,

16 Cf. *Op.* 312–313, quoted above, with the note ad loc.

unlike the good Eris of the farmer. Hesiod's farmer and these craftsmen are in fact in very different situations. In the small communities of Hesiod's world the fixed-sum fallacy is not a fallacy for them. The potter, carpenter, beggar, and bard operate in a restricted market. The case of the beggar is the clearest. At least over the long term the amount of charity that members of a small community will offer will typically remain relatively constant. Even if people are more generous if there are more calls on their generosity, two beggars will not receive twice as much as one beggar. To give one example: when the established beggar, Irus, finds a new beggar in Odysseus's house, he immediately tries to drive him out, threatening a violent *eris* (*Od.* 18.1–13). Penelope's suitors are not a characteristic group, but their eccentricity is likely to be the speed with which they restore equilibrium when a new beggar arrives, and the cruel way they do it, not their preference for homeostasis, although the household is rich and they can be generous with another's property. Begging is thus a fixed-sum activity. Similarly, it may be that the inhabitants of an area where there are two potters will use more ceramics than those who have only one potter available, but unless the population is rapidly increasing or external markets are available, an additional potter will inevitably reduce the other's business. If there is more demand than two potters can fulfill, the limit will still be reached at some point. If there are two τέκτονες available, and their competition leads to lower prices, a farmer might engage one for a task he might otherwise have performed himself, but if the two τέκτονες are in direct competition, prices will have to be lower for both. Poets as a group might all compete against other forms of entertainment to increase market share, but again this cannot expand indefinitely. All these workers are in fixed-sum games, and even if the sum can be increased, its limits are manifest. Competition among potters might be good for the consumer, but it would be bad for potters.

Hesiod's farmers, on the other hand, produce for themselves and only marginally participate in overseas markets. So their situation is different from that of the craftsmen. Still, Hesiod may cite the craftsmen's emotions because both Erides initially inspire the same basic emotion. An individual may both admire and imitate another person (good Eris) even while he criticizes him unfairly (bad Eris). Some, indeed, have thought that the intensity of rivalry in a small Greek community would make it impossible to have competition that did not lead to *phthonos* (Walcot 1978, 8–10). The alliterations of lines 25–26 sound as if Hesiod is basing these lines on a proverb, and if they are proverbial, they link an argument that Hesiod marks as wildly original to a familiar item of common knowledge: everybody knows that competitors in a fixed-sum competition are hostile to each other. This common knowledge is evidence for the power of competitiveness. On this view, Hesiod believes that these emotions at

least attest to the universality of the basic emotion that the Erides share, and perhaps prove that the negative emotions are acceptable as long as they do not go beyond feeling and talk—it does not matter for the wider community if one potter hates the other, as long as he does not sue him or try to burn down his house.[17] Yet even if this *phthonos* expresses itself only in hostile talk, such talk provokes further bad talk: 'if you speak evil of another, you are likely soon to be spoken of worse yourself' (*Op.* 721).

Hesiod moves from the good Eris through the passage on the craftsmen to warning Perses against bad Eris (*Op.* 27–28, quoted above). Thus, after having stressed the importance of the good Eris, Hesiod (a relentless self-corrector[18]) points to how easily bad Eris can be confused with good or how good Eris may become bad. The specialists may express their hostility and envy by striving to be better at what they do, but they are also likely to speak disparagingly of each other and to quarrel. So these lines may represent a pivot between good and bad Eris. When a man feels a competitive urge, he can allow bad Eris to dominate him or seek good Eris; different as the Erides are, however, the man dependent on the market is likely to confuse them.

Bad Eris certainly seems to dominate in the latter two categories of expert. 'Beggar envies beggar and bard bard' may be a joke, but it has a point. Beggars, like craftsmen, are rivals, but they offer no value to the community. A beggar who competes at being a better beggar helps nobody but himself. Bards might appear like beggars to those who do not value what they produce. Poetic performance is a good that is not *prima facie* essential to a community: it is almost a luxury commodity. Potters can disparage each other relatively freely, since people need pots. While the market cannot expand indefinitely, neither can it contract beyond a certain level. If bards, however, criticize each other too much, they can lower demand for their common product. Furthermore, bards are the only group in this list who would have engaged in formalized, direct competition. Hesiod will remind his audience later in the poem that he has won a formal contest at the funeral games of Amphidamas, and by dedicating his prize he has in effect boasted over his rivals (*Op.* 656–659). The funeral

17 Hamilton 1989, 60 argues that the effects of good Eris are solely internal. Nagler 1992, 91–93 believes that there is only one Eris, whose (very limited) 'good' side slips easily into the bad. Cf. Hunter 2014, 5–7, who seems to see bad Eris as operating at the level of communities (it causes war), while good Eris motivates individuals, but the case of Perses does not support this understanding.

18 Cf. *Op.* 327, where he lists various offences against other people that the gods avenge, because the preceding lines could have given the impression that they only punish taking someone else's property.

games would have been a fixed-sum contest, which almost guarantees that Hesiod has been the object of *phthonos*. As an advertisement for the poem to come, Hesiod's comment about the nasty side of competition tells his audience to disregard any negative evaluations they have heard.[19]

4 The Farmer's Prestige Competition

Because the market is so marginal to the Hesiodic farmer, he is not as likely as the craftsman to confuse good and bad Eris. His surplus is stored inside his house and produced primarily by intensive effort by the farmer's household, using resources that the farmer already has or that he can obtain without competition. There is no trace of direct competition among farmers in the poem.[20] Once, and once only, does Hesiod mention a potential gain from another's loss: the farmer should propitiate the gods morning and evening (*Op*. 340–341)

> … so that their mind and heart are propitious towards you, so that you can buy the inheritance of others and not another yours.
>
> ὥς κέ τοι ἵλαον κραδίην καὶ θυμὸν ἔχωσιν,
> ὄφρ' ἄλλων ὠνῇ κλῆρον, μὴ τὸν τεὸν ἄλλος.

If the gods are hostile, a farmer could have such bad luck that he would end by having to sell his land. A man who did not have a year's worth in storage could, for example, be wiped out by a harvest failure. That the successful farmer would eventually buy land tells us that in the world of the poem land is an ultimately limited resource. So there is a potential fixed-sum scenario, but *Works and Days* does not elsewhere refer to acquiring land.

Instead the poem repeatedly stresses the importance of having sustenance inside the house or granary (*Op*. 306–308):

> Let tasks be dear to you, organizing them appropriately, so that your granaries will be full. From work, men become rich in livestock and wealthy.

19 Wilamowitz 1928 on line 23 expresses admiration for Hesiod for confessing to his own *phthonos*.

20 Noted by Edwards 1971, 166: 'Ascra's residents compete intensely for standing in the community but not for land and resources'.

σοὶ δ' ἔργα φίλ' ἔστω μέτρια κοσμεῖν,
ὥς κέ τοι ὡραίου βιότου πλήθωσι καλιαί.
ἐξ ἔργων δ' ἄνδρες πολύμηλοί τ' ἀφνειοί τε.

Hesiod only rarely mentions livestock, but the μῆλα here are a form of wealth stored on the hoof. Again, while the development of herds could lead to genuine competitive pressure—that is the original tragedy of the commons—nothing in Hesiod's poem gives any hint that livestock is a limited resource. The goal is steady acquisition (*Op.* 361–367):

> For if you lay away a little over a little and do this often, soon even that could become a lot. Whoever adds to his stores will avoid blazing famine. And what is laid away at home does not trouble a man. At home is better, since outside is full of harm. It is good to take from what is there, and a pain to the heart to want what is not there.

εἰ γάρ κεν καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ σμικρῷ καταθεῖο
καὶ θαμὰ τοῦτ' ἔρδοις, τάχα κεν μέγα καὶ τὸ γένοιτο·
ὃς δ' ἐπ' ἐόντι φέρει, ὃ δ' ἀλέξεται αἴθοπα λιμόν·
οὐδὲ τό γ' εἰν οἴκῳ κατακείμενον ἀνέρα κήδει
οἴκοι βέλτερον εἶναι, ἐπεὶ βλαβερὸν τὸ θύρηφιν.
ἐσθλὸν μὲν παρεόντος ἑλέσθαι, πῆμα δὲ θυμῷ
χρῄζειν ἀπεόντος.

The Hesiodic farmer is not in competition for resources. In the autumn he goes to the woods, where he can cut as much wood as he needs. So can anyone else.[21]

We might even wonder why Eris should be necessary for the Hesiodic farmer, insofar as he works for survival. Hesiod moves between two different motivations, food security and prestige—the domain of good Eris—but they are inextricably linked within the text. Some passages concern only one or the other, but while we might imagine that food security would be primary and prestige only secondary, for Hesiod they are not in such a simple hierarchy. In the passage just quoted, κήδει refers only to security. At line 476 Hesiod expects that the farmer will be happy when he can take what he needs from his own abundant stores. The poem strongly implies that true security is almost entirely obtainable. You can store surplus at home, and Hesiod acknowledges no limit

21 Hence my strongest disagreement is with Millett 1984, 95, who thinks that Hesiod describes a fixed-sum world.

or difficulties with storage except thieves (*Op.* 605).[22] If you follow Hesiod's advice, you will not only achieve subsistence but also be prosperous, and the poem shows no anxiety about accumulation.

Hesiod explicitly addresses the truly lazy Perses, who has not sought even essential security. However, he has a further potential audience whom he genuinely hopes to influence, namely, satisficers: those who work hard enough to meet their needs but are not trying to maximize what their resources could produce.[23] Anthropologists used to believe that peasants tend to be satisficers. Alexander Chayanov in the 1920s offered a model of economic reasoning for the peasant household, and his work became influential after it was translated from Russian into English in 1966.[24] Chayanov argued that the principle of the peasant household was consumption-labor balance. While views of poor farmers in the developing world have changed, satisficers surely could be a real constituency, and it is for them that Hesiod introduces his second motivation for extra effort: the competitive urge. Hesiod's farmer always has an audience. So the farmer who is late and does not plow and sow until the winter solstice fails in two ways (*Op.* 479–482):

> If you plow at the solstice, you will reap sitting, holding a little bunch in your hand, binding it crossways, all dusty, not very happy, and you will carry it in a basket. And few will look at you with admiration.
>
> Εἰ δέ κεν ἠελίοιο τροπῇς ἀρόῳς χθόνα δῖαν,
> ἥμενος ἀμήσεις ὀλίγον περὶ χειρὸς ἐέργων,
> ἀντία δεσμεύων κεκονιμένος, οὐ μάλα χαίρων,
> οἴσεις δ' ἐν φορμῷ· παῦροι δέ σε θηήσονται.

The thin crop will not sustain him through the year. That is his first failure, a practical, economic failure. But he will also be an object of scorn to the witnesses of his failure. On the other hand, Hesiod makes an astonishing promise (*Op.* 312–313):

22 Gallant 1991, 95–98 discusses loss in storage.

23 'Satisficing' is a term invented by H. Simon in 1956.

24 Chayavnov 1966; cf. Ellis 1993. Schultz 1964 (Nobel in economics 1979) argued that contemporary poor farmers were economically rational and were prevented from maximizing their returns by such factors as excessive taxation and poor education. Scott 1976 proposed that peasants live in a 'moral economy': they resist innovation because the consequences of failure are devastating, and they provide mutual assistance.

If you work, soon the idle man will envy you as you become wealthy. And standing and splendor attend on wealth.

εἰ δέ κεν ἐργάζῃ, τάχα σε ζηλώσει ἀεργὸς
πλουτεῦντα· πλούτῳ δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ.

Once the farmer has food security, being the object of envy seems to be the main purpose of wealth. With this envy comes high social status and even charisma, if κῦδος has its full meaning here.[25] Obviously, Hesiod is surprised at recognizing the good Eris, because he has had the psychological insight that prestige competition could be even more effective than food security. He would have imagined that deep security—having not just enough food to survive a bad year but enough for a series of bad years—would be enough to make farmers work to maximize their production. But he realized that those who work the hardest were motivated not simply by the fear of not having enough but also by the desire for public respect.

Success in Hesiod allows a cautious generosity, which probably deflects the potentially hostile force of resentful envy.[26] The successful man no longer requires *eris* to motivate him (consider the famous image of the road to *aretê* at *Op.* 289–292, a road initially hard and uphill, but easy once you reach the top). Nowhere does he suggest that the rich compete with each other or feel anything but satisfaction in having the power to help others. Just before he warns against the contempt that follows a man who loses his harvest by sowing too late, he promises the diligent farmer that with Zeus's blessing (*Op.* 477–478)

… you will reach gray spring with abundance, and you will not gaze at others. Another man will be in need of you.

εὐοχθέων δ' ἵξεαι πολιὸν ἔαρ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἄλλους
αὐγάσεαι· σέο δ' ἄλλος ἀνὴρ κεχρημένος ἔσται.

The goal of competition is self-sufficiency and a limited philanthropy. Rather oddly, the poem refers to borrowing to present a principle about measurement in transactions with a neighbor (*Op.* 349–352):

25 See *LfgrE* 2.1574–1577 (R. Führer): 'Einheit von numinoser Ausstrahlung u. dadurch impl. gesellsch. Aussehen' (1575).

26 Here I disagree with Edwards 2004, who thinks that Hesiod resists sharing outside the household unless a return is expected—from a poorer neighbor the return may be in work or deference.

> Measure carefully from a neighbor, and pay back carefully with the same measure, and better if you can, so that if you are in need, even later, you will reliably find it. Do not take profit wrongly. Wrong profits are equivalent to calamities.
>
> εὖ μὲν μετρεῖσθαι παρὰ γείτονος, εὖ δ' ἀποδοῦναι,
> αὐτῷ τῷ μέτρῳ, καὶ λώιον αἴ κε δύνηαι,
> ὡς ἂν χρηΐζων καὶ ἐς ὕστερον ἄρκιον εὕρῃς.
> μὴ κακὰ κερδαίνειν· κακὰ κέρδεα ἶσ' ἄτῃσι.

Although one might expect that the ideal addressee of *Works and Days* would not borrow at all, he evidently does. The shortsighted man will try to make a small profit on such exchanges, but it is better to pay them back with interest. Yet generosity, too, needs to be wisely allocated. Hesiod's sequence of gnomes about giving needs some unpacking (*Op*. 355–360):

> People give to a giver, but nobody gives to a non-giver. Giving is good, but stealing is bad, giver of death. For whoever gives voluntarily, even if the amount is large, he is happy with the gift and delights in his mind. But whoever takes, yielding to shamelessness, even if the amount is small, it freezes his (i.e., the victim's) dear heart.[27]
>
> δώτῃ μέν τις ἔδωκεν, ἀδώτῃ δ' οὔ τις ἔδωκεν·
> δὼς ἀγαθή, ἅρπαξ δὲ κακή, θανάτοιο δότειρα·
> ὃς μὲν γάρ κεν ἀνὴρ ἐθέλων, ὅ γε καὶ μέγα, δώῃ,
> χαίρει τῷ δώρῳ καὶ τέρπεται ὃν κατὰ θυμόν·
> ὃς δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἕληται ἀναιδείηφι πιθήσας,
> καί τε σμικρὸν ἐόν, τό γ' ἐπάχνωσεν φίλον ἦτορ.

Reciprocity is crucial to Hesiod's social world, and generosity needs to be treated as an investment. However, reciprocity need not be rigidly equal or involve the same goods. Hesiod urges his addressee to invite neighbors, because in an emergency they come to help even more quickly than relatives by marriage (*Op*. 343–345). The 'repayment' for the feast is not always an answering feast but may be help when it is needed. Indeed, Hesiod's system of reciprocities is complex and often intangible. A more prosperous neighbor provides

27 The last clause of this passage is difficult. Bona Quaglia 1973, 204 n. 20 and Most 2006 take φίλον ἦτορ as 'his own heart', but as Ercolani 2010 notes ad loc. the man given to shamelessness is unlikely to feel remorse.

material benefits partly as insurance for himself and partly for repayment in respect. These ideas are still a long way from the competitive euergetism familiar from the culture of the *polis*, however: there is no indication that a rich man's loans and invitations are in rivalry with those of others.

There is only a limited place for conspicuous prestige consumption in Hesiod, as already mentioned: he dedicated his valuable tripod after his victory in a poetic contest and encourages offerings to the gods, but he has no interest in imported luxury goods. Even in this sphere farmers do not operate in a fixed-sum competition; rather, farming is a prestige competition in itself. Being a good farmer brings cultural capital.[28] Being a bad farmer generates contempt, a negative score. Hesiod, however, seems to be a satisficer in prestige competition and to assume that others are, as well. There may be an informal hierarchy in which one farmer can only win more prestige if another moves down, but if the hierarchy exists, it is not an obvious one, nor is the respect available obviously limited. Everyone can at least avoid being despised. Good Eris is a spur only towards acquiring wealth. Once he has achieved success, the Hesiodic farmer is no longer competitively motivated.

For the most part the two motivations of security and prestige, the actions they inspire, and the outcomes to which they lead precisely track each other. This economy prompts the farmer who has food security to buy further security in the form of well disposed neighbors, and this investment also means that the less successful are more likely to provide prestige without much resentment, since the success of the rich provides benefits for them. In a network of mutual obligations, good Eris can prevail.

5 Conclusion

Farmers, because they can all get rich, are less prone to feel hostility towards their rivals, but they also watch others, and they could benefit by doing so more self-consciously. The poem itself actually substitutes for this scrutiny by explaining what the good farmer does, so that the hearer can directly emulate the ideal figure of the text rather than a real neighbor. But because farming is not fixed-sum, it is easier in farming than in other human activities to use envy in a way that benefits both oneself and the community. Hesiod imagines that the farmer will be competitively motivated to reach a certain level of wealth but not compete with his peers once he attains it. The Hesiodic farmer is utterly

28 It still is: see Halstead 2014, 335–336.

unlike the Homeric warrior for whom the prizes of honor and glory demand that competition with everyone else never end. That may point to the answer as to why early Greek lacks a better term for positive competition. What Hesiod calls good Eris was not a frequent and recognized phenomenon. Friends might occasionally engage in benign competition, but it could be a real social force only among his farmers in their pre-market economy.

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PART 2

Ambivalence, Critique, Resistance

CHAPTER 3

Agonistic Excess and Its Ritual Resolution in Hero Cult: the Funeral Games in *Iliad* 23 as a *mise en abyme*

Anton Bierl

1 Introduction. The Agonistic Spirit and the Function of the *agôn* in the *Iliad* and in Book 23

The agonistic spirit is one of the features of the archaic and early classical Greeks stressed by Jacob Burckhardt in his *Griechische Culturgeschichte*.[1] This rather idiosyncratic but influential idea was taken up by Friedrich Nietzsche and other critics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet it seems to be an anthropological constant that human beings tend to compete with each other.[2] As we learn from social studies, rivalry depends on individual competitive factors such as similarity, relevance, and proximity, and on situational factors such as the number of persons involved, which stands in an inverse relationship with the intensity of the competitive behavior. Certain circumstances are favorable for an ego-oriented mindset that is entirely fixed on growth, improvement, and being the best. To feel the challenge on an individual basis can have a very positive influence on the development of a society. But where aspirations get out of hand and internal ranking is overdone, we can also detect the detrimental aspects of competition.[3]

The Homeric warrior society with its aristocratic value system is an excellent test-case in the classical world. It goes without saying that the Homeric heroes were especially prone to competition and the dangers of its excess. Warriors came together from all over the Greek world to fight in this collective

1 Especially in the fourth volume, edited by Max Oeri on the basis of Burckhardt's manuscript and students' notes of his famous Basel lecture (1872–1886). See Burckhardt 2016, 534–580 (vol. 4, part 9.3), entitled 'Der koloniale und der agonale Mensch'; on Nietzsche and the *Agonale* see in general Tuncel 2013.

2 On the universalistic and anthropological extension of the concept see Huizinga 1970. For a recent treatment of the topic in the field of classics see Fernández, Nápoli, and Zecchin de Fasano 2015.

3 See especially Scodel and Kuin in this volume.

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enterprise. As aristocrats they define themselves as *aristoi*, 'the best' from aristocratic stock; *philoi*, 'friends' and fellows; and *sophoi*, 'people endowed with high intelligence'. The *Iliad* is imbued with the agonistic spirit. We remember the aristocratic motto that Peleus gave to his son Achilles when he was recruited by Nestor and Agamemnon: 'Always to be best and to excel others!' (αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων, *Il.* 11.784).[4]

In short, the *Iliad* deals with the ethics of an aristocratic value system that, owing to new societal developments, is in danger and put into question.[5] The poem can, to some extent, be read as an epic episode taken from the heroic saga, one that problematizes the overdoing of agonistic behavior. The role of the competition between Agamemnon and Achilles in the main plot of the *Iliad* is well known. The present paper focuses instead on competition in the athletic games instituted by Achilles.

In *Iliad* 23 we are given a detailed description of Patroclus's burial (1–257, resp. 261, esp. 109–261). After the fantastically elaborate funeral ritual, which implies and alludes to later hero cult,[6] Achilles institutes an athletic competition in compensation for Patroclus's death. As I will argue here, the unexpectedly long account is not a later insertion—an entertaining scene standing for itself[7] or a pause or ludic transition to the final Book 24[8]—but rather an episode

4 On the Trojan side Glaucus reports that his father Hippolochus sent him with the identical motto to defend Troy (*Il.* 6.208). Thus Trojans and Greeks are united in the same frame of values. An aristocrat endeavors to be *aristos*, 'best', which means constantly to measure oneself with others and outdo them. See Latacz 1995, esp. 39 (revised edition in *Kleine Schriften* 2.311): 'allgemeines Adelsmotto'.

5 On the romantic background of viewing αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν as the fundamental and quintessential value in the Homeric world see Weiler 1974; Weiler 1976; Ulf 2003; Ulf 2004, 85. On the need to correct this opinion see Weiler 1975 and Ulf 2004, 85 (in the sense of an 'intentional history' [Gehrke 1994] and story line).

6 See Nagy 2012; Bierl 2015, 198–199 (§ 50–53); Bierl 2016, 13, 18. On the ritual construct, the excessive elements, and the diachronic blending with earlier periods and Lefkandi, see Richardson 1993, 165, 187–189.

7 See Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1916, 68, who regards it as a 'single poem'; see also Ameis and Hentze 1906, esp. the introduction 51–53; on aesthetic grounds analysts regard the passage as a patchwork of different levels of composition. On the funeral games as a poem of a later poet see Ameis and Hentze 1906, 62–63; West 2011, 399 regards *Il.* 23.257–897 as an example of Homer's ongoing revisions, 'further evidence of P.'s extraordinary ability and willingness to prolong his poem indefinitely'. On Book 23 see Ameis and Hentze 1906, 37–91 and the special commentary by Chantraine and Goube 1964; on the funeral games see also the commentaries by West 2011, 399–410; Richardson 1993, 201–271; Willcock 1984, 302–311; Ameis and Hentze 1906, 49–64, 73–91; moreover, see Frame 2009, 131–172; Grethlein 2007; Ulf 2004; Scott 1997; Lohmann 1992; Dunkle 1987; Dickie 1984; Gagarin 1983; Köhnken 1981; Willcock 1973.

8 See Kitchell 1998, 161–162; on the function as transition to Book 24 see Richardson 1993,

closely connected with the entire *Iliad*.[9] Indeed I argue that it reflects upon the nature of the aristocratic-agonistic ideal of behavior, the protagonists' endeavor to excel, and the danger of overdoing it, since it transfers the main theme of the *Iliad* onto a series of athletic contests in the frame of funeral games.[10] It includes several transgressions against fair play and excessive competitive behavior that again and again has the potential to result in quarrel and destruction among the Greeks. But Achilles now acts to release tensions from the very beginning, repeatedly intervening as arbiter and even breaking the rules by awarding extra prizes to men who have placed equally, to older competitors who have placed behind, and even to warriors who did not participate for their other merits.

It is my contention that the funeral games are not only a 'mirror-story' but a sort of *mise en abyme* of the entire *Iliad*, representing a foil or contrast to the heated rivalry therein.[11] Lucien Dällenbach defines a *mise en abyme* as 'any internal mirror that reflects the whole of the narrative in simple, repeated, or "specious" (or paradoxical) duplication'. Richard Martin uses the concept for the *Iliad*, defining it as 'a text-within-text that functions as microcosm or mirror of the text itself'.[12] (To avoid misunderstanding: I exclude here any postmodern association of the term with a destabilizing infinite regress.) In a *mise en abyme*

165–166, 202; on 'the geometric pattern' and the artificiality of the scene that is comparable to the description of the shield in *Iliad* 18 see Buchan 2012, 99–103; Whitman 1958, 262–264 views it as a geometrically complementary book to the catalogue of *Iliad* 2; see also Richardson 1993, 165.

9 See Richardson 1993, 202–271; Ulf 2004; Lohmann 1992; some critics argue that the scene serves to present the important characters for a last time, a farewell to the heroes; see Hinckley 1986, 209; on 'anticipation' and 'recollection' in the narrative see Hinckley 1986, 210–221, also in regard to the Epic Cycle in a neoanalytical manner.

10 Ulf 2004 regards the contests as a 'mirror-story' that presents alternative routes and models of behavior on a metaphorical level in order to prevent conflicts; on 'conflict management' see also Buchan 2012, 108–113; Kitchell 1998 views the funeral games as a metaphorical expression of the change of Achilles' character in comparison to Book 1. Buchan 2012, 103–113, esp. 110 and 112, interprets the passage as an 'allegory' for political discussions. On athletic contests in Greek epic and archaic texts see Nagy 1990a, 116–135; Nagy 2015; Perry 2014; Nicholson 2014; on sport in Ancient Greece in general see recently Scanlon 2015; Christesen and Kyle 2014.

11 Dällenbach 1989, 43. Ulf 2004 has already applied the concept of the 'mirror-story' to Book 23; referencing de Jong 1985, esp. 5–6, he emphasizes, from the perspective of an ancient historian, the aspects of contrast and opposition to the main story in order to make the listeners/readers aware of alternatives and in order to allude to new sets of values. On a meta-communicative level, focusing on ritual, play, and Bakhtin's polyglossia, see also Grethlein 2007.

12 Martin 2000, 63. On the application to Demodocus's song in *Iliad* 8 see Bierl 2012, 121–132.

markers can indicate an analogy between two narratives, the embedding one and its mirror. It can also underline the relations of contrast and opposition to the larger framing text, as happens in our text. A *mise en abyme* often reflects conditions of the production or reception of the work as well, in our case addressing the fundamental issue of the *Iliad*. In sum, the dense description of competitions in front of a large audience in a spectacular and ritual frame serves as a self-conscious, metapoetic, and synecdochic reflection of the ethical underpinnings of a debate about aristocratic values, the central theme of the *Iliad*.[13] The self-contained episode of organized athletic contests thus both mirrors and departs from the conditions in the Achaean camp that give rise to the *mênis* plot associated with Achilles. It not only duplicates the enclosing *Iliad* as a whole—the decisive feature distinguishing a *mise en abyme* from smaller-scale mirror stories—but also presents a gamut of scenarios, oscillating as it does between negative agonistic strife and amicable resolution. Working backwards and forwards in retrospective and prospective directions in relation to the *Iliad* as a whole, the episode both affirms and undermines traditional values, calling them into question, breaching the expectations of the audience, and suggesting new alternatives of behavior. In this sense it also provides what Irene de Jong (1985) demands from a successful mirror story when she stresses the importance of discernible deviations from and discrepancies with the main story. The vivid narration—full of direct speeches with changing points of view, various focalizers, and numerous other narratological devices discussed by de Jong—underscores the fact that excessive striving for excellence can be very destructive.[14]

The athletic events show their potential for being dangerously disruptive, but the resulting crisis can easily be resolved by a wise leader who intercedes diplomatically, seeking reconciliation for the sake of the wellbeing of the entire army. But this is only possible, of course, because the conditions are different from those of the embedding story of the *Iliad*: it is neither real strife nor life-or-death struggle, but only games set in a ritual frame, even if true violence occasionally comes to the fore despite the sublimation. Most of all, Achilles no longer competes with his fellows. In an obvious contrast to the main story, he is a clearly identified and detached authority-figure managing the funeral

13 On metanarrative elements in Homer see Bierl 2015, 201–202 (§ 60–62).

14 On the different points of view from a narratological perspective see Lohmann 1992. On narratology in Homeric studies see, e.g., de Jong 1987/2004 and the useful chapter 'Homeric Poetics in Keywords' by Nünlist and de Jong 2015. De Jong 1985 illuminates also the role of direct speech and the shift of narrators and focalizers in digressing mirror stories on the example of *Il.* 1.366–392.

games. He serves as *agônothetês* ('judge and president of games'), assuming the proto-juridical roles of a *dikastês* ('judge') or an *aisymnêtês* ('ruler chosen by the people to create reconciliation'), who sets the contests in a positive framework, foreshadowing the reconciliatory outcome in Book 24. Achilles can limit latent hostilities and frictions, since he sets up more than one prize for each competition and there are plenty of prizes to go around. In fact Achilles, being the official heir of his dear friend's property, seems to be determined to allot inherited and personal goods according to merit (including past merit), and according to proximity, equity, and political deliberations in order to create unity and stability in the group.

The contests could also reflect a new model of a social economy with altered relations among the elite (Brown 2003). The narration perhaps even foreshadows new models of 'conflict management' and control of aggression in the near future. According to Christoph Ulf and other critics, this alternative set of values at least looms on the historical horizon.[15] This might even apply to patterns of larger political participation. According to Jean-Pierre Vernant, agonistic legal concepts such as debating with equals in the *agora* and, we could add, publicly competing for and negotiating about the distribution of goods, constitute one of the origins of *polis* democracy.[16] If we apply Gregory Nagy's evolutionary approach to the *Iliad*, later socio-economic and political developments could allude to diachronically later phases of the monumentalized Panhellenic transcript.[17] Naturally the internal mechanisms of conflict resolution in the *Iliad* are much more prominent than external references to new value sets to be enacted. And as many critics have shown, Homeric society itself, viewed in synchrony, depends on a balance between competitive and cooperative values.[18] Despite such reservations, however, we should not ignore the glimpses of a new era to come in the treatment of the funeral games in *Iliad* 23.

Other critics have emphasized the parody and sarcasm in these long agonistic scenes.[19] In the ritual and ludic framing of festive exception the traditional aristocratic value system can be temporarily called into question. The contests thus create a broad web of contrasts with previous behavior and anticipate developments that in *Iliad* 24 will occur on a much more serious and personal level. With the banishing of conflict and all-out competition as well as the inclusion of humor and laughter, tensions between individuals or between

15 Ulf 2004; see also Buchan 2012, esp. 103–113.
16 Vernant 1982, esp. 49–68.
17 E.g., Nagy 1996, 107–206; see also Bierl 2015, 186–192 (§ 21–35) with further literature.
18 See, among others, Adkins 1960, esp. 153–258.
19 See, e.g., Sauge 1994.

different classes of warriors, that is, between aristocratic leaders and the *laos* ('army') as well as between the older and younger generations, are temporarily reduced or completely resolved.[20] These actions prepare the ground for Achilles' upcoming reintegration and the change of behavior and attitude manifested in *Iliad* 24 (Taplin 1992, 251–260).

Before taking a closer look at Book 23 I would like to acknowledge that my interpretation relies to a great extent on Gregory Nagy's vision of the poem, the funeral games, and their ritual implications.[21] Furthermore, I need to recall briefly some theories about the *agôn* ('athletic contest, game'). In line with the views of Karl Meuli and Walter Burkert, many critics believe that the origin of all athletic competitions lies in a blood-sacrifice to appease the dead.[22] The *agôn* would then ritually transform the real sacrifice into the symbolic death of an agony experienced in sport. The *mimêsis* ('reenactment') of violence in a ritual framing entails mitigation. However, Achilles, I contend, includes both aspects in the funeral for Patroclus: on the one hand he performs a cruel human sacrifice of twelve aristocratic youths on the pyre (23.175–177), on the other hand he establishes a civilized surrogate sacrifice in the games. The athletic contests in honor of the new hero are, in some cases and to some degree, framed as life-or-death battles, but the struggle is also transformed into competitions for a prize, for fame and status. Through this ritualization the negative competitive feelings involved can also be resolved without lasting strife. Beyond these psychological considerations, an *agôn* can also be pure performance with an end in itself, ritual in the strictest sense, a spectacle acted out on the bodies of representatives of the group in front of the people, the audience, creating festive unity after emphasizing ludic liminality.[23] Thus I will argue that the games are highly ambivalent, a recurrent way of stylizing and containing the repeated threat of excess competition as well as a ritual reflection of violence. I will further contend that Achilles' temporal proximity to heroization makes him willing to stand outside the competition, regulate its unruly energies as arbiter, and distribute his goods with remarkable generosity.

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20 See Kyle 1984; Kyle 1996, 108–111; see also Ulf 2004; on the relationship between Homeric leaders and the *laos* see Haubold 2000, esp. 47–100 (on *laoi* in the *Iliad*).

21 Nagy 1979/1999, esp. 26–41; Nagy 1990a, 116–145; Nagy 1990b, 202–222; Nagy 2012; Nagy 2013, esp. 169–274; Nagy 2015.

22 See, e.g., Meuli 1968; Meuli 1975, 881–906; Burkert 1985, 105–107; Nagy 1990a, 116–135, 136–145; Nagy 2012.

23 For play and its connection with *agôn*, cult, ritual, sacred solemnity, festivals, and religion see Huizinga 1970, 32–46; Burkert 1985, 102 speaks about the choral dance in a similar way: 'Rhythmically repeated movement, directed to no end and performed together as a group, is, as it were, ritual crystallized in its purest form'.

In the detailed discussion we will explore how this ritual subtext determines the nature of the funeral games and Achilles' role in them. In the ritual frame Achilles' irascibility and emphasis on honor recede into the background. On the one hand the ritual marks only a temporary suspension of his true nature, which still drives him at the beginning of Book 24, on the other hand it hints at a psychological trajectory that seems to leave Achilles more and more indifferent to the questions of status that once consumed him, preparing the way for the return of Hector's body to Priam.

To summarize, I will argue that ritual, socio-economic, judicial, military, political, cultural, psychological, and literary aspects are deeply intertwined in this *mise en abyme*. As in a mirror, the important issues of the poem are reflected in an amusing and light atmosphere, while the dark sides still loom large. Rather than a digression close to the end or a later insertion to be neglected, the scene is of central importance, a vibrant nucleus of the forces and themes of the *Iliad*, of epic energy and involvement that makes it so essential for the present volume's theme of competition.

2 The Contests in *Iliad* 23

2.1 *The Chariot Race as a* mise en abyme

The chariot race as the first contest receives the most detailed description (23.262–652), whereas for the rest we find a repetitive series in '*diminuendo*'[24]—the following contests become increasingly shorter. The narration of Patroclus's burial moves directly into the first *agôn* (see also lines 257b–261), which is crucial since the Myrmidons are horsemen and the chariot is constitutive of Greek combat technique. At the beginning of Book 23 Achilles orders the grieving Myrmidons not to unharness their chariots from the horses but instead to circle around the body of Patroclus three times. With this circular course the mourners express their deep grief; even the horses weep in longing for their master (6–16). In addition, the circling of Patroclus's 'tomb' (*sêma*) will constitute the course of the chariot race, to a certain degree a continuation of the first rite. We will come back to the ritual meaning of the *sêma* in section 2.1.2.

24 So Richardson 1993, 164. See also Lohmann 1992.

2.1.1 The Race as a Spectacular Narrative

The detailed description of the ups and downs and varying positions until the final ranking is striking, comparable in a way to a sportscast of a Formula One race.[25] The 'thick description' is not only great entertainment, however: the details are also needed for the *mise en abyme* to establish a web of echoes and contrasts with the main story of the *Iliad*. The chariot race focuses on five competitors and their prestigious horses striving hard to win the offered prizes (Geertz 1973). The first prize is a woman, the second a mare, a sort of female surrogate in the warrior society. The fierce competition for the fair exchange of a woman or a female prestige animal, of course, recalls the origin of the main conflict of the *Iliad*, the distribution of the girls Chryseis and Briseis as war prizes (Buchan 2012, 108–113). Antilochus becomes the central figure of the dramatic race. The description shows him to be an unfair and angry competitor who, despite his youth and overambitious behavior—in this respect to some extent a mirror of the former Achilles—is eventually willing to concede. This reaction stands in striking contrast to Achilles' character in the *Iliad* so far. Before the lots are drawn and immediately after mentioning Antilochus Nestor addresses his son in a paraenetic speech (306–348) that according to Gregory Nagy encapsulates the deeper ritual meaning of the race.

But let us first follow the events of the race itself, full of suspense and exaggerated ambition, a mirror-event of and foil to the long battles and especially to the dominant *mênis* conflict. The main contrast lies in Achilles' changed attitude toward questions of status, while other figures, particularly Antilochus, stand in for him in his former role. The narration focuses on the changing positions of the contestants. Their position at the start is determined by the drawing of lots (352) rather than the expected order of excellence. Antilochus, the main figure of the episode, obtains the pole position on the inside; Eumelus, who has the fastest horses, follows; then come Menelaus, Meriones, and finally, on the outside, Diomedes, the best charioteer (353–357). After the start they soon reach the signpost for the turn; Eumelus is leading, followed by Diomedes (373–378). According to the experience that a smaller number of participants increases competitiveness, the narrative focuses on one-to-one competitions, as in the notorious duels in combat scenes of the previous books. Diomedes is about to overtake the leader, but Apollo removes the whip that he needs to incite the horses on the long home stretch. At this moment Athena helps her favorite, returning the whip to him and making Eumelus crash (379–397). The scene mirrors the divine apparatus in the *Iliad*, with one group of gods

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25 See Lohmann 1992, 296. On the race see Frame 2009, 131–172.

supporting the Greeks, another the Trojans. Diomedes, the last by lot and the best in technique, takes over the lead and will win (398–400). Menelaus is second, but now the 'camera' focuses on another one-to-one conflict, the fierce competition between positions two and three (401–402). Antilochus threatens his horses with death, inciting them to speed up. As *hêniokhos*, 'charioteer', he intends to use a trick with *noos*, 'mind, cognitive energy', to pass at the narrow point on the straight lap. He does not apply the advice of technical skill and intelligence at the turning point, as was suggested by his father Nestor in the initial paraenetic speech (306–348), but designs a 'fraud with cunning', that is, *dolos*, a shrewder form of intelligence; his name includes *lokhos*, the strategy of fighting from 'ambush'. In this instance he leaves the normal track in an unfair manner, passes his rival, and returns to the route.[26] In order to avoid crashing into Antilochus's chariot Menelaus must cede priority to the fishtailing vehicle. Menelaus is outraged and utters threats to sue him already at this point (403–441).

At this moment the focalization shifts to the spectators, who have a limited view of the situation, and then returns to the fight between positions one and two. Again the turning point at the far end is decisive. Idomeneus proclaims that there has been a change in the ranking,[27] but the crowd, which mirrors the heated atmosphere of the competitors, has not witnessed Eumelus's crash in the straight lap. Idomeneus had seen Eumelus leading before the turn, so he speculates about a possible crash at the turning point (459–466). Evidently it was the critical moment of the race. Coming too close to the pole, as Nestor has already warned (340–341), can lead to a crash with lethal consequences.[28] Idomeneus's limited point of view creates suspense and rivalry among the onlookers. At this point Ajax, son of Oeleus, reacts to Idomeneus's words with indignation, affirming that all the speculation is just babble (474, 478–479). That is, the rivalry among the contestants is transferred to the spectators, whose excitement makes them insult and attack each other. It thus becomes evident

26 Against the facts described in lines 418–421, Gagarin 1983, esp. 37–38, argues that Antilochus surpasses Menelaus at the turning-point, following Nestor's advice to apply *mêtis* there (*Il.* 23.319–341).

27 Ameis and Hentze 1906, 51–52, following Pappenheim 1863, esp. 6–12, 18–40, argue for athetizing lines 448–498 on aesthetic grounds.

28 Nestor may have crashed at a turning post during a chariot race against the Epeian twins in Bouprasion (*Il.* 23.638–642). Thus Eumelus, in Idomeneus's opinion, reenacts Nestor's crash, but Idomeneus is wrong about the real causes. See Frame 2009, 150–151, also on the irony of the complementary races of Antilochus and Eumelus. Another famous example is Orestes' fictitious crash at the turning post in Sophocles' *Electra* (680–763).

how the Greek camp is divided by tensions and frictions. Idomeneus, outraged (482–483), proposes a bet about who is first (485–487) with, ironically, Agamemnon, not Achilles, as *istôr*, 'witness or arbiter, future judge' (486): the basic *mênis* conflict seems to be about to break out again. Ajax gets even more angry (489), but Achilles as *agônothetês*, 'judge of the games', intervenes and settles the dispute, providing the pragmatic solution by asking the spectators to sit down and wait until they see clearly who returns first (492–498).[29] At just this moment Diomedes rushes into sight and reaches the finish. Sthenelus picks up the prizes for his friend, the beautiful woman and the tripod (510–513). Next, as we know, is Antilochus, but Menelaus almost caught up with him at the finish (514–527).

When Eumelus arrives in his wretched state, Achilles, out of pity, wants to award him the second prize, which, so he underlines, poor Eumelus deserved (532–538). This decision makes the competitive seriousness collapse, just as in other instances. As will become clearer later, Achilles, already implicitly foreshadowing his own heroization after the time frame of the *Iliad*, acts like a chthonic distributor of goods and sponsor of reconciliation, similar to a benign hero. According to Achilles, this anti-competitive behavior is right and just (537). All spectators agree to grant the second prize to Eumelus, rather than to Antilochus, who has striven so hard. Antilochus, however, feels betrayed in being forced to move down to the third rank and vehemently protests that he will hate Achilles forever. The quarrel over the second prize, the mare as a surrogate woman, mirrors again the main quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles, who now acts to resolve the tensions. Antilochus emphasizes that the crash was Eumelus's fault, since he did not pray to the gods—even though he cannot know the circumstances, Antilochus is fully aware that the gods play a significant role in any epic success—and suggests that Achilles could grant an extra prize to Eumelus since he inherited so much. He himself, he says, will never give up his second prize, the beautiful mare, the fitting prize for a prominent young charioteer (543–554). Since, to speak in Eustathius's words regarding line 553, 'Achilles knows by experience what it means to be robbed of one's prize' (ὅς πεπειραμένος οἶδεν οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ γέρως ἀφαίρεσις)—the echoes of *Iliad* 1 (1.29; 1.298–303) are very marked[30]—he heeds the advice

29 See Nestor's mediation at Hom. *Il.* 1.254–284.

30 The citation is from Eusthatius's commentary on the *Iliad*, 4.782.3–4 (van der Valk 1987); for all echoes see 4.780–782 (van der Valk 1987); see also Richardson 1993, 228–229 ad *Il.* 23.543–554 and Martin 1989, 188–189. Frame 2009, 154 recognizes in Antilochus's rashness a reenactment of his father and ironies in respect to Nestor (156). Hammer 2002, 134–143 emphasizes Achilles' role in a political framing.

of his dear young and frankly speaking friend Antilochus, giving Eumelus the corselet (*thôrax*) of Asteropaeus (23.555–565).[31] But now Menelaus protests, full of anger and echoing the role of his brother Agamemnon, and even more the resentment of Achilles in the main quarrel (566–567), speaking up against Antilochus (570–585): Nestor's son is diminishing his *aretê*, the 'quality of being best'. Menelaus therefore pleads for public arbitration and brings the case before the public among his fellow leaders in order that it not be decided on the basis of personal support (ἐπ' ἀρωγῇ, 574). Menelaus hates the idea that someone could stand up saying that he overcame (βιησάμενος) his opponent with lies (576) and insists on a ranking based on *aretê* and *biê*, of 'being best and strength'.[32] Menelaus as outstanding co-leader of the army even thinks about taking over the judicial role of the *dikastês*, 'judge' (cf. δικάσω, 579), himself in order to bring about what he had threatened before, namely, binding his opponent under oath (581–585), the fundamental element of an agonistic judicial procedure.

In this threatening scenario Antilochus is wise enough to give in, in contrast to Achilles and Agamemnon as described in the main plot of the *Iliad* (23.587–590):

> Enough now. For I, my lord Menelaus, am younger
> by far than you, and you are the greater and go before me.
> You know how greedy transgressions flower in a young man, seeing
> that his mind is the more active but his judgment is lightweight.
>
> ἄνσχεο νῦν· πολλὸν γὰρ ἔγωγε νεώτερός εἰμι
> σεῖο ἄναξ Μενέλαε, σὺ δὲ πρότερος καὶ ἀρείων.
> οἶσθ' οἷαι νέου ἀνδρὸς ὑπερβασίαι τελέθουσι·
> κραιπνότερος μὲν γάρ τε νόος, λεπτὴ δέ τε μῆτις.[33]

Antilochus, contrary to Achilles, his mirror in the embedding plot of the *Iliad*, inclines to reconciliation.[34] Fully aware of his youth and lower rank, he excuses

31 The corselet (*thôrax*) recalls the scene when Achilles stripped Asteropaeus of his arms (*Il.* 21.182–183) after killing him in a brutal combat-duel (*Il.* 21.139–204), part of Achilles' hubristic fight with the stream Scamander.

32 On *biê* see also Dunkle 1987.

33 Transl. Lattimore 1951/2011 with slight changes (the same applies also to the further block quotations of the *Iliad* in this paper).

34 Richardson 1993, 233 ad *Il.* 23.587–595 calls the reply 'a masterpiece of honourable conciliation'.

himself by stressing that such transgressions are typical of a young man.[35] Antilochus understands now: he misinterpreted Nestor's plea for *mêtis*, for behaving with intelligence, as advice to apply deception and fraud. Like his father, Antilochus is renowned for considerate rationality: it is again *mêtis*, sharp 'intelligence', that makes both men follow a different road than that of Achilles and Agamemnon in the main story of the *Iliad*. Antilochus appeals to Menelaus to calm down and, without further ado, is ready to give back the horse. He even offers further compensation (as Agamemnon did when it was too late),[36] in the hope of remaining in friendly relations with Menelaus and not doing wrong before the gods (591–595).

Menelaus's conciliatory response, too, contrasts with the behavior of Agamemnon or Achilles in the preceding books of the *Iliad*: he is full of joy at the reaction of the young man, who was always considerate and loyal and now lets his anger go as well (596–603). Menelaus warns Antilochus not to repeat his earlier behavior towards better men: other men, he says, would not be so peaceful, but he knows how much suffering Antilochus, his mild father Nestor, and his brother Thrasymedus underwent for the sake of the Atridae. In a wonderful gesture Menelaus even gives the mare, the prize he deserved, to Antilochus, not directly but via Noemon, Antilochus's friend, since he wishes not to be harsh (605–613).[37]

Meriones, who was second to last, receives the fourth prize—Menelaus has taken the third one, the cauldron (613). This, too, is an unusual fact, since Meriones' *aretê*, 'virtue', was rather weak and it was not the custom to award a prize to the fourth. Furthermore, the prize itself—two talents of gold—is generous (614–615); in general the 'market value' differentiation among the prizes is hard to judge. Since Eumelus has received a new prize, the fifth prize was free and, in another generous gesture, Achilles awards it to Nestor, whose mild character was just praised. This happens again in contrast to *Iliad* 1, where Nestor's reconciliation efforts were ignored. Achilles gives him the jar (*phialê*, 616) as a Πατρόκλοιο τάφου μνῆμ' (619), a 'prize' (ἄεθλον) 'just for the giving' (αὔτως) (620–621), that is, without the agonistic frame, since Nestor could not participate owing to his old age.

Nestor frames the central chariot race with two speeches addressed to his son Antilochus, his initial exhortation (306–348) and his memories of a past

35 On his youth see *Il.* 15.568–571. On transgressions committed by the younger generation see the echo in *Il.* 3.106–108.

36 *Il.* 9.120–157; see also the report in *Il.* 9.260–299.

37 Frame 2009, 168–168 argues that Noemon, servant of Nestor, alludes to *noos* and Nestor's tendency towards rashness.

competition at the end (626–650); the form, so to speak, mirrors the content of the encircling movement.[38] In the latter passage he contrasts his current state with the times of his youth, when he participated in the funeral games in honor of king Amarynceus at Bouprasion.[39] There he competed successfully, winning in all contests but one: in the chariot race he lost against the Aktorione, the Epeian twins.[40] To honor Nestor in this discipline is thus an almost ironic move by Achilles, destabilizing the strict aristocratic code. The same applies to Homer, giving the first speech to Nestor, since Antilochus was already an experienced charioteer and did not need to learn how to make the turn at the *sêma* from a charioteer much less successful in this regard (Frame 2009, 137). But obviously the advice bears a deeper meaning and the wise old Nestor is the suitable person to convey it.

2.1.2 The Deeper Ritual Meaning of the Race around the *sêma*

The initial *peridromê*, 'circular course', traced around Patroclus's 'tomb' (*sêma*) by the Myrmidons' chariots at the beginning of Book 23 (6–16) can be interpreted as an apotropaic or cathartic rite. It ritually marks the space around the body, taking possession of what will soon be the center of the grave.[41] In coming into close contact with the body from all sides the mourners sense their loss intensely. Moreover, the chariot has a special significance, since Patroclus used to serve as Achilles' charioteer.[42] As Achilles' surrogate,[43] however, Patroclus had to change from driver into combatant (Krischer 1992). The chariot race around the tomb is a perfect reflection of the earlier ritual *peridromê*. Achilles shifts, so to speak, into Antilochus, a secondary surrogate, since Patroclus, his real alter ego, is dead. The *sêma* will now become of vital importance. In the following analysis of the ritual meaning of the tomb as 'sign' and its

38 Thus we have an outer ring (the actual encircling of Achilles) that frames an inner ring of speeches by Nestor, taking the race around the turning posts in the middle.

39 See Frame 2009, 131–172. He argues that Nestor, back then as a young man, 'had not yet learned to take his brother's [Periclymenus'] place', i.e., to restrain the horses (131).

40 In the famous story of Nestor's Pylian raid the twin Molione, the Aktorione, are the opponents in the battle against the Epeians (*Il.* 1.670–761). They are sons of Poseidon, who rescues them from defeat by young Nestor. See *Il.* 11.709–710 and 750–752. On *Il.* 11.670–761 see Frame 2009, 105–130. Frame believes that *Il.* 23.306–348 and the focus on the turning point 'evoke Nestor's own race' (136) and the crash at the turning point due to a lack of restraint.

41 See Brügger 2009, 19 *ad Il.* 24.16.

42 See Coray 2009, 170 *ad Il.* 19.401; see *Il.* 23.280 and 17.427, 17.439; see also Krischer 1992 and Nagy 2013, 154–157.

43 See Nagy 2013, 146–160 for a full discussion of this idea.

resonance with an implied hero cult I owe much to Gregory Nagy's influential interpretation of the scene.[44]

In line with its Panhellenic message Homeric epic usually excludes local hero cult, but we encounter here clear allusions to heroization and the future state of Patroclus's tumulus.[45] The hero cult in the making is particularly important here since Achilles, knowing about his imminent death, intends to join his surrogate Patroclus soon in the golden urn, a present of Dionysus (*Od.* 24.80), the god of death and the hope for an afterlife as experienced in his mysteries (Nagy 2012, 48–51). To understand what the *agôn* is about, we must be aware of the fact that Achilles is himself in transition from life to death.[46] In solidarity rituals the mourners assume the perspective of the dead person.[47] In his excessive mourning rites—usually and in later times the Greeks feared and avoided close contact with a dead body (Freitag 2010, 39)—it thus seems as if Achilles is growing ever closer to his ritual surrogate and is almost dead himself (Seaford 1994, 167). But here the mourning ritual, the rite of passage, is dangerously prolonged. Thus the 'excessive liminality' of the ritual is about to become real without ever reaching Achilles' reintegration.[48] Usually, as is well known, the funeral *agôn* is meant to generate honor to compensate for the hero's death.[49] Its further function concerns the reintegration of surviving mourners into society and the restoration of unity. In this ritual logic the 'best of the Achaeans' would have to participate directly in the 'agony' (*ponos*). Achilles does speak about the possibility, but only in the conditional: if the Greeks were not contending in honor of Patroclus, he would indeed take part in the race and win, since he has the best horses. But he stays on the sideline, as do his immortal horses, because they have lost the strength of their charioteer and are deeply grieving (274–284). Achilles cannot compensate for Patroclus, his alter ego, since he is part of him and is already envisaged as partially dead and on the way to his own immortalization.[50] Thus Achilles is involved in a double heroization pertaining to both his friend and himself: his future status as cult hero in the common *sêma* is clearly hinted at. Achilles' implied hero status, as

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44 Nagy 1990b, 202–222; Nagy 2013, 169–274; Nagy 2015.

45 See on this important aspect Nagy 2012, esp. 47–71.

46 See Seaford 1994, 159–190. Seaford, however, and despite a glance at the hero-cult and allusion to Achilles' heroization, emphasizes the aspect of reintegration. See also Taplin 1992, 251–260.

47 See Hasenfratz 2001, 237; on Greek death ritual and lament see Alexiou 1974/2002.

48 See Seaford 1994, 166–172. The mourning ritual as *rite de passage* follows the famous tripartite scheme of van Gennep 1960.

49 See Nagy 1990a, 121; Nagy 2012, 51.

50 See Nagy 2012; Nagy 2013, 169–274.

we have seen, is also responsible for his detached and almost ironic attitude as well as for his new generosity in giving out prizes. But since heroes are notoriously ambivalent, his negative side—his tendency towards manic irascibility and brutal revenge—is also present, coming to the fore again in the beginning of Book 24.

2.2 *The Rest of the Contests as a Series of Miniature Mirror Stories*

The following contests, becoming increasingly shorter and added like an appendix, participate in the same overarching thematic complex, composed on the principles of repetition, combination, and variation. Recurring motifs and elements are the excessive competition, the emphasis on status and honor on the side of the competitors, and Achilles' increasingly anti-agonistic behavior and generosity in giving out prizes as a hero-in-the-making during the heroization of his dead friend. Whereas the organizer acts to reduce tensions and resolve the negative consequences of bad strife, the contestants are over-ambitious and eager to win. These episodes are part of the *mise en abyme*, mirroring and contrasting with the key motif emblematized in the figure of Achilles. While the first episode of the chariot race condensed the variations and combinations into one detailed narrative, the short events convey them now in a linear and additive order. In his speech (626–650) closing the first episode Nestor summons Achilles to go on 'honoring his friend with contests' (σὸν ἑταῖρον ἀέθλοισι κτερέϊζε, 646), giving the agenda for the contests to come.

In the boxing competition (653–699) Euryalus dares to fight against Epeius, whose threats reflect the idea that this is a life-or-death battle (673–675):

> I will smash his skin apart and break his bones on each other.
> Let those who care for him wait nearby in a huddle about him
> to carry him out, after my fists have beaten him under.

> ἀντικρὺ χρόα τε ῥήξω σύν τ' ὀστέ' ἀράξω.
> κηδεμόνες δέ οἱ ἐνθάδ' ἀολλέες αὖθι μενόντων,
> οἵ κέ μιν ἐξοίσουσιν ἐμῆς ὑπὸ χερσὶ δαμέντα.

Euryalus has fought at a past funeral, in this case the games in honor of Oedipus. Epeius, having claimed the first prize from the very beginning on the basis of his superiority—like Achilles in the embedding narrative, he feels himself to be the greatest and to deserve the prize automatically—almost makes his threats come true and wins in a knockout fight. But Achilles has promised a second prize even to the inferior athlete. To some extent, one could have agreed on the distribution without any fight, on the basis of prior ranking.

In the wrestling match (700–739) the Telamonian Ajax fights against Odysseus, foreshadowing the future struggle over Achilles' armor. The fierce fight between almost equal athletes drags on, since, according to the rules, it must continue until someone wins. But again, when Odysseus seems to have gained a slight advantage, in an anti-competitive decision and in contrast to his former character, Achilles, the mild arbiter, makes them stop, resolves the fight, declaring it a draw, and decides that both deserve the victory and should receive the same prizes.

In the running contest (740–797) Ajax, son of Oeleus, competes with Odysseus and Antilochus. As happened in the chariot race, one contestant, Odysseus, prays to Athena for help (768–770).[51] Ajax, who spoke in such a foul-mouthed way as a spectator in the chariot race, takes the lead but stumbles close to the finish and falls on the ground, his mouth and nose filled with the dung of cattle. Thus Odysseus, the *polumêtis*, the hero 'full of cunning', wins with the help of Athena (771–777). But Achilles again awards prizes to both (778–779), further destabilizing the agonistic expectation and rules, and the second-prize ox seems more valuable than the first-prize mixing bowl. Then Ajax, full of excrement, speaks up and all break out in laughter (780–784). The comic relief conveys and symbolizes the atmosphere of reintegration, the end of the great divide in the Greek camp that was the main theme of the embedding plot of the *Iliad*. The third prize goes to Antilochus, turning up last. Antilochus makes another diplomatic speech, complimenting the organizer of the games, Achilles ποδώκης, fastest of all but not a contender at these games, with a revitalized epithet. Antilochus has clearly learned his lesson, and Achilles spontaneously doubles the value of his prize to one talent of gold. In terms of 'market value' the last-place runner seems to have received the most valuable prize, another reversal of the usual agonistic logic.

The next event on the program is an armed duel, a contest (*agôn*) of two warriors (798–825).[52] Ajax, son of Telamon, and Diomedes begin a fierce fight. It is the typical duel, but now not between enemies, Greeks against Trojans, but between two prominent Greek warriors. Ajax hits the shield that holds back the spear, Diomedes plans a counter attack and aims a fatal blow at the neck of his opponent. The spectators fear for Ajax's life and demand that the prize be divided. In an almost proto-democratic act Achilles heeds the will of his troops and grants Asteropaeus's 'sword' (φάσγανον, 807–808, 824) to Diomedes,

51 Köhnken 1981 focuses on the echoes with the chariot race. See also Richardson 1993, 249.

52 Some critics see it as the nucleus from which funeral contests developed; see Malten 1923/24; Meuli 1968, 15–67.

who would have won and therefore receives the deadly weapon of the brutal aggressor, whom Achilles himself defeated (21.139–204) in a manic rage, stripping his armor (21.182–199) and with it the sword (21.182–183). The other prize, the armor (23.798–800) that Patroclus stripped from Sarpedon's body (16.663–665) after defeating and killing him in a fierce duel-combat (16.462–507), goes to Ajax, who fittingly must defend himself. In this example the true and original nature of the *agôn* comes to the fore:[53] it is a ritual compensation for Patroclus, the dead friend to be heroized. In a life-or-death battle the winner survives, and the loser sacrifices his blood to the dead hero, expiating guilt or assuaging him. The athletic *agôn* transforms the original sacrifice in a symbolic death through ritualization. But in this archaic competition excess can only be contained by introducing an umpire. Violence and its consequences are again negotiated between *laos* and leader. This duel echoes and sharpens the internal conflict between Achilles and Agamemnon in the main story. Yet in the end it can be resolved through mediation and the insight that the Homeric society depends on a balance between competitive and cooperative values. If competition results in a life-or-death battle among fellows or allies, the cohesion of the army is in great danger. But at this point Achilles, now the emblem of Greek civilization, intervenes and averts the most violent outcome, whereas in previous books he craved blood, dismemberment (σπαραγμός), and 'raw-eating' (ὠμοφαγία, 22.346–347).[54]

The duel, reflecting the ritual origin of the *agôn*, is framed by more or less harmless agonistic episodes as further ritualizations. The ritual nucleus, so to speak, is taken into the middle of the seven smaller contests: the chariot race (23.262–652) as a detailed *mise en abyme* in itself, occupying pride of place not only because it is the first of the eight *agônes*, is followed by a series of seven events, all told as shorter mirror stories. The armed combat is fourth (798–825). Thus three contests—boxing (653–699), wrestling (700–739), and running (740–797)—precede the direct combat in arms, and three contests follow it—weight-throwing (826–849), archery (850–883), and spear-throwing (884–897). The last three are reviewed quickly here, since they increasingly hide the original sense of an *agôn*.

The throwing of a heavy iron lump that Achilles had taken from Andromache's father Eetion follows again the pattern of a sportscast (826–849). The throw of Epeius, the first of four competitors, is accompanied by laughter. In a climax each competitor outperforms his predecessor, and when Polypoites

53 See above on the theories of Meuli and Burkert.
54 On this aspect see Bierl 2016, 16.

finally casts the weight beyond the 'area of the contests' (ἀγῶνος, 847) the spectators shout aloud, applauding the winner.

The archery contest (850–873), criticized by Aristarchus (Arn/AT 857) for presenting the result of an accident as its outcome, a sort of *husteron proteron*, is very technical and reflects divine intervention again.[55] Teucrus forgot to make a vow to Apollo and misses the dove, only hitting the string that tied it to a mast, taking the single axes; the real target, of course, is the bird. Meriones, who was fourth in the chariot race, makes a vow, hits the dove, and wins the double axes. Perhaps Homer wants to present Achilles, a hero-in-the-making, as already endowed with heroic foresight. Winning implies again an animal sacrifice for compensation. Moreover, in the destabilizing manner of the small *mise en abyme*, the contest almost seems to call itself into question, since it is much more difficult to hit the string than the bird.

Achilles' final contest involves javelin-throwing (884–897), with the spear itself and a valuable cauldron as prizes. Agamemnon and Meriones wish to compete. But Achilles awards the prizes before any competition takes place, a decision even more anomalous than awarding a prize in the chariot-race to the non-participant Nestor. The final competition is thus an *agôn* not realized, an anti-*agôn*. We can see how the underlying impulse of competitive behavior, which led to the catastrophe in the Greek camp, is again called into question and destabilized, whereas cooperative mechanisms are brought to the fore. As was said before, the mini-mirror stories—woven together on the principles of repetition, variation, combination as well as extension and compression—revolve around the main motifs of the *Iliad*: status, honor, and prizes. Like narrative nuclei they reflect and extend the main embedding story, forming webs of textual allusions and references. Agamemnon, Achilles' internal rival in the *Iliad*, provides a 'grand finale' that is only briefly touched upon here. Achilles' reaction is highly ironical and almost cynical, but also diplomatic and conciliatory. Achilles prevents the leader of the army from competing in honor of and compensation for Patroclus. Achilles says: 'Atreus's son, we know how much you surpass all, and how you always ranked best in power and throwing the spear' (890–891). This is a clear reference to the fierce quarrel of the two alpha males. The 'best of the Achaeans' allegedly yields first position to Agamemnon on the grounds of his being best.[56] But the recipients know very well that

55 See the scholia to *Il.* 23.857 of the manuscripts A and T, which according to Erbse (5.501, Ψ 857 a and b) are ultimately derived from Aristonicus (and through him from Aristarchus).

56 See Nagy 1979/1999, 26–41. He (26) shows that '[t]he title is hotly contested between Achilles and Agamemnon'. Whereas Achilles is usually so called (*Il.* 1.244, 412; 16.271), '[d]uring his quarrel with Achilles' Agamemnon also 'lays claim to the title' (1.91; 2.82).

Agamemnon occupies his leading position only on the basis of unclear categories, particularly that of being the brother of Menelaus, who lost his wife Helen to the Trojan prince Paris. Therefore Agamemnon hardly excelled in being best. The beginning of the *Iliad* rings in our ears, especially the passages in Book 1 (lines 161–168 and 225–230) where Achilles 'accused Agamemnon of taking the best of the prizes of war without having the courage to fight for them'.[57]

Achilles orders Agamemnon to go to the ships with the first prize. This is again an ironic allusion to Achilles' own retreat. Achilles, being on the verge of heroization, distributes goods even to his enemy. Agamemnon's superiority is not really deserved, and, in a way, he is excluded from the contest and from further exertion of authority. Agamemnon, whose excessive compensation (*Iliad* 9.120–157, 260–299) Achilles refused to accept (9.378–409), is now beaten on his own territory. He accepts the first prize without being able to prove his ability (896). Agamemnon seems to be ashamed as well, and gives the prize—as the last word of Book 23, ἄεθλον, 'prize', concludes the subject matter of the *athla* in a marked way—to Talthybius, whose first appearance we remember when Agamemnon had ordered to take Achilles' war prize Briseis (1.318–325) to his tent. Despite the tensions under the surface, Achilles secures the reconciliation. But with Patroclus's death and his own imminent end he has reached a different, almost mystical attitude, dismantling and undermining the value he formerly assigned to agonistic superiority. This change is due to his status as hero-in-the-making.

3 Conclusion

Homer's *Iliad* is an exemplary text for reflecting upon the nature of competitive behavior and the dangers of overdoing it. Book 23 addresses these issues with a thematic *mise en abyme*, stressing the exaggerated agonistic dangers and the relaxed, anti-agonistic components. The agonistic spirit finds a reflection in the string of athletic contests (*agônes*) that reveal different facets of behavior and agents including the organizer of the funeral games, the competing athletes, and the spectators. The Funeral Games both affirm and undermine the central aristocratic ideology of being the best. They focus on fierce strife, on winners and losers, on the fanatic involvement of the spectators, and on the role of the *agônothetês*, 'judge and president of the games', who has an almost

57 See Richardson 1993, 270 ad *Il.* 23.884–897.

judiciary responsibility to control and channel destructive energy and promote 'good strife', the healthy aspects of rivalry. He must prevent people from cheating and make decisions about who is to win and how to award the prizes.

Athletic contests as spectacles can function as an outlet for aggression, create relief, and lead to reintegration and unity. In the episode considered here the *Iliad* explores the true nature and origin of a funerary *agôn* as well as the later ritualization and civilization of the custom. The *mise en abyme* is a *mise en scène*, bringing the performative aspects to the fore, and it works on the levels of both form and content. The structure emphasizes the first contest, the chariot race, by giving it an extended description and putting it as an independent *mise en abyme* at the head of the series of eight *agônes*. The *mise en scène* of funeral games explores head-to-head rivalries in the chariot race and places armed combat, as their alleged origin, in the middle of the seven shorter contests. On the level of content, Achilles as *agônothetês* underscores numerous aspects of athletic contest. However, his elevated, almost mystical role as a hero-in-the-making is also responsible for undermining agonistic behavior. Achilles decides contests himself and divides prizes or awards them to all competitors, all according to a value-system of his own. He even awards prizes to members of the warrior group who did not actually compete and prevents competition in order to avoid reviving old wounds. Achilles thus calls excessive agonistic behavior into question and creates foils to the behavior of Agamemnon and himself in the early books of the *Iliad*.

As in a performative ecphrasis and retardation—to some extent to be compared with the shield in *Iliad* 18 (lines 478–608)[58]—just before the final book, the funeral games are an occasion to focus on and reflect upon all aspects of the *Iliad*, especially upon the problematic agonistic behavior. Each contest illuminates some aspects of the larger framing story of the *Iliad*, forming both parallels to and contrasts with the main story and reworking it on the principles of compression and extension, variation and combination. The prospective double hero-cult for Patroclus and Achilles underlies the long account of the funeral games in Book 23, although it is only alluded to and will not materialize before the poem ends, since the Panhellenic epic of monumental size tends to eclipse such cults. Achilles, with his cultic heroization imminent, acts like a distributor of goods and wealth. This is what *daimones*, 'chthonic spirits, gods', and heroes are all about: they transfer special power from Hades or the grave, dangerous for enemies and benign for friends. In euphemistic terms, such heroes

58 See Buchan 2012, 99–103 (on the shield, 73–93) and Coray 2016, 192–266 (on its function as a *mise en abyme*, 197, 199–200).

dispense 'wealth' (*olbos*), themselves being *olbioi* ('rich' and 'blessed').[59] The *agônes*, according to Gregory Nagy, help Patroclus's 'soul' (*psuchê*) reintegrate into the new hero-cult. It is for this reason that the text places so much emphasis on circling and successfully making the turn at the signpost. The tomb is a *sêma*, 'sign', and a *mnêma*, 'commemorative object', whence this energy emanates. Achilles acts as a wise arbiter since he is about to be united with his friend in the *sêma*. What he puts *en scène* is a *mnêma* for his comrade and a *sêma*, a sign for the Greeks in Troy and for us. They and we, as readers, have to deal with the hermeneutical problem of what this entertaining scene of athletic games really means.[60]

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59 See Henrichs 1991; Nagy 2013, 367–386.

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CHAPTER 4

Certare alterno carmine: the Rise and Fall of Bucolic Competition

Yelena Baraz

1 Introduction

The picture of Tityrus as Meliboeus finds him at the opening of Vergil's first *Eclogue*—a shepherd peacefully piping in the shade of a tree, at leisure and unencumbered by cares—is iconic for the pastoral genre, a representative image, if not quite a representative anecdote in Paul Alpers's terms.[1] Once we put another shepherd into this picture, however, the mood shifts: contemplative and carefree is not the dominant way in which ancient bucolic poetry represents how shepherds relate to one another around and through music. An essential underlying feature of how the shepherds interact with each other is competition, be it in the spoken preliminaries or in the sung exchanges that can be said to constitute the singing contest proper.[2] In the artificial pastoral world that we find in these poems the shepherds always appear to be on the lookout for a singing contest and just waiting to slot themselves and others into the position of a competitor or a judge.[3] But it is the way the contest functions in this world that sets bucolic competition apart from other genres and contexts, namely, the built-in role of collaborative creativity. The shepherds need to show their skills as singers not in isolated showpieces but by displaying the ability to listen and respond, that is, to use the contribution of their rivals as a point of departure for their own song and then to surpass them. Exchange as a crucial part of bucolic creativity is not limited to how the human singers interact with each other, for even what might appear solitary composition turns out, most of

1 'Representative anecdote', a term borrowed from Kenneth Burke, is a central concept in Alpers's cross-cultural and cross-historical treatment of pastoral; see Alpers 1996, 13–21 for a discussion of Burke.

2 Rossi 1971b terms this section 'preagon'; Henderson 1999 in his analysis of Vergil's third *Eclogue* breaks it into 'bickering' (3.1–27) and 'bargaining' (3.28–54).

3 On the fictional world of the pastoral see Payne 2007, especially the introduction, and Kania 2016. For a different approach to the status of these competitions see Gutzwiller 1991, 134–137 on Theocritus 5 and 4; she reads the poems as verisimilar representations of ancient shepherds' interactions.

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the time, to be conceived of as an exchange between the singer and the sounds of nature.[4] This back and forth, mutual inspiration, and inherent competition lie at the heart of what bucolic poetry does.

In this chapter I trace the trajectory of how the narrative patterns and themes of this competition develop over time, from their origins in Theocritus's *Idylls*, through Vergil's reception of them in the *Eclogues*, to their transformation in the *Eclogues* of Calpurnius Siculus, a collection in which the poet takes the traditional features and stretches and expands them to their logical conclusion, bringing them to the point of self-parody and self-destruction. In my discussion I demonstrate that, as the tradition develops, the poems engage more explicitly with external models of competition—forensic, military, and athletic—to which the bucolic contest is analogous. I argue that the increasingly explicit nature of the connection between bucolic competition and its more openly adversarial equivalents is ultimately exploited by Calpurnius to explode the central feature of the bucolic genre he inherited.

2 The Structure of Bucolic Contests in Theocritus and Vergil

Our first example of a proper bucolic contest is found in Theocritus's *Idyll* 5, and it contains many features that were imitated in the later tradition and came to be seen as typical. When the two shepherds Comatas and Lacon first meet, they open their interaction with accusations of theft. Comatas accuses Lacon of having stolen his goatskin, the latter in turn claims that Comatas took his pipe. The invitation to a singing contest provides a way out of the impasse in which each shepherd vigorously denies the accusation against him (*Id.* 5.17–22):[5]

> C. Oh, no, my good man, no, by these nymphs of the lake,
> if only they would be propitious and kindly towards me,
> Comatas did not secretly steal your pipe!
> L. If I should believe it, may I reap the pains of Daphnis.
> But then, if you wish to put up a kid—and that is nothing
> of importance—still I will compete with you in song until you say:
> enough.

4 For a discussion of the interaction between shepherd-singers and natural sound see Baraz 2015; cf. Damon 1961, 292–294.

5 Translations throughout this chapter are my own. For Theocritus's text I quote Gow's edition.

κ. οὐ μάν, οὐ ταύτας τὰς λιμνάδας, ὦγαθέ, Νύμφας,
αἵτε μοι ἵλαοί τε καὶ εὐμενέες τελέθοιεν,
οὔ τευ τὰν σύριγγα λαθὼν ἔκλεψε Κομάτας.
λ. αἴ τοι πιστεύσαιμι, τὰ Δάφνιδος ἄλγε' ἀροίμαν.
ἀλλ' ὦν αἴκα λῇς ἔριφον θέμεν—ἔστι μὲν οὐδὲν
ἱερόν, ἀλλά γέ τοι διαείσομαι, ἔστε κ' ἀπείπῃς.

The competition does not begin for another sixty lines, over the course of which the competitors continue to exchange insults based on their stakes, their character, their singing ability, and their past history, including Comatas's claim of a sexual encounter in which Lacon had been the passive partner. They then proceed to have an extended squabble over the location where the contest is to take place. After they call a nearby woodcutter to be their judge, the competition finally begins with them exchanging two-line-long segments of song; the entire song contest is shorter than the preliminary exchange of insults. The match concludes when the judge awards the victory to Comatas, who rejoices in his victory, not terribly graciously; we do not hear from Lacon again.[6]

Idyll 6 provides a very different model. It is introduced by the narrator, who reports that Daphnis issued a challenge to Damoetas; the two exchange extended songs on the subject of Polyphemus and Galatea, and the narrator concludes the poem by mentioning that the two exchanged a kiss and gave each other gifts of musical instruments. 'The victory went to neither one', reads the last line, 'they were both undefeated'.[7] This poem extends into an exchange of song the narrative pattern of the opening poem of the collection, in which the goatherd and the shepherd begin with an exchange of compliments but the superiority of the shepherd, Thyrsis, is acknowledged from the start, as the goatherd inveigles him into performing a song with the promise of the gift of the cup and further rewards him at the end by letting him milk a goat into it. A similar pattern is found in the more structurally complex *Idyll* 7, where Simichidas and Lycidas exchange extended songs as they travel together. Lycidas promises and awards Simichidas his staff, a gift in addition to the song and an encouragement that responds to the younger man's initial self-deprecation.

The contest between Menalcas and Daphnis in the pseudo-Theocritean *Idyll* 8 could be described as a compressed version of the pattern found in *Idyll* 5,

6 Much of the scholarship on the poem has focused on working out the reasons for Comatas's victory, without arriving at a consensus; there is a similar strand in the studies of Vergil's third *Eclogue*.

7 Theoc. *Id.* 6.46: νίκῃ μὲν οὐδάλλος, ἀνήσσατοι δ' ἐγένοντο.

with a challenge, stakes, and the summoning of a judge, but it is free of the insults that constitute so much of the exchange in Theocritus's poem. Since the poem represents an early, high-quality contribution to the bucolic tradition after Theocritus,[8] we can reasonably conclude that the anonymous poet took the basic structure of the lead-up to the contest as a basic feature he needed to include for the bucolic competition in his poem to be recognizable as such.

As we move to Vergil's bucolic collection, there are four competition poems to consider. The first, *Eclogue* 3, alludes to several of Theocritus's *Idylls*, with the programmatic contest poem, *Idyll* 5, again serving as the main model, especially in terms of structure.[9] However, unlike the author of *Idyll* 8, who takes over the basics without elaborating them, Vergil develops the insults.[10] In his poem, accusations of dishonesty, bad character, and thievery lead to a dispute about singing contests: Menalcas accuses Damoetas of stealing a goat, which the latter then claims to have won in a singing competition. This reference to a contest works as a pivot: the bickering subsequently shifts into the sphere of singing ability (*Ecl.* 3.25–29):[11]

> M. You [beat] him in singing? Did you ever even have a pipe
> joined by wax? Didn't you, you ignoramus, use to destroy
> wretched songs in the crossroads, on your hissing pipe?
> D. You want then to test between us what each one can do,
> taking turns?

> M. Cantando tu illum? aut umquam tibi fistula cera
> iuncta fuit? non tu in triviis, indocte, solebas
> stridenti miserum stipula disperdere carmen?
> D. Vis ergo inter nos quid possit uterque vicissim
> experiamur?

8 For an overview of the poem in its relationship to Theocritus and the rest of the post-Theocritean tradition see Bernsdorff 2006.

9 Taken together with *Idyll* 8, the third *Eclogue* demonstrates the importance of *Idyll* 5 as a dominant model for bucolic competition in the later tradition. Clausen 1994, 88–90 provides a clear guide to the Theocritean influences. Karanika 2006, using an ethnographic comparison with Cretan song, reads the preagon as 'real' competition, and the song exchange as 'literary'. I wish to emphasize the literary quality of both.

10 Henderson 1999, 145–169 offers a sequential reading of the poem with an emphasis on wordplay and rhetorical give and take; cf. Powell 1976.

11 For the text of Vergil I use Mynors's edition.

A description of the stakes and the summoning of the judge, Palaemon, follows, with the judge setting the place and the order of the contest. After the exchange of couplets Palaemon decides on a tie, and we hear no more from the competing shepherds.

Vergil's second amoebean poem, *Eclogue* 5, follows as its main model Theocritus's sixth *Idyll*. The two shepherds open by competing in mutual praise and exchange songs on the subject of the death of Daphnis; each praises the other's song and the two exchange gifts as the poem concludes.

The second set of contest poems, *Eclogues* 7 and 8, are quite different: their focus is no longer on the preliminaries to the competition. The opening of *Eclogue* 7 is much more concerned with the entry of the narrator, Meliboeus, into the poetic world where he witnesses the contest, here called a *certamen* (7.16), between Corydon and Thyrsis in the presence of Daphnis. He asserts the victory of Corydon and its lasting impact on the winner's reputation in the closing lines. *Eclogue* 8 also begins with an account of observers, in this case the animals and rivers thrown off their usual patterns by the sound of the music. Vergil follows up this opening with the dedication to Pollio and then briefly sets the scene. Thereafter two long songs are exchanged; no closing lines are given to the narrator. Here, too, the contest is explicitly identified as such (the two shepherds are 'competing', *certantis*, at 8.3); however, no details of stakes or judging are given. It would appear that, after having established the structure of what a *certamen* in this context might entail and after having indicated his connection to the earlier bucolic tradition in this way, Vergil is no longer interested in elaborating the details of such preliminaries and instead subsumes them all under the general heading of competition.

What we see in looking at the tradition before Calpurnius Siculus, then, is that Theocritus establishes the basic parameters of what a singing competition might look like in *Idyll* 5; these are imitated successfully in a poem that is transmitted as part of his corpus, *Idyll* 8, and Vergil follows this lead. As a result, in the post-Vergilian tradition the singing contest, appearing as it does in four of his *Eclogues*, was considered a major generic marker of bucolic poetry, or rather of a collection of bucolic poems. The structure in which a song contest follows a preliminary exchange that functions as a contest in its own right was also rendered canonical by Vergil's repetition of the patterns introduced by Theocritus and his follower. The structure admits much variation while still remaining easily recognizable: the preliminary exchange can be conducted in positive terms of praise or in negative ones of insult and can, but does not have to, include an exchange of stakes or gifts and the invitation of a judge.

3 The Poetics of Bucolic Contests in Theocritus and Vergil

After this overview of the structure and the basic content of the contest poems, I move to the manner in which these contests are depicted, in particular the language and the imagery the poets employ to locate their poetic competitions in relation to other types of contests. Theocritus and his follower do not seem to have much interest in defining the idea of bucolic competition; the basic vocabulary used to describe it—forms of *erizô* for the challenges and the exchanges, of *nika* and *nikaô* for victories and defeats, and of *krinô* for the judging—are general enough to evoke associations with other types of contests (military and forensic, but also rhetorical, athletic, etc.) without connecting the bucolic competition precisely to any of them.[12] The content of the opening insults in *Idyll* 5, that is, the accusations of theft, could be seen as analogous to a legal contest, with each shepherd citing evidence of sorts in his defense, after which the 'case' is taken to a judge. The use of *aethlon* in *Idyll* 8.11–12 to refer to the stakes the rivals are putting forth does create a link with competitions in which prizes were awarded—but this is still a broad category. The author of this poem also expands the use of *nikaô*, which in Theocritus appears twice, and both times in proverbial contexts, to refer to the contestants themselves for the first time. In all these poems, the amoebean singing contest—the only kind of contest available to these shepherds, and one that tests their main skills, poetry and singing—is loosely equivalent, in their closed fictional world, to a variety of competitions found in the world at large.

Once we move to Vergil, we can see an expansion of this basic idea at the point when the first, most elaborate, and most Theocritean contest is about to begin. In the final exchange of the third *Eclogue*, before the judge is summoned and the contest proper begins, the language used to refer to the contest

12 These terms are found in the greatest concentration in *Idyll* 5, the programmatic contest poem; the second highest concentration is in the imitator's *Idyll* 8. It is also worth noting how often they occur in proverbial contexts, referring to ill-matched opponents. *erizô*: *Id.* 1.24, in reference to an earlier contest in which Thyrsis had sung; 5.23, with the cognate noun, in a proverbial reference to Athena and the sow; 5.30, the imperative by Comatas directing Lacon to begin; 5.67, describing the competition as such to the judge; 5.137, in Comatas's boastful summing up of his victory, also in a proverbial context; 6.5, describing Daphnis's challenge; 7.41, proverbial, referring to uneven matches. *nikaô*: 5.28 proverbial; 7.40 proverbial, uneven match; 8.7, Menalcas's opening boast, echoed by Daphnis's rejection of it in 8.10; 8.17 looking forward to the winner getting a prize; 8.84 in the judge's designation of Daphnis as the winner; 8.89 narrator's description of his reaction; *krinô*: 5.62 and 69, looking for and instructing the judge; 8.25: slight variation on 5.62; 8.29 narrator's description of the judge's acceptance of the summons.

becomes more specific and more evocative of other types of contests. Following the description of the two cups and Damoetas's contemptuous dismissal of Menalcas's offer of the cup as a stake instead of a heifer, Menalcas signals his willingness to enter the contest on his opponent's terms and to risk the more valuable stake (*Ecl.* 3.49–53):

> M. No way will you escape me today; I will follow wherever you call.
> Just let someone who comes by, at any rate, hear these [verses],
> look, here is Palaemon. I will make it so that afterwards
> you won't challenge anyone else with your words.
> D. Come then, if you've got anything. There will be no delay on my account, nor do I flee anyone.
>
> M. Numquam hodie effugies; veniam quocumque vocaris.
> audiat haec tantum vel qui venit, ecce Palaemon.
> efficiam posthac ne quemquam voce lacessas.
> D. Quin age, si quid habes; in me mora non erit ulla
> nec quemquam fugio.

Here, despite the apparently colloquial quality of the language,[13] Vergil elevates the contest to the level of single combat[14] through an allusion to a tragedy of Naevius, the *Equus Troianus*, identified by Macrobius in the list of Vergilian borrowings in *Saturnalia* 6.1.38:

> No way will you escape today dying by my hand.
>
> numquam hodie effugies, quin mea manu moriare.

This appears to be the only surviving fragment from this play,[15] and while something of the plot can perhaps be surmised from the Trojan War canticum of

13 Coleman 1977, 116 and Clausen 1994, 103–104 ad loc. Chahoud 2010, 61 argues that the ascription of straightforwardly colloquial status to this instance on the basis of comic parallels is problematic, since the only examples outside of Vergil come from early poetry and the expression (the redundant *numquam hodie*) might no longer have been colloquial in Vergil's time.

14 The expansion of the use of *nikaô* by the author of *Idyll* 8, discussed above, can be seen as underlying this development.

15 It has been suggested that there may be some confusion with a play of the same name attributed to Livius Andronicus. See the recent summary in Schauer's edition (2012, 84–85).

Chrysalus in Plautus's *Bacchides* (925–975),[16] we know next to nothing about it. Various proposals have been made for the identity of the speaker and his addressee in the Naevius fragment: Menelaus or Aeneas threatening Helen; Neoptolemus threatening Priam or Polites.[17] Each possibility has something to recommend it as an intertext for the Vergilian passage. But even without the knowledge of the identities of the speaker and the addressee in Naevius, it is clear that the allusion evokes an armed threat in an epic or tragic context, with the speaker issuing the threat in a manner that portrays the addressee as the weaker party (a woman, a child, an old man). The epic valence of this line is confirmed by Vergil's partial reuse of the allusion in *Aeneid* 2, when Aeneas rises from a position of weakness to resist the Greeks and concludes his speech with lines that in effect constitute a response to the threat contained in the line from Naevius (*Aen.* 2.669–270):[18]

> Give me back to the Greeks; let me see again renewed
> battle. No way will we all today die unavenged.
>
> reddite me Danais; sinite instaurata revisam
> proelia. numquam omnes hodie moriemur inulti.

The next half line of the third *Eclogue*, *veniam quocumque vocaris* (*Ecl.* 3.49), in which Menalcas accepts Damoetas's challenge, evokes a different type of contest. In Cicero's speeches we find two examples of the use of *veniam quo* with a form of *vocare* to indicate the speaker's willingness to follow the lead of an opposing party and compete on his terms. In the *Pro Flacco* Cicero uses this expression to signal that he is prepared to submit to the judgment of the people regarding his actions in suppressing the conspiracy of Catiline (97):

> Therefore, if anyone calls me there, I will come: the Roman people as the arbitrator not only do I not refuse, but in fact I demand.

16 The difficult and inconsistent canticum has been much analyzed; the most detailed discussion is Jocelyn 1969; cf., most recently, Lefèvre 2011, 102–116, and Barsby 1986, 169–171. While the focus of discussion is primarily on the role and transformation of the Greek original and the stages of interpolation, the influence of Roman tragedy in mediating the story is acknowledged, as is the tragic parody in lines 933–934 (Jocelyn 1969, 138; Lefèvre 2011, 107; Barsby 1986, 173–174).

17 Schauer 2012, 85 gives an overview under *cs*.

18 Both Austin 1964, 252 and Horsfall 2008, 475 ad loc., like the commentators on the *Eclogues*, emphasize the comic provenance of the expression.

> qua re, si quis illuc me vocat, venio; populum Romanum disceptatorem non modo non recuso sed etiam deposco.

In a passage from the speech *Pro Caecina* the structure is quite similar to what we have in the third *Eclogue*. Cicero protests against his opponent Piso's desire to argue the case on the basis of the letter of the law but then agrees to follow his framework (82):

> Since I have stated my disagreement sufficiently, I now follow where you call.

> quoniam satis recusavi, venio iam quo vocas.

The expression is also found in a letter to Atticus, where Cicero proclaims that he has been convinced by his friend and will follow his direction,[19] and its core, *quo vocas*, is found in *De legibus*, where the character Cicero refuses to follow the suggestion of the character Atticus and discuss civil law.[20] I suggest that in the sense of 'accepting one's opponent's terms' the expression has associations with competitive argumentative contexts, especially the forensic environment. In the context of the eclogue such a reading is supported by the expressed need for a judge and the summons of Palaemon immediately after *veniam quocumque vocaris*. The additional connotation present in Cicero's speeches is that following the opponent into the area of argument that he sees as beneficial to his side is an expression of the speaker's confidence in the strength of his case and his ability to win the argument on any terms. This sense of confidence is also present in Menalcas's blanket willingness to follow Damoetas's lead and supported by the epic challenge that precedes it. In the bucolic plot this results in Damoetas's taking the lead in the exchange.

The following threat to silence Damoetas forever (*efficiam posthac ne quemquam voce lacessas*) looks back to Theocritus in that Vergil uses *lacesso* to translate one of his predecessor's key words, *erizô*. The Latin verb also serves to maintain the connections, established earlier in the poem, with both military and forensic contexts. In fact, one could say that Vergil emphasizes the conflation of the two fields through the innovative use of *voce*, referring to verbal competition, as an ablative of means with *lacesso*, which corresponds to the

19 *Att.* 16.13.1 *itaque veniam quo vocas.* See Shackleton Bailey 1967, 304 ad loc. on the expression as metaphorical, i.e., not as a reference to an invitation to some place.

20 *Leg.* 1.14 *quam ob rem quo me vocas.*

epic challenge (Clausen 1994, 105 ad loc.). Thus, in this densely allusive passage Vergil establishes the connections between bucolic contests and military and forensic competitions, reaches back to Theocritus, and at the same time lets the scene stand on its own terms as a new and original moment, sufficient to endow shepherds' matches with the flavor of their higher-genre analogues.

4 Calpurnius Siculus

The next surviving corpus of pastoral poetry after Vergil is that of Calpurnius Siculus. In his collection of seven *Eclogues* Vergil looms large,[21] but Calpurnius is also in constant dialogue with Theocritus.[22] In developing his own take on bucolic he shares one strategy with other authors who position themselves as secondary, as following on a great example of their chosen genre, namely, targeting features that can be seen as typical of the genre and transforming them through rejection, distortion, or exaggeration. A striking example of this strategy at work is the breakdown in the exchange of song between nature and human singer, an essential part of the preceding tradition (Baraz 2015). Calpurnius's treatment of the bucolic contest in his *Eclogue* 6 shows a related development: in this poem he disrupts collaborative communication among the human singers as well, so that the planned contest never does take place.

Calpurnius's corpus contains two contest *Eclogues*, the second and the sixth. The second poem is an amoebean competition between the gardener Astacus and the shepherd Idas, judged by Thyrsis. It is a very amiable contest, with no taunting preliminaries, and it ends in a tie. The two boys are in love with the same girl, and it is implied, though not explicitly stated, that this amorous rivalry is what brings them together in competition. Each boy proposes a stake from his own sphere of activity: a harvest from the garden and seven sheepskins respectively. Calpurnius alludes to several of Vergil's exchange eclogues here, but he also begins to transform his model. Thus, the little scene at the start of Vergil's eighth *Eclogue*, in which the heifer and lynxes are stunned and the rivers stopped in their beds,[23] is expanded here into a lengthy description

21 Slater 1994 and Hubbard 1998, 150–178, emphasize the importance of Vergil.

22 Magnelli 2006 emphasizes Calpurnius's engagement with the bucolic tradition, not just Vergil.

23 Verg. *Ecl.* 8.1–5: *Pastorum musam Damonis et Alphesiboei, / immemor herbarum quos est mirata iuvenca / certantis, quorum stupefactae carmine lynces, / et mutata suos requierunt flumina cursus, / Damonis musam dicemus et Alphesiboei.*

of the audience that gathers to hear the performance, which is what the contest has now become (*Ecl.* 2.9–26):[24]

> And there was a great contest, with Thyrsis as judge.
> Every kind of cattle was present, every kind of wild beast,
> and whatever [creature] beats the high air with its wandering wings.
> Together come whoever under the shady holm-oak pastures
> slow sheep, and father Faunus, and the two-horned Satyrs;
> the Dryads of the dry foot, the Naiads of the wet were present,
> and the rushing streams held their courses;
> the east winds ceased from attacking the trembling leaves
> and created deep silence through all the mountains:
> all things were idle, and the bulls were trampling over
> the neglected pastures: as these two were competing,
> even the skilled bee dared to let go of the flowers full of nectar.
> And now under the ancient shade, in the middle, Thyrsis had
> sat down and said, 'O boys, when I am judge, stakes
> are pointless, I warn you: let this be enough of a prize,
> if I praise the victor, if the defeated earns reproach.
> And now, so that you may distinguish your alternating songs better,
> each throw up your hands quickly three times'.

> et magnum certamen erat sub iudice Thyrsi.
> affuit omne genus pecudum, genus omne ferarum
> et quodcumque vagis altum ferit aera pennis.
> convenit umbrosa quicumque sub ilice lentus
> pascit oves, Faunusque pater Satyrique bicornes;
> affuerunt sicco Dryades pede, Naides udo,
> et tenuere suos properantia flumina cursus;
> desistunt tremulis incurrere frondibus Euri
> altaque per totos fecere silentia montes:
> omnia cessabant, neglectaque pascua tauri
> calcabant, illis etiam certantibus ausa est
> daedala nectareos apis intermittere flores.
> iamque sub annosa medius consederat umbra
> Thyrsis et 'o pueri me iudice pignora' dixit

24 For the text of Calpurnius I quote Vinchesi's edition.

'irrita sint moneo: satis hoc mercedis habeto,
si laudem victor, si fert opprobria victus.
et nunc alternos magis ut distinguere cantus
possitis, ter quisque manus iactate micantes'.

In place of one heifer we now have 'every kind of cattle', in place of lynxes 'every kind of wild beast' and all the birds. More importantly, the audience also gathers together all the residents of the countryside, all the shepherds, and all the local divinities. Finally, Calpurnius expands on Vergil's stopped rivers by adding the cessation of the winds and the silence in the mountains. So the contest, which is a casually assembled local happening in Theocritus and Vergil, and doesn't tend to have, or need, much audience other than a judge, is now the focal point of the entire locality at every level.[25] We can also compare the scene in Calpurnius to the opening of Vergil's seventh *Eclogue*, a poem in which there is an additional observer, the narrator Meliboeus invited by Daphnis to attend the contest between Corydon and Thyrsis. The difference is quite stark: Calpurnius's shepherds are putting on a gala performance, and we can wonder whether the performance history of Vergil's *Eclogues* themselves couldn't be seen as underlying this change.[26]

Another major development is the judge's announcement that he rejects the use of *pignora*, pledges or stakes: this is competition for its own sake, with praise or blame as its only outcome. In addition, the judge leaves the choice of who will begin the singing to chance, asking the boys to participate in a game, now called *morra* in Italian, that involves guessing the number of fingers the players throw out.[27]

Finally, we come to Calpurnius's sixth *Eclogue*, a poem that engages closely with the idea of an amoebean competition but in the end fails to produce one.[28] As the poem begins, Astilus addresses Lycidas, who has just arrived (6.1–3):

25 Here Calpurnius draws on, and repurposes, a different strand of the tradition, the universal mourning for Daphnis in Theocritus's first *Idyll*. Cf. Vinchesi 2014, 172 *ad* 10–19; Fey-Wickert 2002, 64.

26 Donat. *Vit. Verg.* 26–27: *Bucolica eo successu edidit ut in scena quoque per cantores crebro pronuniarentur*.

27 Vinchesi 2014, 181 *ad* 26; cf. Keene 1887, 69.

28 See Vinchesi 2014, 436 for an overview of the scholarship on the poem. Becker 2012, 32–39 gives the most significant parallels in Theocritus and Vergil. For a different approach to this poem see Karakasis 2016, 223–250; he reads it in terms of a 'dichotomy between a traditionally pastoral past' bound by rules and 'an unconventional bucolic present' (224).

> You are here late, Lycidas: just now Nyctilus and the boy Alcon
> have competed in alternating song under these branches,
> with me as the judge, and not without a stake.
>
> Serus ades, Lycida: modo Nyctilus et puer Alcon
> certavere sub his alterno carmine ramis
> iudice me, sed non sine pignore.

The idea that Lycidas can be late implies a situation similar to the one in Calpurnius's *Eclogue* 2: there is an audience in attendance. There is also a clear metapoetic resonance to the phrase: Calpurnius is late to the game of writing such competitions, and his ability to measure up to his predecessors is in question.[29]

In response to Astilus's apparently neutral opening Lycidas begins by insulting Astilus's decision, something we have never seen before in the tradition, since the judgment is normally given at the end of the poem[30] and no one questions the judge's verdict (6.6–8):

> That the rough Alcon has overpowered Nyctilus in singing,
> Astilus, is to be believed, if a crow should defeat the goldfinch,
> if the owl should overcome the melodious nightingale.
>
> Nyctilon ut cantu rudis exsuperaverit Alcon,
> Astyle, credibile est, si vincat acanthida cornix,
> vocalem superet si dirus aedona bubo.

Astilus responds in kind, insulting Nyctilus. The exchange of insults continues as the two opponents now target the appearance of the two earlier competitors. What is noteworthy at this stage of the poem, which appears for now to follow the pattern of Vergil's third *Eclogue* and Theocritus's fifth *Idyll* in starting with an exchange of insults, is the difference in the orientation of the opening taunts. In the earlier tradition the insults concern actions in everyday country life—theft, dishonest treatment of others' flocks, passive homosexuality—and

29 See Karakasis 2016, 227 on 'the notion of "lateness" … as part of Calpurnius' self-fashioning of his "generic identity" with respect to the previous literary tradition'; see also Gibson 2004, 12 for a metapoetic reading of the contest failure in this poem as a 'meditation on its own failure, and the wider lateness of post-Virgilian Latin'.

30 As Gibson 2004, 9 points out, Calpurnius begins his poem where his predecessors end theirs, with the judgment.

the singing contest is a means of resolving the conflict by providing transition to a different sphere. Here, by contrast, the focus of the exchange is, first, the ability to evaluate the quality of singing, and second, the appearance of the singers;[31] the presence of this second category indicates that the quarrel here is actually about the capacity for aesthetic judgment.[32]

Astilus's claim that Lycidas in fact has no 'experience in song' (*carminis usus*, 17) moves this exchange in the direction of a new match between the quarreling connoisseurs (6.19–21):

> Then you want, since you are no equal to us, you rascal,
> you, yourself a judge, to bring your pipe against ours?
> you want to meet in single combat? Let Alcon come and be a judge.
>
> vis igitur, quoniam nec nobis, improbe, par es,
> ipse tuos iudex calamos committere nostris?
> vis conferre manum? veniat licet arbiter Alcon.

Whereas the early Greek texts alluded to combat in a general way, and Vergil brought the epic model closer to the surface by introducing Naevius's verse into his text, Lycidas makes the military connotations explicit by using the expression *conferre manus*. The phrase occurs regularly in the last four books of the *Aeneid*.[33] Originally not a very common phrase—found only twice in Cicero[34]—it appears to have been chosen by Vergil[35] because, unlike the more common parallel expressions (*conferre signa, arma*, *castra*), it lent itself to a semantic development that emphasized single combat.[36] Because of its frequency in Vergil the expression is taken up by Silius and Valerius Flaccus; it is also found in the *Latin Iliad*.[37] The incorporation of a usage strongly asso-

31 Calp. *Ecl.* 6.22–24: *vinces tu quemquam? vel te certamine quisquam / dignetur, qui vix stillantes, aride, voces / rumpis et expellis male singultantia verba?*

32 Cf. Vinchesi 2008, 546–549, where this is discussed as a dispute over artistic competence of the two competitors. *Pace* Karakasis 2016, 229–230, who reads the focus on appearance as an elegiac presence, distinct from the attention to the quality of the music.

33 *Aen.* 9.44 and 690, 10.876, 11.283, 12.345, 480 and 678.

34 Cic. *Font.* 12 and *Dom.* 53.

35 Virgil adapts a construction using the ablative found at Lucr. 4.843: *at contra conferre manu certamina pugnae*.

36 Lyne 1989, 111–112 emphasizes the prose origins of the expression (excessively, according to Tarrant 2012, 176 *ad Aen.* 12.345). Oakley 2005 on Liv. 9.5.10 is noncommittal on the register and stresses how uncommon the phrase is.

37 Val. Fl. 2.222, Sil. *Pun.* 15.188, *Ilias Latina* 270, 454.

ciated with the *Aeneid* is in line with Calpurnius's general tendency to incorporate within his pastoral universe material from the works of Vergil that followed the *Eclogues*.[38] Lycidas, then, is figuring the contest as single combat that will decide whose aesthetic sense is true, and he indicates his level of self-confidence by accepting as potential judge the very Alcon whose singing and appearance he has just insulted. Calpurnius will not write an epic, but he will depict his competing shepherds as quasi-epic fighters.

In the next stage of the exchange, starting in line 22, the taunting becomes more personal: Astilus, still from the position of one who judges song, gives a highly unflattering description of his opponent's singing. The description is detailed in a way that confirms his self-positioning as a connoisseur: rather than simply insulting his adversary, Astilus analyzes the problems with Lycidas's voice and sound production, expanding on Vergil's *stridenti*, the insult Menalcas throws at Damoetas (*Ecl.* 3.27, quoted above).[39] This attitude to judging is quite different from what we saw in Calpurnius's predecessors, where the judges simply designated the winner or indicated that the quality of the two performances was equally high.

Lycidas in his response for the first time attacks the character of the opponent: he accuses Astilus of making things up (*fingas*, 25), points to what appears to be an earlier loss or simply a critique of his singing uttered by a certain Lycotas, and implies that he is also deficient as a judge by praising the now arriving Mnasyllus as a good arbiter, one who will not be taken in by puffed-up rhetoric. As Mnasyllus enters, Lycidas also makes explicit a parallel for the upcoming competition that had traditionally been in the background: by calling their quarreling *vana lis* (6.27) he alludes to a legal contest.

Next, Astilus insults Lycidas by claiming that the contest is beneath his dignity, but he then relents and offers a precious stake, a deer beloved by his girlfriend Petale. The long and detailed description of the stag is another markedly epic feature of this poem. Calpurnius's models are, first, the pet stag of another young girl, Silvia, in *Aeneid* 7 and, second, the sacred stag in the story of Cyparis-

38 On Calpurnius's generic experimentation as being in line with the preceding bucolic tradition see Magnelli 2006. Interaction with georgic and epic material in *Eclogues* 5 and 6 respectively is a major focus of Becker 2012; see also Fey-Wickert 2002, 16–22 for a treatment of the georgic material in *Eclogue* 2.

39 Vergil picks up on *stridenti* later in the same line by using the old fashioned *disperdere* 'for the harsh sound it makes' (Clausen 1994, 98 ad loc.); cf. Coleman 1977, 112 ad loc. Cucchiarelli 2012, 211 ad loc. points out that one of the manuscripts changes the word order in the line so as to strengthen the play on sound.

sus in Ovid's *Metamorphoses* 10;[40] a similar description is also found in Silius Italicus's *Punica* 13. In response, Lycidas wagers a horse, an animal, here described in detail, that connects the poem both to epic and to *Georgics* 3. Horses, even more so than stags, are epic animals; they are not found in pastoral, and Lycidas's emphasis on the horse's pedigree further highlights the epic connection. It is Lycidas, once again, who makes clear the competitive and aggressive nature of the choice of stakes itself, as he addresses the judge (6.48):

> He believes, Mnasyllus, that I am frightened by his stake:
> see, how scared I am.
>
> terreri, Mnasylle, suo me munere credit:
> aspice, quam timeam!

Finally, Mnasyllus addresses the two contenders, graciously and in line with the behavior of earlier pastoral judges, and proposes a place for the contest. After a brief squabble over the locale the judge calls on the two shepherds to give up their quarrel (6.72–73):

> Now put aside your wrangling, let songs be given to me,
> for I would rather you sing in turns of your tender loves.
>
> nunc mihi seposita reddantur carmina lite,
> nam vicibus teneros malim cantetis amores.

Mnasyllus tries to separate the preliminary fighting from the contest that is to follow rather than seeing the two as continuous, and he encourages the singers to begin, offering the sort of exhortation that is always obeyed in the preceding tradition. But Calpurnius's shepherds cannot give up on the aggressively adversative model and move towards collaboration: Lycidas, under the guise of asking the judge for impartiality, once again insults his opponent with a now obscure reference to an earlier competition. Roused, Astilus too goes on attack: he accuses Lycidas of only wanting *iurgia*, 'altercations' (6.79), an exchange of insults, that is, not of song, and in another legal allusion promises to give him

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40 Becker 2012, 39–45 gives a detailed account. See Simon 2007 for an analysis of the descriptions of the prizes here as playing an ekphrastic role analogous to the cups in Theocritus and Vergil and contributing to the generic richness of the corpus.

what he wants: a recitation of *crimina* (6.82) that would make Lycidas grow pale and tremble with fear. Astilus appears to be right, since Lycidas immediately escalates the situation and accuses his adversary of a homosexual liaison with Mopsus, which provokes Astilus to bring the latent violent metaphor to the surface and issue a final threat (6.86–87):

> If only Mnasyllus, who is stronger than me, were not yet present:
> I would make it so that no one would be uglier than you.
>
> fortior o utinam nondum Mnasyllus adesset!
> efficerem, ne te quisquam tibi turpior esset.

Not only is the quarrel failing to develop through sublimation into a song exchange, it is in fact moving in the opposite direction and looks likely to turn into a physical brawl. The threat also circles back to the original disagreement over aesthetics, in which the opponents disparaged the looks of the other's favorite. But here, rather than argue about the validity of opinions, Astilus is ready to use violence to make his rival look as ugly as he wants him to be, to turn his judgment into reality instead of defending its value. Lycidas's repeated provocations and his explicit appeals to the underlying metaphors of nonartistic strife seem to have transformed the nature of the encounter by bringing the potential contest closer to those other types of competitions. In the process Lycidas has destroyed the hope of its actually taking place, which would only have been possible if these associations had remained under the surface.

The judge gets the last word (6.88–92):

> Why are you raging? Where has madness directed you to move?
> If you want to have a competition taking turns—but I am not a judge
> for you: let another judge settle this.
> And look, here comes Mycon, and the neighbor Iollas is coming:
> they will be able to put an end to your fighting.
>
> quid furitis? quo vos insania tendere iussit?
> si vicibus certare placet—sed non ego vobis
> arbiter: hoc alius possit discernere iudex!
> et venit ecce Micon, venit et vicinus Iollas:
> litibus hi vestris poterunt imponere finem.

Mnasyllus's closing contribution begins in an epic key, with *furor* and *insania* pointing once again to the world of epic and tragedy, and to the *Aeneid*

more specifically.[41] His attempt to return to the basic premises of a traditional bucolic competition, *vicibus certare*, is an anacoluthon: he gives up and moves on.[42] The designation of the interaction as *lites* surfaces for the last time. The exchange of insults has embraced and strengthened the implications of its previously loose associations with epic and forensic competitions. As a consequence, it has grown in a way that renders the traditional bucolic contest, an exchange based on mutual respect and agreement about the contest's form, impossible. On a metapoetic level we could say that Calpurnius's project of enclosing Vergil's later works and their genres, in this case especially epic, within the framework of bucolic poetry has expanded, but in the process also undermined, or even exploded, the traditional model. The shepherds who are aware of and embrace the martial and litigious parallels to their singing competition can no longer participate in it: they are too late.

I have suggested elsewhere that we should see the post-Vergilian trajectory from Calpurnius to Nemesianus as a 'road not taken' in the development of the later pastoral tradition (Baraz 2015, 92). The words of these poets may be alluded to, but they themselves are not treated as a major part of the tradition that connects the later European pastoral to Vergil, and their innovations are largely ignored. In this light it is worth noting, in concluding this study of the development of bucolic competition, that Nemesianus, the last poet to write bucolic within the Calpurnian branch of the tradition, does not present a singing contest in his four *Eclogues*. Two of them, the second and the fourth, do loosely fit into the pattern of amoebean exchange, but they are decidedly not competitive; instead, they are set up as lovers' complaints, *querelae*, presented in parallel. Calpurnius, like Astilus and Lycidas, destroyed it—for his branch of the tradition—in his sixth *Eclogue*, his last gloriously excessive contest poem.[43]

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41 Verg. *Aen.* 5.670: *quis furor iste novus, quo nunc, quo tenditis?*

42 Vinchesi 2008, 556 compares his departure to a comic trope found in Plautus's *Amphitruo* when Blepharo gives up trying to adjudicate between Amphitruo and Jupiter and leaves. Blepharo's first line in this scene (*vos inter vos partite; ego abeo, mihi negotium est*, 1035), is especially resonant.

43 An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 'Contests of Speech and Song' conference at St. Anne's College, Oxford, organized by Matthew Leigh and Celia Campbell. I am grateful to the organizers and audiences at both conferences, and to Amanda Klause, for their comments and suggestions, and to Christoph Pieper and Cynthia Damon for exemplary editorial guidance. All translations are my own.

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CHAPTER 5

Stasis, Competition, and the 'Noble Lie': Metic Mettle in Plato's *Republic*

Geoffrey W. Bakewell

1 Introduction

The *Republic*'s city of Kallipolis, though imaginary, is founded upon historical bedrock. This is apparent in many ways, not least in its cautious stance toward the agonistic impulse characterizing archaic and classical Greece. According to Socrates, 'most cities today are inhabited by those sparring with one another and forming factions for the sake of ruling' (ὡς νῦν αἱ πολλαὶ [*sc.* πόλεις] ὑπὸ σκιαμαχούντων τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιαζόντων περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν οἰκοῦνται, 520c7–d1).[1] He therefore seeks to reduce intergroup *stasis* by separating Kallipolis's inhabitants into three tiers (rulers, auxiliaries, and providers), assigning them different tasks, and having them mind their own business.[2] Moreover, drawing an analogy between city and soul,[3] Socrates holds that each individual is likewise tripartite on the inside: we all consist of reasoning, spirited, and desiring parts bound together in different arrangements.[4] By designing Kallipolis' educational program to separate people's psychic elements and arrange them in an appropriate hierarchy Socrates seeks to reduce individuals' proclivity to *stasis* as well. Put differently, the city's success hinges on its ability to limit and manage competition on multiple levels.[5] In this regard the *Republic* is indebted to Hesiod. In keeping with that poet's depiction of twofold *Eris* ('Strife'), Socrates

1 In addition to the participle στασιαζόντων (Pl. *Resp.* 520d1), note the subsequent description of the best city as 'that least marked by *stasis*' (ἀστασιαστότατα, 520d4). A contemporary of Plato, Thucydides, also emphasized the prevalence of *stasis*, noting that ancient Athens was fortunate in being largely free from it (ἀστασίαστον, 1.2.6).

2 Pl. *Resp.* 433e10–434a1: 'holding and taking care of one's own, and of oneself, would be agreed to be justice' (ἡ τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕξις τε καὶ πρᾶξις δικαιοσύνη ἂν ὁμολογοῖτο).

3 On the analogy see Ferrari 2003.

4 At Pl. *Resp.* 435e3–436a1 these are described with substantives: τὸ φιλομαθές ('fond of learning', e6), τὸ θυμοειδές ('spirited', e3), and τὸ φιλοχρήματον ('acquisitive', a1) respectively. The activity proper to each is described (436a9–10) as μανθάνειν ('learning'), θυμοῦσθαι ('being passionate'), and ἐπιθυμεῖν ('desiring').

5 On Achilles' attempt in *Iliad* 23 to manage 'agonistic excess' see Bierl in this volume.

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sees a negative and a positive side to competition; he wants to discard the former while retaining the latter. To this end Kallipolis will identify, sort, and train its inhabitants according to their psychic amalgams. Socrates justifies his extensive regimen with another feature adapted directly from the *Works and Days*, namely, its 'myth of ages'. He intends the resulting 'noble lie' to stifle overt competition while tacitly affirming its necessary place in society.

The *Republic*'s interest in managed competition helps explain Plato's choice of host for the evening. By setting events in the house of Polemarchus he offers an example of how Kallipolis' sorting and training mechanisms might work. Although Polemarchus is the son of a wealthy industrialist and lives in Piraeus, he nonetheless proves to be a philosophically promising young man. The fact that he is a metic, not a citizen, suggests an analogy between the civic distinctions of Kallipolis and those of historical Athens. Both were largely based on lineage, and as such, inherently conservative. The *Republic* depicts Polemarchus as someone worthy of elevation beyond the circumstances of his birth to a more valuable caste, to the benefit of the broader community. Put in terms of Socrates' myth, his mettle is found to differ from his surface metal. Even so, Polemarchus constitutes the exception proving the general rule: in the end both Kallipolis and historical Athens insist on their social hierarchies at the expense of individual merit.

2 Competition in Kallipolis

Agonistic moments frame the *Republic*. The work begins with Socrates recounting his recent trip to Piraeus for some democratic spectation: he had been eager to see how the first festival of Bendis would come off (327a1–4).[6] After gazing their fill Socrates and Glaucon were preparing to return to the upper city when they were stopped by Polemarchus and company, who challenged them to a peculiar sort of *pankration* ('all-in fight') (327c7–14):

> Polemarchus: Do you see us, how numerous we are?
> Socrates: How could I not?
> Polemarchus: Then either be stronger than these men, or stay here.
> Socrates: But isn't there another option, if we persuade you that you should release us?

6 Nails 1998, 388 dates the introduction of Bendis's worship in the Piraeus by Thracian metics to between 443 and 411. Cf. Planeaux 2000, 167, and Wijma 2014, 139–140.

Polemarchus: And are you able to persuade those who don't listen?
Glaucon: Certainly not.
Polemarchus: Then think of us as people who will not listen.

Ὁρᾷς οὖν ἡμᾶς, ἔφη, ὅσοι ἐσμέν;
Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Ἢ τοίνυν τούτων, ἔφη, κρείττους γένεσθε ἢ μένετ' αὐτοῦ.
Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι ἐλλείπεται τὸ ἢν πείσωμεν ὑμᾶς ὡς χρὴ ἡμᾶς ἀφεῖναι;
Ἦ καὶ δύναισθ' ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς, πεῖσαι μὴ ἀκούοντας;
Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων.
Ὡς τοίνυν μὴ ἀκουσομένων, οὕτω διανοεῖσθε.

Hoping to soften his companion's aggressive tone Adeimantus then mentioned the evening's relay race, to be conducted on horseback with torches to honor the goddess (328a1–2). The recounted discussion that is the *Republic* thus begins amid a festival and athletic contest, with men seeking primacy and prizes before an audience.[7]

The competitive tenor persists throughout the ensuing gathering.[8] While some of those present watch silently, others play to the crowd. Thrasymachus, for instance, is incensed by Socrates' rejection of the traditional notion that justice means helping friends and harming enemies. According to Socrates, Thrasymachus 'clearly desired to speak to gain renown, thinking he had a beautiful comeback' (καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος φανερὸς μὲν ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰπεῖν ἵν' εὐδοκιμήσειεν, ἡγούμενος ἔχειν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλην, 338a5–7). Here important features of Socrates' philosophical method, namely, its sequence of question and answer, definition and redefinition, are entwined with Thrasymachus's competitive instinct.[9] As *Republic* 1 ends, Socrates is confronted with a particular instance of the larger problem framed above: how to transform an individual's striving for renown into something that will benefit rather than harm the broader com-

7 The work also ends on a competitive note: Socrates exhorts his interlocutors to choose the upward path so they may 'collect the prizes (ἆθλα) of justice and be led around like victors (νικηφόροι)' (Pl. *Resp.* 621c7–d1).

8 The gathering resembles a symposium: only men are present, and they perhaps converse in an *andron* ('men's dining room'). Biles 2007, 24 notes that Plato's own *Symposium* is marked by competition: 'the various performers seem to be engaged in a kind of agonistic display wherein each succeeding eulogist attempts to outperform all previous contributors'.

9 On the elenctic nature of the efforts to define a just man in *Republic* 1 see Nakhnikian 1971, 147–153.

munity.[10] The work's consideration of justice is from the outset linked to the sometimes agonistic motivations of its characters.

It is likely that the first book of the dialogue was originally composed as a stand-alone piece and later refashioned and incorporated into the more substantial work bearing the name *Republic* (Nails 1998, 393–395). One piece of evidence is that while the first book ends in a kind of *aporia, Republic* 2 makes a fresh start: Glaucon and Adeimantus succeed Thrasymachus and Polemarchus as primary interlocutors. Together with Socrates they take on a competitive task, assessing poets and poems in terms of their societal and psychic effects. In discussing which epic and tragic works are appropriate, and for whom, they criticize cultural icons, especially Homer, Hesiod, and Aeschylus. In issuing their verdicts Socrates and Adeimantus assume the role of the eponymous archon. This citizen, chosen annually by lot, had the task of deciding which plays were to be sponsored by liturgists and performed (Csapo and Slater 1994, 108–109). The two men agree that 'whenever [a poet] speaks such [i.e., false] things about the gods, we will become angry, deny him a chorus, and not allow teachers to use his work to educate the young' (ὅταν τις τοιαῦτα λέγῃ περὶ θεῶν, χαλεπανοῦμέν τε καὶ χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς διδασκάλους ἐάσομεν ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ χρῆσθαι τῶν νέων, 383c1–3). With the phrase χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν and the word διδάσκαλοι Plato metaphorically inserts the two men into the process of selecting and producing plays for Athenian dramatic festivals.[11] They have become gatekeepers to the city's most high-stakes competition; their approval is a necessary prerequisite for any *khorêgos* ('producer') dreaming of erecting a victory monument along the Street of the Tripods.

Socrates' invocation of the *Works and Days* in this context is significant,[12] given that attempts to manage competition loom large in the poetic and political history of Greece.[13] At the beginning of the poem Hesiod claims that 'there was not one race of Strifes, but rather two exist upon the land' (οὐκ ἄρα μοῦνον ἔην Ἐρίδων γένος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν / εἰσὶ δύω, 11–12).[14] While the 'blameworthy' one (ἐπιμωμητή, Hes. *Op.* 13) produces war and carnage, the better sort (ἀμείνω, 19)

10 For a discussion of this same issue in Aristotle see Kuin in this volume.

11 Enacted before an audience, the metaphorical archons' criticism is itself a type of performance. Monoson 2000, 89 notes that 'to attend the theater was to constitute a mass gathering designed to hear critical speech regarding political matters and to play the role of judging citizen'.

12 'Noble Hesiod' is first explicitly mentioned at Pl. *Resp.* 363a7–8 (ὁ γενναῖος Ἡσίοδος).

13 Thalmann 2004, 386.

14 On the difference between the depictions of *Eris* in *Theogony* and *Works and Days* see Clay 2003, 6–8. See also Scodel and Ham in this volume. On the tendency of strife's negative consequences to outweigh its positive ones, see Scodel in this volume.

was placed by Zeus 'at the roots of the earth' (γαίης [τ'] ἐν ῥίζῃσι, 19), promoting industry and prosperity. Under the influence of this 'good' (ἀγαθή, 24) Strife, 'potter becomes angry with potter, and builder with builder; poor man envies poor man, and singer singer' (καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, / καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ, 25–26). According to the poet, the competitive spur benefits the community by making it wealthier and more dynamic. Even so, the harshly alliterative presence of κότος ('anger') and φθόνος ('envy') points to danger.[15] For 'rivalry, jealousy, and hatred are potentially by-products of any form that *eris*, seen as a unity, might take, from war to athletic or economic competition' (Thalmann 2004, 380). The need to restrain the negative emotions created by rivalry extended into the classical period and contributed to the creation of important structures and procedures in democratic Athens, including popular law courts, ostracism, liturgies, and the extensive use of sortition (Thalmann 2004, 388).

Socrates' interaction with Thrasymachus in *Republic* 1 highlights strife's potential to derail not just poetry and pottery but philosophy as well. At several points in the work Socrates seeks to separate eristic from dialectic. Like Hesiod's Strifes, these two species of verbal argument are intimately related and often mistaken for one another. But while eristic pursues victory and renown, dialectic seeks something different: truth. And as Socrates notes, the former too often succeeds at the expense of the latter: 'many people seem to me to lapse into illogic even unwillingly and think not that they are being disputatious but rather that they are practicing dialectic' (δοκοῦσί μοι εἰς αὐτὴν [*sc.* ἀντιλογικὴν τέχνην] καὶ ἄκοντες πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ οἴεσθαι οὐκ ἐρίζειν ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, 454a4–5).[16] Because of the possible damage to society Socrates seeks to create a genuine philosophical community to lead Kallipolis. He limits the practice of argument to those best suited for it; these self-sacrificing few committed to the pursuit of truth will eventually be taught dialectic (537c6–540c2).

Kallipolis's restriction of philosophy to well trained guardians reflects its emphasis on hierarchy. In defending this essentially anti-competitive framework Socrates is once again indebted to Hesiod. He reworks the *Works and Days*' 'myth of ages' (109–121), where the poet describes a largely deteriorating sequence of human generations: golden ancestors give way to silver successors, and they in turn to bronze, then demi-gods, and at last iron. Socrates reforges

15 On the prominent role of envy in political life at Athens see Thuc. 2.35.2, 2.45.1.

16 At Pl. *Resp.* 454a8–9 Socrates repeats the same opposition with nouns rather than infinitives: the same misguided people 'make use of strife, not dialectic, towards one another' (ἔριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι). See further 499a4–9 and *Grg.* 505e3–5.

these metallic elements into a 'noble lie', a ψεῦδος that is nevertheless γενναῖον (414b8). According to him (415a2–c5),

> we will speak to them [i.e., the citizens of Kallipolis] in myth, saying that while all of you in the city are brothers, when the god was shaping you, he added gold in the creation of all those able to rule, which is why they are the most valuable; [he added] silver in the creation of the auxiliaries; and [he added] iron and bronze in the creation of the farmers and other craftsmen. Generally you will beget children like yourselves, but since you are all related, there will be times when a silver child is born from a golden parent, a golden child from a silver parent, and so forth. Thus the god's first and greatest instruction to the rulers is that there is nothing they must pay more attention to than the mixture of these things in the souls of the children. If their own child is born with iron or bronze underneath, they must in no way pity it but value it according to its nature and thrust it out among the craftsmen or farmers. And again, if a child of these proves to have gold or silver underneath, they must value it accordingly and lead it up to the guardians or the auxiliaries.
>
> ἐστὲ μὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀδελφοί, ὡς φήσομεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς μυθολογοῦντες, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς πλάττων, ὅσοι μὲν ὑμῶν ἱκανοὶ ἄρχειν, χρυσὸν ἐν τῇ γενέσει συνέμειξεν αὐτοῖς, δι' ὃ τιμιώτατοί εἰσιν· ὅσοι δ' ἐπίκουροι, ἄργυρον· σίδηρον δὲ καὶ χαλκὸν τοῖς τε γεωργοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς. ἅτε οὖν συγγενεῖς ὄντες πάντες τὸ μὲν πολὺ ὁμοίους ἂν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς γεννῷτε, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἐκ χρυσοῦ γεννηθείη ἂν ἀργυροῦν καὶ ἐξ ἀργυροῦ χρυσοῦν ἔκγονον καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτως ἐξ ἀλλήλων. τοῖς οὖν ἄρχουσι καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα παραγγέλλει ὁ θεός, ὅπως μηδενὸς οὕτω φύλακες ἀγαθοὶ ἔσονται μηδ' οὕτω σφόδρα φυλάξουσι μηδὲν ὡς τοὺς ἐκγόνους, ὅτι αὐτοῖς τούτων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς παραμέμεικται. καὶ ἐάν τε σφέτερος ἔκγονος ὑπόχαλκος ἢ ὑποσίδηρος γένηται, μηδενὶ τρόπῳ κατελεήσουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῇ φύσει προσήκουσαν τιμὴν ἀποδόντες ὤσουσιν εἰς δημιουργοὺς ἢ εἰς γεωργούς, καὶ ἂν αὖ ἐκ τούτων τις ὑπόχρυσος ἢ ὑπάργυρος φύῃ, τιμήσαντες ἀνάξουσι τοὺς μὲν εἰς φυλακήν, τοὺς δὲ εἰς ἐπικουρίαν.

Socrates' effort to justify rule by the golden is a clear attempt to reduce the danger of *stasis* among the various social classes in Kallipolis. His subsequent move to outlaw traditional families and private property among the guardians is an effort to reduce *stasis* within that group as well. In banning these things, he eliminates the sorts of prizes that Greek tradition awarded to elite victors: marriages, prestige objects, money. Finally, by highlighting the burdens of rule Socrates seeks to render victory itself undesirable.

The 'noble lie' reflects the precarious nature of Kallipolis's attempt to split the effects of competition, enjoying some while rejecting others. As the verb παραμέμεικται ('have been mixed') and the adjectives ὑπόχαλκος ('bronze underneath'), ὑποσίδηρος ('iron underneath'), ὑπόχρυσος ('gold underneath'), and ὑπάργυρος ('silver underneath') indicate, citizens are often made up of different metallic admixtures.[17] Decades of training, observation, and selection will therefore be required to identify and train the guardians, ensuring their commitment to dialectic rather than eristic. As Socrates tells Glaucon, 'we must observe them [i.e., the candidates] at each point of their lives' (δοκεῖ δή μοι τηρητέον αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἡλικίαις, 412e4–5).[18] He repeatedly describes the process with terminology borrowed from competitive contexts.[19] And he claims that those who successfully complete the training 'will live a life yet more blessed than the most blessed one—that of the Olympic champions' (ζήσουσί τε τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου ὃν οἱ ὀλυμπιονῖκαι ζῶσιν μακαριώτερον, 465d3–4). Although its guardians are the ultimate agonistic victors, neither statues nor *epinikia* ('victory odes') will mark their triumph: Kallipolis wants to conceal rather than celebrate the fact.

Socrates' refashioning of Hesiod's metals creates an unavoidable by-product. Although he emphasizes the brotherhood of all the citizens of Kallipolis, his talk of gold and silver, bronze and iron nevertheless strengthens the value distinctions among them. The metaphor he uses to describe their educational vetting is telling: 'we must place youths amid various fears, and then transfer them again into pleasures, testing them much more than gold in fire' (εἰς δείματ' ἄττα κομιστέον καὶ εἰς ἡδονὰς αὖ μεταβλητέον, βασανίζοντας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσὸν ἐν πυρί, 413d9–e1). Several lines later he reiterates that 'the one who is continually tested in childhood, youth, and manhood, and who always comes out pure, should be made ruler and guardian of the city' (καὶ τὸν ἀεὶ ἔν τε παισὶ καὶ νεανίσκοις καὶ ἐν ἀνδράσι βασανιζόμενον καὶ ἀκήρατον ἐκβαίνοντα καταστατέον ἄρχοντα τῆς πόλεως καὶ φύλακα, 413e5–414a2). Two participles from the verb βασανίζω (413e1, 413e6) and the adjective ἀκήρατον (414a1) emphasize that Kallipolis's citizens are indeed like metals: they must be tested, measured against external

17 The fact that the terms ὑπόχαλκος and ὑποσίδηρος come first in the series suggests that these types occur more frequently than the ὑπόχρυσος and and ὑπάργυρος.

18 The word ἡλικίαι ('stages of life') also recalls the frequent separation of contenders by age cohort.

19 E.g., 'we must establish tasks for them and observe them from childhood' (τηρητέον δὴ εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων προθεμένοις ἔργα, Pl. *Resp.* 413c7–8); 'we must set labors and trials and competitions for them' (καὶ πόνους γε αὖ καὶ ἀλγηδόνας καὶ ἀγῶνας αὐτοῖς θετέον, 413d4–5); 'we must make a competition' (ἅμιλλαν ποιητέον, 413d7).

criteria, and ranked accordingly, revealing their composition in the process.[20] Kallipolis's testing thus recreates the 'triple discourse of status, place, and self' (Kurke 1999, 48) familiar from archaic Greek imagery involving metals. It likewise marks the return of traditional notions of heritable excellence that underlay the oligarchic coup of 411 and the rule of Thirty Tyrants.[21] Kallipolis's social order ultimately rests upon inequality as much as equality: some citizens are intrinsically more valuable than others.

3 Polemarchus's Metic Mettle

While based on Hesiod's 'myth of ages' Socrates' 'noble lie' also borrowed from another prominent mythic notion, that of autochthony. Speaking of Kallipolis's sorting and training regimen Socrates says (414d2–e5):

> I shall attempt to persuade first the rulers and the soldiers, and then the rest of the city, with regard to how we raised and taught them, that, as in dreams, they imagined that they had experienced all these things, and that they actually happened to them, but in truth they themselves were at that time being formed and reared beneath the ground, both themselves and their weapons and all their craftsmen's gear, and after they were entirely finished, it was actually the land, their mother, who sent them forth. [And I shall attempt to persuade them] to deliberate about the land where they are and defend it as if it were their mother and nurse, and if anyone assaults it, to consider all the other citizens their autochthonous brothers.

> ἐπιχειρήσω πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας πείθειν καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν, ὡς ἄρ ἃ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὺς ἐτρέφομέν τε καὶ ἐπαιδεύομεν, ὥσπερ ὀνείρατα ἐδόκουν ταῦτα πάντα πάσχειν τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτούς, ἦσαν δὲ τότε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὑπὸ γῆς ἐντὸς πλαττόμενοι καὶ τρεφόμενοι, καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ ὅπλα αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ἄλλη σκευὴ δημιουργουμένη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ παντελῶς ἐξειργασμένοι ἦσαν, καὶ ἡ γῆ αὐτοὺς μήτηρ οὖσα ἀνῆκεν, καὶ νῦν δὴ ὡς περὶ

20 The metallic metaphor is repeated at Pl. *Resp.* 502e3–503a7. On the methods of testing metals in ancient Greece see Fraenkel 1950, 2.202–204.

21 Rose 1992, 361 holds that 'Plato's primary discourse of *phusis* … emerges as the solution to the most explicitly posed and most comprehensive crisis envisioned in the *Republic*, namely the question of justice'.

> μητρὸς καὶ τροφοῦ τῆς χώρας ἐν ᾗ εἰσι βουλεύεσθαί τε καὶ ἀμύνειν αὐτούς, ἐάν τις ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἴῃ, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν ὡς ἀδελφῶν ὄντων καὶ γηγενῶν διανοεῖσθαι.

Several of the details Socrates mentions when introducing the myth, including its purportedly Phoenician origin (414c4) and its warriors springing up armed from the ground, invite comparison with Thebes and the story of Cadmus (Saxonhouse 1986, 255). But the earth-born brothers of Socrates' new city, the γηγενεῖς (414e4), arguably have more in common with Athens and the descendants of Erichthonius.[22]

From time immemorial the Athenians had grounded their citizenship in their ostensibly uninterrupted possession of Attica.[23] With the gradual increase of population during the sub-Mycenaean and Iron Ages they began to demarcate and farm the land with increased vigor (Forsdyke 2006, 347). Under Solon the relationship between citizen and soil was codified in law: the *pentecosiomedimnoi* ('500-bushel men'), *hippeis* ('horsemen'), and *zeugitai* ('yokemen') categories of his census all employed agricultural terms and measures and made Athenian-ness directly proportional to land ownership (van Wees 2006, 352–360). This association eventually flowered in the myth of citizen autochthony. Originally a means of promoting unity among citizens of the young democracy, the myth had the additional effect of strengthening differences between citizens and non-citizens (Rosivach 1987, 301). When immigration to Attica surged following the Persian Wars, these differences, both real and imagined, assumed yet greater importance (Bakewell 2013, 53–54).

According to the myth of authochthony, citizens were the descendants of the land they inhabited, whereas non-citizens were not. This distinction found expression in practical ways. While the stereotypical citizen was a farmer, most metics were artisans and traders. Citizens were permitted to own land and houses; metics were not (Hennig 1994, 305). As a result many citizens lived in the country, with metics often forced to rent dwellings among their own kind in the urbanized areas of the upper city and Piraeus (Whitehead 1986, 82–85). All these differences were crystalized in one's affective stance towards Attica. According to one popular stereotype, citizens were willing to die for their land whereas metics thought that home was where the wallet was (Bakewell 1999, 10).

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22 On Erichthonius see Loraux 1993, 37–41.

23 Thuc. 1.2.5.

The notion of homogeneity was linked to that of autochthony. As Loraux (1993, 45) notes, 'the *polis*, an indivisible unity, … [owed] its authority to the effacement of its *andres*, valiant citizen-soldiers but identical and interchangeable'. Unlike the autochthonous Athenian citizens, however, the inhabitants of Socrates' Kallipolis are far from interchangeable. Although all are nominally citizens, and they are taught to regard one another as brothers, the 'noble lie' is predicated upon their essential difference. Unlike the agrarian categories of the Solonian census, Kallipolis's hierarchical divisions are metallurgical. Historically speaking, working with ore had long been the province of noncitizens. Slaves were the primary miners at Laureion (Jones 2007, 279). Those who smelted and refined ore, and made or shaped metals, were often slaves or metics.[24] Some worked at the mint in the southeast corner of the agora.[25] Others were heavily represented among the bankers and moneychangers active nearby. The servile 'currency tester' (δοκιμαστὴς ὁ δημόσιος) was required to take his seat there as well, 'among the tables' (μεταξὺ τῶν τραπεζῶν; with Stroud 1974, 165–166). Kallipolis's metallic hierarchy calls to mind the social divisions of classical Athens.[26]

According to Socrates' myth, children's psychic amalgams ordinarily resemble those of their parents (415a7–8). In this regard Kallipolis draws heavily upon classical Athenian law. Just as golden children come from two golden parents, silver from two silver, and so forth, so too Pericles' law of 451–450 BCE had defined Athenian citizens as those born to two Athenian parents.[27] Although not strictly enforced during the manpower crises of the Peloponnesian War, the law was subsequently reaffirmed and remained in effect down past the *Republic*'s date of composition (Rhodes 1981, 496). Moreover, Socrates has the rulers of Kallipolis go to great lengths to prevent sexual intercourse between members of different metallic classes (458c6–d2). Living situations and selections for mating, festivals and fictive lotteries are all geared to preventing intermarriage and possible children (459d8–460c6). In this regard they are probably modeled on a historical Athenian law barring marriages between citizens and metics.[28] These deceptive arrangements are part and parcel of the 'noble lie'.

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24 Pipili 2000, 153–162 discusses the depiction of metalworkers on Attic vases. She notes that 'debased poses and objectionable physical characteristics are often combined with the [skull]cap as visual markers of these workmen's humble status' (156).

25 On the mint's production of bronze coinage see Camp and Kroll 2001.

26 At Pl. *Resp.* 450b4–5 Thrasymachus jokingly asks Socrates whether he thinks those present have come to smelt gold rather than listen to arguments (τί δέ; … χρυσοχοήσοντας οἴει τούσδε νῦν ἐνθάδε ἀφῖχθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγων ἀκουσομένους;).

27 On the oft-discussed law see now Blok 2009.

28 The law is cited in [Demosthenes] *Against Neaera* (59.16). See Kapparis 1999, 199–206.

Despite Kallipolis's considerable precautions, Socrates nevertheless admits that there will be exceptions to his Mendelian law of metals: occasionally children turn out to be made of different stuff than their parents (415b1–3). But these anomalies do not invalidate his system. On the contrary, they lend impetus to the rulers' most important task, namely, the testing of the souls of the city's children. The guardians must vigilantly uphold this variation on the practice of infant exposure while simultaneously watching to rescue golden or silver children born to baser parents.[29] In short, despite the fundamental importance of maintaining Kallipolis's rigid metallic castes,[30] Socrates foresees the need for a limited amount of social mobility. The presence of too many individuals with unrecognized merit, or too many taxed beyond their abilities, could create *stasis* and destabilize the city.

One measure of Plato's skill as a dramatist[31] is that his best works sometimes show their primary features in action.[32] This is arguably the case in the *Republic*, where the treatment of Polemarchus offers a case study in how Kallipolis's testing and sorting mechanisms might work: when drawn across the streak plate of his interlocutors the young man reveals his true color.[33] As Gifford (2001, 75) notes, Socrates' initial investigation into whether justice truly consists in speaking the truth and paying one's debts (331c1) is superbly molded to fit the occasion. When Polemarchus agrees to the proposition, Socrates responds with the question of whether it is just to return weapons to a crazed friend. In so doing he pointedly attacks the lucrative business activities of Polemarchus and his family: 'the giving of weapons to "madmen" is precisely the activity to which [they] had dedicated a large part of [their] actual life'. The shields and other weaponry[34] produced by their factory armed Athens's warriors, who then maintained and expanded the city's dominion over others.[35] Perhaps wounded by Socrates' remark Polemarchus rephrases his position into

29 On the interesting possibility of a posthumous upgrade see Pl. *Resp.* 468e5–8. Cf. Thuc. 2.42.2.

30 See also Pl. *Resp.* 546e1–547a6.

31 For this characteristic of Plato see Blondell 2002, 13–47.

32 Lebeck 1972, 267 claims that *Phaedrus* actually 'is what it discusses, exemplifies what it advocates'.

33 For general considerations regarding Plato's use of historical figures in his work see Nails 2002, 307–308.

34 Gifford 2001, 75 n. 55 argues that 'by opting for ὅπλα instead of the singular ὅπλον [at Pl. *Resp.* 331c6] Plato was able to exploit the fact that the plural form also refers to the entire ensemble of articles comprising the hoplite's "battle gear" (i.e., arms and armour)'.

35 On Plato's ongoing concern with Athenian maritime imperialism see Morgan 1998, 114–118.

a more general statement: justice consists in giving back to each person his due (331e3–4). And he soon yields the floor to Thrasymachus, who angrily interrupts and continues the argument.[36] Polemarchus thus begins the *Republic* marked as someone born into a producer family: his wealthy father is as φιλοχρήματος as they come. Until now Polemarchus has led a largely apolitical life.[37] But when questioned by Socrates the young man demonstrates an unexpected aptitude for greater things.

Plato lays the groundwork for Polemarchus' elevation carefully. As we saw earlier, the festival of Bendis provided the occasion for Socrates' trip to Piraeus. While 'the parade of the demesmen seemed [to him] beautiful, that sent by the Thracians was no less distinguished' (καλὴ μὲν οὖν μοι καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπὴ ἔδοξεν εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι ἧττον ἐφαίνετο πρέπειν ἣν οἱ Θρᾷκες ἔπεμπον, 327a4–b1). Wijma (2014) has shown that from the mid-sixth century onward Athens hosted a substantial Thracian contingent whose number and influence increased with time. According to her, 'when we think about the Thracians who brought Bendis to Athens, we should rather focus on Thracian metics, who probably constituted a large middle group between the many slaves, on the one hand, and the Thracian princesses, on the other'.[38] The very first paragraph of the *Republic* thus begins with an explicit comparison between the competitive accomplishments of citizens from Piraeus (ἐπιχώριοι, 327a4) and those of metics. This is crucial because Polemarchus, like the Bendis-worshipping Thracians, was himself a metic. His father had come to Athens in the late 450s seeking economic opportunity (Nails 2002, 84). Like Cephalus his sons had accepted ongoing political and legal restrictions in return for the chance to live and work in Attica.[39]

Socrates' subsequent encounter with Polemarchus emphasizes further the citizen-metic division already visible in the celebration of the Bendideia. The festival takes place in Piraeus, on the metic's home turf.[40] A citizen has descended to a different world, been grabbed from behind, and prevented from returning to the upper city. He has thus been detained far from the more civi-

36 White 1995, 308 argues persuasively that Thrasymachus was in town to speak 'on behalf of his native Chalcedon after an unsuccessful revolt from Athens'. A thinly veiled allusion to Athens's empire would make his subsequent impatience all the more understandable.

37 Had Polemarchus been politically involved, Lysias would certainly have mentioned his brother's accomplishments when recounting his family's services to the city (12.20).

38 Wijma 2014, 131–132, who notes that Thracian metics historically attested in Attica include a shoemaker, a wreathmaker, a perfumer, a potter, and a greengrocer.

39 Whitehead 1977, 18 implies that *metoikia* ('resident alien status') often entailed this type of bargain.

40 According to Whitehead 1986, 83, Piraeus was home to one of the largest concentrations of metics. On the antithesis between the upper city and the port see von Reden 1995.

lized precincts of Acropolis and agora. Political processes and reasoned argument may hold sway in the *bouleutêrion* ('council building') and Pnyx, but what matters in Piraeus is strength; the law offers no protection when a pair of peaceful citizens are accosted by a non-citizen and his slave.[41] Our first glimpse of Polemarchus reveals a metic hostile to the operation of the λογιστικόν ('reasoning element').[42]

The men eventually move to Polemarchus's house.[43] Upon entering they find a number of others within, including Cephalus and Polemarchus's brothers Lysias and Euthydemus; the Athenians Charmantides and Cleitophon; and Thrasymachus from Chalcedon (328b4–8). Juridically speaking, the gathering is a motley affair, with metics, citizens, and a foreigner intermingled. Moreover, while (the narrator) Socrates describes Thrasymachus with his ethnic (Καλχεδόνιος) and Charmantides with his demotic (Παιανιᾶ), he identifies the other men in pre-Cleisthenic fashion, that is, by patronymic and family relationship rather than civic status. The gathering is thus an occasion where political distinctions are jumbled together and juridical designations elided; the men present need to be separated and set in order according to their natures.[44]

Topographically speaking, Socrates' trip to Piraeus was a 'descent' (κατέβην, 327a1). But it was also a true *katabasis*: the house of Polemarchus is haunted by specters.[45] Not many years after the *Republic*'s dramatic date, and prior to its date of composition, two of the work's characters, Polemarchus and Niceratus, were executed by the Thirty.[46] Thrasymachus's heated insistence in *Republic* 1 that justice is simply the advantage of the stronger (338c2–3) perhaps reminded readers of the circumstances surrounding the deaths of these men. And not long after the restoration of the democracy Socrates was famously convicted of impiety and put to death on questionable charges. Plato uses to considerable effect these three characters living on borrowed time. For one thing, their com-

41 Polemarchus's confrontation with Socrates foreshadows his own subsequent seizure by the Thirty.

42 On supposed metic hostility to democratic persuasion see Bakewell 2013, 40–47.

43 As a metic, Polemarchus would ordinarily have been prohibited from owning a house. Yet according to Lysias (12.18), in 404 their family had not one but three houses at its disposal. Perhaps Polemarchus, like the goddess Bendis, had received a grant of *enktesis* ('permission to own immovable property'). On this possibility see Gifford 2001, 57. But Polemarchus may also have controlled rather than owned the property, working through citizen fronts (on the later case of Epicurus see Leiwo and Remes 1999).

44 On 'free spaces' in ancient Athens see Vlassopoulos 2007, 38.

45 Howland 1993, 43 argues that 'Socrates' journey to the Piraeus is to be understood as a metaphorical descent into the underworld'.

46 As in the case of Polemarchus, wealth may have played a role in Niceratus' death: see Nails 2002, 211–212.

mon fate shows that oligarchies and democracies alike define justice in their own interest and use violence to achieve their ends: a different sort of government altogether is thus called for.[47] Second, their impending deaths remind the reader that apparently arcane philosophical arguments can have *grave* ramifications. Finally, they suggest that in conventional cities, distinctions between citizens and metics are largely arbitrary.

Soon after Socrates enters, Cephalus greets him and invites him to visit more often; the two then fall to discussing the uses of the metic's considerable wealth. Cephalus says that his riches are principally helpful for living rightly, that is, for telling the truth and paying his debts. But when Socrates probes further, Mr. Capital loses interest.[48] He excuses himself, names Polemarchus his heir (κληρονόμος, 331d9), and proceeds toward the sacrifices (πρὸς τὰ ἱερά, 331d10). His departure is akin to death, and Socrates steps in as a second father to the orphaned Polemarchus, questioning him under the gaze of the other men present.[49] In true Kallipolean fashion, communal supervision of the younger man by his elders has replaced the biological tie between father and son.

Polemarchus's adoption is immediately followed by a test of his philosophical acumen. According to some scholars, he comes up short: his account of justice in *Republic* 1 proves inadequate, whereupon he is replaced by Thrasymachus as the primary interlocutor. Annas, for one, judges his performance harshly (1981, 30):

> Polemarchus has accepted justice as a set of rules governing a not very basic part of his life, and the result is that he has an unreflective and external attitude to them, and they are not integrated with the way he actually lives. No wonder his beliefs about justice collapse at the first query.

To Annas's argument one might add that Polemarchus largely disappears following the end of *Republic* 1. Glaucon and Adeimantus take over the argument with Socrates; to all appearances, the citizen sons of Ariston have bested the metic son of Cephalus and the foreigner from Chalcedon.[50]

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47 Gifford 2001, 96 notes that 'Polemarchus and the oligarchs that killed him were both scrupulously following the very same crudely self-interested and fully partisan principle of helping friends and harming enemies'.

48 For this financial meaning of κεφάλαιος see *LSJ s.v.* I.5.

49 Prior to departing, Cephalus encourages Socrates to treat his sons as his own relatives (φίλους τε καὶ πάνυ οἰκείους, Pl. *Resp.* 328d7).

50 Rose 1992, 353 claims that 'Plato's own brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantos ... and by implication Plato himself constitute the primary paradigmatic demonstration of the continued validity of aristocratic *phusis*'.

Yet Annas's verdict on Polemarchus is too critical. While he speaks but once in the subsequent dialogue, his lone remark proves crucial.[51] Just as his appearance near the Bendideion launched the party central to the *Republic*, so too his reemergence at the start of *Republic* 5 sets the direction for the work's second half (449b1–6):

> But Polemarchus—for he was sitting near Adeimantus—stretched out his hand and caught the shoulder of his cloak from above, and pulled him toward himself, and bending forward whispered some things to him, of which we heard nothing except 'Are we going to let it go, or do something?'
>
> ὁ δὲ Πολέμαρχος, σμικρὸν γὰρ ἀπωτέρω τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου καθῆστο, ἐκτείνας τὴν χεῖρα καὶ λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου ἄνωθεν αὐτοῦ παρὰ τὸν ὦμον, ἐκεῖνόν τε προσηγάγετο καὶ προτείνας ἑαυτὸν ἔλεγεν ἄττα προσκεκυφώς, ὧν ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν κατηκούσαμεν, τόδε δέ· Ἀφήσομεν οὖν, ἔφη, ἢ τί δράσομεν;

At first glance Polemarchus's actions here reprise those at the beginning of *Republic* 1. He is again responsible for grabbing a citizen's cloak and again contemplates applying coercion to Socrates. But closer inspection reveals important differences. To understand the progress that Polemarchus and the discussion have made in the interval, we must consider briefly the role that *erôs* ('passionate love') plays in the work, in light of the broader Platonic corpus. When Polemarchus first halted Socrates in *Republic* 1, he sought to influence him with carrot as well as stick, citing a number of enticements for remaining in Piraeus (328a7–9): 'we will get up after the meal and watch the nighttime festival. And we will hook up with many of the youths there and have some good "conversation"' (ἐξαναστησόμεθα γὰρ μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ τὴν παννυχίδα θεασόμεθα. καὶ συνεσόμεθά τε πολλοῖς τῶν νέων αὐτόθι καὶ διαλεξόμεθα). According to Wijma (2014, 142), the *pannukchis* ('nocturnal festival') probably involved not only the torch-race on horseback but also choruses of maidens and perhaps women singing and dancing to honor the goddess. The cover of night, flashes of fire, and rhythmic motions of youthful bodies would undoubtedly create a sensual atmosphere. Polemarchus's language is accordingly rich with double-entendre. Σύνειμι, the verb he uses to describe 'being with' the young men, can certainly have the anodyne meanings of 'live with' and 'associate with'.[52] But in

51 Even Strauss, no fan of Polemarchus, admits that '[he] is more important for the action of the *Republic* than one might desire' (1964, 123).

52 *LSJ s.v.* II.1, II.3.

his speech in the *Symposium* Agathon uses the same verb suggestively, noting that the god Eros 'is himself young and constantly attends young men' (μετὰ δὲ νέων ἀεὶ σύνεστί τε καὶ ἔστιν, 195b4). The verb is also 'the standard euphemism for intercourse' and frequently employed that way in comedy (Henderson 1991, 159). Moreover, διαλέγεσθαι, the verb Polemarchus uses to denote the longed-for 'conversations', admits of similarly broad application. While its most common meanings are to 'hold converse with' and 'practice dialectic', it also occurs in Aristophanes, Hyperides, and Plutarch as another euphemism for intercourse.[53] According to Henderson (1991, 155), it has a 'rather harsh tone' in Aristophanes.[54] At the outset of the *Republic* Polemarchus's language thus suggests that he has a wholly physical, even crass view of love. Given the dialogue's setting in Piraeus, he could easily be ranked among those coarse men described by Socrates in the *Phaedrus*, who, 'having been raised among sailors, have not seen a truly free love' (ἐν ναύταις που τεθραμμένων καὶ οὐδένα ἐλεύθερον ἔρωτα ἑωρακότων, Pl. *Phdr*. 243c7–8).

But all is not lost. According to Socrates' account in the *Symposium* of Diotima's speech, even corporeal attraction can be the start of something greater and more noble. Put in her terms, Polemarchus is a worthy candidate for initiation into the mysteries of Eros. His appreciation of young men's physical charms has prepared him for the next stage in the process, when initiates (Pl. *Symp*. 210b6–c4)

> learn that the beauty in souls is more valuable than that of the body, with the result that, if someone who is lovely in soul has little in the way of blossom, that is enough for him to love and care for, and to beget such talk as will make young men better, so that he may be compelled in turn to behold the beauty in customs and laws.
>
> τὸ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κάλλος τιμιώτερον ἡγήσασθαι τοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι, ὥστε καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιεικὴς ὢν τὴν ψυχήν τις κἂν σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ, ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ κήδεσθαι καὶ τίκτειν λόγους τοιούτους οἵτινες ποιήσουσι βελτίους τοὺς νέους, ἵνα ἀναγκασθῇ αὖ θεάσασθαι τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καλόν.

This is precisely the point Polemarchus has reached at the beginning of *Republic* 5. The sort of nocturnal encounters he alluded to in *Republic* 1 have been explicitly criticized by Socrates and Glaucon (Pl. *Resp*. 403a–b) and replaced

53 *LSJ s.v.* I.1, I.2; cf. I.5.

54 Henderson 1991, 155. He translates the imperative διαλέγου at Ar. *Eccl*. 890 as 'screw yourself'.

by speeches about how to improve people's souls, especially those of budding guardians. The bulk of *Republic* 2–4 could fairly be characterized as an exposition of the perverse beauty inherent in the customs and laws (τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις) of Kallipolis. As his remark to Adeimantus at the beginning of *Republic* 5 shows, Polemarchus has been listening intently and is eager to hear more. Soon afterward Socrates describes the philosopher's relationship with the truth in explicitly sexual terms. Having understood the nature of each thing with that part of his soul most suited to the task and similar to it, the philosopher 'approaches and has intercourse with that which is, begetting reason and truth' (ᾧ πλησιάσας καὶ μιγεὶς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, 490b4–5). In the *Republic* the promise of one sort of διαλέγεσθαι is replaced by another: its interlocutors now chase truth, not youths.[55] If the *Phaedrus* is any evidence,[56] Polemarchus eventually ascended even farther up Diotima's ladder, turning to philosophy in a lasting way (211c2). And his conversation with Socrates and others that fateful evening in Piraeus may have marked the crucial moment in his initiation.[57]

4 Conclusion

The *Republic* depicts significant steps in the formation of a philosophical community, with particular attention to the management of Eris therein. Thrasymachus's angry eristic is replaced by the discourse of interlocutors seeking truth, while Polemarchus's erroneous views on love begin to shift. These changes result in substantial part from the kind of collections and divisions that Plato elsewhere characterizes as constituting true dialectic.[58] For instance, in their conversation at 403a7–b2 Socrates and Glaucon repeatedly distinguish between love proper (e.g., ὁ ὀρθὸς ἔρως, Pl. *Resp*. 403a11) and related yet different phenomena. Likewise, the figure of the Divided Line is an attempt to clarify

55 According to Halperin 1986, 73, Plato's language typically emphasizes 'the active, restless character of the desire that is common to the passionate paederast and the aspiring philosopher'.

56 At Pl. *Phdr*. 257b2–4 Socrates prays that Eros will put an end to Lysias's writing of offensive speeches and turn him toward philosophy, as the god has already done with his brother Polemarchus (Λυσίαν τὸν τοῦ λόγου πατέρα αἰτιώμενος παῦε τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν δέ, ὥσπερ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Πολέμαρχος τέτραπται, τρέψον).

57 Howland 2004 argues that Plato's treatment of Polemarchus in *Republic* 1 is meant as a corrective to what Lysias says about his brother in *Against Eratosthenes* (Lys. 12).

58 E.g., Pl. *Plt*. 285b; see also *Soph*. 253d, *Phdr*. 262b.

the relationships between understanding, thought, belief, and conjecture (νόησις, διάνοια, πίστις, εἰκασία, 511d8–e2). The *Republic*'s emphasis on separating the bad effects of competition from the good is similarly dialectical. Those who engage in argument only to triumph create *stasis* that hurts the community, as do those whose false views about *erôs* harm themselves and others. The 'noble lie' simultaneously illustrates and conceals the work of philosophers engaged in the work of collection and division as it applies to individual souls. Put in terms historical rather than philosophical, the guardians function as *dokimastai* ('currency testers'): they constantly scrutinize the metal of Kallipolis's citizens, determining what they are made of and how they may be spent.[59] In the course of the *Republic* we see one such identification performed on Polemarchus. Born into a family of metic producers, in his encounter with Socrates he proves different from his brazen father. Eschewing Cephalus's monied ways he acquires a taste for philosophical conversation and places his erotic drive in the service of dialectic. Although he is not suited to become one of Kallipolis's rulers, he nevertheless merits a place among its auxiliaries. Earlier in *Republic* 1 Socrates stated that it is never just to harm anyone (335e5). After Polemarchus agrees to this controversial proposition, Socrates states that 'we will thus fight on the same side, you and I' (μαχούμεθα ἄρα … κοινῇ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, 335e8).[60] Socrates has apparently spotted in Polemarchus the gleam of finer mettle that he is always seeking in his conversations with young men. His host is like someone made of silver after all (ὑπάργυρος), and he is prepared to stand at the side of his philosopher-king: 'I for one am ready to share the battle' (ἐγὼ γοῦν … ἕτοιμός εἰμι κοινωνεῖν τῆς μάχῆς, 335e11). Once a metic, Polemarchus now takes his place in the hoplite phalanx alongside a citizen:[61] the young Warlord has grown into his name.[62]

59 On the *dokimastai* see Stroud 1974. At Athens these figures were public slaves; in Kallipolis the guardians are likewise wholly at the city's disposal.

60 At 534c1 Socrates relates the attempt to define the form of the good via dialectic to the experience of battle (ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ).

61 Metic hoplites occasionally saw field duty in classical Athens (e.g., the invasion of the Megarid in 431 BCE, where they probably had their own contingent (Thuc. 2.31.2)), but more often served as garrison troops. On Socrates' brave service in difficult combats, including Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium, see Nails 2002, 264–265.

62 *Cratylus* begins (383b–384c) with a consideration of whether Hermogenes' name truly suits him. On Plato's interest in etymologies, personal and otherwise, see Sedley 1998.

5 Historical Epilogue

Polemarchus's metallic upgrade should not obscure Kallipolis's strong preference for hereditary hierarchy as a means of preventing *stasis*. For every person whose upward mobility might benefit the city, there are many more who firmly belong in the categories assigned them by birth, and whose ambitions should be dampened rather than excited. In this regard Kallipolis is not so much revolutionary as reactionary, despite its novel social practices. This is evident in the way the turbulent political history of late fifth- and early fourth-century Athens frames the *Republic*. Plato sets his treatment of justice against the backdrop of tyranny in both the argument and real life. We saw above how Polemarchus's impending death, fully known to readers, summons the specter of the Thirty. But the route taken by Socrates and Glaucon from the upper city down to Piraeus does so as well.[63] The pair probably followed a cart track running just outside the Northern Long Wall, entering the port through the *Asty* gate.[64] Much of their route thus matched that taken by Thrasybulus and his supporters in their move from Phyle to Piraeus, and by the Thirty and their supporters in pursuit shortly thereafter.[65] And their destination, Munychia, hosted not only the festival to Bendis but also the climactic battle between oligarchs and democrats in 403.[66] Polemarchus's brother Lysias, quietly present throughout the *Republic*, played an important role in these events,[67] as did many other metics.[68] So conspicuous were their examples of civic merit that, following the

63 According to Gifford 2001, 59 n. 31, 'the opening scene contains clues which were meant to remind an early 4th-century audience of events surrounding the Athenian stasis of 404–403'.

64 On the cart track see Garland 1987, 144–145. While Corcoran 2016, 28 holds that the men followed a route between the Long Walls, this is unlikely. The *Republic* contains no mention of a military threat to Athens, making the extramural route feasible and arguably more pleasant. (On Socrates' occasional attraction to a stroll outside the city walls see Pl. *Phdr*. 230b–c. On his choice of an extramural route to reach the Lyceum from the Academy in *Lysis* see Planeaux 2001.) Moreover, the influx of people within the city following the outbreak of war in 431 had led to dense settlement in the area of the Long Walls (Thuc. 2.17.3): an intramural route, if passable, would have been longer and more involved.

65 Xen. *Hell*. 2.4.10.

66 Xen. *Hell*. 2.4.11. On Plato's interest in politics as a young man, and the prominence of his relatives and acquaintances among the oligarchs, see *Epist*. 7.324b–d.

67 Nails 2002, 192. On Lysias's political inclinations see Dover 1968, 48–56.

68 According to Taylor 2002, 396, non-Athenians constituted some 40 % of Thrasybulus's original hundred-plus supporters at Phyle. On Osborne's interpretation (1982, 41–42) of IG II 2.10, approximately 70–90 of the roughly 1000 men who marched to Piraeus were non-Athenian.

democratic victory, Lysias argued that while some metics had behaved like stalwart citizens during the crisis, some citizens had acted like stereotypical metics.[69] That he could do so openly, before a jury composed entirely of Athenian citizens, is telling. Even so, Thrasybulus's proposal to enfranchise his valiant metic supporters ended in failure. Archinus, the man who blocked it with a *graphê paranomon*, subsequently introduced a far less generous measure that became law. Under its terms all the non-Athenians who claimed to have come down from Phyle with Thrasybulus and who survived a careful vetting received not citizenship but rather a block grant of cash with which to accomplish sacrifices and dedications. Each man's share was paltry, consisting of an olive wreath and less than ten drachmas.[70] According to Taylor (2002, 396), Archinus's explicit message was that 'we Athenians will acknowledge and honor the foreigners who helped us restore Athens to democracy, but we shall not make them part of ourselves. The "indigenous *demos* of the Athenians" will not be sullied'. But Archinus was at least forthright about his feelings. Socrates, by contrast, is willing to lie to support the birth-based social hierarchy of Kallipolis. On those rare occasions when its competitive testing program reveals a metallic mismatch such as Polemarchus, the crucial question is whether a reclassification will benefit the city: if so, his 'myth of metals' allows the city to reduce the risk of *stasis* by handling the results quietly and in house.[71]

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69 Lys. 12.20, 31.29; see Bakewell 1999.

70 Aeschin. 3.187. In exchange for risking his life, each man received less than a citizen did for serving on a jury or pulling an oar for twenty days.

71 I thank the editors and referees for their helpful suggestions. References to and quotations from the *Republic* are based on Slings 2003; English translations are my own.

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CHAPTER 6

Competition and Innovation in Aristotle, *Politics* 2

Inger N.I. Kuin

1 Introduction

The idea for this article arose around the time Donald Trump announced his 2016 presidential bid, which he would undertake using the slogan 'Make America Great Again'. The appeal of his motto lay arguably in its patriotic tone and its promise of a return to an undefined, nostalgic version of America, offering change without innovation. Even the slogan itself was not new: Reagan used it in 1980. The premise of the 2016 campaign strategy was that voters had become suspicious of political innovation. Because of the changes to the country during the past decades some Americans no longer felt at home; Trump's campaign responded by offering to return to them their home, the America of old.

The 'Make America Great Again' slogan appears to echo some defining features of ancient political thought, which was characterized by conservatism, nostalgia, and patriotism.[1] The Romans' professed regard for the *mos maiorum* and the Athenians' attachment to Solon's laws are obvious examples of the conservative bent of politics in antiquity. Another example that seems to corroborate the conservative orientation of ancient political thought is Aristotle's rejection of Hippodamus in *Politics* 2. Hippodamus of Miletus suggested in the fifth century BCE that a good way to spur political innovation might be to have citizens compete with one another in producing proposals for the benefit of the state. Aristotle criticizes this idea harshly and uses Hippodamus as the starting point for a discussion of the dangers of political innovation.

This article focuses on the competitive aspect of Hippodamus's plan. I propose that Aristotle rejects Hippodamus's idea precisely because it turns politics into a contest. Competition had negative and positive connotations—as the different approaches in this volume illustrate—but in the realm of politics it was thought to be particularly problematic because of its destabilizing potential. Curtailing or controlling competition between individual members and member groups was vital in antiquity for maintaining the strength of the political system. The 2011 volume on ancient competition edited by

1 On conservatism in ancient thought see Ker and Pieper 2014, esp. 1–22.

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Fisher and van Wees mentions several such attempts, from the neo-Assyrian and Aztec Empires to the Roman Republic.[2] In ancient Greek thought thriving cities derived their success from concord (*homonoia*), and competition was often viewed as problematic because it could easily escalate into strife (*stasis*), the ultimate destroyer of cities.[3] At the same time competitiveness and ambition were important features of life in the ancient Greek city. Competition inescapably played some part in politics as well, but, on account of the risks associated with it, had to be carefully managed.[4] Aristotle's criticism of Hippodamus is one instance of the efforts to do exactly that.

In suggesting that Aristotle criticizes Hippodamus's proposal primarily because of its competitive aspect, I also argue that *Politics* does not reject political change per se. According to Aristotle many laws have been altered for the better, and he implies that some political innovation is beneficial. The question is how such political innovation can best be achieved. I suggest that one possible answer to this problem is present, albeit implicitly, in Aristotle's *Politics*, namely, that in politics the new must be made to look old. The choice of titulature by *princeps senatus* Augustus is arguably among the most successful implementations of such a strategy in history: clothing his radically new role in the Roman state in the old title of *princeps* was a calculated and effective part of the policy of his early reign.[5] The contemporary example that I started this paper with is relevant to the ancient material because it illustrates well the allure of the past in politics and the reluctance to advocate change openly. However, the Augustan example and, as we will see, Aristotle's ideas are much more than a slogan. For them using the past is not (only) about appearances and expediency: the viability and stability of the system as a whole are at stake in the successful embedding of political innovations in existing structures.

This paper is organized as follows: I start with a discussion of Hippodamus's proposal as presented by Aristotle in *Politics* 2 (section 2). Next, I look at Aristotle's response to the competitive aspect of the proposal (section 3), and his approach to the problem of political innovation in general (section 4).

2 The neo-Assyrian kings promoted competition between the different contingents of the army to neutralize it and strengthen royal rule (Radner 2011). Failure to manage competition led to conflict in the Aztec Empire (Berdan 2011). The *centuria praerogativa* was a tool to manage competition among the elites of the Roman Republic (Mouritsen 2011).

3 Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1167b9–16; an absence of *homonoia* is also associated with *pleonexia* (see further below). On Aristotle's concern for unity in the city in *Politics* 2 see Kraut 2001. The *locus classicus* is Thuc. 3.82, where *philotimia*, 'love of honor', is the cause of *stasis*.

4 On attempts to manage competition in Plato see Bakewell in this volume.

5 See Wallace-Hadrill 1982 on the effectiveness of the *princeps* model in the early empire.

I then discuss Aristotle's strategy of anchoring political innovations in the familiar (section 5) and finally conclude with some new questions (section 6).

2 Hippodamus's Proposal

Hippodamus was an architect and city planner, and in antiquity he was best known for designing the grid for Piraeus.[6] In Aristotle we encounter him as a political theorist. Hippodamus's writings are not extant, and what we know about them we know from Aristotle, whose account suggests that the architect-philosopher wrote a fairly comprehensive blueprint for city government. Aristotle refers to Hippodamus's ideas as a 'constitution' (*taxis*, *Pol.* 1268a15) and mentions a number of substantive and wide-ranging proposals (*Pol.* 1267b30–1268a14): dividing the population into three classes (artisans, farmers, and warriors); dividing the land into the categories of sacred land, public farmland for the warriors, and private farmland for the farmers; restricting the scope of law to three areas (rape, damage, and homicide); instituting an appeals court composed of selected elders; allowing jurors to give a verdict of 'partially-guilty'; providing for war orphans at state expense; having the assembly elect the archons. It is clear that Hippodamus preferred to organize things into threes,[7] and his proposals seem to lean more towards democracy than towards oligarchy.

Hippodamus's plan for political innovation comes just before the provision about the war orphans (Arist. *Pol.* 1268a6–8):

> Moreover, he proposed a law that those who invented something of advantage to the city should obtain honor.
>
> ἔτι δὲ νόμον ἐτίθει περὶ τῶν εὑρισκόντων τι τῇ πόλει συμφέρον, ὅπως τυγχάνωσι τιμῆς.[8]

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6 How innovative Hippodamus's street design for Piraeus was has been subject to debate. He did not invent city grids, because evidence for those dates to the eighth century BCE. He may have used the grid pattern in an innovative way at Piraeus: see Burns 1976; Gehrke 1989; Gorman 1995.

7 Perhaps following Pythagorean number theory; see Saunders 1995, 140.

8 Translations from the Greek are my own throughout.

Giving all citizens a chance to think about the laws of the city, as a form of direct democracy, fits well with the rest of Hippodamus's political program. The phrase 'something of advantage to the city' need not denote innovations to the laws exclusively—it could also cover, for instance, military innovations—but Aristotle's subsequent discussion shows that he interprets Hippodamus's proposal in this narrow sense.

The proposal as presented by Aristotle clearly announces the two elements under investigation in this paper, innovation and competition. The verb *heuriskô* already in Aeschylus has the connotation of discovering something new;[9] a few lines earlier Aristotle used the same verb in this sense to introduce the topic of Hippodamus's proposal for a new constitution.[10] Nonetheless, we should keep in mind the ambiguity that is inherent in the verb *heuriskô*, which can describe both 'finding something that already exists' and 'finding something that does not yet exist', that is, 'discovering something'. Archimedes' legendary (*h*)*eureka*-moment postdates Aristotle by about a century.

The word 'honor' (*timê*), though it had a wide range of meaning, was often closely connected to competition.[11] Competition in complex societies has social status as its primary objective; depending on historical and cultural contexts this social status may in turn be used to increase wealth, power, or resources (van Wees 2011, 23–28). In ancient Greece men could attain honor by outdoing others in virtue, in courage, in the arts, in athletic achievement, etc.[12] The conflict between Achilles and Agamemnon in the *Iliad* has traditionally been interpreted as, at least in part, a reflection of the competition for honor between the aristocrats of the late Bronze Age. For the archaic period Pindar's victory odes establish *timê* as a key concept in the context of elite competition in athletic games. In classical Athens both athletic and artistic contests funded by liturgists rewarded citizens' competitiveness with honor, even if the battlefield continued to be an important venue for obtaining *timê* as well.[13]

9 Aesch. *PV* 467–468: θαλασσόπλαγκτα δ' οὔτις ἄλλος ἀντ' ἐμοῦ / λινόπτερ' ηὗρε ναυτίλων ὀχήματα.

10 Arist. *Pol.* 1267b22–23: ὃς καὶ τὴν τῶν πόλεων διαίρεσιν εὗρε; see Gorman 1995; *contra* Burns 1976 and Gehrke 1989, who interpret the phrase as referring to Hippodamus's city designs; see also the note above on city grids.

11 See Lendon 1997, 276–277. On Greek agonism see Ober 2015, 54–55 (with additional bibliography at 335 n. 12).

12 See Bierl, Steiner, Taplin, Rosen, de Jonge, and Zadorojnyi in this volume.

13 For *timê* in Homer generally see Riedinger 1976; on *timê* and competition in the *Iliad* see, e.g., Whitmarsh 2004, 44–46 (with additional bibliography at 232); cf. Brüggenbrock 2006, 49–51. In Pindar see, e.g., *Ol.* 13.37 and *Pyth.* 8.5 with Kurke 2013 [1991], 159–168. On classical Athens see Alexiou 1995, 40–47, 109–114 (on Isocrates); Brüggenbrock 2006, 61–142 (on athletics); cf. Fisher 2011.

Through its use of *timê* the language of Hippodamus's proposal, as phrased by Aristotle at least, evokes the realm of Greek elite competition in areas such as athletics and poetry; unfortunately we cannot know to what extent it reflected Hippodamus's own terminology. However, if we put this issue to the side, trusting that Aristotle's representation is generally faithful, we can say that Hippodamus's proposal aimed to spur creative innovation in the realm of politics through a competition analogous to competitions in other realms. By institutionalizing *timê* for innovative policies he wanted to motivate citizens to invent new, advantageous laws for the city. On the model of contests in running or singing, Hippodamus's plan envisages that citizens competing with one another will generate more and better political innovations. Aristotle is silent as to what form the *timê* granted to winning proposals might take, but we can think perhaps of wreaths or amphorae of olive oil, as in athletic and artistic competitions. Alternatively, Hippodamus may have imagined as a prize an honorific decree from the council or the assembly, possibly inscribed, although this type of honor was still unprecedented for citizens in the fifth century BCE.[14]

At the beginning of this article I emphasized the tension between competition and politics: for the political system to thrive competition between citizens and groups of citizens needed to be contained. This hypothesis stems from an understanding of Athenian democracy as a solution to the volatilities caused by intra-elite strife and competition in oligarchic states, with the procedure of ostracism as its sharpest tool. Yet the agonistic values of the Athenians (and the Greeks) did not suddenly vanish from the political scene with the coming of democracy. In other words, Hippodamus's idea for promoting competition in politics did not arise in a vacuum. Two examples of the continued prominence of institutionalized political competition in fifth- and fourth-century BCE Athens are the elections for select high offices and the provision of liturgies for the city.

About ninety percent of offices were filled by lot, the remaining ten percent by election. Among the offices decided by election the most important was that of general (*stratêgos*). It seems likely that because the *stratêgoi* needed special-

14 The epigraphic record shows that before the middle of the fourth century BCE Athens generally inscribed honorific decrees only for foreigners. In earlier periods honorific decrees were voted for Athenians but not inscribed. In general these types of honors were awarded for material benefactions to the city or the virtuous fulfillment of office rather than for innovative political proposals (on this distinction see further below). At Dem. 20.86 honors are voted but not inscribed for Chabrias; similarly, we have inscriptions set up by or for Athenians honored by the *demos* and/or the *boulê* (e.g., *SEG* XXI 338 = *Agora* I 6573 and *Agora* XV 1) but no decrees containing decisions about such honors; see Whitehead 1983; Lambert 2011; 2012 [2004]; Meyer 2013, 467, 473–491.

ized military expertise this office was considered unsuitable for appointment by lot.[15] The elections of the *stratêgoi* and select other officials were not open competitions: a small number of leading families dominated, and each tribe probably elected its own *stratêgos*.[16] In general the filling of offices in Athens was designed to minimize competition. But intentions, of course, did not translate directly into reality: in practice the elected officials were very powerful within the larger system, and the history of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE shows the members of the Athenian elite competing fiercely for the favor of the *dêmos*. Additionally, the critical attitude towards competition found in philosophy (of which, as we will see, Aristotle is an example) probably stood at some distance from day-to-day politics.

Athenian liturgy, our second example, was embedded in a complex regulatory structure designed by the city to manage the pre-existing phenomenon of private donations of war ships, festivals, and sacrifices. Benefactors could be honored for their contributions, but the city regulations circumscribed the level of competition. Yet, as was said above, within the athletic and artistic contests paid for by liturgists competitiveness was unbridled. One of the functions of this competitiveness was, it appears, to promote community cohesion by mitigating the threat of *stasis*. It has been argued that games and festivals promoted interaction between different strata of society due to the large numbers of people involved.[17] In a sense, 'good' competition was seen as a way to prevent 'bad' competition.[18]

The examples of liturgies and elections for office show that competition was present in democratic Athens but carefully managed. We can, however, think of competitive elements in politics that would have been harder to regulate: the battle of eloquence between leading figures is a case in point, of which the antagonism between Demosthenes and Aeschines, the leading figures of mid-fourth-century BCE Athens, is perhaps the best-known example. Hippodamus's proposal for a competition of political innovations falls outside of the areas of competition we have just discussed: his plan is about individuals contributing ideas instead of money, about competing with legislative proposals not for election to office. When (inscribed) honors for Athenians become common from the fourth century BCE onwards, these are awarded for donations of money and

15 Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1317b21–22.
16 Hansen 1991, 233–237; Mitchell 2000.
17 See Wilson 2003; Fisher 2011. For a comparison of democratic liturgies and earlier elite benefactions see Kurke 2013 [1991], 147–154 and now Gygax 2016, 139–179.
18 See Scodel in this volume.

the successful fulfillment of office.[19] What Hippodamus proposed was unusual in that he sought to introduce competition and institutionalized rewards into an area of politics—legislation—that had traditionally been devoid of competitiveness.

3 Aristotle on Competition in Politics

Before turning to the larger question of where Aristotle stands on the competitive landscape of classical Athens we will look at how he reacts to Hippodamus's plan. Aristotle starts out by suggesting that Hippodamus's proposal about the political innovation contest is self-serving. He suspects that Hippodamus wants a system of honors for political innovations so that he himself might be so honored.[20] Given the above-mentioned breadth of Hippodamus's 'constitution', there would be several proposals that he could enter in a competition, but Aristotle picks out his idea that the city provide for war orphans. Hippodamus proposed it believing that 'this had never before been arranged by law among other people'.[21] But this law, writes Aristotle, is not new at all: it exists in Athens and in other cities. Even if the system were to be instated, suggests Aristotle, Hippodamus would not win any honors in his own competition (*Pol.* 1268a10–12).[22]

Aristotle produces a harsh political critique of the competitive aspect of Hippodamus's plan as well (*Pol.* 1268b22–25):

19 For honors awarded for successful fulfillment of office, including membership of the *boulê*, see Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 46.1 and D. 22, esp. at 22.17; see also the note above on honorific decrees.

20 If we follow Aristotle in situating Hippodamus's proposal in an Athenian context, and if we assume that the proposal only allowed citizens to propose innovations, which seems highly likely, we are faced with the question of whether or not Hippodamus was, unlike Aristotle himself, an Athenian citizen. It is possible that he was granted citizenship-by-decree for his services to the city when he designed the grid for Piraeus; Blok 2017, 250–265. On the other hand, Aristotle's casual insinuation can still contribute to a negative characterization of Hippodamus even if the latter would not be able to participate in his own contest. (The characterization of Hippodamus as among τῶν μὴ πολιτευομένων at Arist. *Pol.* 1267b29 need not imply that he lacked citizenship; see Lockwood 2015, 67–69.)

21 Arist. *Pol.* 1268a9–10: ὡς οὔπω τοῦτο παρ' ἄλλοις νενομοθετημένον.

22 Diogenes Laertius 1.2.55 attributes the provision for (male) war orphans to Solon. Aristotle glosses over the fact that he and Hippodamus were about a century apart and tacitly assumes that in general laws of his time already existed in Hippodamus's time. Although in this instance he may be correct, the assumption is quite telling. The end of the fifth century BCE saw major legislative change constructed as a restoration of the 'old' laws.

> As to the law that those who invent something of advantage to the city must receive some honor, this legislation is not safe but only pleasing to the ear: for it entails vexatious prosecutions and, if it comes to pass, constitutional upheavals.
>
> περὶ δὲ τοῦ τοῖς εὑρίσκουσί τι τῇ πόλει συμφέρον ὡς δεῖ γίνεσθαί τινα τιμήν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσφαλὲς τὸ νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλ' εὐόφθαλμον ἀκοῦσαι μόνον· ἔχει γὰρ συκοφαντίας καὶ κινήσεις, ἂν τύχῃ, πολιτείας.

Aristotle fears that, since it can be argued that exposing threats to the city is useful, the prospect of winning honor will incite citizens to denounce fictitious conspiracies and falsely accuse fellow citizens. The second danger is that the law may lead to constitutional upheavals as a consequence of such prosecutions, or when citizens desirous of honor propose a change of political system as beneficial to the state.[23] Hippodamus's proposal, argues Aristotle, could lead to instability.

Aristotle focuses not on the spirit of Hippodamus's proposal and its intended outcome but on its worst-case-scenario consequences. Exposing (fabricated) conspiracies hardly qualifies as 'inventing something of advantage', while proposing to replace the political system would be a counterproductive way of seeking honor from that same political system. Nonetheless, it is difficult to fault Aristotle for being vigilant. The litigious Athenians might well have tried to abuse a law like Hippodamus's in the ways that Aristotle foresees, and the humanitarian costs of political instability could not be overstated.[24]

Aside from the threat of upheavals, it seems that another problem with Hippodamus's innovation competition for Aristotle is the effect it would have

23 At Arist. *Pol.* 1304b21–24 *sukophantai* are mentioned as a cause for constitutional change; see Simpson 1998, 109. In Athens the derogatory term *sukophantês* could be used for anyone thought to be participating in a legal prosecution of someone wealthy (prosecutors, court orators, witnesses) for the sake of financial gain; see Christ 1998, 49–50. Aristotle seems to think that *sukophantai* would abuse Hippodamus's plan to obtain money and *timê* through false prosecutions.

24 Even if the horrors of the rule of the Thirty Tyrants and the fight to overthrow them predate Aristotle by a few decades, these events were still vividly remembered in the fourth century BCE. During Aristotle's lifetime the Athenians were divided over the question of how to respond to the rise of Philip II of Macedon; both of Aristotle's sudden departures from the city (in 347 BCE and in 323 BCE) have been connected to anti-Macedonian sentiments in Athens. Aristotle was perhaps even prosecuted, and he is reported to have said that it was hard to live in Athens because of the many figs there (*suka*, Diog. Laert. 5.1.9), a play on *sukophantês* (on whom see also above). For Aristotle's life see now Natali's (2013) updated biography.

on the character of the citizens. This brings us to Aristotle's broader views on competition in the city. Competition can be harmful because it relies on and encourages the citizens' love of honor (*philotimia*). Aristotle's eudaimonist political philosophy considers the state to be 'a means for the well-being of its citizens' (Horn 2013, 227). *Philotimia*, however, is in Aristotle's view antithetical to the wellbeing of the citizens: it is a mark of a lack of virtue and even of injustice. If too many citizens are *philotimoi* this may lead to *stasis* in the city.[25]

In *Politics* 2 Aristotle explicitly criticizes two regimes for their failure to check *philotimia* sufficiently. First, Phaleas's arrangement, whereby all the citizens enjoy one and the same education (*Pol.* 1266b35–39):

> Even if there is only one kind of education, this education might still be such that the citizens will be desirous of having more than their fair share of goods or honors or both. For men do not only enter upon civil strife on account of inequality of goods but also on account of inequality of honor.
>
> ἔστι γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν μὲν εἶναι καὶ μίαν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην εἶναι τοιαύτην ἐξ ἧς ἔσονται προαιρετικοὶ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τιμῆς ἢ συναμφοτέρων. ἔτι στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν.

Phaleas's arrangement is naïve: education needs to train citizens to desire only their fair share of honor (Kraut 2001, 71). Secondly, Aristotle faults the constitution at Sparta for 'making the citizens desirous of honor';[26] one example he gives is *gerontes* having to campaign to be elected. Aristotle's disdain for this shows his unease with competition between candidates for political office.[27]

In Aristotle's discussion of the causes of *stasis* in *Politics* 5 honor also plays a major role: men may embark on *stasis* to gain more honor than is their due, to avoid dishonor for themselves or for their friends, or because they see that others are unjustly getting more honor than is their due (*Pol.* 1302a33–b5).[28] This analysis harkens back to Aristotle's discussion of honor in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where *timê* is the prize of virtue, and it is the mark of the magnanimous man to accept the honors that are his due (*Eth. Nic.* 1123b35–1124a10). The virtue connected to honor is nameless: it occupies the mean between being unambitious (*aphilotimos*) and being too ambitious (*philotimos*), and it entails pursuing the right amount of honor, from the right source, in the right way

25 See Whitehead 1983, 55–60 on the evolution of *philotimia* in Greek thought.
26 Arist. *Pol.* 1271a14–15: φιλοτίμους γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοὺς πολίτας.
27 On the remarkable procedure cf. Plut. *Vit. Lyc.* 26.
28 See Balot 2001, 47. On *Politics* 5 generally see Polansky 1991.

(*Eth. Nic.* 1125b1–25). Finally, the desire to have more honor than one's due at the expense of others—that is, *pleonexia* with respect to honor—is a form of injustice (*Eth. Nic.* 1130a32–1130b5).[29]

In his introduction to Hippodamus's constitution Aristotle remarks that the man had too much *philotimia*. This prefigures his critique of the competitive aspect of the proposal for political innovation in two ways.[30] First, Aristotle implies that Hippodamus introduces new laws to satisfy his own *philotimia*. Second, Aristotle fears that the proposal, if made law, would increase the *philotimia* of the citizens, which would be detrimental to their wellbeing and to the city. Though Hippodamus's proposal must certainly, in his view, be rejected because of its potential consequences, the remainder of Aristotle's discussion will show that at least part of the apparent intent of the plan—promoting the invention of good laws for the city—aligns closely with Aristotle's own concerns.

4 Aristotle on Innovation in Politics

Hippodamus's proposal to hold a competition for the devising of new laws was itself a political innovation. In fifth-century BCE Athens archons proposed new laws, on which the assembly voted; while the Areopagus, until Ephialtes absolved it of this function, played an important role as overseer and enforcer of the laws.[31] At the end of the fifth century BCE the Athenian laws of Solon, Draco, and some of the new laws were collected, edited, and inscribed in two rounds of codification by legislative boards. Immediately afterwards the Athenians adopted a formal procedure for making changes to these now codified laws. A brief sketch of how this procedure worked will be helpful at this point, because it would have been part of the framework against which Aristotle judged Hippodamus's proposal.

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29 See Kraut 2002, 136–139. Skultety 2009 extrapolates from the importance of agonism in arts and athletics, and Aristotle's support of such pursuits, that in Aristotle's ideal city competition would play a large role in politics, e.g., through elections for office. He does not discuss Aristotle's critique of Hippodamus in *Politics* 2. Skultety ignores the differences between the realms where competitiveness would be acceptable for Aristotle and the political sphere, where the stakes and risks are far higher. Aristotle's view of Spartan elections (see above) makes it unlikely that he would have given competition for office a place in his ideal city.

30 Arist. *Pol.* 1267b23–24: γενόμενος καὶ περὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον περιττότερος διὰ φιλοτιμίαν.

31 Hansen 1991, 29–40; Harris 2013, 3–18.

Under the new procedure an individual citizen, the assembly, or the *thesmothetai* (officers who summoned the court) could propose a new law, which was by definition understood as a challenge to the existing laws. The assembly decided whether or not the revision was necessary and, if so, appointed five advocates to defend the existing laws against this 'challenge'. On the day that the new law was to be discussed a pre-determined number of *nomothetai* were picked by lot. Then the proposer of the new law delivered his challenge, followed by rebuttals from the five defenders of the existing law. The *nomothetai* decided by a simple majority vote if the challenge was to be accepted or rejected.[32] There is no mention of a reward for the successful challenger, but his name was inscribed along with the new law.[33]

The epigraphic record preserves only seven new laws passed by the *nomothetai*, as compared to several hundred decrees.[34] On Aristotle's account it seems likely that Hippodamus's plan would, indeed, also provide for introducing new laws, not just decrees. Since Aristotle feared, as we will see, that the plan would lead to frequent changes to the laws, it also seems likely that Hippodamus's model entailed a less cumbersome procedure than fourth-century BCE *nomothesia*. On this interpretation it is precisely the combination of the promise of *timê* as a prize for the best new laws and an easier procedure for adopting new laws that causes Aristotle to anticipate a radical increase in changes to the laws as a result of the plan. Therefore, while the transition from the fifth to the fourth century BCE did bring an increase in honors to individual Athenians as well as a more democratic procedure for changing the laws, Hippodamus's plan would have been innovative still in Aristotle's day: the competitive element was new in lawmaking—as opposed to elections, liturgies, or speaking in the assembly—and it is likely that his procedure for changing the laws was more accommodating than the existing *nomothesia*.

Although Aristotle criticizes the competitive aspect of Hippodamus's proposal, he takes the underlying issue very seriously: Hippodamus's plan prompts him to investigate the larger question that precedes the issue of how to generate innovation; namely, whether or not political innovation is desirable. Aristotle frames this question as follows (*Pol.* 1268b26–28):

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32 Aristotle does not mention *nomethesia* in [*Ath. Pol.*] or *Pol.*; I return to this issue below. Most of our evidence for *nomothesia* comes from Dem. 24. For a detailed description of the institution see Hansen 1991, 161–177. There is an ongoing debate about the authenticity of the laws included in Dem. 24 (*pro* Hansen 2016; *contra* Canevaro 2013), but this issue does not affect the sketch of *nomothesia* given above, which relies on Demosthenes' speech, not the documents he cites.

33 See, e.g., *SEG* XII 87.4–5.

34 Hansen 1991, 367. On the distinction between laws and decrees: ibid. 170–174.

> Some people have been at a loss to decide whether it is harmful or beneficial for the cities to change the ancestral laws if a different law would be better.
>
> ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πότερον βλαβερὸν ἢ συμφέρον ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ κινεῖν τοὺς πατρίους νόμους, ἂν ᾖ τις ἄλλος βελτίων.

Formulating it in this way makes answering the question seem deceptively easy. When a new law would be an improvement to the law code, surely adopting it would further the wellbeing of the city?

Aristotle's initial discussion points to this 'easy' answer. He compares doing politics to other crafts (*technai*):[35] in medicine and in gymnastic training innovations have clearly led to the advancement of these respective fields (*Pol.* 1268b34–38). Similarly, some of the laws of the past are demonstrably worse than the laws of the present. For example, he says, the Hellenes of old used to carry arms and to purchase their wives (*Pol.* 1268b40–41). In addition to this comparison with other *technai*, Aristotle gives three further arguments for changing the laws. First, in general men do not seek what is traditional (*patrion*) but what is good (*Pol.* 1269a3–4). Second, our forefathers may well have been undiscerning (*anoêtoi*), so following their decrees would be foolish (*Pol.* 1269a4–8).[36] Third, it is impossible to write a perfect constitution, because it is of necessity general, while our actions deal with particulars. Aristotle then draws a provisional conclusion (*Pol.* 1269a12–13):

> Based on this it is clear that some laws must sometimes be changed.[37]
>
> ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι κινητέοι καὶ τινὲς καὶ ποτὲ τῶν νόμων εἰσίν·

This preliminary answer supports Hippodamus in his effort to design a procedure for changing the laws, even if the procedure he proposed was, to Aristotle, infelicitous.

Immediately afterwards, however, Aristotle presents the opposite side of the argument. The problem is that even changing the laws for the better might be

35 For Aristotle, as for Plato, politics is a skill (Arist. *Pol.* 1268b36–37); see Saunders 1995, 146.

36 See Saunders 1995, 146–147 for this translation of *anoêtoi*.

37 The verb κινέω is regularly used in the sense of 'changing' or 'innovating' the laws or customs (*LSJ* A2): compare, e.g., Hdt. 3.80 and Pl. *Leg.* 797b. Like the Latin phrase *res novare* it often has negative connotations.

harmful. He rejects his own analogy: lawmaking is actually quite different from other *technai* (*Pol.* 1269a19–24):

> Also the example about the crafts is false: for it is not the same to change a craft as it is to change a law. The law has no other strength to secure obedience than custom, and this does not come about except through longevity, so that readily changing from the existing laws to other and new laws is to make the power of the law weak.
>
> ψεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν· οὐ γὰρ ὅμοιον τὸ κινεῖν τέχνην καὶ νόμον· ὁ γὰρ νόμος ἰσχὺν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἔθος, τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος, ὥστε τὸ ῥᾳδίως μεταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων εἰς ἑτέρους νόμους καινοὺς ἀσθενῆ ποιεῖν ἐστι τὴν τοῦ νόμου δύναμιν.

The major difference lies in the fact that laws need to have authority to be effective; other crafts are effective simply when they deliver the goods. The law's authority is undermined by frequent changes, and the citizens, who are involved in changing the laws as members of the assembly, become accustomed to disobeying their rulers if they become accustomed to unscrupulously undoing the laws (*Pol.* 1269a15–18). Aristotle's reasoning here may contain another *ad hominem* argument against Hippodamus. The implicit point is that because he was an architect, a craftsman, Hippodamus thought that in lawmaking, as in *technai*, all innovation is good. Aristotle implies that Hippodamus should have stuck with what he knew.[38] Because laws can be harmed by frequent changes even if the innovations are good, lawmaking, unlike other *technai*, is unsuitable for the competitive model, which aims to accelerate innovation.[39]

The objection that Aristotle raises creates a difficult conundrum: in what came before, the need for changing laws was established, but if changing the laws weakens them, it defeats the whole purpose of having laws. After his fundamental objection Aristotle poses several questions to those who would have it that the laws should be changed: should all laws be subject to change? In every constitution? By whom? Just by anyone, or only by certain designated persons (*Pol.* 1269a24–27)? The questions go unanswered, and Aristotle concludes his discussion of political change by saying that it should be pursued at

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38 Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1267b29–31 with Peterson 2011, 119–120; Pangle 2013, 83–85.

39 On competition in other *technai* see in this volume Rosen (on physicians) and Siwicki (on architects).

a different, more opportune time (*Pol.* 1269a27–28). If he ever delivered on this promise, no text for the continuation of this discussion has been transmitted (Saunders 1995, 148).

Aristotle ends his discussion on whether or not the laws should be changed in explicit *aporia*. It seems that it ought to be possible to change the laws, but it is not clear that the benefits outweigh the risks. Even if it is granted that change is necessary, difficult questions remain about the procedure. Surprisingly, Aristotle does not mention the Athenian procedure for *nomothesia*, here or anywhere else, although he must have known about it. Perhaps Aristotle omitted it for rhetorical reasons: he (cautiously) criticized Athenian democracy for its disregard for the law, and the Athenians' meticulous *nomothesia* rules would not fit well with this image.[40] Further, it is not clear whether Aristotle thinks any changes at all to the laws should be allowed, let alone whether the Athenian *nomothesia* would be a good method for doing so.

Scholars have reacted to Aristotle's *aporia* on political change in different ways. Some simply acknowledge and accept it as is (Brunschwig 1980), others have attempted to distill an Aristotelian position on the issue, either in favor of or against political change, in spite of his refusal to formulate one. Lockwood (2015, 72–75) maintains that, while on a theoretical level *Politics* 2 indeed is aporetic on the issue of political innovation, on a practical level Aristotle seems to support it, in so far as he himself proposes an innovation, namely that property be owned privately but used in common. Boyer (2008) argues that, while Hippodamus's proposal goes too far for Aristotle, he does support innovation but only when it is absolutely necessary. Kraut and Peterson insist that *Politics* 2 is conservative and opposes political change as such. Peterson (2011) counters Lockwood's view by arguing that Aristotle's own innovations are exceptions and concern founding laws, not governing laws. Kraut (2002, 352) argues that for Aristotle the innovations that he proposes are 'practices of great antiquity', not innovations.

The debate seems to be in a state of deadlock: in his explicit discussion of the topic Aristotle does *not* endorse the necessity or desirability of change, and yet the project of *Politics* 2 is to present a blueprint for a city constitution that is significantly different from existing constitutions, which would require political change if it were to be put into practice. Peterson's distinction between founding laws and governing laws is not a satisfactory solution. As we will see,

40 Implicit criticism of Athens regarding laws: Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 41.2, cf. *Pol.* 1292a5–6, 23–25. Hansen 1991, 176 thinks Aristotle may have implicitly included the *nomothetai* in the *dikastêria* in [*Ath. Pol.*]. Aristotle does not mention Plato's system for changing laws either (Pl. *Leg.* 951a–952d, 961a–b). On Aristotle's view of Athenian democracy see Strauss 1991.

Aristotle himself connects his own ideas to existing practices: even laws for a new city cannot be written in a vacuum but need to be embedded somehow. Kraut's view, then, is actually the most helpful, even if it fails to point out that Aristotle does tolerate some form of change. For Aristotle the innovative aspect of Hippodamus's proposal is at least as problematic as its competitive element. He mocked Hippodamus for thinking that his Solonian proposal about war orphans was new, but the architect's real mistake was striving for novelty in the first place. In *Politics* the laws can be safely improved only by affecting continuity and by avoiding overt innovation.

5 Anchoring Political Innovation

Aristotle's plan for the distribution of property is an example of how he thought the laws might be safely improved. In *Politics* 2 and 7 he proposes that property should be owned privately but used in common. This is in contradiction with Athenian practice, where both ownership and use of property were private. Exactly how this common use would work in practice—that is, whether this would occur informally, among friends, or whether it would be institutionalized—has been subject to debate.[41] It is clear, however, that Aristotle's proposal would entail a change from the status quo.

In *Politics* 2 Aristotle presents his innovation by connecting it to known practices from elsewhere (*Pol.* 1263a30–32):

> This arrangement exists already in some cities in outline, so it is not impossible.
>
> ἔστι δὲ καὶ νῦν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐν ἐνίαις πόλεσιν οὕτως ὑπογεγραμμένον, ὡς οὐκ ὂν ἀδύνατον.

Aristotle argues for the proposal's feasibility by pointing to similar arrangements that exist elsewhere. In the next sentence he uses Sparta as a specific example, where people use each other's slaves, horses, hounds, and produce if needed (*Pol.* 1263a35–37). In *Politics* 7 Aristotle discusses one aspect of his proposal about property, namely, common meals, and he writes that these already existed in Crete in the time of Minos and even earlier in Italy (*Pol.* 1329b5–23). In embedding his innovation Aristotle relies on two kinds of familiarity: what

41 On this issue see Mayhew 1993; cf. Nussbaum 1990, 2000; Kraut 2001, 66–71; 2002, 322–356.

existed in the past and what exists elsewhere. The two anchoring devices function in similar ways. The 'elsewhere' anchor, just like the 'past' anchor, is old, but only the former has persisted into Aristotle's day.[42] A new innovation just put into practice elsewhere is still unproven and cannot, it would seem, function as an anchor. It is unclear whether Aristotle prefers the one, reviving an old practice that has been interrupted, over the other, borrowing an old practice that still exists elsewhere.

In *Politics* 7 we find an explanation of Aristotle's methodology interwoven with the presentation of his ideas about property. Following his statement on the antiquity of common meals Aristotle says (*Pol.* 1329b25–36):

> We have to understand, almost, that the other arrangements, too, have been invented many times in our long history, or rather countless times; for probably the necessary things exigency itself teaches, and once those are available it is reasonable that things for refinement and luxury start developing; so that we have to suppose that it works the same way with political institutions. … Therefore it is necessary to use existing inventions when adequate and attempt to investigate what has been passed over.
>
> σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὑρῆσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, μᾶλλον δ' ἀπειράκις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα τὴν χρείαν διδάσκειν εἰκὸς αὐτήν, τὰ δ' εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν ὑπαρχόντων ἤδη τούτων εὔλογον λαμβάνειν τὴν αὔξησιν: ὥστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οἴεσθαι δεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον. … διὸ δεῖ τοῖς μὲν εὑρημένοις ἱκανῶς χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ παραλελειμμένα πειρᾶσθαι ζητεῖν.

Aristotle says that all of the truly necessary political arrangements have already been invented many times over—the verb *heuriskô* in this instance retains its ambiguous meaning. It follows that if one is seeking to improve upon an important element of existing laws, the ancestors must already have provided for that issue in some way. Hippodamus, in his quest for novelty, erroneously ignored history. The job of the innovator, rather, is to seek out the relevant earlier invention and expand it into areas that the lawgivers of old 'passed over' because they did not yet have the luxury to attend to them. It is perhaps not a coincidence

42 For a general treatment of the concept of 'anchoring' as a heuristic tool for interpreting ancient innovation see Sluiter 2017; the concept itself derives from the work of the social psychologist Serge Moscovici; see Moscovici 2008 [1961] and cf. Bauer and Gaskell 1999: 163–186.

that this job description would render a a scholar like Aristotle a much more suitable innovator of the laws than a craftsman like Hippodamus.

Aristotle's methodology has been dismissed as a plea for putting old wine into new wineskins.[43] The connotation of the phrase 'old wine into new skins', however, is that something that *is not* new is purposely made to *seem* new. In my view this is the opposite of what Aristotle actually does when he connects his proposals to existing and ancient examples: he makes something that *is* new *seem* old. Aristotle presents his strategy as one of economy: all the necessary political arrangements have already been invented, so we should (re)use them. But this is only part of the story. Aristotle's own proposal does not just expand old customs to cover extraneous, 'passed over' needs. Rather, the innovation borrows older elements and incorporates them into a new system that goes a lot further than sharing meals or borrowing horses. Instead of recycling the old and familiar, Aristotle uses old and familiar elements as anchors for true innovation.

The necessity of Aristotle's strategy of anchoring was already made clear in the criticism of Hippodamus. The problem inherent in his proposal was that frequent changes to the laws make them weaker. If there are frequent changes this leaves no time to become accustomed to obeying the established laws; people actually become complacent about abandoning the laws and disobeying their rulers. Anchoring legal innovations in familiar practices helps avoid the risks associated with changing the laws: if the break with older customs and laws seems less radical, citizens no longer feel that they are disobeying the old laws; and if a new law in some respect already appears familiar, it is easier to get accustomed to obeying it.[44]

6 Conclusions (and New Questions)

Aristotle, although he did not work towards putting it into practice, shows us with his anchoring strategy how he would go about improving the laws. But how might other people do so? And would there be any room for competition in this framework? Hippodamus's main error was taking lawmaking to be a regular craft, where a higher rate of change for the better spurred on by competition is by definition beneficial; there is at least a suggestion that this mistake

43 Lockwood 2015, 83. Kraut 1997, 112–113 interprets the remark as another sign of Aristotle's conservatism; see also above with Kraut 2002, 352.

44 Aristotle's organic, evolutionary understanding of legal change appears to mirror his views of novelty in nature; see D'Angour 2011, 38.

is due to the fact that Hippodamus himself was a craftsman, not a philosopher. Aristotle's evolutionary model of incremental political change also stands in contrast to the practice of *nomothesia*, which represents an oppositional view: new laws were defined as challenges to and, if successful, cancelations of old laws. It seems that the only viable way of participating in political innovation for Aristotle is the one he presents: collect and research old laws and extend them with (seemingly) small innovations.

At first glance there appears to be little room for competition in Aristotle's model of embedded political innovation, even aside from his distaste for competition in politics. When innovation is dressed up as continuity in order to be inconspicuous, you do not want to win any prizes with it. One important question, however, has lingered beneath the surface of our present investigation: which old laws, which past, or which anchor should be used? In Aristotle's time the codification of the 'old' laws of the end of the fifth century BCE was still a fresh memory. Factions made claims to the legacy of Draco, Solon, or Cleisthenes respectively, and accused one another of taking liberties with the traditional laws. But traditions or anchors, as Eric Hobsbawm (1983) has shown, need not be authentic to be effective. This is precisely where competition can and perhaps does play a role, in spite of Aristotle's qualms: claiming or inventing traditions can itself give rise to competition. The issue of choosing between competing anchors will remain unresolved here but deserves attention in the future precisely because Aristotle has shown us that, with respect to the criteria of viability and stability for legal systems, anchoring new laws is not just expedient but actually necessary. Habituation is vital for the strength of the law. Anchoring changes to the laws in what is familiar prevents the sudden interruption of this process of habituation. It is imperative to make the new seem old.[45]

45 This research has been carried out as part of the 'After the Crisis' research project at Groningen University and the OIKOS Anchoring Innovation Research Agenda. In this chapter I build on and expand comments on Aristotle and political change I have made elsewhere (Kuin 2017). I would like to thank the editors of this volume and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback on earlier versions of this article, as well as the participants in the 2016 Penn-Leiden Colloquium for their thought-provoking questions and comments.

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CHAPTER 7

Aristotle's *Poetics* and *skênikoi agônes*

Oliver Taplin

1 Introduction

This contribution sets out to reopen yet again a well known issue in Aristotle's *Poetics*, one that may seem at first sight to have no connection with *eris*, good or bad: Aristotle's attitude to *opsis*. In the light of his treatment, *opsis* is probably best rendered in English as 'spectacle', meaning 'outward show'; but this is, at the same time, the only word provided in *Poetics* for the visible instantiation of tragedy. Furthermore, it is the only term offered to cover the entire materiality of performance, including, for example, handling objects, movement, and relative positioning. As interest in performance and its essential contribution to theatrical meaning has increased in recent years, Aristotle's apparent disparagement of *opsis* has become more and more of a challenge for devotees of his *Poetics*.[1] While still greatly admiring the enduring insights in Aristotle's work, I shall argue that his take on the enactment of tragedy, as experienced by the spectators in the theatre, is distorted by his own experiences of performances in his own day.

2 Aristotle on *opsis*

Aristotle intermittently shows himself to be well aware that enactment is of the essence of theatre: the actors do not, that is to say, just *tell* the story, they *do* it. First, in the opening pages of *Poetics* he observes that tragedy and comedy have in common that, in contrast to epic, they both represent people doing things, enacting, 'since both represent people in direct action' (πράττοντας γὰρ μιμοῦνται καὶ δρῶντας ἄμφω, 48a27–28).[2] Then, in the middle of the most influential

1 Two brave attempts to defend Aristotle from complaints open a recent book devoted to performance (Harrison and Liapis (eds.)): Sifakis 2013 and Konstan 2013. They are both scholars I greatly respect, even though they set up my past discussion as a target for shooting down.

2 Throughout I shall quote from the careful and informed translation of *Poetics* by Halliwell 1995, with any addition or variation put in square brackets. For other citations the translations are my own.

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definition of tragedy ever formulated, he specifies that it is conveyed through the *mimêsis* of agents doing things, 'employing the mode of enactment, not narrative' (δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, 49b26–27). Yet, as the treatise continues on its course, this basic, indeed defining, feature of the art-form runs into stormy weather.

The turbulence begins with the terminology of the six defining components (μέρη) of tragedy (50a7 ff.). Here, rather than using some term or phrase that more broadly signifies action and enactment, Aristotle settles on the more limited word ὄψις. It is important to register that all of the other five *merê* are shared with some other kinds of poetry, some of them even with prose: μῦθος, ἤθη, λέξις, διάνοια, and μελοποιία. So *opsis* is the only one that is distinctive of tragedy, the feature that differentiates it from other poetic forms. Despite that, it is not highly rated.

There are two passages above all where *opsis* is disparaged. When Aristotle gets to say something specifically about it at 50b16–20, as the last of his six *merê*, he downplays it as the least integral to the creative art: 'spectacle is emotionally potent but falls quite outside the art and is not integral to poetry' (ἡ δὲ ὄψις ψυχαγωγικὸν μέν, ἀτεχνότατον δὲ καὶ ἥκιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς ποιητικῆς, 50b16–18). He explains this claim with a γὰρ clause: '[because] tragedy's capacity is independent of [i.e., works without] performance and actors' (ἡ γὰρ τῆς τραγῳδίας δύναμις καὶ ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν ἔστιν, 50b18–19). It is worth registering the ἄνευ here: tragedy has its full power '*without* …'. Aristotle then adds: 'besides, the costumier's [or 'prop-supplier's'] art has more scope than the poet's for rendering effects of spectacle' (ἔτι δὲ κυριωτέρα περὶ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τῶν ὄψεων ἡ τοῦ σκευοποιοῦ τέχνη τῆς τῶν ποιητῶν ἐστιν, 50b19–20). So *opsis* is the territory of the behind-the-scenes artisan, the *skeuopoios*, rather than of the creative tragedian.[3]

There is a second passage, at 53b3–11, that makes the same point even more strongly. It should, Aristotle claims there, be sufficient, and even superior, for the requisite pity and horror to be aroused just by *hearing* the tragedy, without seeing it performed, ἄνευ τοῦ ὁρᾶν (ἄνευ again). The achieving of this effect by means of *opsis* is less a function of the poet than of *chorêgia*: 'to create this effect through spectacle has little to do with the poet's art, and requires

3 The only earlier occurrence of the role of *skeuopoios* is at Ar. *Eq.* 230–232, where it refers to mask-makers (plural); their craft almost certainly, however, included the costumes and portable props. We know the name of only one of these neglected contributors to the theatre: a certain Baton, who was part of a theatre company based in Egypt in the mid-third century BCE (*OGI* 51, 60, registered by Stefanis 1988, 111, no. 520).

material resources' (τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενόν ἐστιν, 53b7–8).

Chorêgia in fifth-century Athens meant the financial support raised from the citizens selected to bank-roll the expenses of the chorus. By Aristotle's time the word could mean expenditure more generally, as in Halliwell's translation above; but Wilson (2000, 86–89 and 343 n. 172) has argued that its use here is still tied to the Athenian institution, and that the *chorêgoi* covered wider material costs, including those of the *skeuopoios*.

3 Theatrical *agônes* in Aristotle's Day

So what has all this to do with the subject of this volume? The crucial link lies (of course) in 50b18: the power of tragedy remains intact καὶ ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν. This use of *agôn* clearly must refer to the occasions at which tragedies were put on; in other words, theatrical performances were inextricably associated with the competitions mounted at festivals. This equation between performances and *agôn* is even more explicit at 53a26–28, where Aristotle is discussing the kind of plot that proves 'most tragic': 'in theatrical contests such plays are found the most tragic' (ἐπὶ ... τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων τραγικώταται αἱ τοιαῦται φαίνονται). The competition at these *skênikoi agônes* was not only between playwrights but also between the choruses and the entire 'teams' of their productions. And there was already in fifth-century Athens a competitive prize for actors as well. So it seems clear that, whether at Athens or elsewhere, the rivalry will have included those attention-seeking *chorêgoi* (in the sense of 'finance managers') and even the humble *skeuopoioi*. It is this *agôn* among the ancient equivalents of the producers, designers, and stage-managers that must be the point of Aristotle's attribution of responsibility for *opsis* to them rather than to the playwright.

So the theatrical contests—as now, *mutatis mutandis*—showcased actors, financial backers, costumiers, technicians. That might well be regarded as a positive *eris* for the promotion of publicity and celebrity, but Aristotle evidently sees these aspects of the competitions as an *eris* that is detrimental to his idea of the true poetic art. This explanation of his attitude is confirmed by the most likely interpretation of another passage: at 51b35–52a2 he says that even good playwrights may be corrupted into composing episodic plays in order to promote their actors when they produce ἀγωνίσματα. Some scholars, including Halliwell, take *agônismata* here to mean special pieces composed for solo display; but the uses of *agôn* elsewhere in *Poetics* point, rather, to the actors' performances within the *skênikoi agônes* generally. In Aristotle's eyes, in that

case, the rivalries of the actors were liable to have a bad influence on the artistry of the poets, however good they might be. He sets the artistic and intellectual quality of the poetry in conflict with its materiality in the theatre.

Much of what the *Poetics* has to say aspires to generality, even to a timeless validity, but on this matter of *skênikoi agônes* Aristotle is clearly affected by the practices of his own day, the mid-to-later fourth century.[4] Even the great intellectual genius—as he surely was—does not escape from the perspectives and prejudices of his own times. Another way of putting this is that his goal of a universal synchronic analysis has led to a failure to recognise that he is dealing with a diachronically developing competitive genre.[5]

There is, in fact, more to be said about the theatre in Aristotle's own times than has been generally supposed, although the evidence is undeniably scrappy. The last few years have seen a highly productive movement in scholarship to open up perspectives on the practice of theatre to the Greek world both beyond Athens in place and beyond the fifth century down in time into the fourth and third. This can be surveyed especially, though by no means exclusively, in the magnificent volume *Greek Theatre in the Fourth Century B.C.*[6]

Our evidence from the fifth and fourth centuries indicates that all theatrical performances were mounted at competitive festivals, especially Dionysia. If there were exceptions, they have left no direct trace.[7] The evidence for these *agônes* is richest from Athens itself in the form of the three famous inscriptions known as the Fasti, Didascaliae, and Victor Lists. The recent discussion by Millis concludes convincingly that 'the monumentalising of this vast, detailed array of information concerning dramatic productions' was undertaken to confirm Athenian prestige in the sphere of theatre.[8]

It has only recently become appreciated how much evidence there is concerning the rural festivals of Attica as well as those records of the productions at the City Dionysia. It is increasingly recognised that they were taken seriously and liberally financed.[9] The evidence for no fewer than 21 deme theatre

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4 There is consensus that *Poetics* dates from around the 330s BCE.

5 I owe this formulation to an anonymous reader.

6 Csapo et al. (eds.) 2014. Other significant contributions include Csapo 2010; Bosher (ed.) 2012; Vahtikari 2014; Csapo and Wilson 2015.

7 I have myself suggested in Bosher (ed.) 2012, 250 that non-competitive performances might have been commissioned on occasion by Italian elites in northern Apulia, but this is, to put it mildly, speculative.

8 Millis 2014; quotation from 445. These inscriptions have been well re-edited in Millis and Olsen 2012.

9 The archaeological evidence is authoritatively set out by Goette 2014.

locations is surveyed by Csapo and Wilson, who observe, 'we hear of a contest (*agôn*) in several demes, and some have left dedications by choregoi who declare themselves victors. The city's competitive format was thus apparently reproduced in these places …'.[10]

Even in this monumental new volume on fourth-century theatre there is, however, not much to be found on the subject of competitions beyond Athens and Attica. It has been emerging from the new broadening in Greek theatre history that the crucial period for the spread elsewhere was between about 400 and 350, yet it is for this very period that there is an unfortunate dearth of direct testimony for the *skênikoi agônes*. At the same time, however, there is not none; and there is some surrounding or circumstantial evidence.

We might start from the later period of the third century with the substantial inscriptions about the activities of the *technitai*, the Artists of Dionysus.[11] These, which begin from soon after 300, involve many local festivals over a wide geographical spread. All this organization and network cannot possibly have sprung out of nowhere, and must surely have been developing well back into the previous century. There is also one splendid document that vividly exemplifies the range of competitive festivals: the epitaph for an actor (and boxer), name not preserved, that was found near the theatre of Tegea in the central Peloponnese.[12] The inscription, which has not been dated more precisely than to the middle fifty years of the third century, lists the locations of the actor's greatest triumphs. First, and surely most prestigious, comes the Great Dionysia at Athens; then the Soteria at Delphi, Heraia at Argos, Naia at Dodona, and, finally (Leporello-like!), 'in theatrical contests in individual cities, and Dionysia, and all sorts of other festivals that the cities have conducted: eighty-eight' (καὶ τοὺς κατὰ πόλεις ἀγῶνας σκηνικοὺς Διονύσια καὶ εἴ τινας ἄλλας ἑορτὰς αἱ πόλεις ἤγοσαν ὀγδοήκοντα ὀκτώ). The widespread and highly organized world of *agônes skênikoi* evoked by this inscription, like those about the *technitai*, must surely have been in formation in Aristotle's time and even earlier.

With that end-situation for the 'missing' period of theatre history in place, we may turn back to the beginning of it. Firstly, there are indicators in Plato, revealed though his negative attitude to theatre. In *Republic* (475d6–8) listening-lovers (*philêkooi*) and viewing-lovers (*philotheamones*)—by which he means theatre-lovers—are compared unfavourably with wisdom-lovers (*philosophoi*). They are scorned for rushing around to every Dionysia they can get to,

10 Csapo and Wilson 2015, 319–328; quotation from 326.

11 Documented and studied by Le Guen 2001; also Aneziri 2003; for some nice illustrative translations see Csapo and Slater 1995, 239 ff.

12 *IG* V 2.118 = *SIG* III 1080 = *TrGF*1, DID B 11.

'not missing any, neither those in the cities nor those in the villages' (περιθέουσι τοῖς Διονυσίοις οὔτε τῶν κατὰ πόλεις οὔτε τῶν κατὰ κώμας ἀπολειπόμενοι). While there may not have been many such theatre-maniacs in reality, this is solid evidence for multiple theatrical Dionysias both within Attica and beyond.[13]

Then, from later in Plato's career, the Athenian visitor in *Laws* complains that the audience that used to be an '*aristocrateia* in *mousikê*' has now turned into a degenerate '*theatrokrateia*' ('spectator-rule', *Leg.* 701). He also gives some interesting and more specific detail in another revealing passage (*Leg.* 659), where he insists that the judges should influence audiences, not the other way round. To exemplify this he contrasts the proper priority with what goes on in contemporary Sicily and Italy, where the contest is left to the audience to judge through a majority show of hands: 'as the custom these days in Sicily and Italy is to turn it over to the mass of spectators to judge the winner by a show of hands' (καθάπερ ὁ Σικελικός τε καὶ Ἰταλικὸς νόμος νῦν τῷ πλήθει τῶν θεατῶν ἐπιτρέπων καὶ τὸν νικῶντα διακρίνων χειροτονίαις, *Leg.* 659b6–8). This clearly indicates not only that there were theatre competitions in the Greek East but also that there were a lot of them—so much so that this corrupting reliance on the audience-vote is 'the norm these days' (ὁ νόμος νῦν).

Plato's *Laws* dates from the mid-fourth-century; so does Demosthenes' 'On the False Embassy', which reports Philip's celebrations after taking Olynthus in 348.[14] He organized a festival of Olympian Zeus (probably at Dion) and 'got together all the [or 'all sorts of'] *technitai*' ('Ολύμπι' ἐποίει, εἰς δὲ τὴν θυσίαν ταύτην καὶ τὴν πανήγυριν πάντας τοὺς τεχνίτας συνήγαγεν, *De falsa legatione* 192). This extravaganza definitely included theatrical performances organized into competitions, because Demosthenes goes on to tell of crowning victors, including Satyrus the famous comic actor.

Alexander followed and multiplied his father's example, and there are many stories about his gatherings of huge numbers of performers, even far in the East. The three thousand *technitai* he is said to have attracted to Ecbatana and Babylon in 324–323 included many athletes and musicians, but also actors and theatre personnel.[15]

Demosthenes' naming of Satyrus points us to the most substantial indirect evidence: the acting profession. It is well attested that the fourth century was a golden age for actors; there were a lot of them, and some attained superstar

13 Note that the plural 'cities' must refer to city-states beyond Athens; cf. Taplin 1999, 39.
14 On the Macedonian kings and the theatre see Moloney 2014, esp. 240–245.
15 All admirably documented by le Guen 2014, 249 ff.

status. They were famously even employed on important diplomatic missions.[16] Furthermore, it is interesting that, while Athens remained the metropolis of theatre, and no doubt the most prestigious place to win the actors' prize, the leading actors came from all over the Greek world; and presumably they also toured all over the Greek world.

So it is pretty safe to suppose that by Aristotle's day there were plenty of *agônes skênikoi*, spread around many places, and incorporated into many festivals. Csapo and Wilson (2015) have recently provided a much clearer picture of this phenomenon with their invaluable survey of places beyond Athens where there is evidence of performances before 300. Their grand total gathers no fewer than 116 locations. The theatrical shows at some of these places will have been on a greater scale than others, and some more prestigious than others; some would have had more expense lavished on them—more ornately costumed and furnished, for example—and some less. The finance officials (whether or not they were called *chorêgoi*), and even the *skeuopoioi*, will have been part of the show, striving to win attention and admiration. While the variety will have been great, performances of tragedy and comedy were, it becomes clear, indivisibly associated with their setting within the *agôn*.

4 Aristotle's Reservations about Performance

This supplies a picture of the world of festival contests within which Aristotle himself would have encountered performances of tragedy (and comedy). It tends to be supposed that Aristotle will only have seen plays once he had moved from Stageira to Athens; but there were places where he might well have attended *agônes skênikoi* up in the north, including Aigai, Pella, and Dion. Now there is not, as a matter of fact, a single direct indication in *Poetics* that Aristotle ever actually went to see a performance in the theatre. All the same, it is beyond reasonable doubt not only that he did so but also that he must have attended many. The very passages surveyed above about the true effect of tragedy not having need of the clutter of competitions, actors, lavish expenditure, and so forth—all these negatives require that he had experience of these phenomena, however much he considered them as not of the essence.

There is one passage in the works of Aristotle—and just one—where he alludes directly to his own experience of performances of tragedy (and another

16 Recent accounts of the stellar actors include Easterling 2002 and Csapo 2010, ch. 3.

similar passage for comedy).[17] At *Rhetoric* 1404b20–24, where he is talking about how the orator should avoid seeming contrived in order to be most effective, he cites the analogy of how Theodorus' voice was superior to those of other actors in this quality: 'for example the way that Theodorus's voice has effect compared with that of other actors' (καὶ οἷον ἡ Θεοδώρου φωνὴ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν, 1404b21–23). The wording implies that Aristotle had often heard Theodorus perform and had often heard his rivals as well. It is interesting and telling that this one clear allusion is to an actor and not a playwright. The nearest he comes to talking about experiencing a playwright in performance is the passage at 53a27–30 (quoted above) where he specifies the kind of plays that come across as τραγικώταται in *agônes skênikoi*; and he adds that Euripides, for all his faults, does come across (φαίνεται) as the τραγικώτατός.

It is clear that the theatre of Aristotle's day was, above all, an actors' theatre. In fact he says this explicitly in a well known sentence nearby in *Rhetoric* (1403b31–35) where he talks about the power of the skilled voice, and how those who deploy it well 'nearly always win the prizes in the *agônes*' (τὰ μὲν οὖν ἆθλα σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων οὗτοι λαμβάνουσιν, 1403b31–32). He goes on to complain that the orators with the best voices succeed in politics, 'just as [in the *agônes*] (ἐκεῖ) the actors are more important these days (νῦν) than the playwrights' (καθάπερ ἐκεῖ μεῖζον δύνανται νῦν τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ὑποκριταί, 1403b32–33). The competitive setting promotes the showcasing of actors above that of poets—a comparable complaint to those in *Poetics*.

Aristotle evidently did not think highly of the way that actors loomed so large in the dramatic competitions.[18] It is this low opinion that makes more sense of the wording at *Poetics* 50b18 about tragedy retaining its full power καὶ ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν—the phrase might even be glossed as 'without performances and the actors who dominate them'. While the actors are most often praised or criticised for their voices, there are also references to their vanity and to their acting styles—it is these more visible manifestations that are emphasised by Aristotle's choice of *opsis* to cover the whole business of enactment.

He particularly comments on contemporary actors towards the end of *Poetics* when he gets to comparing epic and tragedy. At 61b32–62a1 he tacitly approves of the old-style actors while disparaging their more recent successors, as epitomised by Callipides, who earned the nickname of 'the ape'. And a few lines later at 62a8–16 he condemns Callipides and others for their crude

17 I am most grateful to Stephen Halliwell for informing me about this evidence, and letting me see Halliwell forthcoming. The passage bearing on hearing comedy live is at *Rh.* 1413b25–28.

18 Similar observations in Hanink 2014, 214–215.

movements,[19] especially in demeaning female roles. It is in view of all the vulgar things that actors get up to that he goes on to insist, in a crucial and perhaps under-scrutinised sentence, that tragedy has its effect even without movement. This is clear, he claims, because it works effectively through reading: 'besides, tragedy achieves its effect even without actors' movements, just like epic; [for] reading makes its qualities clear' (ἔτι ἡ τραγῳδία καὶ ἄνευ κινήσεως ποιεῖ τὸ αὑτῆς, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐποποιία· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀναγινώσκειν φανερὰ ὁποία τίς ἐστιν, 62a11–13). Presumably the 'effect' and 'qualities' of tragedy mean for Aristotle its essential power. So he is insisting that that essence is detachable from the externals of performance—notice ἄνευ again, as in ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν and ἄνευ τοῦ ὁρᾶν.

That phrase ἄνευ κινήσεως has generally slipped below the scholarly radar, but it should bring us up short. All the *kinêsis* that Aristotle so airily dismisses must presumably include the stage movements and body language of actors and chorus, as well as the dramatic integration of costumes and props, the products of the *skeuopoios*. That tragedy 'does its thing' and 'reveals the sort of thing it is' through reading is in some senses undeniably true, as we have all experienced. But only in some senses. The assertion is that tragedy has its full effect without *kinêsis*—and that must mean without treading on purple cloths, emerging with gouged-out eyes, carrying a dismembered head on a thyrsus, handing over a bow or a letter, embraces, taking refuge at altars, and so on and so forth. That claim surely cannot be endorsed, precisely because it denies to tragedy the centrality of its enactment. Aristotle has set up a false competition between reading and performance and declared reading to be the winner. In doing so he has thrown out the baby of enactment with the bathwater of the tasteless acting that he had witnessed and so disliked.

5 Conclusion

This location of Aristotle's attitude in the theater competitions of his time is the nub of my argument here. He sometimes recognized in theory that enactment—which is so much more than merely *opsis*—was an essential differentiating feature of theatre; but he inevitably experienced this through attending contemporary *skênikoi agônes*. He went to the shows, and on the whole he did not like what he saw and heard. Once the analytical genius takes

19 Halliwell translates the phrase καὶ νῦν ἄλλοις as 'and now other actors', but might it mean more pointedly 'others these days'?

his seat in the *theatron*, he sounds more like an indignant reactionary, complaining about the terrible things that 'they' get up to 'these days'.

In our contemporary theatre a comparable tone of complaint is most often to be heard voiced against directors, or 'auteurs', rather than against the actors.[20] Peter Sellars, Katie Mitchell, Thomas Ostermeier, Romeo Castelucci … . Those who are outraged by their kind of productions protest that such directors are drawing attention to themselves rather than to the playwright; that they do not respect the words or the construction or the meaning of the original.[21] Some of these dissatisfied purists might well claim that the original play is fully powerful without costumes, sets, stage-actions, expenditure, and all the attention-seeking clutter of productions. Such a reaction would be similar to Aristotle's claim that reading is all that is needed, 'without movement'. And that would be the same distorted over-reaction, dismissing the essential element of enactment because of contemporary fashions in the theatre.

In Aristotle's day it was the leading actors who ran the show: they were the equivalent of our star directors. He felt that the competition between them was leading to a sensationalism and spectacularity that was eclipsing the *poiêsis*. For him the tragedy itself was better, more effective, without all that. This, I am suggesting, is why he made the initial false step of making *opsis* the differentiating feature of theatre instead of embracing its broader enactment. And this is why he went on to be deprecatory, even derogatory, about *opsis*. He was set against all the superficialities, the special effects, the showy costumes and props, the vocal and physical virtuosity, the sexualised acting, And so it came about that the most influential work ever written on the theatre did not do justice to the very thing that makes theatre the art-form that it is.

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20 The term 'Regietheater', which often attracts fierce negative invective, is applied mainly to productions of opera.

21 While an organised contest is no longer the setting for theatre, competition still has relevance here as well: who will win the big international prizes? Who gets invited to the prestigious festivals? Who will land the plum job?

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CHAPTER 8

Paradoxes and Anxieties of Competition in Hippocratic Medicine

Ralph M. Rosen

Anthropologists and biologists may still be debating whether competition and rivalry are human 'universals', and so part of what it means to be human,[1] but classicists will need no convincing that in Greco-Roman antiquity competition often surfaced as a hallmark of cultural identity. It has become a commonplace to refer to the Greeks, especially, but the Romans too, as 'agonistic' cultures in the context of their games, literary competitions, political contests within democratic systems, philosophical rivalries, and so on. By late antiquity authors were also able to thematize competition as a way of conceptualizing and organizing a Greco-Roman literary and cultural past, whether by pitting Homer against Hesiod, for example, or by comparing Aristophanes to Menander or Lucilius to Horace.[2] With literary rivalries, which involve matters of taste rather than demonstrable truths about superiority or practical efficacy, the stakes are lower than they are, for example, in cases of economic or territorial competition.[3] If competition always, at its root, involves a struggle for either material

1 Most biologists would regard competition as a fact of existence for any living being that requires resources: 'Without resources, organisms will die, and so the contest to find, harvest, transport, store and retain possession of resources is an essential part of the struggle for survival' (Keddy 2001, 1). Other non-material resources that humans compete for—reputation, honor, prestige, etc.—are limited in different ways and appear more historically contingent than universal. For the classical debates over competition for such 'internal goods' see Gill 2003.

2 Homer and Hesiod: e.g., *The Contest of Homer and Hesiod*, a Hadrianic-era text (though probably classical in origin; more detail in Graziosi 2002, 168–180); Aristophanes and Menander: Plutarch, *Comparison of Aristophanes and Menander* (*Mor.* 853a–854d); Lucilius and Horace: Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.94 (*multum est tersior ac purus magis Horatius et, nisi labor eius amore, praecipuus*). See de Jonge in this volume on the inter-cultural comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero in Greek and Roman rhetorical treatises.

3 Despite frequent *claims* by poets across antiquity to superior truths and sometimes even to practicality. See, e.g., the literary contest in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, where Aeschylus claims superiority for his tragedy because of its military content (1019), Euripides for his ability to make people think practically about their lives (954–958). Hunter 2009 argues for a strand of utilitarianism running through most of Greco-Roman literature, which, as in *Frogs*, served as

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goods (profit, land, etc.), reputation, or some measure of both, literary rivalries tend to be more about the latter—repute and esteem (κλέος or *fama, gloria*)—than profit.[4] Outside of literature, however, competition took as many forms as there were human activities, and it is often difficult to sift through its complex etiologies to discover what *exactly* motivates people to compete in any given domain, and what drives them to persist sometimes in the face of great adversity. To paraphrase Socrates in Plato's *Republic* 1 in a discussion of professions (τέχναι, Pl. *Resp*. 345–348), why do humans do *any*thing in their lives in the first place? Always for their own good, or for the good of others? Answers will, of course, depend on whom we ask, and whether one is answering normatively or practically.

1 Competition in Greek Medicine: Entering the Fray

In this chapter I will be particularly interested in this question of motivation in the case of Hippocratic doctors in competition with their putative rivals. In the Greek medical profession, which we can watch coalescing and evolving across a long and varied ancient textual tradition from Hippocratic authors to Galen, one might well wonder why anyone would ever have chosen to become a physician. It is not just, as we will see below, that any opportunities for material enrichment or esteem were often counterbalanced by a high risk of failure (the death or incurability of the patient, for example),[5] but the experience of working with the sick in an era of limited physiological understanding and technology could be nothing short of harrowing.[6] A casual sampling of the

criterion for judging competing types of poetry. But as Rosen 2004, Halliwell 2011, 93–154, and Ford 2010 discuss, *Frogs*, if anything, calls attention to the many practical and logical absurdities of aesthetic competition.

4 Which is not to say that ancient poets did not complain about the role of money and profit in their careers. This took various forms; see, e.g., Pind. *Isth*. 2.1–11, where contemporary poetry is imagined as a prostitute for hire (see Kurke 1991 [2013, 208–222]), or Hipponax's complaint (44 Dg) that the god Wealth never visits him. In a different economic system Athenian dramatic poets fretted about resources allotted to them for training choruses; see Cratinus fr. 17 KA (Sophocles allegedly passed over for a chorus by the archon, in favor of the inferior tragedian, Gnesippus) with Wilson 2000, 86–89.

5 See, e.g., von Staden 1987, Jouanna 1999, 107–111, and Rosen and Horstmanshoff 2003.

6 As some compensation for what must have been a difficult profession, we find ample evidence from the classical period on the public honors that appreciative communities would bestow on particularly successful, high-profile doctors. The biographical tradition about Hippocrates includes mention of public honors for Hippocrates (see Jouanna 1999, 44–54), among them the fictional letter, *Decree of the Athenians*, recording the gratitude of the Athe-

case-histories in the Hippocratic *Epidemics* (7 books from the fifth century BCE) shows vividly that to attend to the sick was to enter a world of relentless pain, fear, depression, leaking orifices, and foul-smelling fluids. As the defendant in Isocrates' *Aegineticus* 28 pleads after describing his own care of his terminally ill adoptive father, Thrasylochus, over six long months, '… you should consider yourself how much loss of sleep, how much misery attends anyone who takes care of a sickness such as this and for such a long period of time'.

However thankless in some respects it must have been to be a Greek *iatros*, there were clearly still enough attractions to make the job highly competitive, sometimes antagonistically so. Indeed it is hard to think of any profession in Greco-Roman antiquity in which competition and rivalry played a more powerful role. From the Hippocratic texts of the classical period to the intellectually fervid decades of Galen's time, when the practice of (and theorizing about) medicine had settled into discrete schools or sects, doctors were continually competing with a multitude of others who claimed to possess healing skills.[7] In a period without regulation and an only inchoate, evolving sense of professionalization the medical field was crowded and confusing, and in the health marketplace, broadly speaking, doctors also had to compete with religious healers, drug-sellers, and a variety of medical poseurs. Many of the Hippocratic treatises show a persistent concern for establishing their own credibility in the face of such competition, and their authors can often be seen making a show of their own philosophical and logical prowess to repudiate those they regarded as quacks and charlatans (Jouanna 1999, 184–185, 195–202).

Part of what sets Greek medicine apart from other professions in terms of how its practitioners competed with each other and dealt with rivals arises from a confluence of two factors: first, because the goal of medicine (the treatment of sick patients) was so often a high-stakes matter of life and death affect-

nians to Hippocrates for his various services (including 'the occasion of a plague' when he sent his pupils around Greece to administer appropriate treatment; see Smith 1990, 107 for text). See also the second-century BCE inscription recording public honors to the Coan physician 'Onasander, son of Onesimus': text in Herzog 1991, with English translation available in Jouanna 1999, 370–371. See also Laes 2011 for inscriptional evidence about Greek midwives, illustrating that their services, too, could receive public recognition.

7 The notion that Greek medicine was fraught with rivalry and competition is emblematized well by the biographical tradition claiming that Hippocrates burned down the archives at the temple of Asclepius at Cos after having stolen the cures that had been collected and stored therein. There are variations on this story in the tradition (see Jouanna 1999, 26–27, Pinault 1992, 127, Perilli 2006, and Rosen 2012, 228–229), but it seems to have originated in Hellenistic anti-Hippocratic polemics, instigated by one Andreas; see von Staden 1999, 151.

ing virtually *every* human being at some point in their lives, people were eager, often desperate, to commodify a service they thought would bring relief or cure from suffering; and second, unlike with most other professions, there was rarely agreement about 'best practices' among healing practitioners. Potters might specialize in different shapes and sizes of their product, but it was easy enough for everyone to know—because one could see and feel the result—how to make clay or paint successfully, with predictable qualities of utility, say, or durability. By contrast, when so much about health and disease involved hidden processes and causes, and so much was based on inferential or analogical thinking, the rhetoric of competition became particularly strident because it was less easy to point to a 'product', and any talk of medical efficacy (= success at healing) was always relative to individual cases. This is why, for example, there was an ongoing ancient debate about what to do with 'incurables'—particularly among Hippocratic writers who were just beginning to formulate principles about such matters—since the death of a patient, at least one thought to be curable, could never be good for business.[8]

To judge from our texts, at any rate, competition for scientific recognition ('reputation') and business ('goods') seems to have been a persistent concern among Greek doctors, partly for practical reasons but also because of the moral anxiety that medicine often generated. While such anxiety—or more accurately, a *rhetoric* of moral anxiety that may not always have been sincere—was not unique to the medical profession, it took a specific form in medicine and arose, as I argue in what follows, from a tension between altruistic and self-serving strains inherent in the profession (e.g., 'doing good for humanity by attending to the sick' vs. 'making money and maintaining a career').[9] I will focus

8 The matter of the terminally ill or 'incurables' is somewhat more complicated (see above, n. 5), since a prognosis of death early on in a patient's disease could be seen as a mark of the physician's competence. At the same time his decision not to treat a patient deemed incurable was also being judged by the public, and when such patients died, there was always the risk that the physician's decision not to treat might be blamed for the deaths. See Jouanna 1999, 110: '[I]mmediately upon making a first prognosis about the condition of the patient, he had to make a second prognosis regarding his own situation. Could he withdraw without doing harm to his reputation or not? … as a public figure he was the prisoner of the judgment of the public'. In the face of limited medical knowledge the 'rules' of medical competition among the Hippocratics—particularly what it meant to 'win'—seemed more fluid and unstable than in other competitive realms.

9 Scodel's discussion in this volume of 'good' and 'bad' competition between farmers in Hesiod offers an interesting comparandum with the competition among Greek doctors portrayed in the Hippocratic writers. While there is also a moral dimension to the 'good *eris*' in Hesiod—it leads to the prestige and admiration that follows from the accumulation of wealth—wealth

in this study primarily on Hippocratic texts, but most of my observations and conclusions (as a quick glance at Galen towards the end will show) are borne out across the entire extant Greek medical tradition.

2 Hippocratic 'Humble Bragging'

We will examine various Hippocratic texts that show how their authors, in their efforts to distinguish themselves from their rivals, crafted a strategy of self-promotion that relied specifically on disparaging the self-promotion of others, and claimed a moral superiority grounded in the belief that physicians should not, in fact, be motivated by a spirit of competition or a desire for wealth. Part of the paradox of this formulation, of course, is that so many of the Hippocratic authors are unquestionably writing in a competitive mode, as any number of treatises can attest. The author of *Sacred Disease*, for example, famously argues for a non-divine etiology of paroxysmal disorders with cranky, polemical language intended to belittle the competition (*Morb. sacr.* 1.4, Jouanna 2003, tr. Jones 1923; italics added):

> My own view is that those who first attributed a sacred character to this malady were like the magicians, purifiers, charlatans and quacks of our own day, men who claim great piety and superior knowledge. Being at a loss, and having no treatment which would help, they concealed and sheltered themselves behind superstition, and called this illness sacred, in order that their utter ignorance might not be manifest.
>
> ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκέουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι τοῦτο τὸ νόσημα ἀφιερώσαντες τοιοῦτοι εἶναι ἄνθρωποι οἷοι καὶ νῦν εἰσι μάγοι τε καὶ καθάρται καὶ ἀγύρται καὶ ἀλαζόνες, ὁκόσοι δὴ προσποιέονται σφόδρα θεοσεβεῖς εἶναι καὶ πλέον τι εἰδέναι. οὗτοι τοίνυν παραμπεχόμενοι καὶ προβαλλόμενοι τὸ θεῖον τῆς ἀμηχανίης τοῦ μὴ ἴσχειν ὅ τι προσενέγκαντες ὠφελήσουσιν, ὡς μὴ κατάδηλοι ἔωσιν οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενοι …

The opening of *Nature of Man*—dated with reasonable confidence to the late fifth century—alludes to public debates on philosophical and scientific topics and is suffused with the language of competition, victory, intellectual prowess, and weakness. The author is concerned here to argue against those

as an explicit goal of medicine worried Hippocratic doctors, who, as we will see below, preferred to stress a rhetoric of selflessness and philanthropy.

who believed the human body to be composed of a single substance such as blood or bile (*NH* 1, Jouanna 2002, tr. Jones 1931; italics added):

> He who is accustomed to hear speakers discuss the nature of man beyond its relations to medicine will not find the present account of any interest … One of them asserts that this one and the all is air, another calls it fire, another, water, and another, earth; while each appends to his own account evidence and proofs that amount to nothing. The fact that, while adopting the same idea, they do not give the same account, shows that their knowledge too is at fault. *The best way to realise this is to be present at their debates*. Given the same debaters and the same audience the same man never wins in the discussion three times in succession, but now *one is victor, now another*, now he who happens to have the most glib tongue in the face of the crowd. Yet it is right that a man who claims correct knowledge about the facts should maintain *his own argument victorious always, if his knowledge be knowledge of reality and if he set it forth correctly*. But in my opinion such men by their lack of understanding overthrow themselves in the words of their very discussions, and establish the theory of Melissus [i.e., they encourage a monistic understanding of the world].
>
> ὅστις μὲν οὖν εἴωθεν ἀκούειν λεγόντων ἀμφὶ τῆς φύσιος τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης προσωτέρω ἢ ὅσον αὐτῆς ἐς ἰητρικὴν ἀφήκει, τούτῳ μὲν οὐκ ἐπιτήδειος ὅδε ὁ λόγος ἀκούειν· … λέγει δ' αὐτῶν ὁ μέν τις φάσκων ἠέρα τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἕν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν, ὁ δὲ ὕδωρ, ὁ δὲ πῦρ, ὁ δὲ γῆν, καὶ ἐπιλέγει ἕκαστος τῷ ἑωυτοῦ λόγῳ μαρτύριά τε καὶ τεκμήρια, ἅ ἐστιν οὐδέν. ὁπότε δὲ γνώμῃ τῇ αὐτῇ προσχρέωνται, λέγουσι δε οὐ τὰ αὐτά, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ⟨ν⟩ γινώσκουσιν. γνοίη δ' ἂν τῷδε τις μάλιστα παραγενόμενος αὐτοῖσιν ἀντιλέγουσιν· πρὸς γὰρ ἀλλήλους ἀντιλέγοντες οἱ αὐτοὶ ἄνδρες τῶν αὐτῶν ἐναντίον ἀκροατέων οὐδέποτε τρὶς ἐφεξῆς ὁ αὐτὸς περιγίνεται ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, **ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν οὗτος ἐπικρατεῖ, τοτὲ δὲ οὗτος**, τοτὲ δὲ ᾧ ἂν τύχῃ μάλιστα ἡ γλῶσσα ἐπιρρυεῖσα πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον. καίτοι δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸν φάντα ὀρθῶς γινώσκειν ἀμφὶ τῶν πρηγμάτων **παρέχειν αἰεὶ ἐπικρατέοντα τὸν λόγον τὸν ἑωυτοῦ, εἴπερ ἐόντα γινώσκει καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποφαίνεται**. ἀλλ' ἐμοίγε δοκέουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνθρωποι αὐτοὶ ἑωυτοὺς καταβάλλειν ἐν τοῖσιν ὀνόμασι τῶν λόγων ⟨τῶν⟩ ἑωυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀσυνεσίης, τὸν δὲ Μελίσσου λόγον ὀρθοῦν.

Such polemical language and concerns can be found in other Hippocratic treatises as well,[10] but there is a smaller subset of self-consciously prescrip-

10 See Jouanna 2002, 223–231 and Craik 2015, 212.

tive works (sometimes called 'deontological' works) in which some anxiety begins to emerge over how to maintain the moral high ground in a professional marketplace with unscrupulous competition, particularly when it comes to awkward matters of fees and self-promotional displays. The Hippocratic *Decorum* (Περὶ εὐσχημοσύνης), for example, is of uncertain date—suggestions range from the Hellenistic to the imperial period[11]—but aligns on many points with earlier Hippocratic texts in its normative injunctions for the aspiring physician. The opening paragraphs are concerned to distance the Hippocratic physician from those who practiced medicine as a 'vulgar' sort of craft, aiming primarily at money and hawking their wares with shameless display. Chapter 2 has its textual difficulties,[12] but the key concepts are discernible (Heiberg 1927):

> For all wisdom not [corrupted] by *shameful love of profit and unseemliness*—in these there's a scientific method at work, but if it's not guiltless, [such wisdom] is vulgar. Young men fall in with those [who follow that kind of wisdom], and when they're grown they become sweaty with embarrassment in looking at them; when they are old men, they pass legislation to banish them from their cities out of bitterness. These are the men who, making the circuit of cities, work up the *crowd, deceiving them with vulgarity. One might recognize them by their clothing and the rest of their appearance*; for even if they are splendidly decked out, they should much more be avoided and hated by those watching them.
>
> πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ μὴ μετ' **αἰσχροκερδείης** καὶ ἀσχημοσύνης, κἀκείνοισι μέθοδός τις ἐοῦσα τεχνικὴ ἐργάζεται, ἀλλ' εἴ γε μὴ πρὸς ἀναιτίην, **δημευταί**· νέοι τε γὰρ αὐτέοισιν ἐμπίπτουσιν, ἀκμάζοντες δὲ δι' ἐντροπίην ἱδρῶτας τίθενται βλέποντες, πρεσβῦται δὲ διὰ πικρίην νομοθεσίην τίθενται ἀναίρεσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. καὶ γὰρ **ἀγορὴν ἐργαζόμενοι** οὗτοι **μετὰ βαναυσίης** ἀπατέοντες καὶ ἐν πόλεσιν ἀνακυκλέοντες οἱ αὐτοί. ἴδοι δέ τις ἂν καὶ **ἐπ' ἐσθῆτος καὶ ἐν τῇσιν ἄλλῃσιν περι-**

11 Golder 2007, 97–98 for a Hellenistic date; Fleischer 1939, 58–60, 67 and Jouanna 1999, 380 for later (first or second century CE).

12 Cf. Jones 1923, 28: 'The details of this chapter are hopelessly obscured, partly through the corruption of the text, but the general outline is clear. "Quack" philosophers are described, to be compared with genuine philosophers in the next chapter. It is useless to try to rewrite the text so as to make it grammatical and logical.' I use Heiberg's *CMG* text (1.1., 1927), although his (more conservative) readings are not always more comforting than Jones's highly emended text. The translation offered above, and all subsequent uncredited translations, are my own.

γραφῆσιν· κῆν γὰρ ἔωσιν ὑπερηφανέως κεκοσμημένοι, πουλὺ μᾶλλον φευκτέον καὶ μισητέον τοῖσι θεωμένοισίν ἐστιν.

The text mentions a 'shameful love of profit' (αἰσχροκερδείη), 'unseemliness' (ἀσχημοσύνη), a popularity based on pandering (δημευταί, [*sc.* σοφίαι]) as they 'work the crowd' with vulgar trickery (μετὰ βαναυσίης ἀπατέοντες; 'vulgar' here carries hints of classist prejudices against artisan crafts), and a certain style of, presumably flamboyant, dress (ἴδοι δέ τις ἂν καὶ ἐπ' ἐσθῆτος). *Decorum* is a strange and often obscure text, but it seems to be arguing for the special status of an in-group of physicians who would claim to practice a τέχνη rooted in σοφία, in contrast to those with baser motivations. When the author speaks of 'medicine' (ἰατρική), it is *their* medicine, not just any medicine, and in chapter 5 the author lists what this means:

> … there are in medicine all the things that constitute wisdom: lack of venality, a sense of shame [?], modesty, restraint, opinion, judgment, calmness, boldness, purity, gnomic speech, knowledge of the things useful and necessary for life, selling of purifying things, lack of superstition, divine excellence. For they have what they have, in contrast to intemperance, vulgarity, insatiability, desire, robbery [?], shamelessness.

> καὶ γὰρ ἔνι τὰ πρὸς σοφίην ἐν ἰητρικῇ πάντα, ἀφιλαργυρίη, ἐντροπή, ἐρυθρίησις, καταστολή, δόξα, κρίσις, ἡσυχίη, ἀπάντησις, καθαριότης, γνωμολογίη, εἴδησις τῶν πρὸς βίον χρηστῶν καὶ ἀναγκαίων, ἀκαθαρσίης ἀπεμπόλησις, ἀδεισιδαιμονίη, ὑπεροχὴ θεία. ἔχουσι γάρ, ἃ ἔχουσι, πρὸς ἀκολασίην, πρὸς βαναυσίην, πρὸς ἀπληστίην, πρὸς ἐπιθυμίην, πρὸς ἀφαίρεσιν, πρὸς ἀναιδείην [ἐνιδεῖν].

Craik (2015, 59) has tentatively revived the notion, first suggested by Jones, that *Decorum* implies a kind of 'secret society' of doctors requiring initiation as if into religious mysteries, an idea that was once in vogue to explain some of the religious language of the Hippocratic *Oath*.[13] This is not a question we can pursue here, but whether the language of piety and sanctimony that we

13 On the hypothesis of a Pythagorean origin of the *Oath* see Edelstein 1967, *contra*, von Staden 1996, 409–410, with further bibliography in n. 10, and Craik 2015, 149. With *Decorum* the injunctions do seem to be as prescriptive as they are idealistic, i.e., while articulating a set of general principles that ought to characterize a good doctor, they also remind the in-group that they must not behave in a way that brings disrepute on their community. We can only speculate, however, about the intended readership of the treatise, whether specific doctors or outsiders.

find in such treatises was meant literally or metaphorically, it has the effect of introducing a different set of criteria for evaluating success in competition than merely money and personal esteem. Or rather, the esteem that is valued in these treatises comes from what are sometimes informally referred to as 'quiet virtues'—for example, selflessness, humility, or modesty. Indeed, as we will see, anxiety over the very question of what constituted a proper medical reputation—how much of it one should desire, and what form it should take in the minds of those who generate it—appears emblematically in other Hippocratic treatises, as well, sometimes with explicitly moral overtones, sometimes with practical concerns in mind.

Decorum never quite gets into the question of 'why medicine?' in particular—does one choose this profession, for example, *because* one desires to acquire a reputation for all the virtues the author enumerates, or for some other reason? Nor, on a practical note, does it spell out how well the virtues of modesty, decorum, and self-control will help one acquire patients and maintain a professional career that pays the rent. None of the Hippocratic treatises fully addresses this practical question, but the professional perils of always taking the high road in a competitive world are not lost on some of them. One work, *Precepts* (Παραγγελίαι), also difficult to date but possibly from as early as the 3rd century BCE,[14] offers some striking testimony on this issue, and is worth some discussion.

Precepts 10 begins as if to repudiate the behavior of rivals who engage in extravagant display to drum up business but then abruptly back-tracks slightly by saying that a *little* self-promotion (he uses the word εὐχαριστία here, i.e., 'the incurring of gratitude in someone') is acceptable and not unworthy of medicine (Heiberg 1927, mod.):

> You should also avoid luxurious[15] head-dress and extravagant perfume for acquiring patients.[16] For through an excess of ['an ample supply of'?] strangeness (ἀξυνηθείῃ)[17] you will acquire slander (διαβολήν), but with a

14 Golder 2007, 98 (mid-fourth century BCE); *contra* Fleischer 1939, 18 (first or second century CE). See also Craik 2015, 232–233.

15 Reading θρύψις for τρίψις, a conjecture by Triller and adopted by Littré (9.266) and Jones 1927, 327 but not by Heiberg 1927; i.e., referring to the 'luxury' of the headgear. τρίψις ('wearing down') is difficult to construe in this context.

16 Lit. 'because of the [desire for] procurement of healing'; an odd phrase: 'Apparently, in order to increase your practice by fastidiousness in the matter of dress. But the expression is very strange, and should mean, "in order to effect a cure."' (Jones 1927, 327 n. 2).

17 An emendation proposed informally by Kühn and adopted by Littré (see Littré 1861, 9.267

> little, you'll get respect (εὐσχημοσύνη); for a pain in a part [of the body] is a small thing, but when the pain is everywhere, it is excessive. But I don't keep you from [seeking] gratitude, for that is not unworthy of medical care.[18]
>
> φευκτέη δὲ καὶ θρύψις ἐπικρατίδων διὰ προσκύρησιν ἀκέσιος, ὀδμή τε περίεργος· διὰ γὰρ ἱκανὴν ἀξυνηθείην διαβολὴν κεκτῆσαι, διὰ δὲ τὴν ὀλίγην, εὐσχημοσύνην· ἐν γὰρ μέρει πόνος ὀλίγος, ἐν πᾶσι ἱκανός. εὐχαριστίην δὲ οὐ περιαιρέω· ἀξίη γὰρ ἰητρικῆς προστασίης.

In *Precepts* 12, however, the author draws the line at public performances, the desire for which, he says, is inglorious (οὐκ ἀγακλεῶς ἐπιθυμέεις):

> And if you want to hold a lecture for the sake of a crowd, that's not a glorious desire, but [if you do,] at least don't cite poetry [while lecturing], for that clearly shows feebleness of effort. For I reject for [medical] practice a different effort [not pertinent to the art] working up a story, for which reason it is in itself alone a graceful attraction.[19] For you will achieve the empty toil of a drone bee with its transport.
>
> ἢν δὲ καὶ εἵνεκα ὁμίλου θέλῃς ἀκρόασιν ποιήσασθαι, οὐκ ἀγακλέως ἐπιθυμέεις, μὴ μέντοι γε μετὰ μαρτυρίης ποιητικῆς· ἀδυναμίην γὰρ ἐμφαίνει φιλοπονίης· ἀπαρνέομαι γὰρ ἐς χρῆσιν ἑτέρην φιλοπονίην μετὰ πόνου ἱστορεομένην, δι' ὃ ἐν μούνῃ ἑωυτῇ αἵρεσιν ἐοῦσαν χαρίεσσαν· περιποιήσει γὰρ κηφῆνος μετὰ παραπομπῆς ματαιοκοπίην [*coni. Weigel*].

The injunction to avoid citing the testimony of poets if one *does* aim to draw a crowd for a public recitation is curious and revealing. Such a practice, he says, not only suggests weakness of effort (ἀδυναμίη) on the doctor's part but is rep-

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nn. 6–7) for ἀξυνησίην ('stupidity'), which is not implausible, but is something of a *non sequitur* after the emphasis on headgear and perfume.

18 Cf. Hippoc. *Fractures* 1, which disparages doctors who treat fractured and dislocated bones in outlandish ways simply in order to impress, when in fact, the author says, 'treating a broken arm is not really a big deal' (σπουδή μὲν οὖν οὐ πολλή) and should be a routine part of the doctor's practice. Others, however, he continues, prefer to praise 'what is out of the ordinary' (τὸ ξενοπρεπές) and 'the strange' (τὸ ἀλλόκοτον) before they even understand if it is useful (οὔπω ξυνιέντες, εἰ χρηστόν). On these terms see Pétrequin 1868, 92 n. 13.

19 The writing is obscure, even if the meaning is clear enough. As Jones 1927, 309 notes, 'The writer of *Precepts* seems to have gone out of his way to wrap up his meaning in unusual diction, which is often almost unintelligible'.

rehensible because it is useless to the medical art and exists only for its own intrinsic pleasantry.

On this point similar complaints by Galen much later may help us understand the larger background of what troubles the Hippocratic author here. In his *On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato* (*PHP*) Galen complains on several occasions about the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus's use of poetry in his psychopathological works (or more specifically, about Chrysippus's over-use and misuse of poetry—Galen does not object to quoting poetry as a corroborative flourish to an argument already derived 'scientifically').[20] One passage of many will suffice to give the flavor of Galen's attitude to this practice (*PHP* 5.7.43, De Lacy 1978, tr. De Lacy 2005):

> Ignorance of a thing is pardonable, as I said before; but it is not pardonable to handle the argument so ineptly as to cite as proof of so important a doctrine the words of comic and tragic poet—men who do not try to prove anything but only adorn with beauty of language (κοσμοῦσι διὰ τῆς ἑρμηνείας) the speeches they think appropriate to the character speaking in the play—and to fail to mention what Plato said in proof of it …
>
> ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγνοῆσαί τι συγγνωστόν, ὡς καὶ πρόσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ συγγνωστὸν δὲ τὸ πλημμελῶς οὕτως μεταχειρίσασθαι τὸν λόγον ὥστε τῶν μὲν τοῖς κωμικοῖς ἢ τραγικοῖς ποιηταῖς εἰρημένων μνημονεύειν εἰς τηλικούτου δόγματος ἀπόδειξιν, ἀνθρώποις οὐδ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἀποδεικνύειν οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ μόνον οἷα ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ πρέπειν τῷ λέγοντι προσώπῳ κατὰ τὸ δρᾶμα, κοσμοῦσι διὰ τῆς ἑρμηνείας …

Galen's complaints were directed against Chrysippus's practice in his published works, but the problem is similar to the one noted in *Precepts* 12: citing poetry is so irrelevant to proper medical science that it can only derive from a desire to show off, to out-do others competing for the same share of the marketplace. Listeners may be impressed because poetry has its own charms, but it tells them nothing about a doctor's competence. At the same time the Hippocratic author leaves open just the smallest window for public performance ('if you have to do it, just make sure never to cite poetry!'), anxious that without *some* attention

20 On Galen's use of poetry see further De Lacy 1966, Tieleman 1996, 219–248, Rosen 2013. It has to be said that when it suits Galen, he cites poetry throughout *PHP*, but usually to illustrate arguments he believes he has already made logically, not as part of an argument itself.

of self-promotion, honorable physicians will be ignored in all the jostling for recognition.

A similar ambivalence surrounds the question of medical prognostication in the Hippocratic authors, an area where there was evidently great scope for bravado. Desperate patients and those close to them would understandably admire anyone who could predict the course or outcome of a disease, and there was a particular temptation, for obvious reasons, to predict a recovery, despite the high risk of being wrong. Hippocratic doctors certainly believed in the legitimacy and importance of prognosis, but it made them nervous to think of it as a competitive arena, because it could so easily intersect with divination and sorcery, which is to say, predictions not based on an empirical and systematic understanding of disease.[21] The opening of the Hippocratic *Prognostics* begins by stating the importance of prediction for gaining the trust of patients (Jouanna 2013, tr. Jones 1923; italics added):[22]

> I hold that it is an excellent thing for a physician to practice forecasting. For if he discover and declare unaided by the side of his patients the present, the past and the future, and fill in the gaps in the account given by the sick, *he will be the more believed to understand the cases, so that men will confidently entrust themselves to him for treatment.*
>
> τὸν ἰητρὸν δοκέει μοι ἄριστον εἶναι πρόνοιαν ἐπιτηδεύειν· προγινώσκων γὰρ καὶ προλέγων παρὰ τοῖσι νοσέουσι τά τε παρεόντα καὶ τὰ προγεγονότα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι, ὁκόσα τε παραλείπουσιν οἱ ἀσθενέοντες ἐκδιηγεύμενος **πιστεύοιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον γινώσκειν τὰ τῶν νοσεόντων πρήγματα, ὥστε τολμᾶν ἐπιτρέπειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους σφέας ἑωυτοὺς τῷ ἰητρῷ.**

Doctors who are good at prognosticating are 'justly marveled at' and more likely to remain 'free of blame'. The author of *Prorrhetics* 2 (ca. end of the fifth century BCE)[23] in the opening lines of that work is more specific about the kinds of prognoses he is willing to engage in and sets his practice apart from those irresponsible doctors who make 'frequent, fine, and wondrous predictions'—predictions, he says, 'such as I myself have never made, nor ever heard anyone else making' (*Prorrh.* 2.1). He continues by telling anecdotes about doctors called in for a second opinion in cases where the patient's original doctor

21 On Hippocratic prognostication in general see Jouanna 1999, 100–111.
22 Also discussed at Jouanna 1999, 101.
23 For the date see Jouanna 1999, 407. Jouanna also discusses *Prorrhetics* 2 on pp. 103–104.

predicted death. The new doctors contradict the original depressing prognosis and instead predict recovery accompanied by some seemingly random physical deformities.[24] The author, by contrast, prefers to limit predictions early on in a disease to the question of whether a patient will survive or die, interpreting clinical signs (σημεῖα) only and staying within the realm of the 'human' (ἀνθρωπινωτέρως) (*Prorrh.* 2.2, Potter, tr. Potter 1995; italics added):

> I, however, shall not prophesy anything like this; rather I record the clinical signs from which one must deduce which persons will become well and which will die, and which will recover or die in a short or a long time. I have also written about the apostases, and how one must meditate upon each of them. I believe, in fact, that those who make predictions about lameness and other conditions of that kind make their predictions, if they are sensible, only after the disease has become fixed and it is clear that the abscession will not revert, rather than before the abscession begins to occur. I also intend in the other kind of cases to make predictions more *in line with human possibilities* than what is reported.

> ἐγὼ δὲ τοιαῦτα μὲν οὐ μαντεύσομαι, σημεῖα δὲ γράφω οἷσι χρὴ τεκμαίρεσθαι τούς τε ὑγιέας ἐσομένους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς ἀποθανουμένους, τούς τε ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἢ ἐν πολλῷ ὑγιέας ἐσομένους ἢ ἀπολουμένους· γέγραπται δέ μοι καὶ περὶ ἀποστασίων ὡς χρὴ ἐπισκέπτεσθαι ἑκάστας. δοκέω δὲ καὶ τοὺς προειπόντας περί τε τῶν χωλωσίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἤδη ἀποστηριζομένου τοῦ νοσήματος προειπεῖν, καὶ δήλου ἐόντος ὅτι οὐ παλινδρομήσει ἡ ἀπόστασις, εἴ περ νόον εἶχον, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὶν ἄρχεσθαι τὴν ἀπόστασιν γινομένην. ἐλπίζω δὲ καὶ τἄλλα προρρηθῆναι **ἀνθρωπινωτέρως** ἢ ὡς ἐπαγγέλλεται·

Further into *Prorrhetics* 2.2 the author even speaks of prognosis explicitly as a kind of contest: 'But anyone who is eager for these contests (ὅστις τῶν τοιουτέων ἐπιθυμέει ἀγωνισμάτων) must make his predictions after having understood thoroughly' how to read the signs of the body. In the end the doctor must be as σώφρων as possible (συμβουλεύω δὲ ὡς σωφρονεστάτους εἶναι), since a successful prognosis will bring admiration (θαῦμα) from the patient, but a mistaken one will incur hatred and even charges of madness.[25]

24 The author mentions three cases where the doctor predicts that the patient will survive but, in the first example will go blind, in the second will become 'disabled in one arm', and in the third will find his toes becoming 'black and rotten' (i.e., gangrenous).

25 'I advise you to be as cautious as possible … in making predictions of this kind, taking into account that *when you are successful in making a prediction you will be admired by the*

The Hippocratic physician, then, who wanted to be both decorous (εὐσχήμων) and honorable but *also* successful, was always in a bit of quandary, since these two goals were often in conflict. In the rough and tumble world of Hippocratic competition the value of behavioral abstractions such as honor and decorum is typically limited to their role in assuring success among competitors. That is, if the sick were persuaded to seek the services of a flashy healer who made extravagant, upbeat prognoses more readily than those of a cautious, 'scientific' Hippocratic doctor who followed a specific code of conduct, the marketplace has in this case decided how much value it puts on the principles of that code (very little). The treatises themselves—especially the deontological ones—come into being, essentially, as rhetorical attempts to counteract the forces of blind, unregulated market competition with the insertion of a different set of values.

3 Hippocratic Altruism

This combination of ambivalence and hostility towards competition is hardly limited to the Hippocratic writers,[26] but as I noted above the competitive stakes involved in the world of ancient healthcare were particularly idiosyncratic, first, because of the basic human urgency surrounding matters of pain, suffering, and mortality, and second, because of the fact that medicine as a τέχνη was still in formation in the classical period. The systematized moral framework that had early on come to shape so many other competitive arenas, such as athletics,[27] took longer to evolve in medicine, as ethical interventions such as those we find in the Hippocratic *Oath* suggest. The reasons for this are surely complex, but it seems likely that social class plays a significant role: one need not be a member of the elite to 'practice medicine' broadly conceived, and the clientele for medicine is not limited by class, which means that traditionally elite values—those, for example, that privileged winning and personal glory—need not have governed its practice.[28]

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patient who is sick, but when you go wrong you will not only be subject to hatred but perhaps even be thought mad' (συμβουλεύω δὲ ὡς σωφρονεστάτους εἶναι … ἐν τοῖσι τοιούτοισι προρρήμασι, γνόντας ὅτι ἐπιτυχὼν μὲν ἄν τις τοῦ προρρήματος **θαυμασθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ ξυνεόντος ἀλγέοντος**, ἁμαρτὼν δ' ἄν τις πρὸς τῷ μισεῖσθαι τάχ' ἂν καὶ μεμηνέναι δόξειεν).

26 See, e.g., Bakewell and Kuin in this volume.

27 See, e.g., Dickie 1984 on the complex ethics of athletic competition that we can see already developed in Homer's depiction of the funeral games for Patroclus in *Iliad* 23 (on these see also Bierl in this volume); see also Nicholson 2014, Kyle 2015, 56–62.

28 See Jouanna 1999, 112–119 on the socially diverse clientele of Hippocratic doctors. See also

In his study of ‘competitiveness and anti-competitiveness’ in the imperial period (especially in Philostratus) König (2011) notes a strain of anxiety about ‘excessive glory-seeking’ (φιλοτιμία) that appears in many areas of elite self-representation.[29] The reasons for this anxiety, as König notes, are similar to what we have seen in the Hippocratic texts, namely, a fear of being thought excessively self-promotional and eristic. But the Hippocratic tradition also offers at least the *pretense* of a more fundamental explanation for this anxiety, one that attempts to shift the very motivation of the medical practitioner entirely away from the self. Anxiety over φιλοτιμία and φιλονεικία among some Greek doctors, in any case, turns out to be not only about one’s reputation, but also about an even higher goal of altruism and public service. Whether or not altruism can ever be entirely disentangled from egoism, there are clear traces in the Hippocratic writers that some thought it should be.

To illustrate this final point we may look at chapter 4 of *Precepts*, which features an unusually extended discussion of an awkward subject in medicine: patients’ fees. This passage precedes the discussion that we looked at earlier about excessive self-promotion and helps explain some of the anxiety that crops up there. The author suggests that doctors should be sensitive about when to bring up the question of fees and only do so when the disease has had a chance to settle into its full manifestation. There are both practical and humane reasons for this strategy (Heiberg 1927, mod., tr. Jones 1923, mod.; italics added):

above n. 13 on the practical uncertainties of how medical competition would be judged by the public. In the case of athletic or military competition the outcome tended to be consonant with the moral verdict: winners are generally portrayed as morally righteous (except in cases of cheating; see, e.g., Dickie 1984). The judgments of non-athletic, non-elite competitions, such as the literary contests of fifth-century Attic dramatic festivals, might come closer, perhaps, to the precariousness faced by the Hippocratic physician, in that criteria of literary merit were more volatile and less codified, especially in the hands of a democratic panel of judges selected by lot (see Taplin in this volume). Aristophanes certainly felt this tension in reflecting on the fact that his *Clouds* lost to Cratinus’s *Pytine* in 423. At *Clouds* 524–525, for example, he speaks of being beaten by ‘vulgar men’ (ὑπ’ ἀνδρῶν φορτικῶν) and blames the spectators of his revised version, whom he calls ‘wise/sophisticated’ (ὑμῖν μέμφομαι τοῖς σοφοῖς), for failing to recognize his superiority when they should have. Theater audiences could be fickle, and the criteria for victory involved aesthetic criteria that were always open to debate. Attic comedy, with its fondness for metatheatricality and self-reflexiveness, was able to be more self-conscious about this problem than tragedy. See Rosen 2004 and Halliwell 2012, 93–153.

29 See also Zadorojnyi in this volume for the term in the context of sophistic erudition.

> For if you begin by discussing fees, you will suggest to the patient either that you will go away and leave him if no agreement be reached, or that you will neglect him and not prescribe any immediate treatment. So one mustn't worry too much about fixing a fee. For I consider such a worry to be harmful to a troubled patient, particularly if the disease be acute. For the quickness of the disease, offering no opportunity for turning back, spurs on the *good physician not to seek his profit but rather to lay hold on reputation*. Therefore it is better to reproach a patient you have saved than to extort money from those who are about to die.
>
> παραινέσιος δ' ἂν καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπιδεηθείη τῆς θεωρίης· εἰ γὰρ ἄρξαιο περὶ μισθαρίων· ξυμβάλλει γάρ τι καὶ τῷ ξύμπαντι· τῷ μὲν ἀλγέοντι τοιαύτην διανόησιν ἐμποιήσεις τὴν, ὅτι [οὐκ] ἀπολιπὼν αὐτὸν πορεύσῃ μὴ ξυνθέμενος, καὶ ὅτι ἀμελήσεις, καὶ οὐχ ὑποθήσῃ τινὰ τῷ παρεόντι. ἐπιμελεῖσθαι οὖν οὐ δεῖ περὶ στάσιος μισθοῦ· ἄχρηστον γὰρ ἡγεύμεθα ἐνθύμησιν ὀχλεομένου τὴν τοιαύτην, πουλὺ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἢν ὀξὺ νόσημά τι· νούσου γὰρ ταχυτὴς καιρὸν μὴ διδοῦσα ἐς ἀναστροφὴν **οὐκ ἐποτρύνει τὸν καλῶς ἰητρεύοντα ζητεῖν τὸ λυσιτελές**, ἔχεσθαι δὲ δόξης μᾶλλον· κρέσσον οὖν σωζομένοισιν ὀνειδίζειν ἢ ὀλεθρίως ἔχοντας προμύσσειν.

The reputation (δόξα) that the 'good physician' (τὸν καλῶς ἰητρεύοντα) should seek instead of profit is a reputation for a certain *relationship* with the patient, not one that only comes from success in treatment. Chapter 5 makes this even clearer, as the author discusses how to treat patients who make unusual or unclear requests:

> And yet some patients ask for what is out of the way and doubtful, through prejudice, deserving indeed to be disregarded, but not to be punished. Wherefore you must reasonably oppose them, as they are embarked upon a stormy sea of change. For, in heaven's name, who that is a brotherly physician practices [Littré, 'would be persuaded to practice'] with such harshness [Jones: 'hardness of heart'] as not at the beginning to conduct a preliminary examination of every illness and prescribe what will help towards a cure, to heal the patient and not to overlook the reward, to say nothing of the desire that makes a man ready to learn?[30]

30 Tr. Jones 1923, mod.; different readings offered in Littré and Heiberg 1927: Jones runs the last sentence into the next clause, as printed above, emending the manuscripts' τῆς ἐπικαρπίης to τὴν ἐπικαρπίην so as to include in that clause the remark about profit [ἐπικαρπίη].

καίτοι ἔνιοι νοσέοντες ἀλλάσσουσι, τὸ ξενοπρεπὲς καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον προκρίνοντες, ἄξιοι μὲν ἀμελίης, οὐ μέντοι γε κολάσιος· διὸ τουτέοισιν ἀντιτάξῃ εἰκότως μεταβολῆς ἐπὶ σάλου πορευομένοισιν. τίς γὰρ ὦ πρὸς Διὸς **ἠδελφισμένος** ἰητρὸς ἰητρεύειν πεισθείη ἀτεραμνίῃ; ὥστ' ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀνακρίνοντα πᾶν πάθος μὴ οὐχ ὑποθέσθαι τινὰ ξυμφέροντα ἐς θεραπηΐην, ἀποθεραπεῦσαί τε τὸν νοσέοντα καὶ μὴ παριδεῖν τὴν ἐπικαρπίην, ἄνευ τῆς ἐπισκευαζούσης ἐς μάθησιν ἐπιθμίης;

The author had opened chapter 5 by stating that unusual requests from patients should be ignored *but not punished,* and one should oppose them 'reasonably' (εἰκότως) because these patients are 'embarking on a stormy sea of change'. In short, sympathy with the patient's experience is recommended. Although there are major textual problems in this chapter, the point is clear: the 'good doctor' will be one of a group that considers itself, conceptually, at least, if not literally, a kind of fraternity (ἠδελφισμένος ἰητρὸς) marked by a specific set of shared values, which practices 'without harshness' (ἀτεραμνίῃ) and, again, avoids thinking about profit before the interests of their patients.

Precepts 6 takes this a step further into abstraction, offering a rare glimpse of the fundamental values that were felt to be essential for a Hippocratic doctor (Jones 1927, tr. Jones 1923, mod.):

> I urge you not to be too *unsociable/inhumane,* but to consider carefully your patient's superabundance or means. Sometimes *give your services for nothing,* calling to mind a previous benefaction or present satisfaction. And if there be an opportunity of serving one who is a stranger in financial straits, give full assistance to all such. For *where there is love of man, there is also love of the art.* For some patients, though conscious that their condition is perilous, recover their health simply through their *contentment with the goodness of the physician.* And it is well to superintend the sick to make them well, to care for the healthy to keep them well, but also to care for one's own self, so as to *observe what is seemly.*

παρακελεύομαι δὲ **μὴ λίην ἀπανθρωπίην**[31] εἰσάγειν, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπειν ἔς γε περιουσίην καὶ οὐσίην· ὁτὲ δὲ προῖκα, ἀναφέρων μνήμην εὐχαριστίης προτέρην ἢ

In other words, Jones makes ἐπικαρπίη object of παριδεῖν, since the genitive of the manuscripts seems to hang ungrammatically otherwise. Heiberg follows Littré in retaining the genitive.

31 ἀπανθρωπίη ('unsociability') is a rare word, found in one other place in the Hippocratic corpus, at *Coan Predictions* 472, which describes the depression (ἀθυμία) and ἀπανθρωπίη of patients with severe diarrhea.

παρεοῦσαν εὐδοκίην, ἢν δὲ καιρὸς εἴη χορηγίης ξένῳ τε ἐόντι καὶ ἀπορέοντι, μάλιστα ἐπαρκέειν τοῖσι τοιουτέοισιν· ἢν γὰρ παρῇ **φιλανθρωπίη**, πάρεστι καὶ φιλοτεχνίη. ἔνιοι γὰρ νοσέοντες ᾐσθημένοι τὸ περὶ ἑωυτοὺς πάθος μὴ ἐὸν ἐν ἀσφαλείῃ, **καὶ τῇ τοῦ ἰητροῦ ἐπιεικείῃ εὐδοκέοντες**, μεταλλάσσονται ἐς ὑγιείην. εὖ δ' ἔχει νοσεόντων μὲν ἐπιστατέειν, ἕνεκεν ὑγιείης· ὑγιαινόντων δὲ φροντίζειν, ἕνεκεν ἀνοσίης· φροντίζειν καὶ ὑγιαινόντων, **ἕνεκεν εὐσχημοσύνης**.

We see here a nexus of prosocial values—'be humane', 'be willing to work for free if appropriate', 'be generous to strangers in need'—values that were probably invoked in opposition to more commonly seen motives of money and self-aggrandizement. The author sums up his attitude with the remarkable aphorism: 'where there is φιλανθρωπίη, there is love of the art'. φιλοτεχνίη, in other words, arises from an initial attitude of φιλανθρωπίη, a concept that again distances the doctor from the traditional competitive motives of profit and reputation. Those motivations are not unimportant, of course, it is just that the best doctors (morally speaking) would at base need to cultivate a philanthropic temperament. A love of humanity naturally leads, as our author believes, to a love of the art itself. The noun φιλανθρωπίη occurs only here in the Hippocratic corpus, but the adjective φιλάνθρωπος appears in a short work called *On the Physician*,[32] where it is associated with a group of traditional Greek virtues—σωφροσύνη, καλοκαγαθία, σεμνότης (*De medico* 1, Potter 1995):

… and it's necessary for the self-controlled man to keep an eye on these things concerning his soul/character: not only to be quiet, but also to be highly ordered in his life, since this will bring him the greatest good in terms of his reputation; and when it comes to his character he must be morally fine and good, and being such, he should also be serious and humane to everyone.

… δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπέειν. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν **σώφρονα**, μὴ μόνον τὸ σιγᾶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὸν βίον πάνυ εὔτακτον· μέγιστα γὰρ ἔχει πρὸς δόξαν ἀγαθά. τὸ δὲ ἦθος εἶναι **καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν**, τοιοῦτον δ' ὄντα πᾶσι καὶ σεμνὸν καὶ **φιλάνθρωπον**.

This passage also mentions δόξα, reputation, but in both authors' minds reputation *follows from* a specific form of moral behavior tailored to the nature

32 *On the Physician* is partly clinical, partly deontological; dating is uncertain (see Craik 2015, 165 with bibliography in n. 3), but scholars agree that it is probably post-classical.

of medicine itself; a desire for reputation (φιλοτιμία) is not *supposed* to be the motivation for taking up the art.

4 Conclusion: φιλανθρωπίη as a Medical Value

This is a partisan and polemical moral stance, to be sure, and it reads as something of a manifesto. It seems to recognize that medicine begins with ethical questions that set it apart from most other arts—not only how to address the ubiquitous, perennial problems of human disease and suffering, but *why*—and it suggests that if one is going to make a competitive case for one's own skill in this art, one should do so for the right reasons, which, ultimately, should lead back to φιλανθρωπίη. That φιλανθρωπίη should be not only an attitude *demonstrated* by doctors in their practice but actually one that *motivates* them to take up the art in the first place was a fine point not lost on that unregenerate Hippocratean, Galen, in the second century CE. Galen picked up on Hippocratic φιλανθρωπίη explicitly in a passage of his *On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato* where he shows his own interest in what drives a doctor to become a doctor and, by implication, what would constitute the proper criteria for assessing a competition among practitioners (9.5.6, tr. De Lacy 2005):

> Some practice the medical art for monetary gain, some because of exemptions granted them by the laws, some from *love of their fellow men* (διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν), others again for the fame and honor that attend the profession. Accordingly, as artisans of health they will all share the name physicians, but insofar as they act with different ends in view, one will be called a *lover of mankind* (φιλάνθρωπος), another a lover of honor, another of fame, still another a money-maker. The goal of the physician qua physician is not fame or profit, as Menodotus the Empiric wrote; this is the goal for Menodotus but not for Diocles, and not for Hippocrates and Empedocles either … *who treated men through love of mankind* (διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν).

Like the Hippocratic authors we have examined here, Galen concludes that φιλανθρωπία should be the primary motivating force for a doctor.[33]

33 See the brief discussion of this passage at Rosen 2014, 171 n. 23.

It may well be that in reality all competition is ultimately about honor, fame, and money, despite protestations to the contrary of the sort we have found in the Hippocratics. Certainly, however, the texts we have examined here show that a specific rhetoric of 'proper' medical competition, grounded in prosocial virtues and proper scientific methodology, was felt to be necessary to counteract practitioners who evidently *did* seem to be motivated by φιλοτιμία and greed, measuring their professional success in the same way as Hesiod's potter.[34]

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34 On Hesiod's potter see Scodel in this volume.

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PART 3

Multivalence, Displacement, Innovation

CHAPTER 9

Sleights of Hand: Epigraphic Capping and the Visual Enactment of *Eris* in Early Greek Epigrams

Deborah Steiner

1 Introduction

In Book 12 of the *Deipnosophistae* Athenaeus describes an epigrammatic exchange between the fifth-century painter Parrhasius, notorious as a *bon viveur*, and an unknown detractor who responds, in graphic form, to the sequence of self-promoting statements that the artist 'was painting (or writing) on works of art that he had himself made'. The account records the several stages of the epigraphic interchange, beginning with the initial inscription of Parrhasius that sparked the first riposte and including the editorializing comments of Athenaeus interjected between his citations of the barbed messages (12.543c–e):[1]

> For he indulged in luxury in a way offensive to good taste and beyond his status as a painter, and yet in talk laid claim to virtue, painting/writing on works of art that he himself had made the following:
>
> 'A man who lives in a luxuriant manner while revering virtue painted/wrote these things'.
>
> Whereupon someone feeling considerable annoyance wrote over/added on to this: 'A man who lives by the painter's rod'. Now Parrhasius painted/wrote on many of his own works the following:
>
> 'A man who lives with refinement while revering virtue painted/wrote these things—Parrhasius from Ephesus, his renowned fatherland. Nor have I forgotten my father Euenor who bore me, his own trueborn son, to carry off the first honors in the skill of the Greeks'.
>
> He also blamelessly boasted in these lines:
>
> 'Though I speak the unbelievable to those who hear, I say these things: that I have found the patent limits of this art by my hand; and unsur-

1 Translations, unless otherwise indicated, are my own.

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passable is the boundary stone that I have fixed. Yet nothing that mortals have done is flawless'.

οὗτος γὰρ παρὰ μέλος ὑπὲρ τὴν γραφικὴν τρυφήσας λόγῳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀντελαμβάνετο καὶ ἐπέγραφεν τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐπιτελουμένοις ἔργοις·

ἁβροδίαιτος ἀνὴρ ἀρετήν τε σέβων τάδ' ἔγραψεν.

καί τις ὑπεραλγήσας ἐπὶ τούτῳ παρέγραψεν 'ῥαβδοδίαιτος ἀνήρ'. ἐπέγραψεν δ' ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ καὶ τάδε·

ἁβροδίαιτος ἀνὴρ ἀρετήν τε σέβων τάδ' ἔγραψεν
Παρράσιος κλεινῆς πατρίδος ἐξ Ἐφέσου.
οὐδὲ πατρὸς λαθόμην Εὐήνορος, ὅς ῥά μ' ἔφυσε
γνήσιον, Ἑλλήνων πρῶτα φέροντα τέχνης.

ηὔχησε δ' ἀνεμεσήτως ἐν τούτοις·

εἰ καὶ ἄπιστα κλύουσι, λέγω τάδε· φημὶ γὰρ ἤδη
τέχνης εὑρῆσθαι τέρματα τῇσδε σαφῆ
χειρὸς ὑφ' ἡμετέρης· ἀνυπέρβλητος δὲ πέπηγεν
οὖρος. ἀμώμητον δ' οὐδὲν ἔγεντο βροτοῖς.

This almost certainly spurious graphic *eris*—detailed in section four of my discussion—neatly foregrounds the larger issues that this chapter addresses and the two chief points that it seeks to make. First, as I demonstrate, already in our very earliest instances of alphabetic writing in Greece epigrams painted or incised on pots and stones supply sites for contestation, declaring their author and/or designer's superiority over real and notional rivals in ongoing struggles within social-cum-political contexts where status remains fluid and first place depends on an individual's paramount display of skill and expertise in a variety of overlapping areas. And second, more narrowly, the three principal examples I have chosen for close readings allow us to observe how the visual and material aspects of an epigram prove integral to its author's capping claims. Just as Parrhasius's lines would in and of themselves visibly demonstrate that he cannot be outmatched, a claim then challenged by the addition of another countervailing phrase, so, to use Emmett Bennett's terms (1963),[2] the 'sematographic' dimensions of other early inscriptions—that is, the purely visual and technical aspects of their lettering, design, placement on the surface of an object, and exploitation of the shape and matter of the clay or stone, in distinction to their 'lexigraphy' or discursive meaning—become prime weapons

2 For further discussion see Pappas 2011, 45–46.

FIGURE 9.1
Dipylon *oinochoe*
ATHENS, NATIONAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL MUSEUM
INV. NO. 192

in these duels of words and lines. Overall, I aim to illustrate how early inscriptions assume an audience primed to approach texts as practitioners of 'readerly visuality',[3] a mode of reading widespread in Greco-Roman antiquity in which individuals engage with lettering as a visual artefact, turning its components into performers whose appearance, deployment, and arrangement are integral to the meaning and, in the three instances treated here, agonistic import of the messages that, when articulated and read in sequence, its words convey.

2 The Dipylon *oinochoe*

Among the most familiar of early inscriptions appears on the so-called Dipylon *oinochoe*,[4] found northeast of the Dipylon gate in Athens and assumed to have come from one of the numerous graves in the area (Fig. 9.1). Dated to ca. 740–730 BCE, the hexameter text around the neck declares 'he who now of all dancers dances most delicately, of him this [*sc.* pot]' (hoσ νυν ορχεστον παντον αταλοτατα παιζει / το [= του] τοδε, *IG* I^2 919; *IG* I Suppl. 492a). Added onto this are a few more ungainly letters of a different style and hand that climb

3 The expression belongs to Esrock 1994.
4 Athens, National Archaeological Museum inv. no. 192.

upward toward the handle—perhaps, in Barry Powell's view, 'an incompetent snippet from an abecedarium' scratched on by a second person trying to learn the unfamiliar letter shapes (1988, 78 and 1991, 162).

As the many discussions of the vase point out, the inscription forms an integral element of its larger decorative scheme and overall design; for an illiterate viewer this might seem just a novel form of ornamentation rather than a message-bearing notation.[5] The arrangement of the letters on the solid black neck zone maintains the same circularity as the concentric bands of black slip surrounding the body, while the jagged-toothed design just below the inscribed shoulder introduces a shape that several of the letter forms match and that reappears in the patterning on the neck in a somewhat altered form. But the inscription also stands distinct, and not just for the diversity of its graphic signs and the different technique that incising (which gives depth and three-dimensionality to the lettering) as opposed to painting requires.[6] By contextualizing the object through its words and the νῦν and deictic in the second partial hexameter anchoring the vessel to the occasion, it invites the viewer to place the jug, its message, and its other decorations within the prescribed frame: that of a prize awarded to the winner of a dancing competition most probably in the context of a symposium.

Here form and layout intersect with the message's content so as to engage in a complex form of *mimêsis*: we witness not so much a narrative of an event as the effect of seeing that thing. The spidery quality of the letters and thinness of the linear and circular notations, products of a particularly sharp instrument requiring manual dexterity on the inscriber's part, themselves evoke and manifest the 'delicacy' or 'friskiness' the winning dancer displays, the lightness of his trace and diversity of his steps. The form and direction of the letters, which replicate the movement of the bands below, freshly reenact the choreography of the circular dance that they describe (Carruesco 2016, 85). The placement is purposeful on a second count: as the viewer turns the vessel around so as to read the entire text, which runs right-to-left, the *oinochoe* itself goes into motion, circling about before returning to its place of origin. This corporeal engagement and reactivation extends to the *oinochoos* as he circumnavigates the room, serving each symposiast in turn: tipping the pitcher down and up he not only observes the letter's correct orientation—from top to bottom—but makes the lettering enact the same bending back and rising motions performed

5 Cf. Osborne and Pappas 2007, 134, on whose discussion this paragraph draws.
6 See for this feature Osborne and Pappas 2007, 137.

by the two star Phaeacian dancers (whom none could 'challenge', ἔριζεν) in their ball dance in *Odyssey* 8.370–379, a spectacle that elicits 'awed amazement' (384) on the part of the watching Odysseus.

But we could, perhaps, interpret the dance performance commemorated on the Dipylon jug in a manner differently from that posited by the majority of other scholars.[7] While one individual is singled out as prizewinner, there is no need to assume a solo dance. Instead, the symposiasts or entertainers brought in for the occasion might compete in impromptu or more organized displays of group or choral dancing at drinking parties, performances that would recall (with marked distinctions) the much more structured, solemn, and formalized spectacles staged at civic celebrations and festivals, where they not infrequently formed part of larger agonistic programs. Although our early written sources offer scant evidence for such collective performances at symposia,[8] and none suggests a competitive dimension to the dancing that did occur, a large number of pots dating from the late seventh century on present groups of dancers in linear formation, often accompanied by a musician as the leader of the line. Where some ensembles perform at what seem to be civic style events, sharing the surface of the vessel with scenes involving sacrifices, processions, and athletic events as well as the banquets with which such festivities would end,[9] others are situated in more apparently private venues.[10] Belonging to the

7 Henrichs 2003, 46 alone, as far as I am aware, makes the same suggestion that I do.

8 One possible exception is *Od.* 23.133–135, where Odysseus orders such group dancing to occur so as to simulate celebrations at a wedding feast. The choral dances and duets staged on Scheria in *Od.* 8, where two dancers are singled out as preeminent (371), take place at a site removed from Alcinous's banquet hall, while Odysseus leaves indeterminate the nature of the dancing to which he refers at *Od.* 14.465. More remote from the period of the Dipylon *oinochoe* are the numerous passages in Pindar that suggest choral (re)performances of the victory odes at symposia hosted by the family of the prize-winner. Beyond the scope of this article is the larger question of whether symposia even existed at the period of the *oinochoe*, and if they did, the degree to which they resembled the occasions described in sixth- and fifth-century sources; for discussion of the evidence, and arguments in favor of assuming knowledge of symposiastic protocol and practices at this early period, see Murray 1994, Steiner 2012, and Węcowski 2002 and 2014.

9 For comprehensive discussion and review see Smith 2000 and 2010. Fehr 1990 assumes the presence of groups of komast dancers at such private occasions, and Smith 2010, esp. 9–12, suggests a scenario in which these 'intimate, informal performances … may have developed into large-scale formal ones', the latter staged at more public occasions.

10 Smith 2000, 309 usefully offers a checklist of visual indicators of a sympotic setting, typically 'recliners on *klinai*, tables with food, cups hanging on the wall and … the krater placed on the floor'; as she notes, the presence of just one or a selection of these is sufficient to mark out a space as sympotic.

FIGURE 9.2 Corinthian black-figure *kotyle*
PARIS, MUSÉE DU LOUVRE CA 3004

first category is a black-figure Boeotian *kothon*-tripod of ca. 570 BCE,[11] which prompts the viewer to assume that the komasts striking extravagant poses on one side of the vase while a piper heads their line are performing in the same space as the reclining symposiasts on the other face; elsewhere on the *kothon*, we witness a pig being led to sacrifice and pairs of athletes. Absent such indicators of a public occasion, a more intimate setting seems the likeliest context for the performers on a Corinthian black-figure *kotyle* of ca. 585–570 BCE (Fig. 9.2),[12] whose reverse is occupied by six komast dancers, the first of whom dips his cup into a *dinos* so as to fill it with wine, and the same occasion would accommodate the five youths dancing vigorously on a red-figure cup by the Euergides painter of ca. 510 BCE.[13] Two among their number accompany their

11 Berlin, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Antikensammlung F 1727. See too the banquet, procession, and dance shown on a *skyphos* of the Boeotian Silhouette Group, Berlin, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Antikensammlung VI 3320.

12 Paris, Musée du Louvre CA 3004.

13 Paris, Musée du Louvre G 71.

steps with the castanets held in their hands while neatly negotiating their way around a variety of drinking implements on the floor. Artists may also choose to intersperse groups of performers with symposiasts reclining on their *klinai*: the bearded and unbearded males dancing around the tondo of a Middle Corinthian plate perform within the same space as a reclining symposiast and several kraters on stands,[14] while a fragmentary black-figure Little Master band cup of ca. 550–500 BCE in Frankfurt[15] displays two dancers to the right of the men on a single couch (the nonsense inscriptions demarcating the dancing figures might indicate the presence of music and/or song, supplying the rhythm that guides their steps). A variation on the scheme provides the decoration for a Siana cup from the second quarter of the sixth century BCE;[16] here three bearded male figures all facing to the right dance in semi-synchronized fashion, each one positioned between symposiasts reclining in an *andrôn* with drinking horns suspended from its walls.

As for a star dancer singled out from a larger ensemble, our best evidence for that comes from a vessel patently designed to commemorate and celebrate the lead member or *chorêgos* of a troupe that had performed at the type of formal *polis* festival posited above. For all the difference in the context surrounding the production of the Middle Corinthian *aryballos* of ca. 590–575 BCE from the temple of Apollo in Corinth (Fig. 9.3),[17] this small-scale pot recalls the Dipylon *oinochoe* on several counts. Exhibiting a fresh combination of an inscription with an agonistic choral dance, it similarly deploys its written contents as a lasting statement of a single dancer's preeminence and uses 'sematography' visually to assert what its message spells out. The *dipinto* inscription—'Polyterpos Pyrrhias, leader of the chorus and to him, himself, an *olpa*' (πολυτερπος πυρϝιας προχορευομενοςαυτοδεϝοιολπα)—falls into two parts. The lettering of the first element, which identifies the *aulos*-player, retraces features of the musician's design; its linearity coincides with the straight lines into which his hair and the pleats of his dress fall, while the curvature of the inscription mirrors the

14 Athens, National Archaeological Museum 951.

15 Frankfurt, Museum für Vor- und Frühgeschichte B 394.

16 Taranto, Museo Archeologico Nazionale I. G. 4339.

17 Corinth, Archaeological Museum C 54.1. An epigram attributed to Simonides, *Anth. Graec.* 6.212, and whose authenticity has been much questioned, suggests, regardless of its authorship, that choral dancing went on in the area close to where the *aryballos* was found. Dedicated by one Kyton, whose mention of his 'crowns' establishes his status as a victor, it expresses the hope that the gifts presented by the donor will bring *charis* to Apollo, '*prytanis* of the agora of fair choral dances (καλλιχόρου)'. For the epigram see Bookidis and Stroud 2004, 407–408. My discussion of the *aryballos* draws on the treatment of the vessel in Osborne and Pappas 2007, 145–146.

FIGURE 9.3 Middle Corinthian *aryballos*
CORINTH, ARCHAEOLOGICAL MUSEUM C 54.1

fold of the himation worn over his long robe. The shape of the name also highlights the relations and distinctions between the several figures. The written sequence forming 'Polyterpos' stands off from the rest, isolating him from the dancers joined into a single unit by the continuous alphabetic stream. While the right-to-left orientation of the aulete's name and his location between the inscription's two parts emphasize his 'separateness', the artist uses the look of the lettering to indicate the close coordination between music and movement and the concomitant distinction of the piper and chorus leader who alone are identified. Approached as purely visual designs, the ten letters fashioning the curve of Polyterpos's name and those that identify Pyrrhias and (the first part of) his function are in exact harmony, the second a mirror image of the shape and structure of the first. Visibly (and audibly too, should a viewer enunciate the message) the same series of letters opens and closes each name, reinforcing the two individuals' mutuality and skilled 'concordance'.

As for the sinuous line formed by the letters that begin to the *aulos*-player's right, here the writing is unmistakably synchronized with the chorus members, describing the same motions, demarcating their order, and, most critically, signaling the contrast between the leaper and the still static dancers in his troupe. With his feet raised up high above the ground, the air-borne lead performer leaves ample space for the writing to curve below his bent limbs and to follow

his back and upraised arm as he performs his winning move, the tricky *bibasis*, a rapid spring from the ground with the legs kicked up behind. Because the remaining choristers have their feet still firmly on the base line, when the stream of letters reaches the second of the groups, there must be a break in the graphic sequence. Intervening between the two letters almost like caesuras or line divisions are the dancers' feet even as the downturn of the inscription over the heads of the first pair operates like a gravitational force, keeping this duo earth-bound. Again the inscription and image work in tandem with the gestures of the user of the flask: as Robin Osborne and Alexandra Pappas (2007, 146) observe, in tipping the vessel up and down so as to dispense its contents, the individual handling the jug makes the letters enact the 'turning up and turning back' motions that their arrangement visually displays; a further result of this action on the pourer's part is to cause Pyrrhias repeatedly to rise up from and then come back to the ground.

If the competition preserved by the Dipylon *oinochoe* involved just the type of group dancing visible on the *aryballos*, the *mimêsis* is closer still: forming a not quite complete chain around the shoulder of the pot, the letters suggest a sequence of figures both similar and disparate that do not, as on the Corinthian jug, so much accompany the dancers' bodies as visually stand in for them as they perform something akin to the ring dance so frequently depicted on vases, where performers appear in circular formation, often with their hands joined. The letters recall these circling painted choristers more narrowly. The shoulder area of the jug, and just below the beginning of the handles, is precisely where artists may choose to position the choral ensemble dancing or processing around the vessel, an arrangement found on many archaic vases and presumably familiar to viewers. And like other painted images of choruses, as on a *phiale* in Athens by the Patras Painter, dated to ca. 590–570 BCE, which includes women processing to the music of an *aulos*-player and a chorus of komast dancers,[18] the engraving occupies the circular surface of the pot, which in itself describes the rotational motions of the performers.[19]

By virtue of the letters' diverse grouping, shaping, and positioning we can see more particularized elements of 'choreo-graphy' that also correspond to features characteristic of painted choruses on Geometric and later pots. Although they move in linear fashion, choristers need not observe strict regularity; some are turned towards one another, as in the mixed dance of youths and maidens on the neck of a Protoattic *loutrophoros* of ca. 690 BCE by the Analatos Painter

18 Athens, National Archaeological Museum 536.

19 See Lissarrague 2015, 239, who cites the *phiale* as exemplary of this.

(Fig. 9.4),[20] or on an *oinochoe* from Pithekoussai, where the figures who may be performing the 'crane dance' are irregularly spaced and face in different directions (Fig. 9.5).[21] Comparable to these deployments is the letters' design on the Dipylon *oinochoe*, where the crooked iota and sidelong alphas, modeled after their Phoenician prototypes, seem to turn their backs on the adjacent notations. Perhaps, again, with a chorus line in mind, the jug's inscriber has narrowed the spacing between some letters, placing them so that they seem to form a pair as they all but bump up against their neighbors while others, with space on either side, proceed around the pot in more 'solo' fashion.

Irregular too on the *oinochoe* is the 'stance' of the individual letters *vis-à-vis* the base line formed by the area picked out in black; some rest on it while others rise above, more free-floating. In his analysis of a late eighth-century *hydria* from Aegina, now in Berlin,[22] Roger Crowhurst (1963, 32–36) observes how the painter introduces into his chorus line just these positional variations and ups and downs: two in the procession of male figures rise up as though on their toes, while the remainder appear more 'flat-footed'. Height differences further distinguish the Aeginetan dancers: one individual is shorter than his fellow chorus members, while two are also given more reduced dimensions, with their knees bent. In similar fashion some of the *oinochoe* letters appear elongated, while others 'squat', hugging the base line. In one further respect lettering and choral morphology exhibit matching designs: witness the alternating arrangement of the repeated sounds 'a', 't' and 'o' making up the words αταλοτατα παιζει / το [= του] τοδε, and how the ταλοτ offers an instance of the visual symmetry found in images with identical figures at the start and end of chorus lines. This arrangement appears on the vase from Pithekoussai cited above, which presents two male dancers in exactly matching positions with the same dress and accoutrements at either end of a group of choristers that includes two female figures—these distinct from one another—while another differently positioned male, further singularized by his gesture, occupies the center point.

Replacing the solo dancer with a choral ensemble on the Dipylon *oinochoe* casts fresh light on one facet of the inscription that commentators typically treat in cursory fashion:[23] the more ungainly incisions at the end. If viewed as

20 Paris, Musée du Louvre CA 2985.

21 London, British Museum 1849, 0518.18, with discussion in Langdon 2008, 177; see too the late eighth-century *skyphos* with four leaping dancers in a variety of poses (Athens, National Archaeological Museum 14447).

22 Berlin, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Antikensammlung F 31312.

23 One noticeable exception is the acute discussion of Binek 2017, which offers a number of objections to Powell's broadly accepted account. I am most grateful to the author for kindly sharing an advance copy of her piece.



FIGURE 9.4
Protoattic *loutrophoros* by the Analatos Painter
PARIS, MUSÉE DU LOUVRE CA 2985

FIGURE 9.5 *Oinochoe* from Pithekoussai
LONDON, BRITISH MUSEUM 1849, 0518.18

a tyro's attempt to practice his abc's, as is suggested by Powell (1988, 76–82), we have a textbook example of *aemulatio*, an amateur's inept strivings to follow in the literal trace of a master epigrapher. But what if these letters do not so much result from an attempt to gain alphabetic proficiency as present a second, analphabetic inscriber's desire to continue what he perceives as a chorus line and to add additional members to the ensemble? Insofar as they preserve the linearity, directionality, and design of the more practiced letters, these notations likewise offer a stylized, schematic visualization of the dancers to whom the hexameter line refers (the ορχεστον of the *dipinto*). As Natasha Binek, on whose interpretation I draw,[24] nicely points out, these additional ornamental elements respect the aesthetic principles observable on unlettered Geometric vases, those of 'symmetry and variation' (Binek 2017, 430) combined with repetition within a system, while also satisfying the viewer's desire to fill the visually displeasing

24 Binek 2017. Where I differ from Binek is in my suggestion that all the graphic elements—whether alphabetic or not—are not just decorative but actual re-presentations of the original dancers.

still empty space on this portion of the jug and, in the interests of achieving symmetrical coherence, to complete the circular trajectory initiated by the first epigrapher.

Its audible, lexigraphic dimension is also integral to the eristic quality of the inscription on the *oinochoe*. As Powell (1991, 160–161) notes, both the meter and the terms of the inscription would put the reader in mind of Homeric verse, and he cites by way of counterpart to its syntactical and metrical structure a phrase used by Odysseus to address the Phaeacian king at the paradigmatic symposium that Alkinoos hosts: 'lord Alkinoos, most excellent of all men' (Ἀλκίνοε κρεῖον, πάντων ἀριδείκετε λαῶν, *Od.* 8.382). If we can assume that the correspondence goes beyond mere sentence structure and triggers remembrance of the context in which Odysseus delivers the line,[25] then the echo seems very purposeful. As the hero, who has just witnessed two dazzling displays of dancing on the part of the Phaeacian youths, the first a choral performance, the second the ball dance cited above, observes in the remainder of his remark, 'you claimed your dancers were the best, and see your word has been made (τέτυκτο) good; awe holds me as I look (εἰσορόωντα) on them' (8.383–384). Paired with the *oinochoe*, the lines seem almost to generate the fashioned, annotated jug, scripting its viewers' response.

But more securely indicative of a Homeric resonance, which serves to promote the winning dancer's preeminence and to endow him with the augmented stature that membership in the heroic world confers, is the exclusively epic adverb ἀταλώτατα, itself a pointer both to dancing and, perhaps, to the youthfulness of the performer capable of the requisite nimbleness in his footwork. At *Iliad* 18.567, in the account of one of the scenes that Hephaestus forges on Achilles' shield, ἀταλὰ φρονέοντες describes the youths and maidens 'skipping' down the path to the vineyard, moving to the music performed by a youth who plays the lyre and sings with 'delicate voice' in their midst (569–571). If the glance to epic equates the foremost sympotic dancer with his Odyssean and Iliadic avatars, then here the inscriber's skills also receive due celebration: the small-scale jug's artistry rivals that of Hephaestus's supposedly unsurpassable creation, which closes with the virtuosic forging of a choral dance, the capstone representation in the extended sequence.[26]

25 Robb 1994, 27–28 modifies Powell insofar as he proposes that the precise referent intended by the phrase is Alkinoos's statement at *Od.* 8.251–253, where the king issues the summons to the Phaeacian youths to put on a dance performance.

26 For the several ways in which this penultimate band surpasses and encompasses all those preceding it see Steiner (forthcoming).

3 The Graffiti from Thera

Dating from the early seventh century, the well known pederastic graffiti from Thera, scratched onto rocks above the space that would become an ephebic gymnasium in the Hellenistic period, furnish my next example.[27] Concentrated in an area known as the Agora of the Gods at the southeast end of the island, a significant proportion name and praise individuals on a triple count: as purveyors of sexual gratification, expert dancers, and graphologists. Two insights from earlier discussions of these inscriptions shape my discussion here and align these texts with the eristic exchange with which I began: first, as Powell (1991, 171–180) already notes, that graffiti grouped together in close proximity should be seen as existing in agonistic relations, each one a rejoinder to the others in the set that attempts to trump its predecessors in a game of graphic capping. And second, Pappas's detailed demonstration (forthcoming) that the inscriptions' material aspect is critical to our understanding of these lithic claims: the design of the letters, their placement on the rock, their self-positioning *vis-à-vis* the other inscriptions whose space they share, and the visual impression they would make on the viewer as well as reader. Here I focus on just two of the clusters.

The first in the series making up *IG* XII 3.536 (Fig. 9.6) boasts of the sexual conquests achieved by a series of named individuals and of the inscriber, so many notches on the stick: 'Pheidip(p)idas fucked (ō̂ιπ*h*ε). Timagoras and Enperes and I—we fucked (ἐγōιπ*h*[ομες) too'. As Pappas (forthcoming) observes, the emphasis falls, as it does in other of these graffiti, on the verb: this is the point at which the line turns as it follows the rock edge downward before curving under and moving to the right. Not to be outdone, the second statement in the triplet occupies the space enclosed by the loop of the previous inscription, inserting itself into the curving line as it declares: 'Enpylos [?] these things … *pornos*' (Ἐνπυλος τάδε πόρνος, 536b).[28] Enpylos takes pains to coordinate his assertion with the prior one: Pappas argues that the sexually suggestive *en-* of his name appears all but directly above the same combination of letters in the name Enperes toward the ending of the longer line, creating not just a visual reiteration but, when the line is enunciated, an aural one too.

Pappas and Powell diverge as to what activity is implied in the *tade* of this second statement: sex in Powell's account (1991, 180), writing according to

27 For the most detailed recent discussion see Inglese 2008.

28 The designation of Enpylos as 'faggot' belongs to a later hand, an addition that, situated above Enpylos's self-assertion, literally over-rides it even as it turns the whole phrase into a second loop and visual reiteration of the first inscription.



FIGURE 9.6 *IG* XII 3.536
FROM INGLESE 2008

Pappas (forthcoming). If we adopt Powell's view, Enpylos simply seeks to insert himself—quite literally—into the preceding list of sexual potentates, adding his name to the victory roster. But Pappas's reading respects the agonistic impetus that structures this and other graffiti clusters by introducing an element that raises the stakes, namely, the declaration that Enpylos is a dexterous writer as well as fornicator, the latter role already implied by the inscription's material, visual, and aural coordination with the line enclosing it. As Pappas also notes, Enpylos's capacities as inscriber give the cue for the opening of the third inscription in the series, an overt claim of authorship: 'Enpedokles carved these things (ἐνεϙ̄όπτετο τάδε). And he danced (ϙ̄ορκ*h*ε̂το), by Apollo'. Again, this last individual has no need to spell out his membership of the fraternity of Theran *erastai*: as in the case of Enpylos, fresh visual and audible echoes guarantee him that status. The writer's name recapitulates the critical *en-* element found in the previous two instances and establishes a visibly perceptible and syntactical parallelism between writing and sex.[29]

29 As Pappas (forthcoming) explains, just as the author of the first inscription places in first position the name in the nominative case followed by the act that he performs—sexual

But striking too are the relations the inscription proposes between graphology and dancing. By virtue of the verbs' close coordination Enpedokles frames his carving as performative, a 'spectacular' display of expertise: no less than in the dance, primacy goes to the best writer. Just such a view of the practice as a skilled performance that enhances an individual's status emerges from a religious context, where the messages are designed to attract a divine as well as mortal audience. Dating from ca. 700 to the early sixth century, several of the inscriptions found on votive potsherds from the sanctuary of Zeus on Mount Hymettus introduce their donors as writers, creators of objects whose value and appeal depends on the presence of their epigraphic elements.[30] In two instances the sherds foreground the giver as inscriber: *h*οσπερ εγραφσεν ('as he wrote') and, with a fresh burst of pride, -αι ταδ' αυτηοσ εγ⟨ρ⟩αφ[σε ('he wrote this himself').

The visual extension of the line, too, suggests the capping agenda motivating Enpedokles' inscription, which, exploiting the shape and contour of the rock surface, can travel further to the left than its two predecessors, claiming a hitherto vacant space. This 'stretching out' might imply and display the superior duration of this individual's writing, dancing, and sexual feats (sympotic practice may even have come to include a prize for the one still standing after a night's heavy drinking, suggesting that endurance was at a premium).[31] In a further subordinating gesture on the part of the inscriber's hand, Enpedokles has appropriated part of the initial inscription so as to draw out his assertion still further; its ending is so positioned that the eye sees the opening portion of that first graffito as part of the third inscription, which makes the lettering that covers the area to the right appear part of Enpedokles' space. The element of

penetration—so Enpedokles has replaced that verb with the act of carving, this again expressed by the third-person verb following the nominative subject; and just as line one bends around at the verb, so does line three. To cite further from her account, 'Indeed, the overall layout of this serpentine inscription visually mirrors the sinuous line "a" inscription above, with its parallel placement of the first name, the bend with verb, and the continuation of its loop, the shape of which is determined in part by the end of the earlier overtly sexual line above'. For the sexual innuendoes of carving see Pappas (forthcoming) and Ar. *Thesm.* 778–781.

30 For discussion with earlier bibliography see Woodard 2014, 265–266, drawing on Langdon 1976, 18–21. As Woodard plausibly suggests (266–288), the emphatic role of writing in these inscriptions may be particularly fitting for the worship of Zeus Semeios, the deity celebrated at the site: the sign-giving god is best able to appreciate these inscribed messages and to give answering signs in return.

31 For this see Węcowski 2002, 629 and Bravo 1997, 115–118. See too Steiner 2012, 137–138; I return to the sympotic associations of these graffiti at the section's end.

innovation declares itself in the line's design: the letters are carved retrograde, reversing the direction of the previous two messages.

Where Pappas explores the sexual 'subtext' implied by the verb chosen by Enpedokles for the act of inscription, literally 'to beat, pound in', I would note how the term additionally anticipates its author's role as dancer. κόπτω calls to mind the sound made by the performer as he strikes the ground with his feet, a feature of (choral) dancing exploited by Homer when, at *Odyssey* 8.274, Demodocus evokes Hephaestus as he 'beats out' (κόπτε) the chains that will entrap Ares and Aphrodite *in flagrante* even as the audience would hear that same sound emitted by the feet of the choral ensemble that performs while the bard narrates his tale.[32] The writer's name, Enpedokles, the individual famed for being 'in the ground' or 'firm set on his feet',[33] already foregrounds the body part so essential to the act of dancing. Taken together, name, dance, and the act of inscription stand in relations of contiguity and contrast; where the alphabetic notations 'pounded into' the rock fix the vaunt for all times, Enpedokles' enduring renown also depends on his superior pedal mobility.[34] The letters' visible trajectory across the rock face enacts that movement, turning the space occupied by the messages into the dancing floor for the alphabetic performance.

If, following Pappas, the first inscription's curve around the term 'fornicate' visually replicates the bend of the sexual partners' bodies, so here a second curve introduces a new parallel, that between writing and the dance. Inscribed retrograde, the letters literally bend back to form a loop, that accomplished dance-move performed not just by the two star Phaeacian performers mentioned above but also by the professional dancer who would later entertain the company gathered at Callias's symposium, bending backwards 'until she resembled a hoop' (Xen. *Symp.* 22). The additional appeal to Apollo in the context of Enpedokles' assertion of his role as dancer includes a further act of self-promotion. Already in the *Homeric Hymn* addressed to the divinity, we witness Apollo 'stepping finely and high' (καλὰ καὶ ὕψι βιβάς, *Hymn. Hom. Ap.* 516) as he leads the Cretans in the paean; a fragment of Pindar (fr. 148 S.-M.) likewise celebrates Apollo as 'the dancer (ὀρχήστ') ruling over the festivities', using the noun cognate with the verb chosen by Enpedokles for the activity in which this graffitist emulates the divine dancer *sans pareil*.

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32 For the coincidence between the internal narrative and the ongoing performance see Steiner (forthcoming). Note too the earlier description of the dancing youths as they 'strike the wondrous dancing floor with their feet' (πέπληγον δὲ χορὸν θεῖον ποσίν, *Od.* 8.264).

33 See Chantraine ^{2}1984–1990 s.v. πέδον for the derivation of the term from πούς.

34 Returning to Demodocus's second tale, Ares, the sexual potentate, owes his dominance over Hephaestus to his being 'strong' or 'swift/nimble of foot' (ἀρτίπος, *Od.* 8.310).

FIGURE 9.7 *IG* XII 3.540
FROM INGLESE 2008

A second cluster, *IG* XII 3.540 (Fig. 9.7), also dating to the early seventh century, again invites the viewer to perceive in the lettering's carving, assemblage, and shape a reenactment of a series of dances that stand in an agonistic relation to previous performances. Three inscriptions in different hands also make up this set, beginning with the assertion *Lakydidas agathos*. Positioned above this, another inscriber visibly claims the higher ground by writing boustrophedon and in two lines in place of one 'Eumelos is best (ἄριστος) in the dance (ὀρχεστάς)'. The letters of the final term differ from those in the line above, more spaced out and many of exaggerated dimension as though to call particular attention to this activity (noteworthy is the elevation of these letters, whose elongation might suggest that 'high step' attributed by the Homeric hymnist to Apollo in the phrase cited above). The wording of the inscription invokes a Homeric intertext, too. It is the Phaeacians' prowess as dancers that Alcinous urges Odysseus principally to remember, asserting at *Odyssey* 8.250 that the Phaeacians are by far the best (ἄριστοι) of all dancers and then reiterating the affirmation by declaring ὀρχηστύς the sphere in which they surpass all others (253). In recapitulating two terms from the Homeric song the author of the graffito may signal his membership in an equivalent latter-day group of elite dancers as well as his literary connoisseurship.

While Eumelos's declaration that he is 'best' supersedes the merely 'good' quality of Lakydidas, now consigned to second place, our third author caps even that superlative.[35] In a line that Pappas (forthcoming) describes as spi-

35 For this progression see Pappas (forthcoming) and Inglese 2008, 398.

raling outward 'as if visually trumping' the less kinetic and briefer two-line inscription above it, Krimon—whose tendency for self-assertion is on display in other rock inscriptions (e.g., 537, 538b)—writes 'Krimon first (πράτιστος) in the *konialo*, has warmed/melted Simias'. Here the author engages in the same scriptural 'highjacking' observed for the third inscription in 536: carved so that its opening coincides with the close of Lakydidas's message, the line appears a prolongation of the first message, designed so as to cover more of the surface of the rock than any of its predecessors; the length of a graffito and its spatial claims are self-promoting moves in epigraphic competitions.

Where earlier commentators understood the activity in which Krimon scores his primacy to be a type of obscene dance,[36] a reexamination of *konialo* has put paid to that interpretation; Alessandra Inglese (2008, 234) suggests instead a proper name. But I would not jettison all reference to dancing here. Krimon's inscription begins with a claim to surpassing excellence; as a response to Eumelos, who has just declared himself the best of dancers, the third inscriber's assertion most obviously reads as a critique and correction of what the preceding graffitist has boasted: 'no, Eumelos; I'm the foremost in that activity'. If the allusion to the dance remains verbally implicit, a viewer of the line would witness its performance as the inscriber demonstrates at one and the same time his virtuosity as stonecutter and as dancer. This final graffito is written in the so-called *Schlangenschrift*, where the writing uncoils in the manner of a snake and spirals round as though pirouetting at the end. Contrasted with the design of Eumelos's inscription, it appears more fluid, replacing the squared off, block-like, or ranked arrangement of its neighbor with an undulating line ending in a circle or masterly spin.

Without entering the scholarly morass concerning possible relations between the dancing mentioned in these early graffiti and the religious rituals that, in later periods, were staged in the Agora of the Gods,[37] the site that

36 So Powell 1991, 176, citing Hesychius s.v. *konisalos*: 'a satyr-like leaping about of men with swollen sexual organs' or '(dances?) to do with Aphrodite'; both Scanlon 2002, 88 and Powell observe a link with athletics, and particularly with the dust (*konis*) or residual substance scraped from athletes after exercise.

37 Readings of the early inscriptions have also been in part conditioned by the construction of the nearby ephebic gymnasium (dated to the second century BCE) and the nature of the activities, some initiatory in character, that it might have hosted. For a full discussion of these interpretations and earlier bibliography see Pappas (forthcoming). In Scanlon's account of the early inscriptions (2002, 83–86) he suggests that they would have been located at a site 'near or at an early track, dance floor, or place used for communal education' (84) that accommodated practices similar to those at the Spartan Gymnopaideia; this, however, disregards the time lag between the graffiti and the first secure evidence for the types of activities to which he refers.

would also come to house the archaic cult of Apollo Karneios and (perhaps) the choral performances integral to the celebration of the Karneia in Sparta and elsewhere, I would nonetheless suggest that in advertising their dancing acumen the Theran inscribers may refer to their participation in group as well as solo performances.[38] When approached as visual representations as much as texts, the 'look' and structural design of Krimon's and Eumelos's graffiti seem expressly incised and shaped so as to call to mind the principal choral formations described by Homer and several later archaic sources.[39] In the Iliadic account of the chorus forged by Hephaestus on the penultimate band of Achilles' shield (*Il.* 18.599–602), for example, the performers alternate between dancing in *stichoi* or ranked, quadrilateral structures and regrouping in rings, that second deployment given additional prominence through the inclusion of the simile of the potter working at his wheel, which alerts the audience to the particular proficiency that the choristers' rapid, smooth, and seemingly self-perpetuating spinning motion demands. Following the linear-cum-'processional' entrance of the first notations making up Eumelos's graffito, its last eight characters position themselves so as to form just such a square as the Homeric poet describes, each element lined up in one of the two ranks that seem to face one another.

No less striking is the match between the visual impression made by Krimon's inscription and the representation of choral motions given in Pindar's albeit much later and polemical second *Dithyramb* (fr. 70b S.-M.). As the singer-dancers observe at the outset of the piece, old-style dithyrambic song 'used to creep along stretched out like a rope' (ἕρπε σχοινοτένεια, 1), a description that evokes and audibly mimics the chorus line as it moves in linear or more properly undulating and serpentine fashion while the choristers sing.[40] Far superior, in the poet's view, is the more innovative circular structure now adopted by the troupe as its members dance 'spread out wide in fair-centered circles' (4–5).[41] Absent the temporal contrast between the two choral formations that Pindar

38 Scholars generally date the construction of the Temple of Apollo Karneios to the sixth century, thereby calling into question the relevance of the cult to the earlier inscriptions.

39 My suggestion is not, as some have proposed (see, again, Scanlon 2002, 83–86 for discussion), that the inscriptions commemorate actual choral dances performed within or close to the space where the graffiti were found; rather, I understand their authors as referring to performances, both individual and collective, that would have occurred elsewhere and on other occasions.

40 The 'snake' is written into the phrase by virtue of the verb and the subsequent mention of the vitiated quality of the *san* articulated by the chorus as well as by the sequence of sibilants in the poet's choice of terms. For this see Porter 2007, 7.

41 See D'Angour 1997 for this reconstruction and reading of the lacunose lines.

highlights, Krimon's graffito describes both the 'snaky' line and the expansive ring in which his alphabetic dance concludes.

If my suggestion that choral dancing informs the design of these rival declarations is correct, then ἄριστος and πράτιστος acquire fresh significance insofar as they reflect—visibly as well as semantically—the struggles waged between the several graffitists as they jockey for the privileged role of chorus leader. In conformity with visual and textual sources, where the *chorêgos* typically owes his (or her) leadership to his superior social standing, beauty, or other type of signal distinction, Eumelos seeks to assign himself this spotlight position in the chorus line. Kimon's capping claim quite literally displaces him from that sought-after and seemingly contested site (cf. Thuc. 6.56.1–2); the superlative with which he interjects is derived from πρῶτος or πρᾶτος, the Doric form of the term[42] that is applied to this foremost performer in later sources, there designated the πρωτοστάτης.[43]

In contrast to the Dipylon *oinochoe*, whose context is manifestly sympotic, the Theran graffiti are inscribed out of doors, where they invite a more heterogeneous set of viewers. But in privileging fornication, writing, and dancing the rock-cutters, I would propose, have turned the natural landscape into something resembling an expanded, open-air, and civic *andrôn* where, through the medium of their messages, they re-engage in and restage the agonistic activities that typically occurred at more exclusive sympotic gatherings and play out their rivalries in the public domain for all to see. The ribald and sexually explicit terminology to which *oiphô* belongs finds its home in the iambic songs composed specifically for the drinking party,[44] compositions in which individuals can hold up for show (or seemingly, and very much tongue in cheek, call

42 πρᾶτος appears in other inscriptions, where it forms the prefix of an individual name (1446, 1616); used without suffix in 581, it may be an adjective describing one Meniades, mentioned just above the term, or again be part of a proper name.

43 Calame 1997, 41 citing Arist. *Metaph.* 1018b26 ff.; Phot. *Lex.* s.v. τρίτος ἀριστεροῦ.

44 Chantraine ²1984–1990 s.v. οἴφω views the etymology of the verb as obscure, and scholars continue to debate its range of meaning (see Pappas, forthcoming n. 16, for discussion of the variant interpretations). While οἴφω does reappear in sixth-century inscriptions and the Gortyn law code, the only extant contemporary instance of the term belongs to the compound *Oipholios*, most likely an obscene epithet for Dionysus, apparently used by Archilochus in fr. 251 W. Preserved as part of a longer composition cited in the Mnesiepes inscription, the lines in which the expression appeared were judged 'too iambic' by the Parian public when performed at a *polis* festival, as though its presence in that public context was inapposite. The reference to Archilochus's *hetairoi* in the same phrase in the inscription further suggests that this lewd vocabulary was better suited to the symposium. Note too the appearance of the name *Oiphon* ('Screwer') for an ithyphallic satyr on an Attic vase (Schulze 1935, 716; Pappas, forthcoming, also refers to the vase).

into question) their sexual prowess. Dancing expertise, as the Dipylon *oinochoe* confirms, also occupied a central place at symposia, where it too would serve to manifest the prized physical conditioning, balance, and dexterity that many sympotic contests required of their increasingly inebriated participants.[45] One such display of mastery, whose demonstration Archilochus enacts in his fragments 185–187 W, takes its cue from the indecorous dance performed by its target and the poet's erstwhile *hetairos*, one Karykides, at the symposium, and roundly contests Karykides' claim to primacy at the drinking party as well as in the civic domain (with a sexual vaunt written in).[46] Whether or not the *skutalê* with which the Archilochean speaker of fragment 185 W declares himself equipped already included the graphic dimension that the baton *qua* carrier of a coded text acquired in later archaic times (the earliest attestation is in Pindar *Ol.* 6.91), writerly skill is the additional claim of the Theran graffitists. At this early date the ability to fashion letters already locates an individual at the social apex, and it is no happenstance that the symposium yields many of our first and most skillful epigrams—that on Nestor's cup most notoriously.[47]

4 Parrhasius's Epigrams

Temporally latest in this series of polemics is the exchange (quoted in the first part of this chapter) between Parrhasius and the individual who challenges and dismantles his claims and, much as in the other examples explored here, uses both diction and the visual means that epigraphy additionally supplies to undermine the painter's boasts. In doing so, I suggest, the respondent takes his cue from Parrhasius, whose self-promotion depends not only on his careful choice of terms and neat inter-textual allusions but also, and in equal measure, on the design of the epigrams that visibly and 'facturally' assert the technical primacy articulated by their wording.

The opening self-characterization already advances its author into elite ranks as Parrhasius affirms his participation in the quintessentially aristocratic and Lydian-inflected practice of *habrosunê*, a luxuriant lifestyle 'consciously embraced by the ruling class to distinguish themselves from everybody else'[48] and one that, outside the charmed circle of the *kaloikagathoi*, acquires a largely negative cast in fifth-century sources. Since, as images showing individuals

45 See Lissarrague 1990, 68–86 for these.

46 For detailed analysis see Steiner 2016.

47 For a more developed form of the argument see Węcowski 2014, 128–134.

48 Kurke 1992, 94; here I follow Kurke's larger reading of the term.

decked out in Eastern-style finery in sympotic contexts affirm, the symposium supplied the chief context for displays of *habrosunê*, the painter, for all his artisanal status, nonetheless claims a place at the exclusive occasions where such 'refinement' was at a premium.[49]

While the assertion of legitimate birth and the Homeric-sounding phrases of the second epigram further elevate Parrhasius, and the declaration that the artist 'carried off' the first prize of expertise, as though participating in a sporting event (for which, see more below), frees *technê* from any banausic taint it might otherwise introduce, the final statement preserved by Athenaeus develops and gives fresh dimensions to the motifs sounded in the preceding epigrams. Granting the incredible nature of what is to follow, the artist's affirmation that he 'found the patent *termata* of skill' not only earns him a place among the 'first finders', those celebrated innovators in the cognitive, artistic, poetic, or technological domains, but also conjures up the posts around which horses and chariots would turn in the most exclusive and prestigious contests at athletic games: the equestrian events. Successfully negotiating these posts, as Nestor's advice to Antilochus at *Iliad* 23.309–325 details, requires the charioteer to exercise his utmost dexterity and *mêtis*.[50] But it is the re-appearance of these posts in the *Odyssey*, in a passage where the poet employs several of the terms and motifs reprised by Parrhasius and gives *termata* precisely the shade of meaning the artist would intend, that proves a still more apposite precedent. On this occasion we witness Odysseus's winning cast with the discus, a throw that surpasses those of all the previous Phaeacian contestants in the event (*Od.* 8.192–198):

> The discus flew over the marks of all, speeding lightly from his hand. Athena, likening herself to a man, placed markers and spoke to him calling him by name; 'Even a blind man would be able to discern your mark by feeling all around it, since this one here is not mingled with the crowd; but it is the first by much, and you may be confident with regard to this contest. No one of the Phaeacians will come up to it nor surpass it'.

> ὁ δ' ὑπέρπτατο σήματα πάντων,
> ῥίμφα θέων ἀπὸ χειρός· ἔθηκε δὲ τέρματ' Ἀθήνη
> ἀνδρὶ δέμας εἰκυῖα, ἔπος τ' ἔφατ' ἔκ τ' ὀνόμαζε·
> 'καί κ' ἀλαός τοι, ξεῖνε, διακρίνειε τὸ σῆμα

49 For a Roman example of an eristic competition between artisans and the elite see Siwicki in this volume.

50 See Bierl in this volume for a full discussion of this passage.

ἀμφαφόων, ἐπεὶ οὔ τι μεμιγμένον ἐστὶν ὁμίλῳ,
ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρῶτον. σὺ δὲ θάρσει τόνδε γ' ἄεθλον·
οὔ τις Φαιήκων τόν γ' ἵξεται οὐδ' ὑπερήσει'.

If the Homeric intertext equates the artist's primacy with that of the god-sponsored hero, and, more specifically, the *termata* established by Parrhasius with the markers that Odysseus's unmatchable throw lastingly generated, then the penultimate statement in this third epigram demonstrates fresh literary borrowings and aggrandizing self-fashioning. Among these may be a nod to the notorious *horoi* that figure in Solon fr. 36 W (an author much cited and re-performed in fifth-century Athens). In the first part of that iambic composition the lawmaker recalls how he liberated the Attic soil by removing 'the boundary stones fixed everywhere' (ὅρους ἀνεῖλον πολλαχῇ πεπηγότας, 6).[51] Standing parallel to those now absent markers and balancing them in the poem's structure are the ordinances Solon then drew up in writing (θεσμούς … ἔγραψα, 18–20) and that were subsequently posted on the Acropolis, where they would lastingly remain inscribed on the *kyrbeis* and *axones* that exhibited the limit-declaring and not-to-be-transgressed new code of law. Reversing the lawgiver's original 'displacing' action and giving it a positive cast in his revisionary account, Parrhasius now reenacts the Solonic gesture as founder-inscriber as he 'fixes' his own non-traversable boundary lines by means of his epigram.

The introduction of the *horos* also curiously and perhaps even wittingly recalls the only previous extant usage of this 'outlier' term in the otherwise highly conventionalized epigrammatic repertoire. Artfully positioned at the end of the second line, where it requires a reader or viewer to stop before casting his eye back to the starting point of the next distich, the same 'boundary stone' appears in a choregic dedication of ca. 500–480 BCE raised on the Athenian Acropolis, where it commemorates and celebrates another victor, in this instance a dithyrambic poet-chorus leader (*IG* I^3 833*bis*):[52]

[having won] first with a chorus of men at Athens
he dedicated this *horos* of (lovely? practiced?) poetic skill

51 Note how Parrhasius follows the example of Solon insofar as he too places *horos* in verse-initial position. In the current view, these *horoi* functioned not as mortgage markers but as objects that cordoned off portions of land, declaring them accessible to only a restricted and elite group of citizens.

52 My transcription follows the reconstruction of Peppa-Delmousou 1971; for detailed discussion see Martin 2007 and Steiner (forthcoming). This is the first extant choregic monument.

having made a vow; he claims to have won with the most choruses
for (or around) a tripod elsewhere throughout the tribes of men.

[νικέ]σας *h*ό[δε πρô]τον Ἀθένεσ[ιν χο]ρôι ἀνδρô[ν]
[-υυ]τε̂ς σοφ[ίας] τόνδ' ἀνέθε[κ]εν *h*όρον
[εὐχσ]άμενο[ς π]λείστοις· δὲ [χ]οροῖς ἔσχο κατὰ φῦ[λα]
[ἀνδ]ρôν νι[κε̂]σαί φεσι π[ερ]ὶ τρίποδος

But beyond the choice of terms and conceits that advance Parrhasius's agenda and give added luster to his assertions through his appropriation of the personas of hero, law-giver, and even victor in a more recent *agôn* of technical skill, is there anything in these several statements to suggest that the painter also scores his points through the epigrams' aesthetic or 'sematographic' dimensions, their placement, design, contour, and other visible and material features? While Athenaeus says nothing of the artefacts on which the lines appeared, Parrhasius's own manufacture apart (which the latter-day author twice recalls), nor of their arrangement on the painted or worked surfaces, the language of the series gives some clues. Emphatic in the final epigram is the act of creating a boundary marker, the *terma* or *horos* that none can go beyond. While the first of these expressions has a broad range of meanings, variously describing a 'limit', 'boundary', 'turning post', 'goal', or, as in the Odyssean passage, marks set in the ground, when read in the context of the technical facilities for which Parrhasius garnered his particular renown, the painter's diction seems to be making a more particularized and pointed claim. After noting Parrhasius's practice of the artistic verisimilitude that prompted Zeuxis to mistake a painted curtain for the fabric itself, Pliny reminds us of his other area of especial expertise (*HN* 35.67–68):

It is admitted by artists that he won the palm in the drawing of outlines. This in painting is the peak of exactness; to paint bulk and surface within the outlines though no doubt a great achievement, is one in which many have won distinction, but to give the contour of the figures and make a satisfactory boundary where the painting within it finished, is rarely attained in successful artistry. For the extreme outline, to be properly executed, requires to be nicely rounded, and so to terminate as to prove the existence of something more behind it, and thereby to disclose that which it also hides.

confessione artificum in liniis extremis palmam adeptus. haec est picturae summa subtilitas. corpora enim pingere et media rerum est quidem

> magni operis, sed in quo multi gloriam tulerint; extrema corporum facere et desinentis picturae modum includere rarum in successu artis invenitur. ambire enim se ipsa debet extremitas et sic desinere, ut promittat alia e⟨t⟩ post se ostendatque etiam quae occultat.

Mapping Pliny's statement onto the language of the epigram allows us to discern how closely its visual aspect might in and of itself carry Parrhasius's point. Positioned so as to contour the painted elements, to delimit and cordon them off as well as to follow the shapes and movements they described, the letters could supply the *termata* celebrated in the artist's boast. Such was the proficiency and finesse deployed in the creation of these alphabetic outlines that there was no outdoing or, more literally, going beyond them, whether by the objects and individuals whom they circumscribed or by other painters. Pliny's final phrase, with its evocation of the line's rounded shape and its capacity to establish the terminus, can also be matched up with the epigram's design; Parrhasius's *termata*, which simultaneously mark the limits and require things to turn around, could, in coordination with the painted scenes, visually assume these structuring and demarcating functions, as alphabetic elements and written lines so regularly do on archaic and classical vases.[53] Viewed this way, the placement of *horos*, emphatically enjambed and located so as to end the penultimate phrase, also seems purposeful. Compelling the reader of the epigram to observe a stop before moving on to the closing *gnomê*, an arrangement that recalls the choregic epigram just cited (*IG* I^3 833*bis*), this point of closure might also coincide with the endpoint of a discrete element in the picture and require the viewer's eye to travel to a fresh area on the surface of the object.

But Parrhasius's attempts to guarantee his lasting artistic renown would not go uncontested, nor even be allowed to retain their original layout and design. As the quips reported by Athenaeus demonstrate, the painter's boasts attract a gainsayer who seeks to return him to the artisanal milieu to which he more properly belongs. The opponent makes his counterclaims by using both the time-honored methods discernible in the polemics between rival poets past and contemporary and the additional weaponry supplied by the visual and manual/material features integral to epigrams. Much as archaic and classical authors echo and revise the vocabulary of their predecessors and competitors, scrambling their terms, applying the same language in novel and opposing contexts, or modifying compound words so as to introduce new and coun-

53 For demonstrations of this see the pioneering publications of Lissarrague, among them Lissarrague 1992 and 1994.

tervailing elements,[54] so does Parrhasius's respondent. The laconic réplique prompted by the painter's first declaration preserves Parrhasius's two opening terms with one critical alteration, the replacement of the hapax ἁβροδίαιτος with ῥαβδοδίαιτος, a virtual homonym of the original compound term and a yet more novel coinage. The revision not only patently upends Parrhasius's intended bid for status by re-equipping him with the defining tool of his trade but may also take issue with exactly the area of expertise that would have recommended the artist to his patrons and that he himself parades in the final epigram. Since ῥάβδος can also describe some sort of vertical mark, a stripe or line, does the refuter mock Parrhasius on the grounds of the excessive 'linearity' of his designs? The 'look' of ἁβροδίαιτος also supplies an arena for the critic's visual counterattack in a more immediate respect; in devising his new characterization,[55] that author simply appropriates the first four letters of his antagonist's adjective and rearranges them so as to create a new sequence of virtually the same dimensions as the contested term. Perhaps written directly above or below Parrhasius's inscription and exactly aligned with it, the new message visibly draws attention to its graphic scrambling, engaging in just that placement-dependent eristic word play already on display in the Theran inscriptions.

But it is the editorializing comment introducing this short salvo that proves our best evidence for the positionality of the epigrams and for the way in which Parrhasius's adversary might have emended and visibly contradicted his vaunts. In the first attested usage of παραγράφω, the verb chosen by Athenaeus to preface his second citation, the Aristophanic slave Xanthias describes how his master no sooner sees a graffito written on a doorway declaring one Demos *kalos* than he writes 'in proximity' or 'below' it a new formulation, which attests to his obsession with the law courts (παρέγραψε πλησίον 'κημὸς καλός', *Vesp*. 99). Other appearances of the verb in fourth-century sources, and particularly in the speeches by Demosthenes and other orators, suggest a more radical type of graphic intervention: the term can designate an entry on a document that has been physically altered so as to read differently. For Athenaeus παραγράφω could evoke just this type of emendation, which involves marking up a text and even all but obliterating portions of it while allowing the original terms still to show through.[56] Whether Parrhasius's detractor has simply physically aligned

54 For a succinct and rich discussion see Griffith 1990.

55 Such acts of verbal innovation are themselves prized; see Pind. *Ol*. 9.80, where the poet wishes that he 'might be a word-finder (εὑρησιεπής)'.

56 In post-classical texts παραγράφω can also mean to 'interpolate' or 'indicate with a *paragraphos*'; as a middle, it also refers to the action of canceling or effacing something by drawing a line across it. For these various usages, see LSJ *s.v.* Cf. also Solon fr. 20 W, where

his two-word phrase with the artist's claim or more actively tampered with it, the 'deconstructivist' intention of his graphic intervention proves impossible to miss.

5 Conclusion

For all their spatially and chronologically scattered character, and the heterogeneous media in which these alphabetic battles have been preserved, the examples treated in my discussion all share in the 'readerly visuality' with which I began, which depends on experiencing texts and written lines not purely or even principally as repositories of meaning but also as physical and visible objects whose significance depends on the diverse aspects of their design. Enlisting these features in the service of their polemics, the different writers cited here could not only expect their auditors and readers to act as viewers and, on occasion, users of the artefacts hosting the different interjections, but also as those attuned to the physical processes, painting, inscribing, chipping away at a stone surface, and to different tools, whether brushes, chisels, or sharp-pointed engraving instruments, that served in the messages' creation. Working simultaneously through sound and sense, these more immediately perceptible facets of an epigram allow antagonists still more finely to hone their attacks.

This phenomenon, I would suggest, may not be exclusive to competitions waged through alphabetic means. Comparable to the Odyssean Athena's appeal to the 'blind man' who would tangibly discern the imprint left by the hero's mighty cast with the stone is the scenario described in the second self-styled ἔρις (*Od.* 18.366) in the sequence of trials that the disguised Odysseus proposes by way of dismantling Eurymachus's claims to social and physical superiority (the scene occurs in the course of a sympotic gathering).[57] As the hero imagines the second of these contests (18.371–375), the two antagonists would be charged with ploughing four acres with a team of oxen; victory, the challenger explains, would go to the individual whose furrow was unbroken (διηνε-

the term μεταποιέω appears in the poet's recommendation to Mimnermus that he alter one of the lines in his fr. 6 W; unattested before Solon, the verb in later periods refers to the act of marking changes within documents or of altering them by replacing one word with another (see the evidence cited by Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 403). Assuming that Mimnermus's verses were by now circulating in written form, and that audiences would encounter them as texts as well as in live performances, Solon's new 'constructivist' or 'poietic' coinage advises just such a visible rewriting on the original author's part.

57 For a short discussion of the scene see Scodel in this volume.

κέα, 375), a continuous straight line that would set its perceptible mark in the earth and so attest—at least for the immediate future—to the superior 'handiwork' of the one driving the brace of animals (these turn out, like the individual directing their linear course, to be the very best of all, the ἄριστοι, 371). 'Facts on the ground', whether set in the earth or on stone or clay, can outlast any verbal assertion, lastingly waiting for the one who will feel, view, and perhaps articulate their message, thereby guaranteeing the contest's winner continued celebration in future times.

But it is a much later reference to a second such trace, here located back in the artistic milieu and where an audience of viewer-judges is integral to the situation, that may best reveal the full importance of 'making lines'. Commenting on the curious fact that it is the unfinished work of painters that elicits particular commendation, Pliny the Elder remarks that these images-in-progress 'are more admired than those [the painters] finished, because in them are seen the artists' remaining lines and their very thoughts and … there is sorrow that the artist's hand, even while executing the work, was extinguished' (*HN* 35.145). The term used for those lines, *liniamenta*, describes not just marks, strokes, and drawings made with painting and writing implements but the very features of an individual face. Even so do the inscribers/painters of the early texts discussed in this chapter leave something of their individual persons—or those of the protagonists to whom their words refer—to continue competing in the struggles which their inscriptions lastingly recall.[58]

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CHAPTER 10

Roman Architects and the Struggle for Fame in an Unequal Society

Christopher Siwicki

1 Introduction

Construction is an activity that encourages competition. Rivalries between individuals, communities, and states are made manifest in physical structures, as attempts at one-upmanship can lead to increasingly large, lavish, and innovative buildings. There is also competition between architects for commissions. Yet what this study explores is rivalry between people working on the same project—an area that is more commonly associated with cooperation than with competition. When it comes to accrediting titular authorship, architecture is quite an unusual field. In art, music, and literature the nominal credit for a piece of work is generally retained by the creator rather than the client: we refer to Michelangelo's rather than Pope Clement VII's *Last Judgement*, and Mozart's not Count Franz Walsegg-Stuppach's *Requiem in D minor*. In the realm of architecture, however, while there are many instances of buildings being inseparably connected to the names of their designers, the sponsor, too, is often given credit for the structure, officially and in public opinion, by name.[1] This can result in a competitive situation where each party feels that its contribution, be it fiscal or intellectual, merits recognition.

Focusing on Italy during the late-republican and early-imperial periods, and looking at public rather than domestic buildings, this chapter considers the relationship between patrons and architects in ancient Roman society. Specifically, it looks at the evidence for anxiety about and rivalry over being celebrated as the creator of a building, as it is revealed in anecdotal stories (section 2), tomb monuments (section 3), and Vitruvius's *On Architecture* (section 4). As we will see, convention in Roman society directed that those who sponsored a monument were given credit for it, while those who actually built the structure were ignored. Yet this investigation shows how members of the latter group did

1 A discussion of authorship and architecture in historical contexts and modern practice is provided in Anstey, Grillner, and Hughes 2007.

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not simply accept the status quo but instead sought to have their involvement publicly recognized. The way in which they did so is indicative of the possibilities and limitations of competition between people of different status. Further, by examining how certain architects strove to gain fame for their achievements we learn something about both the concerns of these professionals and the environment in which they worked.

2 Being Written Out

The immense gulf in social status between the different actors makes this a particularly interesting subject for exploring notions of competition in antiquity. In the city of Rome the patrons of civic buildings were almost always members of the ruling elite: during the republic this meant senators; under Augustus and thereafter it was mostly members of the imperial family.[2] Architects, by contrast, were skilled workers and, while some were Roman citizens, many of those operating in Italy were foreigners and freedmen.[3] The label 'architect' is used throughout this study, although defining the ancient responsibilities of an *architectus*/*arkhitektôn* and who might be classified as such requires more exposition than is possible or necessary here. I use the term 'architect' as an umbrella title that refers to professional builders more generally; in addition to *architectus*, this includes the engineer (*machinator*), the contractor (*redemptor*), and the supervisor (*praefectus fabrum* and *magister*), but not craftsmen such as carpenters and masons.[4] For what is relevant to this present investigation is not the difference between specialist job titles but rather the broader distinction between professionals and patrons.

The construction of a building is a collaborative process. Even if the conception of a particular building is the brainchild of one person, many others contribute to its creation and completion. Yet this is not the impression given by ancient authors when they refer to the monuments of Rome. A huge number of public buildings were constructed and restored in the city of Rome

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2 Eck 1984, 129–167; 2010, 89–110; Patterson 2015, 213–242.

3 On the status of architects working in Roman Italy see Gros 1983, 425–452; Anderson 1997, 15–67; Wilson Jones 2000, 26–30; Thomas 2007: 91; Cuomo 2007: 145–152; on Caesar's equestrian *praefectus fabrum*, Mamurra, see Palmer 1983, 343–361.

4 On using 'architect' as a blanket term see Taylor 2003, 9–14. On the definition and varied duties of architects and these other professions in ancient Rome see Donderer 1996, 15–23; Anderson 1997, 3–15 and 95–118; Delaine 1997, 66–68; 2000, 120–125; Cuomo 2007, 134–145. The social distinction between architects and craftsmen in antiquity is commented on at Thomas 2007, 91.

during the first two centuries CE, but ancient literature contains the names of just five architects connected with these projects.[5] Even when an author acknowledges the role of a professional builder in the construction process, that individual often remains unnamed. For example, when Pliny the Elder disapprovingly details the creation of the remarkable yet dangerous revolving theatres in 52 BCE, he asks rhetorically who should be admonished for the invention, the patron or the designer (*HN* 36.118). While Pliny names the *auctor* of the project, the aedile Scribonius Curio, he is either unaware of, or uninterested in the identity of the architect, simply referring to him as an *artifex*.[6]

In Roman society buildings were first and foremost the *monumenta* of their patrons. It was their names that were inscribed on the façades and recorded in the annals: the inscriptions of the Pantheon claim that Marcus Agrippa 'made it' (*fecit*) and Septimius Severus and Caracalla 'restored it' (*restituerunt*);[7] in his *Res gestae* Augustus takes personal credit for over one hundred structures;[8] authors of poetry and prose consistently refer to buildings in possessive terms such as Metellus's portico or Catulus's temple and instinctively record that emperor *x* built structure *y*.[9] The architects, who were arguably of equal or greater importance in determining the actual appearance of the buildings, are in most cases written out of the story. It is probable that this imbalance was more a societal and literary convention than a conscious effort on the part of almost every patron or chronicler to suppress the role of the architect. Yet there are a number of stories about emperors envious of architects' abilities.

Dio recounts the incident of an architect who devised a novel solution for righting a supposedly irreparable portico in Rome.[10] He claims that he cannot tell his readers the man's name because the emperor Tiberius, impressed at but also envious of the architect's skill, refused to allow it to be recorded and exiled him from the city. When the architect attempted to win favour again by demonstrating a type of unbreakable glass to Tiberius, he was executed. Versions of this last element of the story are also told by Petronius and Pliny the Elder, although they do not identify the anonymous individual as an archi-

5 Severus and Celer (Tac. *Ann.* 15.42), Raberius (Mart. 7.56), Apollodorus (Cass. Dio 69.4.2–5), Decranius (*SHA Hadr.* 19.12). For references to architects in literature working outside of Rome and this period see Anderson 1997, 15–67.

6 Other stories where the architect goes unnamed include those recorded by Varro (*Rust.* 3.17.9), Aulus Gellius (*NA* 19.10), and Macrobius (*Sat.* 2.5.9).

7 *CIL* VI 896 = *ILS* 129.

8 *Mon. Anc.* 19–21.1.

9 A similar point is made at Wiseman 2014, 44–45.

10 Cass. Dio 57.21.5–7.

tect.[11] The differing details, the implausibility of unbreakable glass, and the lack of specifics in the alternative accounts suggest that the incident has been distorted and is quite likely to be entirely apocryphal.[12] For the tale conforms to the theme of skilled practitioners being punished by petty rulers.[13]

The incident also has similarities to the relationship that Dio suggests existed between the emperor Hadrian and the architect Apollodorus of Damascus, who rose to prominence working under Trajan.[14] Supposedly, when Trajan was still alive and Hadrian attempted to interject in a conversation, Apollodorus insulted Hadrian by telling him to 'go away and draw your gourds'. Later, when Hadrian was emperor and sent Apollodorus the plans for the temple of Venus and Roma he was building, the critical response of the architect enraged the emperor, who on realising that Apollodorus was right was forced to recognize his own shortcomings and invidiously put Apollodorus to death. Pointing to inconsistencies in the account and the existence of a wider tradition hostile to Hadrian scholars have cast doubt on the veracity of the incident.[15] Even if Apollodorus was executed, it seems unlikely that this was known to have been motivated by Hadrian's envy of his skill. These stories, which highlight character faults of Tiberius and Hadrian, do not seem to me to indicate that emperors felt threatened by the recognition an architect might achieve; the gap in social status was too great for patrons to worry about being eclipsed. Nevertheless, they do indicate that in popular thought, at least, rivalry between emperors and architects was conceivable. Indeed, the alleged envy on the part of the emperors accords with the negative part of Cicero's definition of *aemulatio*.[16]

But what about those on the opposite side—were architects concerned about their fame, which was far less assured?[17] Even if convention directed that patrons receive credit for the construction of public buildings, the desire of architects to be associated with the structures they built is indicated in the epigraphic record. Several inscriptions belonging to late-republican and early-

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11 Petron. *Sat.* 51; Plin. *HN* 36.195.

12 David Scourfield argues persuasively in a forthcoming paper that it has the characteristics of an urban legend. I am grateful to the author for sharing his paper prior to publication.

13 For example, on Nero see Suet. *Ner.* 23.2–3; 24.1; Cass. Dio 62.29; on Hadrian see Cass. Dio 69.3.4–4.1; cf. Swain 1989, 150–158.

14 Cass. Dio 69.4.2–5.

15 Paribeni 1943, 124–130; Millar 1964, 60–72 esp. 65–66; Ridley 1989, 551–565; Swain 1989, 150–158; Bowie 1997, 1–15.

16 Cic. *Tusc.* 4.17: *est aemulatio aegritudo, si eo quod concupierit alius potiatur, ipse careat*; 4.56: *illa vitiosa aemulatione, quae rivalitati similis est*. See also the Introduction to this volume.

17 Thomas 2007, 91–103 explores a similar question in relation to Greek East in the Antonine period.

imperial public buildings from southern Italy mention the architects responsible for their construction, including the theatres at Pompeii and Herculaneum and the temple of Augustus at Pozzuoli.[18] Similarly, there are buildings on which an architect has signed his work less formally, as in a late second century BCE nymphaeum at Segni, where Quintus Mutius's name is written in pebble mosaic (Figure 10.1).[19]

However, the names of architects are never given anything like equal prominence to those of the patrons: the text of their inscriptions is often smaller and placed in a less conspicuous location.[20] Indeed, in the nymphaeum at Segni Mutius's name would have been largely obscured by the falling water that fed the pool. The scarcity of building inscriptions that actually name the architect is most apparent in Rome, where we know of none from this period. While this might be due to the random preservation of material, it could also be indicative of the rarity with which architects had their names inscribed on structures (Donderer 1996, 27–39). Certainly their relative lack of visibility in the epigraphic record corresponds with the already noted dearth of references to named architects in literature.[21]

Frequently denied formal acknowledgement for their part in the construction of buildings, whether by patrons or writers, some architects took matters into their own hands and employed alternative strategies to achieve recognition. But to what end? Revealingly, the strategies they employed indicate that their anxieties over reputation go beyond concerns about immediate distinction or securing further work. In the same way that patrons understood and utilized public buildings as *monumenta* to ensure fame beyond their lifetime, so, too, we find architects striving for this goal.[22] Unlike poets, however, who also sought lasting renown through their works and whose success was expected to bring fame to both the dedicatee and the author, for architects the patron was a potential rival.

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18 *CIL* X 841 = *ILS* 5638a; *CIL* X 1443; *CIL* X 1614. A catalogue of Roman-era inscriptions that refer to architects is provided by Donderer 1996.

19 Cifarelli 1995, 159–188. I am grateful to Stephen Kay for bringing this example to my attention. On architects signing work see Donderer 1996, 34–39.

20 Donderer 1996, 27–34; Taylor 2003, 9–10; Thomas 2007, 91–92; Hurwit 2015, 28–29.

21 For a comparison with the far greater number of artists who are mentioned in literature see Vollkommer 2014, appendix 5.1.

22 For examples of close interaction between architects and patrons see Cic. *Fam.* 3.1; *Att.* 2.3; Plin. *Ep.* 9.39; Cass. Dio 69.4.2–5. On the Roman understanding of *monumenta* see Thomas 2007, 2 and 165–170.



FIGURE 10.1 Nymphaeum at Segni, late second/early first century BCE. Bottom centre, pebble mosaic inscription: ΚΟΙΝΤΟϹ ΜΟΥΤΙΟϹ ΗΡΧΙΤΗΚΤΟΝΕ [...]
DRAWING BY REBECCA SALEM, DRAWING AFTER F.M. CIFARELLI AND F. COLAIACOMO, *SEGNI ANTICA E MEDIEVALE. UNA GUIDA ARCHEOLOGICA*. COLLEFERRO, 2011

3 Writing Yourself In

Pliny the Elder, in his account of architectural marvels in *Natural History* 36, gives a brief description of the famous lighthouse at Alexandria (36.83):

> The tower is said to have cost 800 talents. We should not fail to mention the generous spirit (*magno animo*) shown by King Ptolemy, whereby he allowed the name of the architect (*architecti*), Sostratus of Cnidus, to be inscribed on the very fabric of the building.[23]
>
> … quam (*sc.* turrem) constitisse DCCC talentis tradunt, magno animo, ne quid omittamus, Ptolemaei regis, quo in ea permiserit Sostrati Cnidi architecti structura ipsa nomen inscribi.

The accuracy of Pliny's explanation for the presence of Sostratus's name has been justifiably questioned.[24] Indeed, rather than revealing the state of patron-architect relationships in third-century BCE Alexandria, the comment is arguably more indicative of the situation familiar to Pliny in first-century CE Rome. The very fact that he considers it a magnanimous, noteworthy, and therefore presumably rare act for a patron to permit an architect to have his name inscribed on a structure corresponds to the general attitude we have already seen in Roman society.

Writing two generations later, Lucian presents a somewhat different story about the inscription in *How to Write History* 62:

> Do you know what the Cnidian architect did? He built the tower on Pharos … After he built the edifice, he inscribed his own name on the stones, then, smearing over a layer of plaster to cover it up, he inscribed over it the name of the man who was then king, knowing full well that in a very short while the legend would fall off along with the plaster to reveal the words: 'Sostratus of Cnidus, son of Dexiphanes, to the saviour gods on behalf of all those who sail'. And this is indeed what happened. So we can see that he had a view not to that particular moment in time or to the rest of the short life-span he had left, but to this day and for all time, for so long as the tower which he built stands and his art endures.[25]

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23 Translation by Eichholz 1962.

24 McKenzie 2007, 41–42; Hurwit 2015, 53–55.

25 Translation by ní Mheallaigh 2014.

> Ὁρᾷς τὸν Κνίδιον ἐκεῖνον ἀρχιτέκτονα οἷον ἐποίησεν; οἰκοδομήσας γὰρ τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ Φάρῳ πύργον, … οἰκοδομήσας οὖν τὸ ἔργον ἔνδοθεν μὲν κατὰ τῶν λίθων τὸ αὑτοῦ ὄνομα ἐπέγραψεν, ἐπιχρίσας δὲ τιτάνῳ καὶ ἐπικαλύψας ἐπέγραψε τοὔνομα τοῦ τότε βασιλεύοντος, εἰδώς, ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο, πάνυ ὀλίγου χρόνου συνεκπεσούμενα μὲν τῷ χρίσματι τὰ γράμματα ἐκφανησόμενον δέ, 'Σώστρατος Δεξιφάνους Κνίδιος θεοῖς σωτῆρσιν ὑπὲρ τῶν πλωϊζομένων.' οὕτως οὐδ' ἐκεῖνος ἐς τὸν τότε καιρὸν οὐδὲ τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον τὸν ὀλίγον ἑώρα, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν νῦν καὶ τὸν ἀεί, ἄχρι ἂν ἑστήκῃ ὁ πύργος καὶ μένῃ αὐτοῦ ἡ τέχνη.

Again it is highly likely that the explanation is apocryphal and perhaps even invented by Lucian himself; regardless, the details are significant to this investigation for a number of reasons.[26] First, it is an example of how a professional, through his ingenuity, could be imagined as prevailing over a king. It also highlights the idea of rivalry between a patron and an architect over who receives credit for the construction of a monument. The temporal location of Sostratus's ambition is particularly interesting. As Karen ní Mheallaigh (2014, 179) has shown, the story has a wider purpose in Lucian's text as an injunction to prospective historians (for whom the piece was ostensibly written) to create a work 'which will win enduring value for its author rather than ephemeral celebrity in the present'. Given this context, one wonders whether Lucian has deliberately omitted Ptolemy's name, instead referring non-specifically to the 'the man who was then king', in order to make the point that prominence or status will not save you from obscurity. Within Lucian's account there is an assumption that the builder of a monument would want recognition for his work and an expectation that under normal circumstances and in the immediate term he could not have it, but that if his focus was longer-term he might triumph. It may well be that the story as told by Lucian is fictitious, but the issues expressed in it appear to reflect actual concerns of architects operating in the Roman world.[27]

What was an architect to do? In the crypt of the seventeenth century Cathedral of St. Paul's in London is the modest tomb of its architect Christopher Wren. On the wall above the simple grave a Latin inscription reads:

26 On this story in Lucian see ní Mheallaigh 2014, 178–179.

27 Thomas 2007, 92 notes that a similar idea is present in another story—also of doubtful veracity—of Pliny's (*HN* 36.42), which concerns two Greek builders, Sauras and Batrachus, who are not allowed to put their names on the temple they constructed in Rome: they carve a lizard and a frog into one of the columns as emblematic of their names in order to preserve the memory of their involvement.

> Buried below is the founder of this church and city, Christopher Wren, who lived for over ninety years, not for himself but for the public good. Reader, if you seek his monument, look around you.
>
> Subtus conditur
> huius ecclesiae et urbis conditor
> Christophorus Wren,
> ui vixit annos ultra nonaginta,
> non sibi sed bono publico.
> Lector, si monumentum requiris,
> circumspice.

Written by Wren's son, the epitaph is an evocative reminder of the man responsible for the magnificent edifice in which the visitor is standing and an example of how the tombs of architects can be employed to promote messages of association with, even ownership of, the buildings they designed.[28] In Roman society, too, funerary monuments were utilized as vehicles for public promotion and self-image. In some instances the deceased's line of work is highlighted: the tools of craftsman and builders are depicted, for example.[29] But certain individuals went beyond simply noting their profession. As with Wren's grave, the tombs of some Roman architects were also used to stake a claim on the buildings they constructed.

An inscription belonging to a large circular tomb on the Via Praenestina outside of Rome told passers-by about the career of its occupant (*CIL* I² 2961):

> Lucius Cornelius, son of Lucius, of the Voturia tribe, was works supervisor (*praefectus fabrum*) of Quintus Catulus when consul, and his architect (*architectus*) when censor.[30]
>
> L· CORNELIVS· L· E· VOT
> Q CATVLI· COS· PRAEF· FABR
> CENSORIS· ARCHITECTVS

28 Elmes 1852, 814 suggests that the inscription was originally intended to be placed inside the Cathedral itself.

29 Zimmer 1982; George 2006, 19–29. On architects specifically see Wilson Jones 2000, 27; Cuomo 2007, 77–102. On freedmen see Leach 2006, 1–18.

30 On this inscription and Cornelius see Molisani 1971, 1–10. *Praefectus fabrum* could be both a civil and a military post.

Quintus Lutatius Catulus, consul in 78 and censor in 65 BCE, was a leading late-republican politician who completed the rebuilding of the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, the *tabularium*, and the monumental substructures that front the eastern flank of the Capitoline Hill. Together these constituted the largest and most prestigious public works undertaken in Rome in the first half of the first century BCE.[31] Catulus assumed responsibility for building the temple of Jupiter following the death of Sulla in 78 BCE—when, according to the inscription, Cornelius was his *praefectus fabrum*—and work continued into the 60s BCE, when Cornelius was employed as his architect.[32] This makes it very likely that Cornelius was heavily involved with, perhaps even the main person responsible for, these construction projects.[33]

Catulus's name appeared on the façade of the temple of Jupiter, and the building is explicitly referred to as Catulus's *monumentum*; Cornelius goes unmentioned.[34] Similarly, a now lost inscription names Catulus and credits him alone with the other components of the building programme: the *substructio* and the *tabularium*.[35] Cornelius is nevertheless able to draw attention to his central role in the construction of these buildings through his funerary monument by highlighting his connection to the man who was formally credited with their construction.

Something similar may be seen in a sculpted relief panel discovered at the coastal town of Terracina around fifty miles south of Rome (Figure 10.2). The piece was found out of context and suggestions as to its date vary from the late first century BCE to the early second century CE.[36] Measuring only twenty-four centimetres in height and fifty-four in length, the fragment was once part of a larger monument, and the frieze appears to continue beyond the breaks at either end (Coarelli 1996, 434–438).

The part that survives depicts a construction scene. On the far left a person is quarrying rock with a pick, in the centre two more figures shape the stones with smaller tools, and behind them another workman, with the assistance of a crane, positions a block on a partially finished tower-like structure of squared masonry. On the right a magistrate wearing military dress and seated on a

31 On the *tabularium*, the substructures, and their attendant problems see Coarelli 2010, 107–132; Tucci 2013/2014, 43–123.

32 The temple was dedicated in 69 BCE but work continued into the late 60s BCE (Cass. Dio 37.44.1–2).

33 Molisani 1971, 1–10; Anderson 1997, 26–32.

34 For Catulus's name on the façade see Tac. *Hist.* 3.72.1; Cass. Dio 37.44.1–2; 43.14.6. For Catulus's *monumentum* see Cic. *Verr.* 2.4.69–70; 2.4.82; Val. Max. 4.9.5; Tac. *Hist.* 3.72.

35 *CIL* VI 1314 = *ILS* 35.

36 Coarelli 1996, 444–446; Romeo 1998, 143–144.

FIGURE 10.2 Marble relief found at Terracina
DRAWING BY REBECCA SALEM

curule chair atop a *suggestum* is represented as directing operations, his presence indicating the public nature of the work being undertaken. Of particular interest are the three cloaked figures clutching what appear to be scrolls (labelled 'A' on Figure 10.2). Although the heads are too damaged for us to say whether they were portraits, the similarities in attire and stance suggest that they represent the same man overseeing different stages of the building process. This, coupled with the inclusion of the scrolls, suggests that he is the architect.[37] The seated magistrate, on account of his relative size, is a dominating figure, but the repetition of the architect, the fact that he faces the viewer, and his position in the foreground imply that the scene is actually about him.

Filippo Coarelli, pointing to what he suggests is the front of a rostrum of a ship in the bottom right corner and a Pharos being raised in the centre, connects the scene to the general find-spot and argues that it shows the construction of the port of Terracina.[38] But the absence of further details means that any such identification remains conjectural. The object that this relief comes from is also unknown. Coarelli argues that it was part of a monumental arch at Terrracina, but such a building has yet to be found and construction scenes do not typically feature in the iconography associated with this type of monument (Coarelli 1996, 448). Also, the prominence of a private individual, the architect, in the scene suggests that it was not from a public building. Ilaria Romeo argues

37 Coarelli 1996, 446; Wilson Jones 2000, 28.
38 Coarelli 1996, 434–454; cf. Giardina 2010, 101; *contra*, Romeo 1998, 143–148.

that it is part of a sarcophagus, but the height of the panel is too short to have been part of the box, and personalized work scenes are not commonly found on sarcophagus lids of the first or early second centuries CE (Romeo 1998, 146–147). Also, the presence of what appears to be a dowel hole in the back of the slab indicates that it was once fixed to another piece of stone or brick masonry, so the notion that the panel faced an actual structure is appealing.[39]

Staying with the idea of a funerary context, an alternative proposal is that the fragment is from a tomb. Running friezes that depict work scenes relating to the profession of the deceased are not uncommon on tombs in central Italy; a famous example is the tomb of the first-century BCE baker Eurysaces, which shows a workforce engaged in the different stages of making bread.[40] Although it is not clear if the Terracina relief formed part of a much longer frieze or was a relatively short stele, tomb reliefs with comparable dimensions are known.[41] Read in this way the relief provides another instance of an architect finding a way to commemorate his involvement with a public building project.[42]

A final example is the second-century CE tomb of the Haterii, an early example of the so-called 'temple' tomb type located on the via Labicana about three miles from Rome. The exterior of the rectangular structure was richly ornamented with busts, architectural decorations, and marble panels showing gods and figural scenes.[43] The inscription on the tomb does not state the profession of Haterius; however, a persuasive case has been made that he should be associated with Q. Haterius Tychicus, known from another inscription to be a *redemptor* (building contractor) operating in Rome.[44] The argument that the Haterius inside the tomb was involved in the building industry is strengthened by one of the decorative panels, which shows a highly detailed, quasi-fantastical construction scene involving a large treadwheel crane and is usually understood as a reference to the deceased's profession. Another frieze depicts five of Rome's monuments side by side: an arch connected to Isis, an amphitheatre (possibly the Colosseum), an unknown quadrafrons, another arch, which is labelled as being at the top of the Via Sacra and thought by some to be the still standing

39 See Romeo 1998, 147, figure 204.
40 On Eurysaces' tomb see Petersen 2003, 230–257, esp. 232–233 and 244–245.
41 For example, a bakery scene located in Trastevere measures 19.5 cm in height; see Wilson and Schörle 2009, 101–103.
42 On the significance of work scenes on tombs see Cuomo 2011, 77–84.
43 Jensen 1978; Sinn and Freyberger 1996.
44 *CIL* VI 607; Coarelli 1979, 266–268; Reitz 2013, 36 with n. 68. On *redemptores* see Anderson 1997, 95–113.

one dedicated to Titus, and a temple to Jupiter.[45] So far as they can be plausibly identified, the construction or restoration of these buildings can be dated to the Flavian period. Following the argument that Haterius was a builder, their presence on his tomb is interpreted as signifying that they were structures he worked on in life, a sort of iconographic *res gestae*.[46]

Like Lucius Cornelius and the architect at Terracina, Haterius uses his tomb to associate himself with monuments that were unlikely to include references to him. Neither the Terracina example nor Cornelius's tomb points to an adversarial rivalry between the patron and the architect. Indeed, for Cornelius the presence of Catulus's name in the inscription is integral to his own self-promotion, and the inclusion of the magistrate in the Terracina relief adds to the prestige of the architect by association. Haterius, however, at least so far as can be determined, chose not to include any reference to the patron(s) of the buildings shown on his tomb. This could have been done by inscribing the relevant emperor's name in the architrave of the different depictions; this was a known technique for labelling buildings in iconography.[47] That Haterius instead decided to use topographical references in the legends (ARCVS AD ISIS; ARCVS IN SACRA VIA SVMMA) is unusual. There are a range of possibilities as to why this might have been preferred, but one consequence of the patron's absence is that for the viewer of the tomb the buildings are associated with Haterius alone.

All three tombs indicate a desire on the part of architects to be directly connected with specific building projects and demonstrate inventive strategies through which this might be achieved. The fact that tombs were the chosen vehicle of these attempts is particularly significant, for by their very definition the structures were *monumenta* intended to project messages about the deceased to the future (Thomas 2007, 168). It is an indicator that the interest of these architects was in securing recognition for posterity, an idea we also find in Vitruvius's ten-book treatise *On Architecture*.

45 These identifications have been challenged by Freyberger and Zitzl 2016, who propose a new interpretation of the buildings depicted and their connection to Haterius. Broucke 2009, 28 has suggested that the 'temple to Jupiter' is actually the Domitianic Pantheon.

46 Castagnoli 1941, 59–69; Coarelli 1979, 255–269; Anderson 1997, 111–112.

47 For example, a triple-bay Augustan arch (*RIC* I second edition, Augustus 359), a single-bay Augustan arch (*RIC* I second edition, Augustus 267), the Domitianic temple of Jupiter Capitolinus (*RIC* II^2 second edition, Domitian 815).

4 The Architect as Author

The premise that the written word is a more lasting *monumentum* than stone structures was familiar to writers in the Augustan age. Vitruvius's contemporary Propertius claims that his verses will outlast the temple of Zeus at Olympia, the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus, and the Pyramids at Giza.[48] Although an evidently self-serving claim when made by writers, its accuracy is borne out by the posthumous reputation of Vitruvius. Since the Renaissance he has been the most famous architect of antiquity and one of the greatest influences in the development of Western architecture, yet not one of Vitruvius's buildings survives and his fame is due entirely to his literary output. This is not an accident. Vitruvius himself articulates the view that writing can act as an author's living memorial. In fact, as is made apparent in the preface to Book 6, he conceived of *On Architecture* as a work designed to perpetuate his own memory (*De arch.* 6.pr. 4–5):

> And so, many people, striving to that end [making money], apply bold methods and along with wealth, they have achieved celebrity too. But I, Caesar, never devoted my efforts to making money by my skill, but rather thought that I should pursue modest means and a good reputation—not wealth and infamy. Thus up to this point little celebrity has followed, yet I hope that once these volumes are published I will be known to future generations.[49]

> itaque plerique ad id propositum contendentes audacia adhibita cum divitiis etiam notitiam sunt consecuti. ego autem, Caesar, non ad pecuniam parandam ex arte dedi studium, sed potius tenuitatem cum bona fama quam abundantiam cum infamia sequendam probavi. ideo notities parum est adsecuta. sed tamen his voluminibus editis, ut spero, etiam posteris ero notus.

The recognition that Vitruvius, like Sostratus, seeks is not immediate and ephemeral celebrity but lasting fame.[50]

In writing *On Architecture* Vitruvius may also, however, have sought to lay claim to a building he designed, a basilica at the Augustan colony of Julia

48 Prop. 3.2.17–29. On this theme see also Hor. *Carm.* 3.30.1–9; Ov. *Pont.* 4.8.31; *Am.* 1.15.7; *Met.* 15.235; *Fast.* 2.55; cf. Fowler 2000, 193–217.

49 Translation adapted from Rowland and Howe 1999.

50 On the idea of texts as a living memory see Vitr. *De arch.* 9.pr.1–3 and 16–17.

Fanestris (Fano) in northern Italy. Vitruvius introduces his readers to the basilica in Book 5, claiming to have both built and arranged (*conlocavi curavique faciendam*) for the construction of an edifice of the highest dignity and grace (*summam dignitatem et venustatem*).[51] In an account too lengthy to reproduce here—it is much the most detailed description of a building in the text, a fact that is further suggestive of its importance to the author—Vitruvius shows the basilica to be an innovative piece of architecture, and one that possesses *magnificentia* and *auctoritas*. On the basilica itself, in line with standard practice, we might assume that the patron or dedicatee's name (either that of the local magistrate or Augustus) was the most prominent, carved in a dedicatory inscription.[52] Whether or not Vitruvius's name was present on the actual building is unknown, but by explaining his involvement in *On Architecture* Vitruvius situates the basilica as his achievement. As is increasingly realized, far from being a 'handbook' on construction, *On Architecture* is a sophisticated piece of literature through which Vitruvius carefully constructs both his own image and that of his profession.[53] The protracted account of the basilica undoubtedly serves a didactic, architectural purpose, but since the text as a whole is intended to ensure the future fame of its author, the description can also be seen to function as a means for Vitruvius to create lasting recognition for his part in the project, an act that establishes a competitive relationship with the patron of the building.

This impression is strengthened if we consider that the patron's name appears nowhere in the discussion of the basilica. Just as authors in other genres typically give no indication that a building is a collaborative endeavour, Vitruvius acknowledges the involvement of no one but himself, the difference being that it is the patron, not the architect, who goes unmentioned. The detailed description of the basilica, which includes information on structural particulars, the thought processes behind decisions, and explanations of how challenges were overcome, displays an intimate level of knowledge that only the designer would possess. The reader is left in little doubt about who was behind the creation of the building, and the impression that it is Vitruvius's *monumentum* is reinforced. The method is different from that adopted by Sostratus, but it arguably has the same purpose and result. With his eye on

51 *De arch.* 5.1.6–10. Palmer 1983, 252 argues that *conlocavi* indicates that Vitruvius let the contracts and so should be considered a major magistrate at the colony, but the notion that he was a magistrate does not accord with the other biographical information he provides, including that he lived off a pension from Octavia (1.pr.2).

52 As on the near-contemporary Basilica Aemilia in Rome: *CIL* VI 3737; V 36908.

53 For example, see the essays in Cuomo and Formisano 2016.

the future Vitruvius is competing to be recognized as the author of a building. His book provides the opportunity to present himself as such, and his silence about the patron removes a potential rival from the picture.

Vitruvius's emphasis on ensuring recognition of the architect's connection to the buildings they design goes beyond the personally relevant example of the basilica at Fanum. As was already mentioned, it was commonplace for Roman authors across literary genres to name the patron of a building and make no mention of its architect; in *On Architecture*, however, we find the opposite. For example, Velleius Paterculus tells us that the senator Quintus Metellus built the temple of Jupiter Stator in the Campus Martius after his victory against the Macedonians in 148 BCE, but Vitruvius states that it was constructed by the architect Hermodoros of Salamis; he does not mention the magistrate's name.[54] Nor is this an isolated instance: in Book 3 alone Vitruvius refers to the temple of Honos and Virtus in Rome by Mucius, the temple of Diana in Magnesia by Hermogenes, the temple of Apollo at Alabanda by Menesthenes, and the temple of Diana at Ephesus by Chersiphon—in all cases the named individuals are the designers not the sponsors.[55] In Book 7 Vitruvius does acknowledge that Gaius Marius sponsored the temple of Honos and Virtus, but this is one of only four occasions in the text in which he attributes a building to a Roman patron.[56] If Vitruvius does not record the architect involved he tends not to give any name at all. Not even Augustus, the dedicatee of *On Architecture*, is mentioned in connection with his temples of Palatine Apollo, Deified Julius, or Quirinus.[57] Vitruvius, it seems, downplays the importance of patrons and increases that of architects in his presentation of buildings: for Vitruvius's readers, at least, Metellus's temple of Jupiter Stator becomes Hermodorus's.

This emphasis is consistent with how Vitruvius attempts to raise both the status of architecture as a discipline in Roman society and the prominence of architects, who are given centre stage throughout the treatise.[58] A notable instance comes in the second half of the final book, which deals with war machines and details a number of historical sieges.[59] In Vitruvius's account of the different battles the kings and generals are passive observers while the

54 Vell. Pat. 1.11.3; Vitr. *De arch.* 3.2.5.

55 *De arch.* 3.2.5–7.

56 *De arch.* 7.1.17 (*aedes Honoris et Virtutis Marianae*); 3.2.5 (*porticus Metelli*); 3.3.5 (*Herculis Pompeiani*); 5.9.1 (*porticus Pompeianae*).

57 *De arch.* 3.3.5; 3.3.2; 3.2.7.

58 On Vitruvius's aims see Romano 1987; McEwen 2003; Gros 2006; Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 145–210.

59 *De arch.* 10.10.

architects are presented as the heroes who secure victory through *sollertia*.[60] This relates to Vitruvius's broader message to his readers and Augustus—for whose benefit he professes to be writing—namely, that architects are indispensable to rulers.

The work concludes with a siege of Massilia in which the defenders are described as outwitting and repulsing the efforts of the attackers. Although Vitruvius refrains from mentioning the protagonists by name, his readers would probably have been aware that this siege was conducted by Julius Caesar during the civil war against Pompey.[61] As Alice König has highlighted, in light of who Caesar's adopted son was, this is a provocative incident for Vitruvius to have included, especially as in his retelling (unlike the version in Caesar's *Civil War*) it ends with Caesar's forces being defeated.[62] König sees this example as part of a wider tension in Vitruvius's relationship to Augustus and argues persuasively that, far from being a text that merely celebrates the principate, *On Architecture* presents 'an exploration, perhaps even an interrogation, of the emperor's newly claimed authority'.[63] While overtly subservient to Augustus, as König shows, at various points in the work Vitruvius also places himself in the role of the emperor's instructor in architectural matters.[64] This is expressed directly at the end of the preface to Book 1 when Vitruvius explains part of his purpose in writing the treatise (1.pr.3):

> I have set down these instructions, complete with technical terms, so that by observing them you could teach yourself how to evaluate the works already brought into being and those yet to be.
>
> conscripsi praescriptiones terminatas, ut eas adtendens et ante facta et futura qualia sint opera, per te posses nota habere.

In this passage Vitruvius goes beyond just claiming that he is more knowledgeable than the emperor in the field of architecture, asserting that his books can assist Augustus not only with future projects but also in understanding what has already been built. The boldness of this implication is that Augustus is to some degree presently ignorant about his own architectural programme.

60 As is argued by König 2009, 47–52. On *On Architecture* 10 see also Cuomo 2011, 309–332.
61 *De arch.* 10.16.11.
62 König 2009, 49–52. Cuomo 2011, 321–324 presents an enlightening examination of this episode in both Vitruvius and Caesar's *Civil War*.
63 König 2009, 35; *contra* McEwen 2003.
64 On Vitruvius and Augustus as instructor and apprentice see König 2009, 42–43.

Indeed, in his discussion of the placement of religious buildings Vitruvius states that temples to Mars should be placed outside of city walls so that their presence does not incite civil war (Vitr. *De arch.* 1.7.1). One of the most symbolically charged and architecturally magnificent temples of the Augustan principate was that of Mars Ultor. Vowed in 42 BCE, it was constructed within the city walls of Rome during a period marked by the threat of and actual civil war. It is this type of 'error' that Vitruvius indicates reading his work can elucidate and prevent. In part, Vitruvius is attempting to establish his relationship to Augustus, and we should not necessarily read intentional antagonism into his pretension. Still, if Vitruvius's forthrightness is indicative of other architects' attitudes, it might help explain why they are the subject of the anecdotal stories about practitioners' skills provoking the envy and hostility of Tiberius and Hadrian. In various ways, therefore, Vitruvius can be seen as attempting to raise the prominence of architects in relation both to the patrons they worked for and the works they created; outside of *On Architecture* it is an ambition that seems to have been largely unsuccessful.

5 Conclusion

Rabun Taylor, in his book *Roman Builders* (2003, 11), asks why, given that nobody would claim Augustus was the author of the *Aeneid*, we allow the assertion that the emperor was the *constructeur* of the Forum of Augustus. The tendency that Taylor identifies, of not acknowledging the role of professional architects in the construction of Roman monuments, is common in modern scholarship but has its roots in antiquity. As was detailed above, building inscriptions and literature leave little doubt that in Roman society buildings were categorized as the *monumenta* of their sponsors. Nevertheless, as this paper has aimed to show, it is apparent that some architects also claimed authorship for the structures they helped to build.

We are therefore confronted by a competitive situation in which the professional has to struggle against social convention in order to try to achieve the recognition that, as is indicated by Vitruvius's attempts to raise the profile of architects, some thought they deserved. Both the patron and the architect had the same goal of being remembered through the *monumentum*, but it is not a straightforward form of competition. First, the architects' rivalry with the patrons is indirect; indeed, it is possible that the latter were oblivious to their employees' aspirations. The various anecdotal stories that describe tense relationships between emperors and architects are arguably indicative of reality, or at least show that such frictions could be imagined as existing, but beyond this

it is difficult to find evidence of animosity. Part of the reason that there is no direct conflict between the two parties is the temporal focus of the architects' ambitions. A common theme in all of the examples discussed, anecdotal and actual, is that the architect is trying to commemorate his accomplishment for a future audience. Although the funerary monuments might have been designed and erected during a person's lifetime, and Vitruvius's text was intended to have an immediate impact, the works are also about ensuring posthumous fame—the central idea behind Sostratus's deception, too. While this deferred field for competition is the choice of the architects, restricting their ambitions to the hope of delayed recognition may have been a matter of necessity, as well, as their social status, relative to that of the patron, prohibited any immediate challenge. Similarly, with traditional channels of propagating one's association with a building—such as dedicatory inscriptions—largely closed off, an inventive recourse to alternative media such as tombs and literature was required.

Irrespective of the difficulties architects faced or their potentially limited successes, their attempts to achieve posthumous fame for their creations reveal a concern that has been more commonly associated with Roman politicians and poets than builders. Further, while it might be possible to read some of the examples discussed within the context of other sub-elite groups (workers or freedmen, for example), what is distinctive here is the emphasis on the specific activity carried out by the individual.[65] The funerary monuments do not simply highlight the occupation of the person, depict tools associated with it, or show a generic scene of work; instead, they promote associations with particular projects. Haterius, Cornelius, the man on the Terracina relief, and Vitruvius do not see themselves as generic artisans but as the creators of individual works—to draw an analogy, they present themselves not as scribes but as authors.

This being said, we should not assume that all architects had such lofty ambitions. Part of the context for Vitruvius's insistence in the preface to Book 6 that he does not seek short-term celebrity is the complaint that this is precisely what many of his fellow practitioners avariciously pursue. Vitruvius offers a disparaging assessment of this type of architect, claiming that the profession is 'arrogated by the ignorant and inexperienced', and he explicitly sets himself apart from those 'who make the rounds and ask openly to work'.[66] Not only does Vitruvius present us with an alternative type of reputation valued by

65 Leach 2006, 1–18 discusses the tomb of the Haterii in the context of freedman art.
66 Vitr. *De arch.* 6.pr. 5–7.

other architects, but his attack also raises the issue of rivalry and competition between those working in the same field, a topic that merits further study.[67,68]

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67 On professional rivalries see also Rosen in this volume.

68 I am grateful to Cynthia Damon, Christoph Pieper, and the anonymous reviewer, whose thoughtful comments have helped develop the arguments and focus of this chapter.

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CHAPTER 11

Political Competition and Economic Change in Mid-Republican Rome

Seth Bernard

Over the course of the fourth and early third centuries BCE a series of legal measures granted the Roman plebs access to various high offices and effectively dissolved the previous monopolization of political power by a small group of patrician families. A new ruling order emerged, now comprising both plebeians and patricians. The authority of this *nobilitas* was no longer predicated on hereditary rank but was instead based on office-holding and membership in the senate. While the admission of plebeians to various magistracies significantly increased the number of Romans eligible for office, the number of offices did not undergo similar expansion. From the Licinio-Sextian laws in 367 BCE through the opening years of the First Punic War only three annually elected magistrates held *imperium* and could thus access the social and material benefits of commanding Roman armies.[1] In sum, with the rise of the patricio-plebeian *nobilitas*, office-holding became an ever scarcer resource just as it became the source of Roman aristocratic power.

In outline this is the cause of intense political competition among the mid-republican political elite in the century prior to the Second Punic War. In the context of this volume it is worth stressing that such competitiveness did not prevent the Roman aristocracy from cohering to brilliant effect as they guided a nascent imperial state across Italy and beyond. Not only was there success abroad, but many cultural innovations flowed from attempts to gain advantage within the political arena, from the financing of *monimenta publica* to the patronage of early Latin literature. The character and mechanics of the competitive mid-republican *nobilitas* are topics of longstanding interest.[2] Here I turn to the less frequently considered question of the ideological basis upon which this political competition turned. With what means did the mid-republican elite vie for political supremacy, and how was the Roman state both competitive and coherent?

1 Hölkeskamp 2004, 19–23 stresses the importance of holding *imperium*.
2 Hölkeskamp 2012 provides a good entry into the substantial modern discussion on the topic.

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At the very least the 'struggle of the orders' no longer served to define Roman political divisions as it had during the earlier republic, even if the old orders were sometimes still activated in the later republic. Von Ungern-Sternberg draws attention to a fragment of Livy describing a riot ca. 220 BCE in Rome that arose in reaction to *conubium* between a patrician and a member of a plebeian family.[3] For the late-republican context one might also mention P. Clodius Pulcher's notorious *transitio ad plebem* in 59 BCE. However, it must be admitted that once plebeian birth no longer represented a real obstacle to political power or to the holding of *imperium*, the struggle of the orders as it had existed in the fifth and early fourth centuries was largely irrelevant. Instead, I propose, political success was increasingly derived from the attachment of Roman aristocrats to opposing but related economic ideologies. Wealth in certain forms had, of course, always been a constitutive element of the Roman aristocracy. However, the influx of imperial spoils from the third century onward not only made many Romans rich, it reconfigured the way in which wealth supported political power.

My interest in the economic dimensions of mid-republican political competition stems from the observation that this period of dynamic political change also saw the structural transformation of the Roman economy. The political and economic trends of the period are known on their own terms but seldom connected.[4] I suspect that this scholarly oversight stems from the reliance of political histories on the textual sources, while recent economic history focuses on the archeological material. However, each set of evidence tells half a story: texts reveal much about developing elite attitudes towards wealth but little about how such attitudes played out on the ground. Meanwhile, pottery, coins, and settlement patterns demonstrate a significant shift in the logic of the Roman economy in the third century BCE but cannot on their own identify the causes of such change. Clearly, these narratives are complementary, and I bring them into a single discussion here.

1 Political Competition and the Roman Economy

An examination of the economic implications of competing political ideologies requires some justification. In general, anthropological approaches, which

3 Livy fr. 12a (Loeb) = fr. 12 Weißenborn-Müller, cf. von Ungern Sternberg 2005; however, see Develin 1986 for doubts on the fragment's context.

4 Older work on wealth and senatorial identity such as Shatzman 1975 needs updating with respect to the archeological evidence. Tchernia 2007 makes important headway.

tend to prioritize sociopolitical structures as they configure economic behavior, and not vice versa, remain most associated with Finley's concept of economic primitivism and have for that reason fallen somewhat out of favor.[5] Certainly, the republican economy, which was by no means static, was not primitive in Finley's sense; however, its dynamics remain highly complex from an historical perspective.[6] On the one hand, the core of the Roman world began to experience significant development during the mid-republic as Rome started to establish a tributary empire. On the other, such growth fell well short of the standards of modern market economies, although I will point to important signs of market production in mid-republican Italy. It is therefore pointless to debate whether the mid-republican Roman economy was primitive or modern: it was neither, or (perhaps more accurately) both.[7] Instead, I argue that the mid-republican economy was embedded within a sociopolitical landscape that promoted both market- and non-market forms of organizing the exchange and acquisition of wealth.

Thus, my insistence that political and social attitudes structured Roman economic behavior takes off from a starting point not so methodologically distant from that of Finley, while my conclusions are quite different. It is also worth noting that a focus on social or political influences on economic behavior aligns with recent work within the paradigm of New Institutional Economics (NIE), which has guided scholarship on the Roman economy for the last decade.[8] In brief, NIE focuses on institutions, the formal and informal rules of the game that shape the decisions of economic actors. At its origins institutional economics developed in the 1930s as a means to explain how 'firms' used (predominately) legal and political institutions to overcome uncertainty

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5 Finley 1999; for anthropological economics see Wilk and Cliggett 2007. Scheidel 2012 reviews recent trends in the study of the Roman economy and contains little that can be considered anthropological. Exceptionally, Viglietti 2011 offers an anthropological but not primitivist approach to archaic Rome.

6 The market dynamics of the Roman economy remain highly debated, although the focus is mostly on later periods. For the modified application of neoclassical economic principles to the empire see Temin 2012; Kay 2014 applies similar principles to the last two centuries of the republic. In historicizing mid-republican economic development I am sympathetic to the view of Bang 2011 that Rome's economy was qualitatively different.

7 Similarly, Saller 2005.

8 See Scheidel, Morris, and Saller 2007; an institutional approach continues to dominate study of the ancient economy but is challenged by historians of other periods, particularly Ogilvie 2011, whose critique of the relationship between institutions and economic efficiency is now extended to Roman *collegia* by Liu 2016: this work questions ideas about the origins of economic institutions and the causes of their persistence but does not dispute their heuristic value.

and costs implied in consummating and enforcing transactions.[9] Since the theory was initially developed as a means of understanding how modern capitalist economies worked, it made the assumption that firms behaved rationally in the sense that they sought to maximize profits. However, once economists started to apply this theory to pre-modern societies, it quickly became clear that the definition of economic rationality was by no means stable through history. In 1983 Simon argued that rationalism was 'bounded' or determined by available information as well as by cognitive makeup. More recently North, a founding figure of NIE, emphasized the 'intimate relationship between belief systems and the institutional framework'. In his view belief systems form the underlying human landscape, while institutions are the structures imposed upon that landscape to produce desired outcomes (North 2005, 49). In this sense social attitudes count for an enormous amount not only in shaping economic goals but also in creating the web of human relationships that institutions seek to shape in pursuit of those goals.

For mid-republican Rome a useful way of understanding how competing social attitudes conditioned economic behavior can be found in the work of Parry and Bloch (1989), whose study of the symbolic contexts of money traces two separate but related discourses of value, each associated with a different timescale.[10] On the one side is the long-term transactional order of wealth that forms symbolically through exchanges that valorize the prevailing aristocratic community and its relationship to divine authority. Within this order wealth is generated by one's standing in an unchanging social hierarchy. Because such exchanges affirm the aristocratic community, they tend to be valued positively. In opposition is the short-term transactional order involving wealth acquired through monetized exchange, wage-labor, or foreign trade and commerce. Short-term transactions are acquisitive and individual; they take place beyond the aristocratic community and without the help of strong social ties. Since short-order wealth is acquired externally, it allows for social mobility and poses a threat to the stability of the aristocratic community. Thus as it comes into conflict with the long-term order, short-order wealth is often cast in a negative moral light: the resulting tension prompts the moralized critiques of short-order wealth found in many societies from Aristotle's denunciation of usury to Martin Luther's 'Mammon' and beyond. In this regard Roman attitudes towards wealth, discussed below, are by no means historically exceptional.

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9 See Coase 1937.

10 Kurke 1999 used their model to interpret archaic Greece, but the approach has made no inroads into the study of Rome.

Importantly, the two transactional orders normally appear not in isolation but linked together in a sort of permanent competition. At a very basic level this occurs because aristocratic communities cannot maintain themselves on symbolic wealth alone and without engaging to some extent in the material world. In the words of Parry and Bloch (1989, 26), 'It has to be acknowledged that this (long-term) order can only perpetuate itself through the biological and economic activities of individuals'. Thus individuals normally engage to some extent with both ends of the spectrum of transactional orders, and societies themselves contain separate but competing modes of exchange. The model is therefore not developmental, nor does it seek to describe the simple displacement by new-money elites of an older ruling class with more symbolic or 'traditional' wealth. Rather, it focuses attention on moments of significant disruption in the balance between the two orders of exchange and in the moralized discourse on wealth and power that arises as a result.

2 New Wealth in Mid-Republican Politics

We observe a dramatic shift in the balance of transactional modes at Rome during the mid-republic. Commerce and foreign trade had long played a part in Rome's economy.[11] However, the early phase of imperial expansion brought wealth on an unprecedented scale in the form of spoils of conquest and expanding commercial opportunities. It was only around this time, as Fabius Pictor claimed, that Romans 'first perceived wealth', and we may pursue the idea that such wealth reconfigured the economic balance of the Roman community and created rising tensions over aristocratic identity.[12] Indeed, the importance of wealth, but also the need to qualify wealth in morally appropriate terms, can be discerned in one of the clearest statements of the mid-republican aristocratic *ethos*, the funeral *laudatio* delivered by Q. Caecilius Metellus in 221 BCE for his father, the consul of 251 and 247 BCE. The speech, cited by Pliny the Elder, concludes with a list of the ten attributes to which Metellus's father, and by extension his generation, aspired (Plin. *HN* 7.140 = *ORF*^{3} 6, fr. 2):

11 See Viglietti 2011.

12 Fabius Pictor F24 Cornell = Strabo 5.3.1. The fragment reveals no precise context other than the conquest of the Sabines, but it makes the best sense where it is normally located, in relation to M'. Curius Dentatus's campaigns in the 290s BCE, when the tradition focused intensely on the contrast between Dentatus's *frugalitas* and Sabine wealth.

> For he wished to be a fighter among the front ranks, the best orator, the boldest commander, to manage the greatest affairs, to be held in greatest honor, to be of the highest wisdom, to be held the leading senator, to find great wealth by appropriate means, to leave behind many children, and to be most renowned in the state.[13]
>
> voluisse enim primarium bellatorem esse, optimum oratorem, fortissimum imperatorem, auspicio suo maximas res geri, maximo honore uti, summa sapientia esse, summum senatorem haberi, pecuniam magnam bono modo invenire, multos liberos relinquere et clarissimum in civitate esse.

The numerous superlatives in this passage are often noted.[14] It is equally worth observing how the qualities to which Metellus's father aspired fall within the boundaries of the aristocratic community: he wished to be the highest ranking member (of the senate), the most famous citizen (in his state), and so forth. Similar qualifications of individual pre-eminence appear in other texts of the same general nature and date. In the *elogium* of Atilius Caiatinus (*cos.* 258 and 254 BCE), for example, the magistrate's eminence was based explicitly upon the consensus of *plurimae gentes*.[15] Likewise, in the *elogium* on the sarcophagus of Scipio Barbatus a list of offices and outstanding virtues concludes with the striking apostrophe that such actions were undertaken *apud vos*, directly invoking Barbatus's fellow Romans as witness to his excellence (*CIL* I^2 7).

Like other attributes of aristocratic preeminence, then, the outstanding wealth obtained by Metellus's father was subject to the judgment of the aristocratic community. The elder Metellus succeeded in 'obtaining great wealth in a socially respectable way' (*pecuniam magnam bono modo invenire*).[16] Metellus's qualification of wealth with *bono modo* is paralleled in a number of other texts of the early second century BCE, particularly in Cato's famous discussion of the sources of wealth and his admonition that a respectable Roman (*vir bonus*) should invest in land, not earn profit through risk-laden activities such as maritime trade.[17] Gabba (1981) notes some textual evidence for the rising

13 All translations are my own.
14 See, e.g., Kierdorf 1980, 10–21.
15 Cic. *Sen.* 61: *hunc unum plurimae consentiunt gentes populi primarium fuisse virum*.
16 For *bonus* as pertaining to social respectability see *TLL* vol. II, fasc. IX, col. 2082, s.v. *bonus* § I.5. *de viro bono*.
17 Cato *Agr. pr.* 2; cf. Plaut. *Trin.* 273–274; Cic. *Att.* 13.23.3; Polyb. 6.56.3.

importance of maritime commerce in the mid-third century BCE and therefore reads Metellus's speech as an early attestation of this Catonian discourse over the social appropriateness of various sources of wealth.[18]

This reading is attractive, and it raises the question of how and when this discourse, implicit in Metellus's characterization of his father's aristocratic prestige, may have first arisen.[19] We may start with the most expedient means of accessing wealth in this period, namely, through *imperium* and military command.[20] Already by the earlier third century competing attitudes existed concerning the ways in which war spoils supported political power. This is clear above all in Livy's detailed depiction of two triumphs at the close of the year 293 BCE.[21] The two triumphant consuls came from contrasting backgrounds. One was Lucius Papirius Cursor, a member of a *gens* whose prominence extended from the earliest years of the republic and the son of the most distinguished general of the Second Samnite War.[22] His colleague was Spurius Carvilius, the first of his family to attain the consulship and an exemplum of political mobility in later Roman history.[23]

The consuls are portrayed as taking contrasting approaches towards triumphal wealth. Livy's account starts with Papirius Cursor's triumph (10.46.2–8), in which not only are the amounts of silver (1,830 pounds) and bronze (2,533,000 asses) specified, but focus is granted to the consul's hereditary standing in the community and the long-term transactional order to which his spoils pertained. The appearance of Papirius Cursor's *spolia* and the number of captives led in triumph are compared to those of his illustrious father, and Livy reports that Cursor used his *manubiae* to complete the temple of Quirinus vowed by his father. Papirius's triumph was a spectacle of the symbols of military *gloria*: soldiers in his parade were decorated with 'civic, mural, and rampart crowns' (*civicae coronae vallaresque ac murales*, 10.46.3). Arms and armor captured from the enemy were designated for public display on the temple and in

18 He mentions, e.g., Polyb. 1.83.7 on Italian traders around the outbreak of the First Punic War as well as the *Lex Claudia* of 218 BCE, discussed below.

19 Archeology, discussed below, now confirms Gabba's intuitions about maritime commerce and invalidates the reservations of Kierdorf 1980, 17 that Metellus's sentiment better fits Roman society of the second century.

20 See Shatzman 1975, 63–67.

21 Oakley 1997–2005, IV.444–445 argues from the passage's language and details that Livy drew for the first time here on official triumphal records.

22 See *RE* s.v. 'Papirius: (1–5) Papirier bis zum Decemvirat', coll. 1005–1007 (F. Münzer); Livy 9.15.9–10 describes the elder L. Papirius Cursor as the most preeminent Roman general since Camillus.

23 For Carvilius as *exemplum* see Vell. Pat. 2.128.2.

public places in Rome and in the communities of nearby allies and colonies.[24] All of the silver and bronze carried in the triumph was deposited directly into the *aerarium*, and none was distributed to the army: for Papirius, the value of the metallic wealth captured in war was primarily symbolic. Its display supported the consul's preeminence, and its deposit into the treasury supported the enduring power of the Roman state. Such wealth apparently did not fund future Roman military action in any direct way as, following Papirius's triumph, it was necessary to levy a tax to pay *stipendium* (10.46.6).[25]

Livy next turns to Carvilius's triumph (10.46.10–15), which brought less wealth to the *aerarium* than that of his colleague (380,000 bronze asses). Moreover, Carvilius applied some of his income to purposes other than deposit: each soldier received 102 asses, and twice that amount was given to centurions and cavalrymen. The distribution was all the more welcome as a contrast to the stinginess (*malignitas*) of Papirius Cursor. Like Papirius, Carvilius built a triumphal monument, a temple to Fors Fortuna beside an earlier temple to the same goddess associated with Servius Tullius. The choice of cult and site were highly significant: Carvilius had no family monuments, so he associated himself instead with the goddess of individual success, whose cult had been established by a legendary figure, King Servius, who had himself risen from obscurity and formed an important foil in the tradition to the hereditary power of the Tarquins.[26] Pliny provides the further detail that Carvilius had his captured arms melted and refashioned into a large statue of Jupiter for display on the Capitol: rather than possessing symbolic value, the arms provided a source of material for other offerings. With remarkable attention to metal Pliny notes that 'from the leftover filings' (*e reliquis limae*) Carvilius made a statue of himself to stand beside that of Jupiter (*HN* 34.43). Clearly, Carvilius did not shy away from individualistic promotion.

For the conservative Papirius Cursor the spoils of war belonged mostly to the long-term transactional order and held symbolic value. Troops earned glory and *coronae* but not money. By contrast Carvilius was cognizant of the desire of the army to have individual and material shares of imperial spoils. Of course both consuls' actions were also to some extent overlapping. Like that of his

24 On the mid-republican practice of displaying arms see Rawson 1990, esp. 164–165 on the Papirii; see also Flower 1998.

25 *Stipendium* could alternatively be paid directly from *praeda*, as Plin. *HN* 34.23 suggests (305 BCE).

26 See Richard 1987; a third-century inscription from Fiesole (*ILLRP* 1070) mentions both Fortuna and Servius, confirming the tradition of the monarch's relationship to the goddess by that date.

colleague, Papirius Cursor's wealth was reckoned, at least by Livy's source, in monetary units. Like Cursor, Carvilius assigned a portion of his *praeda* to the creation of symbolic wealth through the foundation of a temple and the erection of a statue of Jupiter. Rather than being exponents of two wholly independent economic ideologies, the two men espoused different but related ways of translating success in war into lasting political power. Remarkably, both approaches found success: in 272 BCE Papirius Cursor and Carvilius held the consulship together again. By this measure we might conclude that a spectrum of ideological approaches to wealth had, by the first quarter of the third century BCE, become effective in the maintenance of political power.

An important earlier point in the shifting balance of transactional orders appears in the tradition surrounding the career of Appius Claudius Caecus, the censor who stands as one of the most brilliant interpreters of the shifting mid-republican political landscape (Humm 2005). His complex connections to both elite and popular components of the Roman political scene are well documented. He was the scion of the most patrician of patrician *gentes*, the Claudii, whose innate arrogance (*insita superbia*, Livy 2.27.1) towards the plebs was legendary. In his resistance to the *Lex Ogulnia* of 300 BCE, or in his promotion of an all-patrician consulate in 296 BCE, Appius Claudius appears staunchly elitist.[27] But Appius was also portrayed as quarreling bitterly with the senate over his censorial agenda. Likewise, his famous *sententia* 'man is the master of his own fortune' (*faber est suae quisque fortunae*) stands as a motto for the sort of individual mobility offered by the short-term transactional order.[28]

Some accounts portray Appius acting on behalf of a new component of the Roman political scene, men who sought to gain power through short-term transactional wealth. Key is Livy's description of the actions of the aedile Gnaeus Flavius, a political follower of Appius, in 304 BCE (9.46.10–14):

> The 'forum faction' voted Flavius aedile. Their power was born in the censorship of Appius Claudius, who first defiled the senate with the inclusion of sons of freedmen and afterwards, when no one accepted the senate he composed as valid, and he did not gain the urban political power that he had sought in the curia, corrupted both forum and campus by distributing lower status individuals throughout all the voting tribes. So great was the anger during the election of Flavius that most of the nobility took off their gold rings and jewelry. From that time forward the citizens of

27 The second episode in particular has been attacked as unhistorical: see Hölkeskamp 1987, 191 n. 158.

28 For the *sententia* (transmitted in ps.-Sall., [*Ad Caes. sen.*] 1.1.2) see Humm 2005, 523.

> Rome divided into two parties: on one side the virtuous people, patron and supporter of all good men, and on the other the 'forum faction', until the censorship of Q. Fabius and P. Decius; and Fabius, both to preserve order and lest elections fall into the hands of the lowest sort of folk, separated out the crowd of the forum and cast them into four tribes that he called 'urban'.

> ceterum Flavium dixerat aedilem forensis factio, Ap. Claudi censura vires nacta, qui senatum primus libertinorum filiis lectis inquinaverat et, posteaquam eam lectionem nemo ratam habuit nec in curia adeptus erat quas petierat opes urbanas,[29] humilibus per omnes tribus divisis forum et campum corrupit. tantumque Flavi comitia indignitatis habuerunt, ut plerique nobilium anulos aureos et phaleras deponerent. ex eo tempore in duas partes discessit civitas; aliud integer populus, fautor et cultor bonorum, aliud forensis factio tendebat, donec Q. Fabius et P. Decius censores facti, et Fabius simul concordiae causa, simul ne humillimorum in manu comitia essent, omnem forensem turbam excretam in quattuor tribus coniecit urbanasque eas appellavit.

Livy's portrayal of a divided Roman population reveals the influence of the language of Gracchan politics, perhaps owing to the elaboration of L. Calpurnius Piso, whose version of this episode, cited at length by Gellius, features similar language.[30] However, the details cannot all be dismissed as later rhetoric. In particular, Pliny found the same story of the *nobiles* removing their rings and *phalerae* in the earliest annalists (*antiquissimi annales*).[31] It is noteworthy, given our discussion of metallic wealth in the triumphs of 293 BCE, that an apparently early detail of the Flavius story concerned the aristocracy's use of gold jewelry as a token of authority: for the *nobiles* resisting Flavius, gold was worn to mark inherent status rather than used to purchase that status.

The fact that Appius hoped to incorporate descendants of freedmen (*libertini*) into the senate confirms, importantly, that some of his supporters possessed senatorial wealth. Indeed, Appius's *lectio senatus* was disqualified not

29 Gronovius's emendation to *urbanis humilibus* is unnecessary; see Oakley 1997–2005, III.631–632.

30 See Piso F29 Cornell; Oakley 1997–2005, III.603–604; Humm 2005, 234–235.

31 Plin. *HN* 33.17–20. Pliny's source is unlikely to have been Piso; see Oakley 1997–2005, III.606–607. As he points out, Pliny does not relate details known to have been in Piso's account, while his version also shows discrepancies with that of Livy. The implication is that Pliny found the story in earlier and probably pre-Gracchan annalists.

on technical but on moral grounds: the censor's action 'polluted' the senate—precisely the sort of moralized friction that arises, in Parry and Bloch's view, from tensions between short-term and long-term wealth. Thus some of Appius's supporters should be seen as *humiles* not for their poverty but for their undistinguished backgrounds. At 9.46.1 Livy applies the same adjective *humilis* to the aedile Cn. Flavius himself, who 'was born to humble circumstances, his father having been the son of a freedman' (*patre libertino humili fortuna ortus*). As an elected magistrate Flavius was part of the same senate that contested his actions; he was not poor in a material sense, but his background did not match his affluence.

In this case Appius's censorship may be placed at the beginning of a struggle over the political incorporation of elites with less claim to inherited status, whose wealth depended more on short-term transactions. In the Flavius episode and elsewhere the strong association of Appius's supporters with the Forum and the city suggests that this group possessed moveable forms of wealth derived from trade and commerce.[32] It is important, however, to bear in mind that what Appius's urban backers wanted was not to separate themselves from the aristocracy but rather to use their short-term order wealth to access the existing framework of political power either through membership in the senate or in the tribes.[33] Thus competing economic ideologies worked towards redefining and enlarging, not dividing, the aristocratic community. Even if Appius's *lectio* failed in 312 BCE, political reforms over the next decade including the creation of urban tribes in 304 BCE, and the first appearance of census classes reckoning wealth in bronze *asses*, must ultimately have given moveable property greater force in the Roman political system.[34]

32 See Humm 2005, 257. Appius's urban appeal also underlies his aqueduct, which provided water to residents at the foot of the Aventine. During his consulship in 307 BCE Appius 'stayed at Rome to increase his power through urban arts' (Livy 9.42.4: *Romae mansit ut urbanis artibus opes augeret*).

33 *Contra* Staveley 1959, who rightly emphasizes economic motives behind Appius's politics but wrongly insists that the censor sought support from an emerging (and separate) commercial class.

34 See Humm 2005, 255–259; Oakley 1997–2005, III.629–634 gives the most lucid account of the tribal reforms. He leans toward the idea that Appius attempted to enroll rural freedmen into the tribe of their domicile, while Fabius cast them into the urban tribes; the opposite is more attractive, that Appius radically departed from the residential basis of the tribal system by attaching urban residents to rural tribes. If Fabius's censorial measure attached urban residents to rural tribes, it would be Fabius, not Appius, who radically altered Rome's tribal structure; the tradition unanimously casts Fabius as conservative and Appius as reformer.

3 The Material Record of Market Exchange

The idea that Roman political power starting ca. 300 BCE was increasingly open to moveable property, including commercial wealth, finds support in the material record, which displays nascent signs of monetized exchange and market-oriented production from the same period. Coinage is one indicator of this trend, as the introduction of coinage to the Roman economy was contemporary with the rise of the *nobilitas*.[35] Of course, coins could be used to create long-term symbolic value; they could be hoarded and appear not uncommonly in *thesauri* or as votives in sanctuaries.[36] However, both ancient and modern thought acknowledges the fundamental connection between trade and money, and coins were obviously useful to the quantification of value involved in short-term exchange.[37] After a few sporadic issues of bronze and silver minted under Rome's authority, but struck outside Rome, in the last decades of the fourth century, the turning point for Roman monetization was the third century, when Rome began to produce struck silver and bronze coins on the weight standards of Magna Graecia along with cast bronzes linked by form and weight with Central Italy. While complex, Rome's coinage developed in fits and starts: there were only seven silver emissions between ca. 300–240 BCE. None of these early strikes was particularly large until the *quadrigati* of the later third century, and none circulated as widely as the more substantial *denarius* coinage that emerged during the Second Punic War.[38]

Scholars have difficulty explaining why coins first appeared when they did, or why early Roman coinage was issued intermittently and on a small scale. The topic is too large to be treated in depth here, but I note that some of the fiscal explanations usually given for the appearance of coins at Rome do not convince. Claims, for example, that Romans produced coinage to pay armies or mercenaries during the Pyrrhic War, or to meet the large cost of building the Via Appia, encounter the problem that Rome had been engaging in war-making and building on a large scale for centuries and would continue to do so fairly consistently. That is, relatively constant state expenditures poorly match

35 Burnett 2012 summarizes an enormous bibliography. For further discussion see Bernard (forthcoming).

36 See Crawford 2003; Gorini 2011; for the transactional flexibility of Roman coins see Aarts 2005.

37 For monetary exchange and the short-term order see Parry and Bloch 1989, 28–29. The principal source for Roman monetary theory is Paul. *Dig*. 18.1.1, which sees money arising from the need to quantify asymmetric trade; see Nicolet 1984. For money and trade in modern monetary economics see von Hagen 2014.

38 For the particular shape of Roman monetization see Burnett and Molinari 2015, 92–96.

the long, uneven development of coinage, as well as its small scale. At least initially, it seems, some Romans may have used coins for what coins facilitated best—anonymous, market-oriented exchange—while other Romans did not use coins at all, and this locates monetization in the context of the competing economic ideologies elaborated here.

A second material indication not only of changing forms of exchange but of intensifying production is now known as a result of the last twenty years of archeological exploration in the suburbs of modern Rome, which has located a remarkable number (> 50) of large republican farmsteads dating in their earliest phases to the mid-republic.[39] One or two of these 'proto-villas' date even earlier, but the real explosion of this form of settlement around Rome comes in the third century. This trend entailed not only a change in settlement patterns but also a shift in land tenure practices with intensive investment in labor probably drawing from an increasing supply of slaves.[40] The economic shift is most apparent in signs of intensifying production on these new estates. In the third century, for example, a substantial building excavated along the Via Flaminia just south of the Milvian bridge, on modern Viale Tiziano, was rebuilt in the form of a courtyard surrounded by a suite of large rooms. Concentrated in one room were found almost 250 loom weights, suggesting the attempt to achieve economies of scale in the production of wool.[41]

Above all, changes in the landscape of the mid-republican *suburbium* related to the production of wine. Volpe notes that many third-century suburban estates are found in connection with regular furrows cut into the ground for irrigating grape vines, pointing to what seems to have been the first boom in Roman viticulture (Fig. 11.1). While amphorae are largely absent from mid-republican contexts in Rome itself, Volpe (2009) suggests that the urban markets received wine in more perishable containers such as wineskins. That is, even if the material indications of trade are archeologically invisible, the evidence for surplus production and intensive viticulture is hard to interpret as anything but a response to the rising urban market. As Purcell (1985) justly emphasizes, the economics of Roman wine cannot be studied solely from the perspective of supply and distribution. The decision to invest in vineyards also

39 See Volpe 2012.

40 The archeology's chronology aligns well with the end of *nexum* in the late fourth century and mass enslavement during the Second Samnite War, all in all suggesting a shift in Rome's labor supply. On enslavement in this period see Welwei 2000, 42–64.

41 See Piranomonte and Ricci, 2009; whether the building was a textile workshop, perhaps related to the nearby Auditorium villa, or an independent *villa rustica* remains debated: see Pavolini 2006, 47; Volpe 2012, 98.



FIGURE 11.1 Republican villas and vineyards in the Roman *suburbium*. Squares represent evidence of irrigation trenches for vines; dots represent large farmsteads. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION FROM VOLPE 2012, FIG. 6.8

reflected patterns of consumption that were ultimately conditioned by social and cultural practices. It is tempting therefore to link the rising demand for wine implied by these suburban vineyards to evolving banqueting practices among the mid-republican elite. Indeed, it is suggestive that Roman sympotic poetry itself underwent important developments in the third century, the evidence for which is analyzed by Zorzetti (1991). In this case, it seems increasingly possible to purchase at mid-republican Rome not only wine but the trappings of elite behavior that wine consumption represented.

Wine and other goods produced in the *suburbium* were sold at Rome's periodic markets and in its newly built permanent marketplaces. Periodic markets saw greater institutional attention in this period, as a *lex Hortensia de nundi-*

nis of 287 BCE attests. The circumstances of the law's passage are obscure, but the measure seems to have separated *dies comitiales* from days on which markets were held. In the separation of *nundinae* from *comitia* the formalization of the market was thus a political act, and it has been thought that its aim was to restrict those who bought and sold goods in the *urbs* from participating in civic decision making (Michels 1967, 103–106).

Meanwhile, the mid-third century was also the time at which Rome's first permanent market hall, the *macellum*, was built on the north side of the Forum. The father of C. Terentius Varro (*cos.* 216 BCE) allegedly owned a butcher stall there. Valerius Maximus records this fact in relation to the 'remarkable path' (*miro gradu*) by which the consul Varro, a man raised on vulgar wage-earning (*sordidissimae mercis capturis alito*), rose to prominence, thus associating the *macellum* and the activity it hosted with the morally corrupting short-term order.[42] We know that this *macellum* continued the function of, or coexisted beside, a fish market called the *forum piscarium* or *piscatorium*.[43] Excavation reveals a drain conduit and some paving slabs with curved edges pertaining to the *macellum*'s second building phase dating to 179 BCE. These features probably belong to a *tholos macelli*, a circular central fountain providing water for the preparation and sale of fresh fish (Tortorici 1991, 40–44). Thus, the topographical and archeological evidence converges to suggest that the mid-republican *macellum* housed the sale of seafood at Rome. Fish frequently appear as symbols of wealth in antiquity, and their consumption played a part in aristocratic banqueting and the performance of elite identity.[44] Not coincidentally, fish markets were often seen as symptomatic of luxury in Greco-Roman literature (Lytle 2012, 48–49). This social register may help to explain why the *macellum* was topographically associated not only with the *forum piscarium* but also with a *forum cuppedinis*, a market for luxuries: luxurious goods sold at the *macellum* were not in addition to food but the same thing.[45] Like the marketing of wine, the sale of fish at the *macellum* was thus implicated in the changing ways in which mid-republican elites accessed aristocratic identity.

A final class of material culture of great importance to the understanding of economic developments in the mid-republic are the Greco-Italic or Magna Graecia/Sicilian (MGS) amphorae produced in Campania and the surrounding areas starting around 320 BCE and distributed widely around the Mediter-

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42 Val. Max. 3.4.4 under the heading of *exempla de humili loco natis qui clari evaserunt* and, not coincidentally, just after a discussion of Servius at 3.4.3.

43 See De Ruyt 1983, 236–252; Holleran 2012, 162–164.

44 See Purcell 1995, 136; Davidson 1997, 3–11 offers rich evidence from the Greek world.

45 See *LTUR* III s.v. 'Forum Cuppedinis' 298 (C. Morselli).

ranean.[46] We might presume a sort of feedback loop in which wine was largely exchanged for slaves, who were then used to intensify viticulture in Italy, a form of exchange famously noted in Gaul by Diodorus Siculus (5.26.3). By the earliest years of the First Punic War a handful of Roman or Italian names appear stamped or otherwise marked in Latin on these amphorae.[47] The majority of these inscriptions do not reveal the named individuals' personal status or specific role, whether they were commercial agents, ship-owners, or even landowners.[48] However, remarkably one such amphora recently published from a site near Ostia bears the signature of 'Marcus Valerius consul', confirming that the highest levels of Roman politics were involved in some aspect of the commercial activity the transport container represents.[49] Tituli naming members of the Valerian *gens* are otherwise among the most widely distributed and earliest to appear on MGS amphorae.[50] Some other families such as the Anterii, Luri, or Baebi found on these amphorae are obscure, but names of members of other important *gentes* such as the Aemilii, Aurelii, and Minucii appear and confirm the role played at some level by politically powerful families in the surplus production of wine or oil in Campania and Central Italy by the mid-third century. Notable are patrician *gentes* such as the Valerii or Aemilii, whose political prominence extended back to the earliest years of the republic, but who seem on the basis of this evidence to have also involved themselves in the production of more short-term wealth. Other historically known *gentes* are no less intriguing. Amphorae stamped by the *gens Iuventia* found in the Grand Congloué 1 wreck (ca. 200–190 BCE) align suggestively with the family's entrance into Roman politics. T. Iuventius was *tribunus militum* in 197 BCE in Cisalpine Gaul, his son was *praetor* in 194 BCE, and his son in turn was consul in 163 BCE.[51] Was this political ascent facilitated by commercial wealth gained from the short-term transactional order?

46 MGS Type V–VI after van der Mersch 2001; see Panella 2010, 12, 32. The historical importance of this material is already noted by Purcell 1985, 6–7.

47 Names are collected by van der Mersch 2001.

48 See Olcese and Coletti 2016, 125. The full inscription reads *M.VAL / COS.M.CO / A*, probably bearing the name of a consul M. Valerius Messala of 226 or 188, or M. Valerius Laevinus of 220 or 210. The interpretation of the rest of the inscription remains difficult as *M. Co*(?) does not correspond to a known colleague of a consular M. Valerius. On the general interpretation of Hellenistic amphora stamps see Finkielsztejn 2006.

49 For the extent of commercial activity as revealed by shipwrecks see Cibecchini and Principal 2002.

50 See Panella 2010, 24 n. 3.

51 See van der Mersch 2001, 197.

4 Conclusions

Read in tandem, the archeological and textual evidence for this period suggests something like the following model of Roman economic development within a competitive political framework. At an early stage in Rome's conquest of Italy, as nascent imperialism generated increasing opportunities for the acquisition of wealth, Appius Claudius Caecus attempted to enroll some Romans who possessed moveable forms of wealth but no inherited status into the senatorial order. Appius's senatorial peers rejected this move on moral grounds, but nonetheless political reforms gradually incorporated the new socioeconomic group into the aristocracy. By the early third century, while political power remained available to descendants of traditional aristocratic families, other figures like Carvilius found increasing success based more upon their own actions than any inherited standing. Over the next half century the shifting balance at Rome in the accommodation of individually and communally acquired wealth encouraged new economic behaviors, among them coinage and intensive viticulture oriented towards markets in the city and beyond. This shift also spurred debate about how best to assimilate such activities in the aristocratic community.

Parry and Bloch's observation that moral objections to short-order wealth arise from the attempt to incorporate individual gain into the aristocratic community sheds light on the complex development of senatorial identity in the later third century. A mixture of accommodation and objection to short-order wealth sits at the core of the famous *plebiscitum Claudianum* of 218 BCE, which imposed cargo restrictions on ships owned by senators and their sons. In the only extant discussion of the law's circumstances, Livy records that the 300-amphora maximum cargo was 'deemed sufficient for the conveyance of produce from the fields' (*id satis habitum ad fructus ex agris vectandos*). Further 'profit' (*quaestus*) was considered unseemly (21.63.3). This law has stimulated significant debate. Some see the moralistic tone as anachronistic or unhistorical compared to more positive republican attitudes towards *quaestus* expressed elsewhere. The alternative has been proposed that the measure sought to protect the availability of supply ships in the opening of the Second Punic War.[52] However, the ample archeological evidence for Roman viticulture and amphorae in the half-century prior to the law's passage makes

52 See Feig Vishnia 1996, 34–44; Bringmann 2003. Interpretations of the law's complex motivations cannot start from a rejection of the ideology. Instead, Tchernia 2007 sees an early attestation of the ban on senators 'collecting public taxes' (Paulus, *Sent.* 5.28.3: *vectigalia publica conducere*), since large ships were used to convey Sicilian grain tithes to Rome. For

such revisionism unnecessary, while the existence of both positive and negative attitudes towards commerce by this date should not surprise us: the Claudian law reflected the ongoing debate about *pecunia bono modo* and the appropriate absorption of the spoils of empire into the aristocratic community. The only senator to support the measure, or so we are told, was the former tribune Gaius Flaminius, who was otherwise charged with moral corruption (cf. Polyb. 3.80.3). However, Flaminius's ideological position directly supported his election to consul and thus his permanence within the same senatorial class that roundly condemned his actions: that is, moral contestation of his authority did not prevent its extension. Moreover, senatorial resistance to shipping restrictions would suggest, not unlike those patrician names on MGS amphorae, that the broader elite had by this point increased their involvement with market-oriented production. This represents a shift from a century earlier, when Appius's 'forum faction' struggled for inclusion in the Roman aristocracy.

In view of the evidence presented here, the third century appears as a crucial moment not only for the reconfiguration of Roman political groupings but also for the redefinition of aristocratic wealth. Furthermore, the republican market economy did not emerge autonomously or as some vague and inevitable result of modernization. Instead, new economic behaviors expanded deliberately from their attachment to elite ideologies within a larger struggle for distinction and political power. Rather than being two separate phenomena, the rise of the competitive political aristocracy and the transformation of the mid-republican economy are best understood as parts of the same historical process.

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CHAPTER 12

Mihi es aemula: Elite Female Status Competition in Mid-Republican Rome and the Example of Tertia Aemilia

Lewis Webb

Mihi es aemula.[1]

∵

1 Introduction

Status competition was *l'esprit du temps* in mid-republican Rome (264–133 BCE), an impetus for elite male action, as prior studies have shown.[2] If it was vital to elite men, did it also motivate elite women? (By elite, I mean the top tier of the two-tier equestrian aristocracy in mid-republican Rome.) Although Phyllis Culham and Emily Hemelrijk have found status competition among elite women, hitherto no study focuses on the phenomenon.[3] So this chapter turns a lens on mid-republican Rome, investigating the rich evidence for what I term 'elite female status competition'.

Cicero alludes to such competition in his *Pro Caelio*.[4] In a celebrated *prosopopoeia* Cicero summons Appius Claudius Caecus (*RE* 91, *cos.* 307, 296) *ab inferis* to condemn his descendant Clodia Ap.f. (*RE* 66), scion of the elite patri-

1 Plaut. *Rud.* 240. *RE* numbers are provided throughout, patronymics at the first occurrence of female names. On female nomenclature: Kajava 1994. For the magistracies: Broughton 1951; 1952. Latin text comes from the *PHI Latin Corpus*, Greek from the *TLG*. Translations are my own. Dates are BCE.

2 Harris 1979, 17–38; Hölkeskamp 1993; 2010, 99–100, 103–104, 122–123; 2011, 26; Rosenstein 1993, esp. 313; Flower 1996, 10–11, 72–73, 101, 107, 128–158, esp. 139; 2004, 327, 335, 338, 342; Muccigrosso 2006, 186, 191, 194, 202; Steel 2006, 39, 45–46; Rüpke 2007, 144, 176, 218; Jehne 2011, 213, 215, 227; Zanda 2011, 13–14, 18, 25, 33, 36, 53–54, 57, 59, 65; Nebelin 2014; Beck 2016; Champion 2017, 15–16, 46–48; and Bernard in this volume.

3 Equestrian aristocracy: Nicolet 1966; Davenport (forthcoming). Elite women and status competition: Culham 1986, 239–240; Hemelrijk 1987, 223–224; 1999, 12, 202; 2015, 215–216.

4 In defense of Marcus Caelius Rufus (*RE* 35, *pr.* 48).

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cian *gens Claudia*. Cicero's Caecus highlights the social position, status, and character of Clodia's consular ancestors and husband and contrasts it with (what Cicero deems) her debased character (Cic. *Cael.* 33–34). As Caecus, Cicero demands to know whether Clodia's famed ancestor Quinta Claudia P.f. (*RE* 435) had admonished her to compete with her in familial renown for female status (Cic. *Cael.* 34):

> If our male ancestor masks haven't moved you, didn't my descendant, that famous Quinta Claudia, admonish you to compete with her in familial renown [i.e., renown for the family] for female status?[5]
>
> Nonne te, si nostrae imagines viriles non commovebant, ne progenies quidem mea, Q. illa Claudia, aemulam domesticae laudis in gloria muliebri esse admonebat?

Such a question suggests the existence of status competition between elite women.[6] Invective is a problematic species of evidence, but here it prompts further enquiry. By invoking Quinta Claudia's name during the opening of the Megalensia on 4 April Cicero reminded his audience of her statue in the temple of the Magna Mater and her memorialization on stage, lasting testaments to the *gloria* she obtained for her prominent role in the inaugural procession for the Magna Mater in 204.[7] Quinta Claudia and her actions were woven into Roman cultural memory, a powerful exemplum of *laus domestica* for the *gens Claudia*.[8] In conjuring up Clodia's consular relatives, male ancestor masks, and Quinta Claudia, Cicero connected testaments to male status with those to female status.[9] He shamed Clodia with the memory of her exemplary ancestors and the phenomenon of elite female status competition.[10]

How and why did elite women compete for status? Was it vital to them? In this chapter I will address these questions for elite women like Quinta Claudia in mid-republican Rome, a characteristically competitive period, as is

5 See Austin 1977, 93 and *OLD s.v. aemula* (1); *laus* (2); *domesticus* (1, 2); *gloria* (1a). On *laus domestica*, familial renown, and the family brand see section 5.2.

6 Here between members of the same clan, but on competition between unrelated elite patrician and plebeian women see, e.g., Livy 10.23.1–10 with Oakley 2005, 245–259.

7 Statue: Val. Max. 1.8.11; Tac. *Ann.* 4.64.3. Stage: Ov. *Fast.* 4.326. Procession: Cic. *Har. resp.* 27; Livy 29.14.10–14; Ov. *Fast.* 4.291–346.

8 Flower 2002, 162–166, 169–172. Roman cultural memory and exemplarity: Hölkeskamp 2006; Roller 2009.

9 Austin 1977, 93. Ancestor masks: Flower 1996. But, as I argue elsewhere (Webb 2017, esp. 175–176), these ancestor masks were also symbols of female status.

10 Shaming: Skinner 2011, 20–23, 96–120.

expounded below. I begin with some background on status competition and a brief sketch of the domains of elite male status competition (section 2). Thereafter I present my own assessment of elite women and propose some domains of elite female status competition through a survey of literary and epigraphic sources (sections 3 and 4).[11] To elucidate this phenomenon I illustrate and interrogate its presence in the life of Tertia Aemilia L.f. (*RE* 179), an elite woman and a contemporary of Quinta Claudia (section 5). I conclude that such competition was an essential aspect of elite women's lives, for it enhanced personal, familial, and gentilician (clan) status: *gloria* and *laus domestica* (section 6)

2 Status Competition in Mid-Republican Rome

In this chapter 'status' (prestige, glory) is equated with *gloria*, interconnected with but distinct from 'social position' (rank), *locus* (cf. *gradus*, *dignitas*).[12] I conceptualize status as the symbolic capital of individuals, their 'prestige, reputation, [and] renown' (Bourdieu 1985, 724). Symbolic capital contributes to social position, that is, it helps to define social hierarchies. Symbolic capital is a form of recognition or credit—a kind of accumulated prestige and renown—and the form in which other forms of capital are recognized as legitimate. These other forms of capital include economic (wealth and assets), cultural (knowledge and values), and social capital (relationships, social obligations, and networks).[13]

Status competition—competition for prestige and glory—is equated with *aemulatio* or *certamen gloriae*.[14] I define status competitions as those aiming for superiority in status, not for material resources per se.[15] They encompass practices that can enhance or diminish the status of competitors, including

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11 I privilege the earliest (republican) sources, but engage in source triangulation throughout and use later (imperial) sources where necessary. Cf. Schultz 2006, 6–12. I especially draw on mid-republican drama as a source for Roman social history: Manuwald 2011, 293–301; Dutsch, James, and Konstan (eds.) 2015; Wiseman 2015.

12 *Gloria* as status: Enn. *Ann.* 12.365, 14.382 Skutsch; Plaut. *Amph.* 1140; *Aul.* 541; Cato fr. 252 *ORF*. *Locus* as social position: Plaut. *Aul.* 28; *Poen.* 516; Ter. *Eun.* 241; Lucil. 4.150 Marx; C. Gracch. fr. 44 *ORF*; Cic. *Mur.* 16; *Pis.* 52. Cf. *OLD* s.v. *gloria* (1a); *locus* (17, 18); *gradus* (8); *dignitas* (3). See also Hellegouarc'h 1963, 369–383, 385, 388–415.

13 Bourdieu 1985. Symbolic capital and the mid-republican elite: Hölkeskamp 2010, 107–124.

14 Various formulations: *Auct. ad Her.* 4.31, 34; Cic. *Cael.* 34; *Off.* 1.38.5–11; *Tusc.* 4.16–17; Sall. *Cat.* 7.6; Livy 35.47.4. *Aemulatio* (*aemulor* or derivatives): Coelius fr. 45 *FRHist*; Plaut. *Mil.* 839–840; *Pseud.* 196; *Rud.* 240. *Certamen*: Plaut. *Bacch.* 399; *Cas.* 516. Cf. *OLD s.v. aemulatio* (1, 2); *certamen* (1).

15 Hölkeskamp 2010, 99–100, 123; van Wees 2011, 2–5; Fisher 2011, 178.

(but not limited to) conspicuous displays of economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capital.[16] Conditions for such practices include 'perpetual comparison and general comparability of achievements and merits' (Hölkeskamp 2010, 123). While both elites and non-elites compete for status, elites tend to have relatively more economic capital to engage in conspicuous display (Fisher 2011, 178). Such conspicuous displays were not confined to the *nouveaux riches*, but were practices engaged in by 'Rome's most traditional ruling elite' (Beck 2016, 146), that is, the highest patrician and plebeian senatorial elite.

This 'relentless competition for prestige' (Rüpke 2007, 176) flourished in mid-republican Rome.[17] Sallust speaks of the 'desire for status' (*cupido gloriae*) among elite men, a desire that led to the 'greatest status competition between themselves' (*gloriae maxumum certamen inter ipsos*), wherein they wanted 'to be observed' (*conspici*) doing deeds and to have 'great status' (*gloria ingens*) and 'honorable wealth' (*divitiae honestae*) (*Cat.* 7.4–6).[18] Envy, expense, and sorrow accompanied such competition, but these social tensions and repercussions are not my focus.

Socio-economic factors fostered this competition. As Bernard discusses in this volume, by the late fourth century the expansion and transformation of the patrician elite into the patricio-plebeian senatorial elite promoted competition among elite men for the highest public magisterial offices (consulships, praetorships), as these offices conferred status and offered opportunities to gain greater status, as well as wealth through spoils.[19] Economically, increasing state and personal wealth from war indemnities, spoils, mining, taxation, trade, and agriculture in the third and second centuries provided this elite with the resources to engage in status competition.[20] This competition was mediated by a rich visibility culture, where *to be* was *to be seen*. Public recognition and visibility constituted and defined elite identities, for, as Flower argues, conspicuous displays (spectacles) 'expressed the roles, values, and hierarchy of the office-holding elite', 'created a sense of identity, solidarity, and tradition for the community as a whole', and 'reproduced the social and political order' (Flower 2004, 338). These public, conspicuous displays conferred status on the participants, a status that manifested itself and was memorialized 'within the city and through traditional venues and media' (Flower 2004, 338).[21]

16 Cf. Flower 2004, 335, 338, 342; Hölkeskamp 2010, 107–124; Zanda 2011, 13–14, 18, 25, 53.
17 See n. 2.
18 Cf. Diod. Sic. 31.6. See Harris 1979, 17–18.
19 Hölkeskamp 1993, 22; Cornell 1995, 342; Jehne 2011, 215; Champion 2017, 47–48; and Bernard in this volume.
20 Kay 2014, esp. 9–18, 21–42, 131–188; and Bernard in this volume.
21 Barton 2002; Flower 2004.

With their personal wealth elite men engaged in myriad forms of *visible* status competition. The domains of elite male status competition included (but were not limited to) magisterial and sacerdotal public office, 'public religious rites' (*sacra publica*) and 'games' (*ludi*), dress, retinue, family, building projects, houses and villas, banquets, patronage, oratory, jurisprudence, public funerals, and warfare.[22] In many of these domains visibility and wealth were of the utmost importance, with the caveat that public conspicuous display was praised, private luxury condemned.[23] This conspicuous display was risky. It offered potential benefits (e.g., election to public office), but if the censors considered a man's conduct dishonorable, he could receive a public 'censorial mark' (*nota censoria*) and even be stripped of equestrian rank or expelled from the Senate.[24] Despite these risks the attainment of status was at the heart of public life for elite men. In what follows I present an assessment of elite women and argue that their competition operated in similar domains.

3 Elite Women

Elite women are defined here as senatorial women, the daughters and wives of the ca. 300 senators in the mid-republican Senate, female members by birth or marriage of the patricio-plebeian senatorial elite, an aristocracy of office. These women can also be defined as those with (potential) access to male ancestor masks (*imagines*), and in contradistinction to non-senatorial equestrian women, non-elite freeborn women, freedwomen, and female slaves.[25] Our earliest epigraphic sources provide insight into their social position and

22 Domains: *CIL* VI 1285, 1287–1289, 1293; Plaut. *Trin.* 273–274; Polyb. 6.53–54; Sempronius Asellio fr. 13 *FRHist*; Cic. *Rab. Post.* 16–17; *Verr.* 2.5.36; Livy 5.41.1–2; Plin. *HN* 7.139–140. Visible success: a curule magistracy and curule chair, the *toga praetexta*, retinues of lictors and clients, honorific and dedicatory monuments, ancestor masks, and funerary and triumphal processions. See n. 2.

23 Cic. *Mur.* 76, with Zanda 2011, 10–11.

24 Cic. *Clu.* 42, 117; Livy 23.23.4; *Per.* 14; Val. Max. 2.9; Plut. *Vit. Cat. Mai.* 17; Gell. *NA* 17.21.39, with Zanda 2011, 36–48.

25 Elite women as senatorial women: Raepsaet-Charlier 1987, 1–14; Hemelrijk 1999, 10–13, 202. Overviews: Hallett 1984; Purcell 1986; Evans 1991; Bauman 1994; Hemelrijk 1999; Flower 2002; Boëls-Janssen 2008; Hänninen 2011; Valentini 2012. Patricio-plebeian senatorial elite as an aristocracy of office: Hölkeskamp 1993; 2010; 2011; Cornell 1995; Flower 1996; Ryan 1998; Jehne 2011. On elite women and *imagines*: Webb 2017, esp. 147. The senatorial elite was part of a broader equestrian aristocracy comprising a small tier of senatorial equestrians above a larger tier of non-senatorial equestrians: Nicolet 1966; Davenport (forthcoming).

status: elite female names included a patronymic and gamonymic, signifying their association with their natal and marital families and their freeborn status, for example, 'Paulla Cornelia, daughter of Cnaeus, wife of Hispallus' ([*P*]*aulla Cornelia Cn*(*aei*) *f*(*ilia*) *Hispalli* [*uxor*], *CIL* VI 1294, *RE* 445).[26] As daughters, their social position and status were interconnected with those of their natal male relatives, particularly their fathers and brothers, and as wives, with those of their marital male relatives, their husbands and sons.[27] Their sexual status (filial, marital, maternal, divorced, widowed), public behavior, religious activity, and sacerdotal public offices also enhanced (or diminished) their social position and status.[28] While elite women did not have legally defined social positions, they did derive informal 'rank' from their natal and marital families: some women were praetorian or consular, etc., reflecting the highest magisterial public office attained by their father or husband(s).[29]

26 Cf. *CIL* VI 1274, 10043. Outside of the epigraphic context elite women were probably referred to with their *nomina* in formal contexts and a range of personal names in informal contexts, including *nomina*, *praenomina* (particularly for multiple homonymous women, e.g., female agnates), relational expressions (*filia*, *uxor*, etc.), diminutives, nicknames, and pet names. See, e.g., Cic. *Div.* 1.103 (*mea Tertia*); 2.83 (*Aemilia*); *Fam.* 2.15.2 (*Tullia mea*); 4.5.1 (*Tullia filia tua*); 14.1.5 (*mea Terentia*); 14.4.3 (*Tulliola mea*); 14.19.1 (*Tullia nostra*); *QFr.* 2.6.1 (*Tullia nostra*), with Kajava 1994, esp. 19–31, 118–124.

27 Fathers: Cic. *Cael.* 33; *Phil.* 3.16; *Rosc. Am.* 147. Brothers: Cic. *Rosc. Am.* 147; Livy *Per.* 19; Val. Max. 8.1.damn.4; Gell. *NA* 10.6.2; Suet. *Tib.* 2. Husbands: C. Gracch. fr. 48 *ORF*; Cic. *Cael.* 34. Sons: Polyb. 10.4.4–5.7; Nep. fr. 59 Marshall; Livy 40.37.6; Val. Max. 4.4.*pr.* See Dixon 1988; Hemelrijk 1999, 10.

28 Hemelrijk 1999; Treggiari 2002; Langlands 2006; Schultz 2006; DiLuzio 2016. An elite woman's social position, influence, and authority improved when she became a mother, and grew (along with her independence) if she was widowed. See Hemelrijk 1999, 9–10.

29 A senator had a formal social position based on his highest attained magisterial public office. We can thus speak in ascending order of non-curule (tribunician, quaestorian, aedilician) to curule (aedilician, praetorian, consular) senators, with consular senators and the *princeps senatus* at the summit. Cf. *CIL* IX 416 (*lex Latina Tabulae Bantinae*); Plin. *HN* 7.140. See Ryan 1998; Hölkeskamp 2011, 26; Jehne 2011. Cicero explicitly links some elite women with the praetorian and consular social position of their male relatives: Cic. *Att.* 2.1.5 (*illa consularis*); *Cael.* 33–34 (consular *stemma*); *Phil.* 3.16 (praetorian and consular *stemmata*); *Planc.* 18 (consular maternal *stemma*); *Rosc. Am.* 147 (consular *stemma*). Cf. consular wives: Polyb. 31.26.6; C. Gracch. fr. 48 *ORF*. By the early empire senatorial daughters were legally born into the *ordo senatorius*, the senatorial order, as codified by the *lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus* (18 BCE) and the *lex Papia Poppaea* (9 CE): Cass. Dio 54.16.2; 56.7.2; *Dig.* 23.2.44, 47. By the latter half of the second century CE a senatorial wife legally held the title (social position, rank) of *clarissima femina* and an unmarried senatorial daughter the title of *clarissima puella*: *CIL* XIII 1801 (ca. 169 CE); *ILAlg-02–03* 7909; *Dig.* 1.9.8, 10, 12 (Ulpian). By the late second century CE a consular wife legally held the title of *consularis femina*: *CIG* 4380b2 = *IGR* IV 911 (184 CE); *ILAfr* 414; SHA *Heliogab.* 4.3; *Dig.* 1.9.1.1 (Ulpian). See Raepsaet-Charlier 1987, 1–14.

Elite 'married women' (*matronae*) were members of a social network, the *ordo matronarum*, 'order of married women', whose criteria for entry included marriage, senatorial or non-senatorial equestrian social position, and wealth. According to Valerius Maximus and Appian, by 42 this *ordo* included at least 1400 members; some may have been wealthy non-senatorial equestrian women, but its exact composition in the Mid-Republic is unknown (Val. Max. 8.3.3; App. *B. Civ.* 4.32).[30] Members of this *ordo* participated in collective public actions (mourning, financial contributions, demonstrations) and religious activity.[31] Later literary and epigraphic sources suggest that the *ordo* met at

30 *Ordo matronarum*: Plaut. *Cist.* 23–35; Livy 10.23.10; 34.7.1; Val. Max. 5.2.1; 8.3.3; [Sen.] *De remediis fortuitorum* 16.3 Haase. Criteria for entry: Livy 10.23.1–10; Val. Max. 8.3.3; App. *B. Civ.* 4.32–34. See Purcell 1986, 170; Hemelrijk 1999, 11–12, 202; 2015, 213–217; Boëls-Janssen 2008, 38; Valentini 2012, 44–81. Cf. elite female *factiones*: Plaut. *Aul.* 167. Two collective actions by *matronae* in the late third century suggest the *ordo* may have been small in mid-republican Rome: firstly, the selection by *matronae* of Sulpicia C./Ser.f. (*RE* 107 and/or 108) as *sanctissima femina* ('the most sacred/virtuous woman') from a group of a hundred *matronae* to dedicate a statue of Venus Verticordia in ca. 215 (Val. Max. 8.15.12; Plin. *HN* 7.120); and secondly, the dotal collections for Juno Regina in 207, organized by twenty-five *matronae* (Livy 27.37.8–10). These small groups are suggestive. Were the hundred *matronae* in the first instance the entire *ordo* or a part thereof? No clear answer emerges. Perhaps the *ordo* comprised at least 300 *matronae*, that is, the wives of the approximately 300 senators in the mid-republican Senate, but we cannot be certain. More precise data exists for the *ordo* in the first century. According to Appian, in 42 the triumvirate wanted to make up a shortfall of 200,000,000 drachmae/denarii by taxing the property of the 1400 wealthiest *matronae* in Rome (App. *B. Civ.* 4.31–32). Valerius Maximus represents this as a *tributum* on the *ordo matronarum* (Val. Max. 8.3.3). If these accounts are equatable, the *ordo* comprised (at least) 1400 *matronae* by 42. Thence the membership in 42 was greater than just the 900 wives of the approximately 900 senators in the post-Caesarian Senate. It is possible that the 500 additional *matronae* were senatorial widows and divorcees, but of this we cannot be certain. If the tax on the property of these 1400 *matronae* was intended to make up the entire shortfall, then, on average, each of these *matronae* had property worth more than ca. 142,857 drachmae/denarii (ca. 571,428 sestertii). After the successful protest led by Hortensia, the triumvirate revised the number of *matronae* down to 400 and instituted a 2% tax ('a fiftieth part') on all men with property worth 100,000 drachmae/denarii or more (e.g., a tax of 2000 drachmae/denarii) (App. *B. Civ.* 4.34), numbers that suggest that, in 42, 1400 members of this *ordo* each had property worth (at least) more than 100,000 drachmae/denarii (400,000 sestertii), that is, the Late Republican equestrian census qualification or above. Thence, at this later stage, members of the *ordo* were probably wealthy senatorial *matronae* (wives, widows, divorcees) and perhaps some wealthy non-senatorial equestrian *matronae*. On the composition of the Senate see, e.g., Ryan 1998; Lintott 2009, 68–72. On the equestrian census qualification see, e.g., Nicolet 1966, 47-68; Rosenstein 2008, esp. 6–7 n. 27–33.

31 Livy 2.7.4; 2.16.7; 5.25.8–9; 22.1.17; 27.37.8–10; 29.14.10–14; 34.1.5–7; 34.8.1–3; Val. Max. 5.2.1; 8.3.3; App. *B. Civ.* 4.32–34. See Purcell 1986, 181; Hemelrijk 1987; 1999, 12, 217 n. 21; 2015, 217.

a *conventus feminarum/matronarum*, 'assembly of women/married women', on the Quirinal Hill, although this may be a late development.[32] Members had particular privileges and insignia, including privileged movement in Rome (i.e., others gave way), the use of elaborate vehicles (*carpentum* and *pilentum*), the use of gold and purple adornment, and (possibly) funerary orations.[33] I propose that this *ordo* was a stratified and competitive heterarchy, a network with multiple interacting and context-specific hierarchies (clan, patriciate, plebeiate, age, sexual status, social position, sacerdotal public office, wealth etc.), many of which are now irrecoverable.[34] In general these hierarchies may have reflected the male senatorial hierarchy, such that a woman's position in the *ordo* matched her social position: at the base, female relatives of non-senators (if non-senatorial equestrian women were members), above them female relatives of non-curule senators, above them the relatives of curule senators, and at the summit, the relatives of consular senators, consular women.[35] Distinctions in social position could have been visually signaled by differences in adornment and transport, differences regulated by the *ordo* at the *conventus*, as well as by demarcated religious roles.[36] Certainly, consular and praetorian wives had particular privileges, including the right to host the rites for Bona Dea in their own houses during their husbands' consulships or praetorships, as well as significant influence in society.[37] Elite women were wealthy, for they enjoyed their male relatives' fortunes and had access to their own dowries, inheritances, personal effects,

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32 Sen. *De matrimonio* fr. 13.49 Haase; Suet. *Galb.* 5; *CIL* VI 997 (Quirinal); SHA *Heliogab.* 4.3–4 (Quirinal). See Hemelrijk 1987, 230–231; 2015, 215–216; Valentini 2012, 49–52. Prior collective and organised activity by the *ordo* suggests that the *conventus* existed in some form in the Republic; see n. 31.

33 Cic. *De or.* 2.44; Diod. Sic. 14.116.9; Livy 5.25.9; 5.50.7; Val. Max. 5.2.1; Plut. *Mor.* 242E–F (*De mul. vir.* 1); *Vit. Cam.* 8.3–4; Festus, 142L, 225L, 282L; *CIL* VI 31075. See Hemelrijk 1987, 222–223, 229–230; 1999, 11; Hillard 2001; Berg 2002, 43; Hudson 2016.

34 Cf. stratified and competitive nature of the *conventus* and so-called *senaculum matronarum*: Sen. *De matrimonio* fr. 13.49 Haase; Suet. *Galb.* 5; SHA *Aurel.* 49.6; *Heliogab.* 4.3–4; Hier. *Ep.* 22.16. See Hemelrijk 1999, 12; 2015, 215–217. Heterarchy in mid-republican Rome: Champion 2017, 46, 222.

35 See n. 29.

36 Cf. adornment and transport distinctions mediated by *conventus*: Sen. *de Matrimonio* fr. 13.49 Haase; Plin. *HN* 37.85; SHA *Heliogab.* 4.3–4. See Berg 2002, 44; Hemelrijk 2015, 215–216. Demarcated religious roles: Schultz 2006, 139–150; DiLuzio 2016, 17–78.

37 The two attested instances are for Terentia (*RE* 95, consular) in 63 and Pompeia Q.f. (*RE* 52, praetorian) in 62: Cic. *Att.* 1.13.3; Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 9.7; *Vit. Cic.* 19.5, 20.1–3; Cass. Dio 37.45. See Brouwer 1989, 270–271; Schultz 2006, 142–143. Influence of consular wives: C. Gracch. fr. 48 *ORF*; Livy 40.37.4–7; Plut. *Vit. Cic.* 19–20.

and elaborate houses and villas. Other women were wealthy as well, especially equestrian women and other freeborn women in the first census class, but they are not my focus here.[38]

Elite female social position and status were clearly related to social and economic capital, relationships, and wealth. I will argue below that status competition among elite women was predicated on this wealth and expressed through conspicuous displays, mediated by the rich visibility culture of mid-republican Rome.

4 Domains of Elite Female Status Competition

How did elite women compete for status? Livy, or at least his character Lucius Valerius, claims that married women in mid-republican Rome 'can receive no magistracies, no priesthoods, no triumphs, no insignia, no gifts, and no war spoils' (*non magistratus nec sacerdotia nec triumphi nec insignia nec dona aut spolia bellica iis contingere possunt*, 34.8.1–2). He also intimates that their only domains were decorative: 'elegance [cleanliness], adornment, fine appearance [grooming], these are the insignia of women' (*munditiae et ornatus et cultus, haec feminarum insignia sunt*, 34.7.9).[39] I intend to show that these claims are too restrictive: elite (and other) women *could* attain public sacerdotal office and were not simply limited to the decorative. I will establish that elite women could compete in the following interacting and occasionally overlapping domains: sacerdotal public office, *sacra publica*, transport, adornment (dress, jewelry), religious instruments, retinues, family, patronage, houses and villas, banquets, and public funerals. Collectively these domains were similar to those for elite men. This is not unexpected, given that elite men and women

38 Wealth of members of the *ordo*: Val. Max. 8.3.3; App. *B. Civ*. 4.32–34. Dowries: Polyb. 18.35.6; 31.22.4; 31.27; Cic. *Top*. 23, 66; Livy 27.37.8–10; [Ulp.], *Reg.* 6.6. Inheritances: Cato fr. 158 *ORF*. Personal effects (*res*, probably dress, jewelry, and toiletries, sc. *vestis, ornamenta*, and *mundus muliebris*): Plaut. *Amph*. 928; *Men*. 801–804; Polyb. 31.26; Lucil. 16.519–520 Marx. Houses and villas: Livy 39.11–14; Plut. *Vit. C. Gracch*. 19.1–2. Widowhood increased financial independence: Polyb. 18.35.6; 31.22.4; Livy *Per*. 46; Val. Max. 4.4.9. See Dixon 1985; Hemelrijk 1987; 1999; Champlin 1991; Evans 1991; Berg 2002; Treggiari 2002; McClintock 2013; Valentini 2016. Wives with large dowries had significant economic freedom, whatever their legal status, *in manu* or not: Treggiari 2002, 323–364, esp. 329. On senatorial wealth: Shatzman 1975. On equestrian wealth: Nicolet 1966. On the moderate wealth of many members of the *prima classis*: Yakobson 1999, 43–48.

39 The speaker is Lucius Valerius (*RE* 350, *pr*. 192) and context is his *suasio* for the repeal of the *lex Oppia* (215–195) in 195. See discussion below and Briscoe 2003, 39–63, esp. 62.

shared their lives, wealth, and visibility culture. Wealthy non-senatorial equestrian and freeborn women may have competed in some of these domains too, but they are not my focus. While elite women did not face the *nota censoria* for their conspicuous display, they encountered other forms of censure, legislative, economic, familial, and moral.[40] I will briefly delve into one instance of legislative censure, the *lex Oppia* (215–195), to demonstrate the importance of such competition for elite women. Throughout, I avoid substantial considerations of sexual morality, concepts well examined elsewhere.[41]

4.1 *Sacerdotal Public Office and* sacra publica

As was mentioned earlier, social position, status, and religion were interconnected for elite women. Indeed, the religious realm was the primary forum for their conspicuous displays: elite women could compete for visibility and prominent roles in *sacra publica*.[42] Elite (and other) women held sacerdotal public office as priestesses, most notably as the three 'major priestesses' (*flaminicae maiores*: *flaminica Dialis*, *Martialis*, and *Quirinalis*), the 'queen of the sacred rites' (*regina sacrorum*), and the six 'Vestal virgins' (*virgines Vestales*), highly visible and prestigious priesthoods.[43] The patrician *flaminica Dialis*, 'priestess of Jupiter', and the patricio-plebeian Vestals served in particular as living *exempla* for other elite women, embodying ideal marital, sexual, and religious behaviors.[44] Elite women also had many non-sacerdotal roles, participating in festivals, leading processions, hosting rites, dedicating statues, and organizing donations (Schultz 2006, 139–150). Moreover, female participation in *sacra publica* entailed a conspicuous display of religious knowledge and competence, a kind of cultural capital (cf. Schultz 2006; DiLuzio 2016). Particularly prominent functions and actions in *sacra publica* embedded elite women in Roman cultural memory. Examples include Quinta Claudia (*RE* 435), her contemporary Sulpicia C./Ser.f. (*RE* 107 and/or 108), and Quinta Claudia's descendant the Vestal Claudia Ap.f. (*RE* 384), all of whom became female *exempla*.[45] All three women were consular daughters or wives, which probably facil-

40 Women faced legislation, fines, exile, family discipline, and moral censure for some forms of conduct, but not the *nota censoria*: Culham 1982; Hemelrijk 1987; Bauman 1996, 9, 13, 17, 18; Treggiari 2002, 267, 275–277, 299–319; Langlands 2006, esp. 37–77.

41 E.g., Langlands 2006.

42 Schultz 2006, esp. 139–150; DiLuzio 2016, esp. 240–244.

43 DiLuzio 2016, 17–68, 119–239.

44 Schultz 2006, 141–143; DiLuzio 2016, 47–51, 152.

45 Quinta Claudia: Cic. *Cael.* 34; *Har. resp.* 27; Livy 29.14.12. Sulpicia: Val. Max. 8.15.12; Plin. *HN* 7.120. Vestal Claudia: Cic. *Cael.* 34; Val. Max. 5.4.6; Suet. *Tib.* 2.4. See Flower 2002, 162–166, 169–172; Schultz 2006, 144–145.

itated their memorialization.[46] In short, *sacra publica* were a central domain for elite female status competition, within which elite women could compete for status in conspicuous ways.

4.2 *Transport, Adornment, Religious Instruments, and Retinues*

Elite women traveled in horse or mule-drawn *vehicula*, 'vehicles', for secular and sacral purposes, including the *carpentum*, 'two-wheeled carriage', for all purposes and the luxurious, blue, softly upholstered ἀπήνη or *pilentum*, 'four-wheeled carriage', solely for *sacra publica*.[47] Some of the most elaborate of these had ivory decorations.[48] By their elevation therein, elite women signaled their elevated social position and wealth. As to adornment, there was a public *modus matronarum*, 'matronal fashion', for married women, including: the *palla*, 'mantle', which may have functioned as a veil; the *vittae*, 'woolen fillets' for the hair; the *tutulus*, a hairstyle where the hair was braided into six plaits and drawn up into a bun; purple clothing, perhaps purple *pallae* or *vittae* in particular; and, finally, gold jewelry, such as gold diadems, wreaths, and earrings.[49] Elite women also used elaborate gold and silver religious instruments during *sacra publica*, including 'baskets' (*canistra*) and 'libation dishes' (*paterae*).[50] More-

46 Quinta Claudia: her father was Publius Claudius Pulcher (*RE* 304, *cos.* 249). Sulpicia: her father was Caius Sulpicius Paterculus (*RE* 81, *cos.* 258, 254) or Servius Sulpicius Paterculus (*RE* 82) and her husband was Quintus Fulvius Flaccus (*RE* 59, *cos.* 237, 224, 212, 209). On identification problems for Sulpicia: Schultz 2006, 144, 200 n. 24; Briscoe 2008, 236. Vestal Claudia: her father was Appius Claudius Pulcher (*RE* 295, *cos.* 143).

47 *Vehiculum*: Plaut. *Aul.* 168, 502; Livy 34.1.3. *Carpentum*: Liv. Andron. *Od.* fr. 18 *FPL*; Livy 5.25.9 (all purposes); 34.3.9; Festus, 282L; *CIL* VI 31075. ἀπήνη or *pilentum*: Polyb. 31.26.4, 31.26.7; Livy 5.25.9 (*sacra publica*); Verg. *Aen.* 8.665–666; Hor. *Epist.* 2.1.192; Festus, 225L, 282L; Isid. *Etym.* 20.12.4 (four-wheeled); Serv. auct. ad *Aen.* 8.666 (blue and softly upholstered). For ἀπήνη as *pilentum*: Walbank 1979, 503. See Hudson 2016. Secular transport limited by *lex Oppia* (215–195): Livy 34.1.3.

48 *Eburata vehic*[*u*]*la*: Plaut. *Aul.* 168. Cf. SHA *Heliogab.* 4.3–4.

49 *Modus matronarum*: Plaut. *Mil.* 791. *Palla*: Plaut. *Aul.* 168; *Men.* 166–167, 562–568, 658–659, 803; *Mostell.* 282. *Vittae*: Plaut. *Mil.* 790–793; Val. Max. 5.2.1; Festus, 484L. *Tutulus*: Plaut. *Mil.* 790–793; *Mostell.* 226; Festus, 484L. Purple clothing: Plaut. *Aul.* 168, 500; *Men.* 121; *Mostell.* 282, 286–289; Cato *Orig.* frs. 109, 145 *FRHist*; Titin. frs. 1–3 Guardi; Val. Max. 5.2.1; Festus, 484L. Gold jewelry: Plaut. *Aul.* 500; *Men.* 121, 801, 803–804; *Mostell.* 282, 286–289; Cato *Orig.* fr. 109 *FRHist*; Titin. frs. 1–2 Guardi; Val. Max. 5.2.1. The *stola* is not linked with the *matrona* in mid-republican sources. See Hemelrijk 1999, 11; Berg 2002, 43; Olson 2008, 25–41. Wealthy non-senatorial equestrian and other freeborn married women may have had access to some of these forms of adornment, too. For gold rings and jewelry as status symbols for some members of the senatorial elite see, e.g., Livy 9.46.10–14; 26.36.5; Plin. *HN* 33.17–21 with Nicolet 1966, 139-143; Berg 2002, 44–45; and Bernard in this volume.

50 Polyb. 31.26.4; Cic. *Verr.* 2.4.46. See Walbank 1979, 503, 505; DiLuzio 2017.

over, retinues of slaves accompanied elite women when they traveled in public; such a retinue would be discernible from afar, signaling the presence of an elite woman.[51]

Elite female social position was thus materially and visually distinguishable. Elite women could compete with each other in terms of quality and quantity in these domains, depending on their wealth or social position. For instance, a consular woman perhaps had access to (and the right to use) more expensive forms of transport, adornment, religious instruments, and retinues than a female relative of a non-curule senator.[52] While material hierarchies can be difficult to recover, an elaborate ivory decorated *pilentum* and purple and gold adornment were probably the most desirable status symbols for elite women in mid-republican Rome.[53] Ivory was particularly prestigious, for a curule magistrate sat on an ivory curule chair and a triumphal general bore the 'ivory scepter' (*scipio eburneus*).[54] Thence an ivory decorated vehicle may have signaled the presence of a female relative of a curule senator, connoting her elevated wealth and social position.[55] Collectively these material status symbols or means of display constituted an elite woman's *apparatus*, 'equipment'.[56]

4.3 *Family and Patronage*

Elite mothers were concerned with the lives of their children, particularly the political careers and education of their sons and the marriages and security of their daughters. Beyond affection, the successes and failures of their children would have redounded to their own status, as symbols of personal, familial, and gentilician status.[57]

With their wealth elite women engaged in both private and public patronage, providing benefactions and munificence, although public patronage appears to have been limited to some degree to the religious sphere.[58] Indeed

51 Plaut. *Aul.* 501–502; *Men.* 120; Polyb. 31.26.5.

52 See n. 36.

53 Plaut. *Aul.* 168, 500, 502.

54 Ivory curule chair: Polyb. 6.53.9; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 3.62.1; Livy 5.41.2; Hor. *Epist.* 1.6.53–54; Ov. *Fast.* 5.51; *Pont.* 4.9.27–28. *Scipio eburneus*: Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 3.62.1; Livy 5.41.9; Val. Max. 4.4.5.

55 See n. 48.

56 Cf. περικοπή in Polyb. 31.26.6 and *OLD s.v. apparatus* (3, 4). See Berg 2002; Flower 2004, 342; Schultz 2006, 148–149; Skinner 2011, 41–42; Valentini 2016, 135–136.

57 Sons: Polyb. 10.4.4–5.7; Cic. *Brut.* 104, 211; Nep. fr. 59 Marshall; Livy 40.37.6. Daughters: Livy 38.57.2–8; Val. Max. 4.4.10; Plut. *Vit. Ti. Gracch.* 4. Children and maternal *gloria*: Val. Max. 4.4.*pr.* See Walbank 1967, 199–201; Dixon 1988, esp. 168–228; 2007, 26–29, 52–54; Briscoe 2008, 201–203.

58 Plaut. *Amph.* 842; *Cist.* 23–32; Cic. *Dom.* 136–137; *CIL* VI 30899. Cf. the Apulian Busa's (*RE s.v.*

in Plautus's *Amphitruo* Alcmene indicates that it was not her dowry but such patronage (and other qualities) that made her a virtuous woman (*Amph.* 838–842). Patronage constituted a conspicuous display of economic, social, and cultural capital, for it signaled elite female wealth, social networks, and generosity.

4.4 *Houses, Villas, Banquets, and Public Funerals*

Elite women received visitors at their houses and villas, which themselves functioned as domains of status competition, indicators of the wealth, social position, and status of their owners (Foubert 2016). Notably, when Cornelia P.f. '*mater Gracchorum*' (RE 407) hosted literati and royal guests at her villa in Misenum, her hospitality pointedly signaled her social position and cultural sophistication.[59] It was at such houses and villas that elite women participated in secular and religious banquets in and outside of Rome.[60] Banquets were important sites of status competition. They were semi-public events in which economic and cultural capital were displayed and social capital reinforced, providing opportunities for networking, patronage, and the winning of political support, as well as for displaying wealth, social position, cultural sophistication, and generosity. During such banquets elite women engaged in conspicuous display, wearing purple and gold adornment. Moreover, extravagant food and banquet equipment were on display, and place settings reinforced social position.[61]

Finally, elite women had spectacular funerals, including a public 'funerary oration' (*laudatio funebris*) by (at least) the end of the second century and a 'procession of ancestor masks' (*pompa imaginum*) by (at least) the early first century. At these funerals elite males eulogized the deeds and qualities of their deceased female relatives; perhaps in this way some elite women became *exempla*.[62] These interacting and occasionally overlapping domains of status com-

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Busa) largesse to the Roman army after Cannae: Livy 22.52.7; Val. Max. 4.8.2. See Dixon 2001, 100–112; Schultz 2006, 57–69; Bielman 2012.

59 Plut. *Vit. C. Gracch.* 19.1–2. See Dixon 2007, 43–48.

60 Cic. *Att.* 2.14.1 (Βοῶπις = Clodia); 4.12 (P[et]ilia); 5.1.3 (Pomponia); *Cael.* 49 (Clodia); *QFr.* 3.1.19 (Pomponia); Nep. *pr.* 6; Val. Max. 2.1.2; Plut. *Vit. C. Gracch.* 19.2 (Cornelia); Macrob. *Sat.* 3.13.10–11 (Popilia, Perpennia, Licinia, Arruntia, Publicia, Sempronia); Isid. *Etym.* 20.11.9. See Dunbabin 2003, 18–23; Stein-Hölkeskamp 2005, 73–86; 2015, 86–87; DiLuzio 2016, 22–23, 57–58, 186–187.

61 Plut. *Mor.* 528B (*De cup. div.* 10); *Vit. C. Gracch.* 19.2; Macrob. *Sat.* 3.13.10–12. See Dunbabin 2003, 11–35, 36–40; Jehne 2011, 225; Zanda 2011, 18–24, 52–60, 119–128; Stein-Hölkeskamp 2015.

62 Polyb. 31.26.6; Cic. *De or.* 2.44; Gran. Lic. 28.14–16. Cf. Cic. *De or.* 2.225; CIL VI 1527 (*laudatio*

petition distinguished elite women from each other, and distanced them from non-senatorial equestrian women, working women, freedwomen, prostitutes, and slaves. Elite female status competition was fundamentally conspicuous, as it was for elite men.

4.5 Lex Oppia

The *lex Oppia* (215–195) restricted the conspicuous display of female transport and adornment. This sumptuary or wartime law prohibited women from wearing purple clothing and gold jewelry heavier than a half-ounce in public, as well as from using a *vehiculum* (sc. *carpentum*) in the city except during *sacra publica*.[63] The legislation was probably designed to express (and perhaps enforce) a form of normative community during the Second Punic War (218–201) and the attendant financial crises. Conspicuous displays of wealth might have otherwise led to social discontent between wealthy elites (and wealthy non-senatorial equestrians and non-elites) and poor non-elites, disrupting wartime solidarity. It may also have been designed to reduce conspicuous, public movement and appearances by women for secular purposes, as is suggested by the limitations imposed on the secular use of (probably) *carpenta*.[64]

Elite women themselves lobbied for the repeal of the *lex Oppia* in 195. As a body they publicly and successfully petitioned husbands, consuls, praetors, and the plebeian tribunes to propose and ratify the abrogatory *lex Valeria Fundania de lege Oppia abroganda* in the 'plebeian assembly' (*concilium plebis*).[65] The lobby itself may have been organized by the *ordo matronarum* and led by consular women, as happened in a subsequent lobby in 42, when the consular woman and orator Hortensia Q.f. (RE 16) led the *ordo* in a demonstration against a triumviral tax on their wealth.[66]

Livy fashions two speeches for the occasion of the repeal: a *dissuasio*, 'opposing speech' by the consul Marcus Porcius Cato (RE 9, *cos.* 195) (34.2–4), and

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Turiae); VI.10230 (*laudatio Murdiae*); Plut. *Vit. Caes.* 5.2–5; Tac. *Ann.* 3.76.2; Suet. *Iul.* 6. See Flower 1996, 122–125; Hillard 2001; Osgood 2014; Webb 2017; Östenberg (forthcoming).

63 Livy 34.1.3; Val. Max. 9.1.3. *Habere* in Livy 34.1.3 interpreted as 'to wear'. See Culham 1982, 787; 1986, 236–237; Hopwood 2001, 129–130; Berg 2002, 43; Zanda 2011, 115. *Vestimentum versicolor* in Livy 34.1.3 interpreted as *purpura*: Livy 34.3.9; 34.4.10, 14; 34.7.3–4, 10. Cf. Cato *Orig.* frs. 109, 145 *FRHist.* See Culham 1982, 787; 1986, 236; Hopwood 2001, 130; Berg 2002, 43. *Vehiculum* in Livy 34.1.3 interpreted as *carpentum*: Livy 34.3.9. Cf. Livy 5.25.9; Festus, 225L, 282L. See Hudson 2016, 232–245.

64 Culham 1982, 793; 1986, 243–245; Hemelrijk 1987, 220–222; Zanda 2011, 114–117.

65 Livy 34.1.5–7, 34.8.1–3.

66 Val. Max. 8.3.3; App. *B. Civ.* 4.32–34. See Culham 1982; Hemelrijk 1987; Hopwood 2001; 2015. Hortensia: father was Quintus Hortensius Hortalus (RE 13, *cos.* 69).

a *suasio*, 'supporting speech' by the plebeian tribune Lucius Valerius (Tappo) (*RE* 350, *pr.* 192) (34.5–7 with Briscoe 2003, 39–43). Two passages illuminate the entanglement of status competition with the law and its repeal. Firstly, Livy's Cato claims that wealthy women could not bear the leveling the law produced—that is, the visual and social homogeneity—and contends that, if it was repealed, it would start a competition among wives (34.4.14–15):

> [Cato:] 'This itself is the leveling I cannot bear' says the rich woman. 'Why am I not observed as distinguished by my gold and purple? Why is the poverty of others hidden under the pretext of this law, which makes it appear that they would have had, if it were lawful, what they cannot have?' Is this the competition you want to incite among your wives, Roman citizens, with rich women wanting to have what no other woman can, and poor women extending themselves beyond their means in order not to be scorned for not having it?[67]
>
> 'Hanc' inquit 'ipsam exaequationem non fero' illa locuples. 'Cur non insignis auro et purpura conspicior? Cur paupertas aliarum sub hac legis specie latet, ut quod habere non possunt habiturae, si liceret, fuisse videantur?' Vultis hoc certamen uxoribus vestris inicere, Quirites, ut divites id habere velint quod nulla alia possit, pauperes ne ob hoc ipsum contemnantur, supra vires se extendant?

Secondly, Livy's Valerius condemns the law for producing pain, indignation, social homogeneity, and the visual degradation of Roman women in comparison with the wives of the Latin allies (34.7.5–6):

> [Valerius:] He [Cato] asserts there was no competition between individual women because each woman had nothing. Yet, by Hercules, there is universal pain and indignation, when they [Roman women] see the wives of our Latin allies granted the ornaments denied them, when they are distinguished by gold and purple, when they are conveyed through the city, while they themselves [Roman women] follow on foot, just as if the empire lay in those women's communities, not in our own.[68]

67 Cf. on this passage Briscoe 2003, 53–54.
68 See Briscoe 2003, 62.

> Aemulationem inter se singularum, quoniam nulla haberet, esse aiebat. At hercule universis dolor et indignatio est, cum sociorum Latini nominis uxoribus vident ea concessa ornamenta quae sibi adempta sint, cum insignes eas esse auro et purpura, cum illas vehi per urbem, se pedibus sequi, tamquam in illarum civitatibus non in sua imperium sit.

While the speeches are Livian inventions, the sentiments attributed to Cato, at least, reflect his economic censure of and focus on wealthy women elsewhere.[69] Moreover, the sentiments attributed to Valerius suggest the existence of status competition between elite Roman women and their Latin neighbors and expose the raw emotions (*dolor*, *indignatio*) produced by the effects of this law. Collectively these passages suggest the pain felt by Roman women at being denied their privileges, status symbols, and ability to compete with each other (and the wives of Latin allies). We can infer that the *lex Oppia* effectively reduced the collective status of the *ordo matronarum*, rendering senatorial (and perhaps non-senatorial equestrian) women *invisible* to some degree. Such invisibility would have been an affront to women and to their male relatives; the social homogeneity it produced degraded the *laus domestica* of senatorial (and perhaps non-senatorial equestrian) families.[70] During their successful lobby in 195 elite women co-operated to restore their privileges and means of display, as well as their ability to compete with each other. The *lex Oppia* and its repeal confirm that transport and adornment were essential domains of elite female status competition. They also indicate how important such competition was for elite women, as Tertia Aemilia's life will illustrate.

5 Tertia Aemilia L.f. Africani uxor

Tertia Aemilia L.f. Africani uxor (*RE* 179, married well before 213, death ca. 163–162, henceforth Aemilia) was the quintessential elite woman: daughter of the twice-consular triumphal general Lucius Aemilius Paullus (*RE* 118, *cos.* 219, 216, triumph 219) and wife of the celebrated twice-consular triumphal general and

69 Economic: Livy 39.44.2; Plut. *Vit. Cat. Mai.* 18.2–3. Focus: Cato *Orig.* frs. 109, 145 *FRHist*; frs. 93, 158, 221 *ORF*. See Hopwood 2001; 2015, 315–317; Briscoe 2003, 39–43; 2008, 363–365.

70 Livy's Valerius seems to allude to the *ordo matronarum* in his speech, when he claims that 'all other orders' (*omnes alii ordines*) feel the improving condition of the *res publica*, but no 'reward' (*fructus*) had come to 'wives' (*coniuges*) (Livy 34.7.1). The implication here is that the *ordo* of married women, i.e., the *ordo matronarum*, had not prospered after the end of the Second Punic War. See Culham 1986; Hemelrijk 1987, 229–230; Berg 2002, 43.

princeps senatus Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus (*RE* 336, *cos.* 205, 194, triumph 201, *princeps senatus* 199).[71] A member of the ancient patrician *gens Aemilia*, she was related by birth and marriage to many consular senators and women. Natal consular kin included her father, her brother Lucius Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus (*RE* 114, *cos.* 182, 168), and her sister-in-law Papiria C.f. (*RE* 78).[72] Marital consular kin included her husband, her father-in-law Publius Cornelius Scipio (*RE* 330, *cos.* 218), her mother-in-law Pomponia M'.f. (*RE* 28), and her brother-in-law Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiagenus (*RE* 337, *cos.* 190).[73]

Aemilia bore four children. She had two daughters who married future consuls: the elder Cornelia P.f. (*RE* 406), wife of Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum (*RE* 353, *cos.* 162, 155), and the younger Cornelia P.f. *mater Gracchorum* (*RE* 407), wife of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (*RE* 53, *cos.* 177, 163). She also had two sons: the elder Publius Cornelius Scipio (*RE* 331, augur 180) and the younger Lucius Cornelius Scipio (*RE* 325, *pr.* 174). Hers was a home brimming with *laus domestica*: her *atrium*, 'entrance hall', teeming with smoky ancestor masks and honors, to borrow Ciceronian expressions (Cic. *Cael.* 34; *Pis.* 1). As a consular woman by birth and marriage, Aemilia would have occupied the summit of the *ordo matronarum*.

Aemilia and her family were very wealthy. By the end of Africanus's life he had amassed assets worth at least 260 talents (1.56 million drachmae/denarii), a colossal sum in the early second century, much of it from the spoils of his campaigns in Spain, Africa, and Asia Minor.[74] Aemilia enjoyed this fortune while Africanus was alive, and after his death in ca. 183 she was assigned fifty talents (300,000 drachmae/denarii) in his legacy as usufruct to maintain her in her

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71 Sources: Polyb. 31.26–28; Livy 38.57.5–8; Val. Max. 6.7.1 (nomenclature); Gran. Lic. 28.14–16. Marriage date uncertain, but probably before the Second Punic War and well before 213, given her youngest son's praetorship in 174, assuming minimum age of 39 for praetorship: Lintott 2009, 145. Death in ca. 163–162: Polyb. 31.26; Gran. Lic. 28.14–16. Overviews: Walbank 1979, 503–511; Dixon 1985, 151–156; 2007, 1, 4, 6, 16, 34, 37–40, 42, 45, 50; Barnard 1990, 384–387; Bauman 1994, 27–30, 33–34, 37, 39, 42; Kajava 1994, 205; Hillard 2001, 48; Schultz 2006, 148–149; McClintock 2013, 193–198; Valentini 2012, 206–222; 2016.

72 Papiria: her father was Gaius Papirius Maso (*RE* 57, cos. 231).

73 Pomponia: brothers were Manius Pomponius Matho (*RE* 17, cos. 233) and Marcus Pomponius Matho (*RE* 18, cos. 231).

74 Polyb. 31.27; 31.28.3. Adduced from dowries (100), assumed equal inheritance for two sons (100), and Aemilianus's inheritance (60). See Shatzman 1975, 247–248; Kay 2014, 36–37. In comparison, the wealthiest Greek in the early second century, Alexander the Isian (*RE* 32), possessed a private fortune worth just over 200 talents (1.2 million drachmae/denarii): Polyb. 21.26.9–14. See Walbank 1967, 597; 1979, 121–123. Conversion rate is 1 talent = 6000 drachmae/denarii = 24000 sestertii: Walbank 1979, 506; Kay 2014, 22–23.

widowhood.[75] Her daughters received a considerable proportion of the family fortune in their vast dowries, fifty talents each, twenty-five each when they married in the 180s and a further twenty-five each after Aemilia's death.[76] The family assets included a house on the Vicus Tuscus near the Forum Romanum, gardens near Rome, a sepulcher outside the Porta Capena on the Via Appia, and a villa at Liternum in Campania.[77] We will see that Aemilia competed for status with this wealth in *sacra publica*, that she did so to promote *laus domestica*, and that after her death she herself was memorialized by her female relatives as part of their own status competition.

5.1 Sacra publica

Polybius, tutor and close companion to Aemilia's biological nephew and adoptive grandson (and grandson-in-law) Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus (*RE* 335, *cos.* 147, 134), would have known her well.[78] In an excursus on Aemilianus's generosity Polybius reveals that Aemilia displayed her economic (wealth) and cultural capital (religious knowledge) in *sacra publica* (31.26. 3–5):

> Aemilia, for that was this woman's name, used to display magnificent circumstances in the women's processions, since she had flourished equally in the life and good fortune of Scipio. For apart from the decorations of her clothing and of her four-wheeled carriage [*pilentum*], all the baskets [*canistra*], cups [cf. *paterae*], and instruments for the sacrifice—some of silver, some of gold—were brought along on the splendid processions with her, and the crowd of female slaves and household slaves following along was correspondingly large.[79]

> συνέβαινε δὲ τὴν Αἰμιλίαν, τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὄνομα τῇ προειρημένῃ γυναικί, μεγαλομερῆ τὴν περίστασιν ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς γυναικείαις ἐξόδοις, ἅτε συνηκμακυῖαν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῇ τύχῃ τῇ Σκιπίωνος· χωρὶς γὰρ τοῦ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ἀπήνην κόσμου

75 Polyb. 31.26–27. Adduced from second dowry payment (50) to Aemilia's daughters after her death. See Walbank 1979, 503–509; Dixon 1985, 151–156; McClintock 2013, 193–198; Valentini 2016, 133–135. On usufruct: Champlin 1991, 123. I am indebted to B. Hopwood for the clarification regarding usufruct. Africanus's death: Walbank 1979, 235–239.

76 Polyb. 31.27. See Walbank 1979, 505–509; Dixon 1985, 152–156; Champlin 1991, 123; Valentini 2016, 134.

77 House: Livy 44.16.10. Gardens: Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.11. Sepulcher: *CIL* VI 1284–1294; Cic. *Tusc.* 1.13; Livy 38.56.4. Villa: Livy 38.52.1; Val. Max. 2.10.2. See Shatzman 1975, 246–247.

78 Polyb. 31.23–25. See Walbank 1979, 495–502; Dixon 1985, 150; 2007, 8, 36.

79 See on this passage Walbank 1979, 503, 505.

καὶ τὰ κανᾶ καὶ τὰ ποτήρια καὶ τἆλλα τὰ πρὸς τὴν θυσίαν, ποτὲ μὲν ἀργυρᾶ, ποτὲ δὲ χρυσᾶ, πάντα συνεξηκολούθει κατὰ τὰς ἐπιφανεῖς ἐξόδους αὐτῇ, τό τε τῶν παιδισκῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν οἰκετῶν τῶν παρεπομένων πλῆθος ἀκόλουθον ἦν τούτοις.

We can infer that Aemilia engaged in status competition through her *apparatus* during *sacra publica*, and demonstrated her religious knowledge of these *sacra*. She conspicuously displayed her adornment, decorations on her *pilentum*, her silver and gold religious instruments, and her large retinue of slaves. Despite the above-mentioned prohibitions of the *lex Oppia* Aemilia could have signaled her elevated wealth and social position through ivory decorations on her *pilentum* (as a consular woman), other forms of elaborate clothing, silver jewelry, silver religious instruments, and the magnitude of her retinue.[80] Plautus refers to women wearing elaborate non-purple dress (*Aul.* 510; *Epid.* 230–233), while Livy indicates that a senatorial decree allowed women (temporarily) to wear their most splendid dress to celebrate the Metaurus victory in 207 (27.51.8–10). There was clearly some circumvention of the sumptuary intentions of the *lex Oppia* (Hopwood 2001, 129–130). Once the *lex Oppia* was repealed through the lobbying of elite women in 195, Aemilia could have worn a sumptuous purple *palla* and *vittae*, along with ornate gold jewelry.

There were many opportunities for Aemilia to engage in such status competition. As she was a married woman by the time of (or during) the Second Punic War (218–201), there were many high-profile matronal rites she was eligible to participate in. These included those for Juno Regina in 218, 217, and 207, those for Venus Verticordia in ca. 215, and the inaugural procession for the advent of Magna Mater in 204.[81] Aemilia would have been particularly interested in these rites for Magna Mater, as elite women were prominent in the procession and her cousin-in-law (eventual father-in-law of her elder daughter) Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica (*RE* 350, *cos.* 191) took a principal role in the procession, conferring more status on the *gens Cornelia*.[82] Given these connections Aemilia may have been part of a sodality for the extravagant elite 'exchange banquets' (*mutitationes cenarum*) for Magna Mater; at these religious banquets she could engage in conspicuous display through adornment, banquet

80 None of which were prohibited under the *lex Oppia*.

81 Juno Regina: Livy 21.62.8; 22.1.18; 27.37.5–15. Venus Verticordia: Val. Max. 8.15.12; Plin. *HN* 7.120. Magna Mater: Cic. *Cael.* 34; *Har. resp.* 24, 27; Livy 29.14.10–14.

82 Elite women and Magna Mater: Cic. *Har. resp.* 27; Livy 29.14.10–14; Ov. *Fast.* 4.291–346. Nasica: Livy 29.14.6–10; 35.10.9; 36.40.

equipment, and cultural sophistication.[83] Outside of these exceptional rites Aemilia would have participated in annual festivals, notably the Carmentalia, the Matronalia, the Matralia, the rites for Bona Dea, which she may have hosted (as consular wife) in her own home in 205 or in 194, as well as in occasional rites for Pudicitia Patricia and Fortuna Muliebris.[84] It was through *sacra publica* that Aemilia would most conspicuously have competed with other elite women and, after Africanus triumphed in 201 and became censor and *princeps senatus* in 199, advertised his and thus her increased status and social position.[85] In her conspicuous religious activity as described by Polybius, Aemilia matched her husband Africanus, who notably frequented the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus and cultivated an association with Jupiter.[86]

5.2 Laus domestica

Why did elite women compete? By engaging in status competition Aemilia was not just involved in self-aggrandizement. Rather, she was also promoting *laus domestica* by advertising the economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capital of her family, and reinforcing familial and gentilician status, ideologies, and memory. Here we find further links between elite male and female status competition: not only were the domains similar, but they were mutually supportive. For any Roman politician to be successful in his career and warfare he needed to rely on his relatives and family to promote and guard his interests in Rome while he was absent.[87] For a man such as Africanus, who occupied the apogee of the senatorial hierarchy and was beset by envy and personal enemies, such family support was crucial.[88] Was Aemilia obliged in some way to engage in status competition? She may have been encouraged by relatives to advertise the *laus domestica*, for it was a kind of corporate identity, what I term the 'family

83 Sodalities and *mutitationes cenarum*: Cic. *Sen.* 45; CIL I², p. 235; Gell. *NA* 2.24.2; 18.2.11. See Zanda 2011, 120. No evidence suggests these excluded elite women. Cf. Macrob. *Sat.* 3.13.10–11.

84 Carmentalia: Ov. *Fast.* 1.617–628; Plut. *Mor.* 278B–C (*Quaest. Rom.* 56); *Vit. Rom.* 21.1–2. Matronalia: Plaut. *Mil.* 690–691; Ov. *Fast.* 3.245–258; Plut. *Vit. Rom.* 21.1. Matralia: Ov. *Fast.* 6.473–568; Plut. *Mor.* 267D (*Quaest. Rom.* 16). Bona Dea: see n. 37. Pudicitia Patricia: Livy 10.23.1–10. Fortuna Muliebris: Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 8.55–56; Livy 2.40.11–12; Val. Max. 1.8.4, 5.2.1; Plut. *Mor.* 318F (*De fort. Rom.* 5); *Vit. Cor.* 37.

85 Triumph: Polyb. 16.23; Livy 30.45. *Princeps senatus*: Livy 34.44.4; 38.28.1–2.

86 Livy 26.19.5; 38.51.7–14; Val. Max. 1.2.2 (*Par.*, *Nep.*); 3.7.1; Gell. *NA* 6.1.6.

87 Cf. Pomponia, the addressee of the *laudatio Turiae*, or Terentia: Polyb. 10.4.4–5.7; CIL VI 1527 (*laudatio Turiae*); Plut. *Vit. Cic.* 20.1–3. See Walbank 1967, 199–201; Treggiari 2007; Osgood 2014.

88 Cf. Livy 38.50–56 with Briscoe 2008, 170–201.

brand'.[89] This is the force of the intergenerational rebuke in Cicero's *Pro Caelio*, in as much as Cicero's Caecus was berating Clodia for disgracing the brand (and memory) of the *gens Claudia* (*Cael.* 33–34).[90] From this perspective Aemilia's conspicuous display in *sacra publica* successfully advertised the brands of the *gentes Cornelia* and *Aemilia*.

Aemilia's interest in the family brand is evinced by Livy and Valerius Maximus. Livy recounts her reputed indignation that Africanus excluded her from the decision to betroth her younger daughter Cornelia *mater Gracchorum* to Gracchus (38.57.5–8 with Briscoe 2008, 201–203). Her indignation reveals her concern for the success of her daughters' marriages, where success encompassed marriages to men of equivalent social position and status. Moreover, Valerius Maximus praises Aemilia's remarkable self-control in relation to Africanus's relationship with one of her young female slaves (Val. Max. 6.7.1). He reports that she ignored the relationship, dissimulating (*dissimulare*) and, after Africanus's death in ca. 183, manumitted the slave and married her to one of her freedmen (Val. Max. 6.7.1). By demonstrating restraint and even generosity she not only presented herself as an exceptional wife, an exemplum of 'wifely faithfulness, obligingness, and patience' (*uxoria ... fides ... comitas et patientia*), but she also refused to accuse Africanus of being 'guilty of impatience' (*inpatientiae reus*), preferring to protect his status as 'conqueror of the world and great man' (*domitor orbis ... magnus vir*) and hers as 'wife of the first Africanus' (*Africani prioris uxor*, Val. Max. 6.7.1 with Langlands 2006, 136–137). These two accounts indicate Aemilia's clear interest in the future success and memorialization of her family.

Aemilia's family showed a similar concern for their brand on two further occasions. Firstly, the family punished her younger son Lucius for his disgraceful election to the praetorship of 174, forbidding him from setting up his curule chair and exercising his praetorian functions and removing his signet ring bearing the image of Africanus. The censors subsequently expelled him from the Senate.[91] Secondly, the family installed Africanus's ancestor mask in the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, thereby ensuring that all future funerary processions of the *gens Cornelia* incorporated this hallowed location, transforming the temple into an *atrium* for the clan, a physical and ritual reminder of

89 I am indebted to Emily Hemelrijk for this suggestion. For similar views: Flower 1996, 71, 128, 154, 182, 236, 255; 2004, 342–343; Smith 2006, 44–50, 333–334; Hölkeskamp 2010, 116–124, esp. 119; 2011.

90 Cf. Cic. *De or.* 2.225–226.

91 Livy 41.27.2 (praetorship and expulsion); Val. Max. 3.5.1 (punishment). See Flower 1996, 87–88; 2006, 58; Briscoe 2012, 109, 136.

Africanus's status and his cultivated connection with Jupiter.[92] In this brand-conscious family Aemilia emerges as a primary promoter of familial and gentilician interests, deeply invested in brand management and memorialization.[93] Her example indicates that elite female status competition was entangled with *laus domestica*: elite women competed for themselves *and* their families and clans.

5.3 Memoria Aemiliae

Aemilia died in ca. 163–162, and her family gave her an elaborate funeral, including 'trumpets' (*tubicines*, Gran. Lic. 28.16).[94] If later elite female funerals are any guide, it might have included a *pompa imaginum* and *laudatio funebris*, thereby exemplifying and memorializing Aemilia and her family.[95] After her funeral her *apparatus* was used by her female relatives for their own status competition, as is attested by Polybius's account of Aemilianus's generosity to his mother (Aemilia's sister-in-law), Papiria (31.26.6–8):

> Immediately after Aemilia's funeral all this equipment was given by Scipio to his mother [Papiria], who had been for many years divorced from Lucius [Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus] and whose riches were not sufficient to maintain a splendor suitable for her noble birth. Previously, therefore, she had abstained from prominent processions, but after this, whenever there was a splendid public sacrifice, she went out in Aemilia's equipment and riches, and when even the muleteers, pair of mules, and four-wheeled carriage [*pilentum*] were the same, the women who witnessed what had happened were stunned by Scipio's goodness and generosity and, lifting up their hands, all prayed that every blessing might be his.[96]

> ταύτην δὴ τὴν περικοπὴν ἅπασαν εὐθέως μετὰ τὸν τῆς Αἰμιλίας τάφον ἐδωρήσατο τῇ μητρί, ᾗ συνέβαινε κεχωρίσθαι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ Λευκίου πρότερον ἤδη χρόνοις πολλοῖς, τὴν δὲ τοῦ βίου χορηγίαν ἐλλιπεστέραν ἔχειν τῆς κατὰ τὴν

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92 Val. Max. 8.15.1; App. *Hisp.* 89. Cf. Livy 38.56.13; Val. Max. 4.1.6. See Flower 1996, 48–52; Briscoe 2008, 200–201.

93 Cf. Cornelia '*mater Gracchorum*': Plut. *Vit. C. Gracch.* 19.

94 Polyb. 31.26.6; Gran. Lic. 28.14–16. See Hillard 2001, 48. Cf. her brother Macedonicus's elaborate funeral: Polyb. 31.28.1–6; Diod. Sic. 31.25.1–2; Plut. *Vit. Aem.* 39.6–8. See Flower 2004, 335.

95 See n. 62.

96 Cf. on this passage Walbank 1979, 505.

> εὐγένειαν φαντασίας. διὸ τὸν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον ἀνακεχωρηκυίας αὐτῆς ἐκ τῶν ἐπισήμων ἐξόδων, τότε κατὰ τύχην οὔσης ἐπιφανοῦς καὶ πανδήμου θυσίας, ἐκπορευομένης αὐτῆς ἐν τῇ τῆς Αἰμιλίας περικοπῇ καὶ χορηγίᾳ, καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τῶν ὀρεοκόμων καὶ τοῦ ζεύγους καὶ τῆς ἀπήνης τῆς αὐτῆς ὑπαρχούσης, συνέβη τὰς γυναῖκας θεωμένας τὸ γεγονὸς ἐκπλήττεσθαι τὴν τοῦ Σκιπίωνος χρηστότητα καὶ μεγαλοψυχίαν καὶ πάσας προτεινούσας τὰς χεῖρας εὔχεσθαι τῷ προειρημένῳ πολλὰ κἀγαθά.

There was thus a social expectation for elite women to engage in conspicuous display commensurate with their social position in *sacra publica*, an expectation the divorced Papiria, a consular woman, was unable to meet, prompting her abstention from public life until she received Aemilia's *apparatus*.[97] That other elite women recognized this *apparatus* as formerly Aemilia's (and now Aemilianus's to dispose of) indicates its personal and iconic nature, suggesting that an elite woman's means of display were interlocked with her identity. By implication the *apparatus* imparted something of Aemilia's identity and status to its new owners.[98] Perhaps the elements functioned as a material 'memory of Aemilia' (*memoria Aemiliae*), reminding other elite women of her religiosity and status, materializing Aemilia and the *laus domestica* of her family.[99]

Polybius recounts that after Papiria's own death in ca. 160–159, Aemilianus bequeathed this same *apparatus* to his two sisters (Aemilia's nieces), Aemilia L.f. (*RE* 151) and Tertia Aemilia L.f. (*RE* 152 and 180), who also used it in *sacra publica* (Polyb. 31.28.8–9).[100] Collectively these accounts suggest that Aemilianus fostered a reputation for (familial) generosity, that he wanted and encouraged his mother and sisters to engage in status competition via conspicuous display, and that they as elite women felt compelled to do so. Furthermore, they reveal how important it was for elite women to compete in *sacra publica*, how an inability to compete could prompt abstention from public life, and how some elite men like Aemilianus supported this competition. *Sacra publica* were a vital domain of elite female status competition.

97 Culham 1986, 239–240; Flower 2004, 342–343; Schultz 2006, 149.
98 Skinner 2011, 42; Valentini 2016, 135–137.
99 Cf. *Memoriae Agrippinae* and the *carpentum* on: *RIC* I^2, p. 112, no. 55. See: Wood 1988.
100 Walbank 1979, 510–511; Valentini 2016, 137. Aemilia L.f. (*RE* 152) is Tertia Aemilia L.f. (*RE* 180): Plut. *Vit. Cat. Mai.* 20.12. See Kajava 1994, 205.

6 Conclusions

In mid-republican Rome elite women competed for *gloria*, engaging in conspicuous display in many interacting and occasionally overlapping domains, including sacerdotal public office, *sacra publica*, transport, adornment, religious instruments, retinue, family, patronage, houses and villas, banquets, and public funerals. The repeal of the *lex Oppia* and the lives of Aemilia and her female relatives attest to the investment of elite women in these practices and their entanglement with *laus domestica*.

Contemporary literature offers many negative evaluations of female wealth and conspicuous display.[101] The old man Megadorus's diatribes in Plautus's *Aulularia* are paradigmatic (*Aul.* 167–169, 498–502):

> [Megadorus:] I care nothing for those great social connections, those spirits, those sumptuous dowries, those shouts, those commands, those ivory decorated vehicles, those mantles, and that purple; such women drive their husbands into slavery with their expenses … So let no woman say: 'I brought you a dowry far greater than the money you had. So it's equitable that I should be given purple and gold, female slaves, mules, muleteers, male followers, boys to greet people, and vehicles to ride in'.[102]
>
> Istas magnas factiones, animos, dotes dapsiles,
clamores, imperia, eburata vehicla, pallas, purpuram,
nil moror quae in servitutem sumptibus redigunt viros …
Nulla igitur dicat 'equidem dotem ad te adtuli
maiorem multo quam tibi erat pecunia;
enim míhi quidem aequomst purpuram atque aurum dari,
ancillas, mulos, muliones, pedisequos,
salutigerulos pueros, vehicla qui vehar'.

Megadorus is hyperbolic to the point of absurdity, suggesting that Plautus is parodying contemporary speeches against wealthy women (cf. Cato frs. 93, 158,

101 Cato: Cato *Orig.* frs. 109, 145 *FRHist*; frs. 93, 158, 221 *ORF*. See Bauman 1994, 33; McClintock 2013, 195–196; Skinner 2011, 43; Cornell 2013, 140, 156–157. Pictor: Pictor fr. 7 *FRHist*. See Cornell 2013, 24–25. Plautus: Plaut. *Asin.* 85–87; *Aul.* 167–169, 475–535; *Men.* 120–122; *Mil.* 679–700; *Most.* 281–289, 703; *Poen.* 297–307. See Johnston 1980; Evans 1991, 61–65; Moore 1998, 158–180; Manuwald 2011, 165; Skinner 2011, 40–44.

102 Cf. Moore 1998, 162 on this passage.

221 *ORF* with Moore 1998, 162–164). Nevertheless, one suspects the character protests too much (*nil moror*): he clearly cared about (and was concerned by) the wealth and conspicuous display of wealthy women. His rich descriptions immediately evoke the wealth and *apparatus* of Aemilia, the dowries of her daughters, and the use of Aemilia's *apparatus* by Papiria and Aemilianus's sisters. These are clearly (negative and comic) caricatures of real women, recognizable to Plautus's audiences—perhaps even as members of that same audience or as present nearby (Plaut. *Poen.* 32 and Ter. *Hec.* 35 with Manuwald 2011, 98). Here and elsewhere Plautus illuminates the contemporary prevalence of their conspicuous display.[103]

Status competition was essential for elite women and their families in mid-republican Rome, for it accorded *gloria* and enhanced *laus domestica*. We have seen that Aemilia was an exemplary competitor. In life her *apparatus* signaled her elevated social position and abundant wealth. In death it memorialized her and adorned her female relatives. We can imagine the envy with which other married women observed Aemilia as she attended *sacra publica*, adorned in purple and gold, seated in an ivory decorated *pilentum*, and surrounded by slaves. Long after Aemilia's death Seneca describes another married woman voicing such envy to her husband, and her lament is a fitting coda (Sen. *De matrimonio* fr. 13.49 Haase):

> 'That woman appears in public better adorned, this woman is honored by all, I, miserable woman, am despised in the assembly of women'.[104]
>
> 'Illa ornatior procedit in publicum, haec honoratur ab omnibus, ego in conventu feminarum misella despicior'.[105]

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103 See n. 101.

104 See Gloyn 2017, 221 on this passage.

105 Many thanks to H. Baltussen, L. Brännstedt, J. Clarke, K. Conrau-Lewis, M.-L. Hänninen, E. Hemelrijk, B. Hopwood, A. Keith, I. Kuin, C. de L'isle, I. Östenberg, R. Rönnlund, I. Selsvold, K. Webb, the editors, and the anonymous reviewer for their feedback and helpful advice.

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CHAPTER 13

The Poetics of Strife and Competition in Hesiod and Ovid

Charles T. Ham

1 Introduction

In this chapter I argue that the outlines of what I will call a 'discordant poetics' emerge from Hesiod's discussion of *eris* at the beginning of *Works and Days*, that Ovid's presentation of strife and competition in the *Fasti* and *Metamorphoses* is in dialog with Hesiod's discussion, and furthermore that the figure of Ovid's Janus (Geminus) in the *Fasti* is a poetic descendant of Hesiod's double Eris.[1] More specifically, I consider the role of strife in Ovid's twin cosmogonies and beyond. As exhibited through the figure of Janus at the beginning of the *Fasti*, this poetically fertile phenomenon stands in contrast to the role of strife in the cosmogony that opens the *Metamorphoses*. In the course of *Metamorphoses* 1, however, the picture of strife is revised in such a way as to demonstrate—principally through the figure of Amor/Cupid—the function of strife as a potent source of poetic energy in Ovid's epic poem, as well.

2 Hesiod's Erides and the Poetics of Discord

In a brief proem at the beginning of *Works and Days* Hesiod, after addressing the Pierian Muses and their father Zeus (1–10), says that he will proclaim truths (ἐτήτυμα) to his brother Perses (10). We then learn the first of these 'truths': 'So there was not just one birth of Strifes after all, but upon the earth there are two Strifes' (οὐκ ἄρα μοῦνον ἔην Ἐρίδων γένος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν / εἰσὶ δύω, 11–12);[2] the particle ἄρα in line 11 seems to indicate that Hesiod 'changes his mind and contradicts what he himself said at some time in the past'.[3]

1 My chapter takes as its inspiration the seminal discussion in Barchiesi 1991 of the 'Discordant Muses' in *Fasti*.
2 Text and translation of both *Theog.* and *Op.* is that of Most 2006.
3 See Most 1993, 77–79 with references. See also Scodel in this volume.

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In addition to its privileged place in the work, Hesiod's discussion of the Erides is notable for its several self-reflexive gestures. To offer just two examples: the list of 'professionals' in whom Eris inspires competition concludes with the poet, an arrangement that many have taken to reflect Hesiod's own role.[4] Similarly, the double birth of Strifes is usually understood as correcting the genealogy of Eris in Hesiod's *Theogony*, in which there is a single birth of Strife (*Theog*. 225).[5] Furthermore, the allusion adds a nice touch to the beginning of *Works and Days*: Hesiod sets up a conflicting or competing account of strife or competition itself. In other words, the passage enacts the very *eris* or 'competition' it describes. This may be understood as an example of 'representational competition' (on which see the Introduction to this volume), since the *Works and Days* cannot be said to be competing against the *Theogony* in any 'real' way or at least not in the sort of real competition among poets and other craftsmen for market share as discussed by Scodel in this volume. The same goes for Ovid's 'competition' with Hesiod discussed below, which we might call, using Scodel's terms, a 'prestige competition', although not a fixed-sum one: Ovid's competition with Hesiod, while it may increase Ovid's prestige as a poet, will not result in a decrease in Hesiod's reputation in the literary tradition, at least not in any meaningful way.

Mark Griffith (1990, 194–196) has identified 'doublets' such as Hesiod's doubling of Eris as 'a fruitful source of poetic refutation and one-upsmanship'. The syntax of Hesiod's description of the work of good Eris suggests that competition features doublets defined both by close resemblance and difference: the nouns for each of the types of people inspired by Eris at *Works and Days* 25–26 are doubled in different Greek cases ('And potter is angry with potter, and builder with builder, and beggar begrudges beggar, and poet poet', καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, / καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ).[6] Competing doublets are in fact prominent in *Works and Days*: Richard Martin (2004) has argued for the importance of Perses as a 'double' for Hesiod and of doubling more generally in the poem. Martin restricts his discussion to doublets within *Works and Days*, but intertextual doublets across *Works and Days*

4 See, e.g., Rosen 1990, 106 with references and Scodel in this volume.

5 See, e.g., West 1978, 143 ad loc. and Most 2006, 87.

6 This is a useful way of conceptualizing competition in general, but especially poetic competition in the form of allusion: mimetic desire that leads to close resemblance, but also, importantly, to difference; see Hinds 1998, 121. See the Introduction to this volume on doubling and the definition of competition, and Scodel in this volume on how closely good Eris resembles bad (especially in terms of Hesiod's attribution of negative emotions to 'good' Eris), despite Hesiod's claim that we should recognize them as distinct deities.

and the *Theogony*, begun by the doubling of Eris, also appear: for instance, the Prometheus/Pandora myth in *Works and Days* is a doublet of that in *Theogony* but has elements that distinguish it from the earlier version, and the general deprecation of kings (βασιλεῖς) in *Works and Days* makes them an antithetical doublet of the revered wise kings in *Theogony*.[7] Indeed, in a number of cases '*Works and Days* corrects or otherwise modifies *Theogony*'.[8] The first example of this, the double birth of Strifes, is thus programmatic.

In the present section I will focus on just one doublet arising out of the discussion of the Erides, namely, their function, individually and collectively, as a double of the Muses. I argue that in this the Erides are emblematic of a discordant poetics that rivals the concordant poetics of the Muses, and that this discordant poetics finds a parallel in Ovid's poetry, on which I will focus in sections 3 and 4.

Since Eris—at least good Eris—fosters competition among poets (*Op.* 26), the text encourages us to compare her to the Muses as an inspirer of poetry. Eris in certain respects seems a more appropriate 'Muse' for *Works and Days* than the traditional Muses. First, the passage on the two Erides raises the theme of competing or discordant accounts, which reflects the competing views of Hesiod and his brother Perses, or the *eris*/*neikos* between them. Also, the Erides are themselves at odds with one another (*Op.* 13), in contrast to the Muses, whose songs can stop conflict and produce concord (*Theog.* 39, 60, with A. Hardie 2007, 562).[9] (This is not to say that the Muses cannot inspire poetry about *eris*. Much of the *Theogony* concerns strife among the gods, but the poem is ultimately the story of Zeus's resolution of this *eris* and the establishment of a stable cosmic order that is reflected in the harmony of his daughters, the Muses.) Furthermore, kings traditionally put an end to conflict or competition through judgment (*Theog.* 84–87), but their ability to do so satisfactorily or justly is called into question in *Works and Days*.[10] Finally, as a force that tends

7 Cf. *Theog.* 81–92, with n. 10 below. See Hamilton 1989, 57 on the contrast between kings in *Theog.* and *Op.*

8 Most 2006, xxi. Cf. Most 1993, 76. Scodel in this volume, speaking of *Works and Days*, calls Hesiod a 'relentless self-corrector'.

9 On the concord of the Muses see Barchiesi 1991, 7.

10 During his initial diatribe directed at Perses, for example, Hesiod refers to kings as 'fools' and 'gift-eaters' who apparently decided (unjustly) against Hesiod in his earlier legal dispute with Perses (*Op.* 37–41): 'For already we had divided up our allotment, but you [*sc.* Perses] snatched much more besides and went carrying it off, greatly honoring the kings, those gift-eaters, who want to pass this judgment—fools, they do not know how much more the half is than the whole, nor how great the boon is in mallow and asphodel.' (ἤδη μὲν γὰρ κλῆρον ἐδασσάμεθ', ἄλλά τε πολλὰ / ἁρπάζων ἐφόρεις μέγα κυδαίνων βασιλῆας /

to resist closure and instead encourages conflict and competition, Eris is a fitting 'Muse' for the rather open-ended *Works and Days*, so different from the teleological *Theogony*.

Even the 'bad' Eris of the *Theogony* is in some respects a 'dark double'[11] of the Muses.[12] Initially, this is revealed through antithesis, as the capacities of the Muses counteract the effects attributed to Eris through her offspring at *Theogony* 226–232.[13] But in other respects Eris is in fact a mirror of the Muses. Eris begets Pseudea; the Muses in their epiphany to Hesiod in the proem claim that they can speak *pseudea*, 'false things', in addition to the truth (*Theog.* 27–28). Eris also begets Lêthê or forgetfulness; the Muses paradoxically inspire forgetfulness in their listeners (*Theog.* 53–55, 98–103). Another of Eris's offspring are Logoi, which together with Pseudea define Eris a producer of *words* or verbal battles[14] and in this respect encourages us to see her as a doublet both of the Muses[15] and the poet, Hesiod.[16]

While Eris's begetting of Pseudea is part of the negative picture of Eris and her offspring, the Muses' statement to Hesiod that they can speak *pseudea* seems more benign, perhaps even playful. Still, the consequences, especially for poetic competition, are considerable: one of the implications of the Muses' statement is that humans are ultimately unable to distinguish *pseudea* similar to the truth from the truth itself. As a result, competing accounts about the 'truth' are possible, because any story is subject to revision or contradiction.[17]

δωροφάγους, οἳ τήνδε δίκην ἐθέλουσι δικάσσαι, / νήπιοι, οὐδὲ ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἥμισυ παντός, / οὐδ' ὅσον ἐν μαλάχῃ τε καὶ ἀσφοδέλῳ μέγ' ὄνειαρ). Ironically, however, it is a king who declares Hesiod the victor in his legendary *certamen* with Homer; see Graziosi 2001, 71.

11 I take the phrase from P. Hardie 2012, 109. He refers to Fama in the *Aeneid* as a 'dark double of the poet'. On the connection between Fama and Eris see ibid. 54–57.

12 This account is indebted to the analysis of the Muses and Eris in Pucci 1977, especially 130–135. Pucci 1977, 134 writes that '… the voice of Hesiod, in becoming the voice of Dikê, of the Muses, of good Eris, simultaneously assumes discordant notes that reveal the force and violence of its aim'.

13 E.g., the Muses' 'truth' (*Theog.* 28) vs. Eris's Pseudea (*Theog.* 229); Muses as daughters of Mnemosyne or 'Memory' vs. Eris's Lêthê (*Theog.* 227); Muse-honored kings end *neikea* (*Theog.* 80–87) vs. Eris's Neikea (*Theog.* 229); Muse-honored poets bring relief from cares and grief (*Theog.* 93–104) vs. Eris's Ponos and Algea (*Theog.* 226–227).

14 P. Hardie 2012, 56, in the context of a discussion of Phêmê and Eris, notes that 'already at *Theog.* 226–232 the progeny of the fertile (bad) *Eris* includes creatures of strife both physical and verbal'.

15 Cf. Pucci 1977, 28.

16 For Hesiod as producer of *logoi* see *Op.* 106; cf. Hamilton 1989, 65. See Pucci 1977, 4–5 on the Muses' discourse as *logos*.

17 For example, in Ovid's account of the song contest between the Heliconian Muses and the mortal daughters of Pierus, the Pierides, the latter use the Hesiodic Muses' self-professed

Hesiod's discussion of the Erides in *Works and Days* enacts the provisional nature of a poetic statement or 'truth': by 'correcting' the earlier account it highlights the fundamentally contestable nature of poetic claims, which are subject to 'correction' or 'contradiction' by competing accounts. Hesiod's discussion of *eris* can also be seen as the first instance of what will become a rich tradition of multiple, competing explanations in subsequent didactic poetry.

3 Hesiodic Eris and Ovidian Lis

Ovid uses Hesiod's treatment of *eris* as an important source in articulating his own version of a 'discordant poetics'. In *Fasti* 1 Ovid sets up a Hesiodic framework for our understanding of *Fasti* and its relationship to the *Metamorphoses*, its hexameter double; it includes a central role for strife—figured as *lis*—and disputes within the *Fasti* itself and between the two poems. Ovid, in the spirit of Hesiodic *eris*, also seems to contradict or 'correct' aspects of Hesiod's treatment of strife in *Works and Days*. Finally, we might see the programmatically double god Janus in the *Fasti* as a version of the equally progammatic double Eris in Hesiod.

At the beginning of *Fasti* the poet addresses no Muse or Muses,[18] but around 100 lines into the poem the Roman god Janus appears suddenly to the poet, an epiphany modeled on Apollo's appearance to Callimachus in the *Aetia* (fr. 1.21–22 Harder, with Green 2004, 72 ad *Fast.* 1.93). Janus is a privileged figure in the poem not only for being the first of the poet's divine sources but also for the ways in which he is emblematic of the poem.[19] At the same time that Ovid acknowledges his Callimachean model, he also looks through Callimachus to the latter's model, Hesiod, and the epiphany of the Muses in *Theogony*. Janus, for instance, will begin his discourse on origins with the origin of the cosmos, for which he is a unique source, since, as he tells us, 'men of old (for I am an ancient being) called me Chaos' (*me Chaos antiqui* (*nam sum res prisca*) *voca-*

ability to lie as the reason for challenging them and in the course of so doing they 'correct' the account of the Typhonomachy in Hesiod's *Theogony* (*Met.* 5.308–310, with Ziogas 2013, 93).

18 The poem is addressed to Germanicus, the poet-prince (1.3). On the Muses' 'quasi-exclusion from the literary programme' of the *Fasti* see Barchiesi 1991, 1–14.

19 On Janus as emblematic and an 'alternative voice' in the *Fasti* to that of the Muses see especially Barchiesi 1991, 14–17. Barchiesi 1991 (supplemented by Barchiesi 1997, 230–235) and P. Hardie 1991 are still the best accounts of Janus's function in the poem. My discussion of Janus is indebted to theirs throughout, although neither to my knowledge relates Janus and/or *lis* to Hesiodic Eris/*eris*.

bant, *Fast.* 1.103).[20] Janus's self-identification with Chaos and his subsequent narration of the cosmogony are deeply intertextual, alluding to the beginning of Hesiod's *Theogony*[21] but also, more immediately, to Ovid's own *Metamorphoses*, which begins—after a brief proem—with the metamorphosis from chaos to cosmos (*Met.* 1.5–88). But the cosmogony of the *Fasti* is a doublet-with-a-difference with respect to that in the *Metamorphoses*, the principal difference concerning, in fact, the role of strife. In the *Metamorphoses* the demiurge causes the transformation from chaos to cosmos by settling the strife or dispute among the discordant elements and qualities: 'a god or better nature settled this strife' (*hanc deus et melior litem natura diremit*, 1.21).[22] In the *Fasti*, on the other hand, Janus/Chaos says that 'when once this mass, owing to the strife of its own elements, had parted and dispersed into new homes, fire sought out the height, the nearer place took the air, while earth and sea sunk into the middle ground' (*ut semel haec rerum secessit lite suarum / inque novas abiit massa soluta domos, / flamma petit altum, propior locus aera cepit, / sederunt medio terra fretumque solo*, 1.107–110). That is, among the primordial elements in *Metamorphoses*, *lis* is a principle that impedes the formation of the ordered cosmos, whereas in *Fasti* it seems to be the principle responsible for the emergence of that same cosmos.[23] These two contrasting strifes might bring to mind Hesiod's two contrasting Erides at the beginning of *Works and Days*.

And, in fact, we are encouraged by Janus himself to recall *Works and Days* in addition to the *Theogony*. In Janus's preface to his cosmogony he addressed the poet with the didactic injunction 'set aside your fear and learn, hard-working poet of the days' (*disce metu posito, vates operose dierum*, 1.101). Following others I take this as an allusion to Hesiod's *Works and Days*, which probably had the title *Opera* (~ *operose*) *et Dies* (~ *dierum*) in Ovid's time.[24] In the cosmogony that follows this address the poet alludes to the corresponding passage in the *Metamorphoses*, as we saw, and both Ovidian cosmogonies allude to a third cosmogony at the beginning of Hesiod's *Theogony*. Therefore, Ovid at the same time encourages comparison of his two works and alludes to the two Hesiodic poems, thus creating an analogy: the *Metamorphoses* corresponds to the *Theogony* and the *Fasti* to *Works and Days*.[25] This analogy too involves the con-

20 Text of *Fast.* is that of Alton, Wormell, and Courtney 1978. Translations are my own.
21 'In truth, first of all Chasm came to be …' (ἤτοι μὲν πρώτιστα Χάος γένετ', *Theog.* 116).
22 Text of *Met.* is that of Tarrant 2004. Translations are my own.
23 Wheeler 1995, 96.
24 Green 2004, 74–75 *ad* 1.101 with references.
25 Feeney 1999, 26. Feeney emphasizes how parallels and contrasts in the time-schemes of the respective pairs of poems encourage this analogy. He observes that the representa-

cept of strife. As we saw, *Works and Days* appears to 'correct' the genealogy of Strife in the *Theogony* by positing a 'good' Strife in addition to the 'bad' one in the *Theogony*. Similarly, in the cosmogony in the *Fasti*, *lis* or strife is a creative principle, whereas in the *Metamorphoses* it defined the chaos that the demiurge then transformed. Ovid's revision of *lis* would therefore seem to be modeled on Hesiod's analogous revision of *eris*. Yet in using *lis*—a word that can mean 'lawsuit'[26]—in the *Fasti* for this 'good' strife he is also revising Hesiod, for whom legal strife in *Works and Days* is largely negative.[27] He thus competes with Hesiod in properly assigning praise or blame to this manifestation of strife.

One further aspect of this Ovidian revision of Hesiod *vis-à-vis* legal strife is the emphasis placed upon the prince Germanicus's good judgment and legal acumen at the beginning of the *Fasti*. As was noted above (n. 18), Germanicus is the addressee of (at least the proem of) *Fasti* 1.[28] The poet humbly submits his poem to the (aesthetic) 'judgment' (*iudicium*, 1.19) of the 'learned prince' (*docti principis*, 1.19–20). The legal connotation of *iudicium* is picked up in the following lines, where Germanicus is said to be skilled in forensic oratory: 'For we realized what eloquence there is in your refined voice when it took up civil arms on behalf of trembling defendants' (*quae sit enim culti facundia sensimus oris, / civica pro trepidis cum tulit arma reis*, 1.21–22). This positive evaluation of the *princeps* Germanicus as both 'judge' and legal advocate stands in notable contrast to Hesiod's famous deprecation of kings in their role as judges in *Op.* 37–41 (see above n. 10). Although this statement about the judgment of kings, unlike the *Fasti*'s contrasting praise of Germanicus, is not directly addressed to the kings, later in *Works and Days* Hesiod does momentarily turn aside from speaking to Perses about justice to address them directly (ὦ βασιλῆς, 248) and strongly urges them to straighten their crooked judgments (*Op.* 248–274, especially 260–264).

tion of time in the *Metamorphoses*, like that in the *Theogony*, is (at least broadly speaking) 'sequential from origins', while the representation of time in the *Fasti*, like that in *Works and Days*, is 'annually circular'. Thus, in Feeney's words, 'Ovid is a modern Hesiod in both his works [i.e., *Metamorphoses* and *Fasti*]'. Van Noorden 2015, 215–216 points out the limits of this analogy, since 'both [*sc. Met.* and *Fast.*] recall both [*sc. Theog.* and *Op.*]'. Nevertheless, the analogy is sometimes useful as a hermeneutic tool, as I hope my analysis shows.

26 See *OLD s.v. lis* 1.

27 See *Op.* 27–41, although it should be noted that in lines 30–34 Hesiod does qualify his injunction that Perses not listen to legal quarrels by telling him that were he to store up enough food, *then* he might engage in quarrels and conflict.

28 On the question of whether the dedication to Germanicus was part of the original plan of the poem or a post-exilic revision see Green 2004, 15–25.

Ovid might well have expected Germanicus, as a learned poet himself,[29] to notice this revision of Hesiod's view of the judgment and justice of rulers. Ovid thus engages in a discourse of praise and blame of rulers in the context of legal 'strife' that is itself Hesiodic. As Philip Hardie (2012, 56 ad *Op*. 12–13) notes, 'Hesiod introduces the two Strifes themselves within a framework of verbal judgement' and 'it is the job of the *aoidos* Hesiod to persuade us that this *is* the correct allocation of praise and blame between the two Strifes, in the face of the competing view of the world ascribed to the misguided Perses, tempted into taking pleasure in the bad Strife manifested in judicial disputes'. In a similar, but competing vein, the poet of the *Fasti* takes on the job of persuading us both that (judicial) strife is not as bad as Hesiod suggests and, furthermore, that he himself is correct in assigning praise to the princely *iudex* and advocate Germanicus against his Hesiodic model.[30]

The legal discourse begun in the *Fasti* proem recurs prominently later, in the Janus-cosmogony, in which the strife among the elements is *not* settled by a demiurge or divine arbitrator as it is in the *Metamorphoses*; and this absence of a 'judgment' turns out to be programmatic for the *Fasti*. One of the poem's chief subjects is the calendar and its *causae*, which is part of the aetiological and Callimachean program of the poem;[31] and one of the basic features of the poem's aetiological discourse is the presentation of competing *causae*, which are often framed as a legal dispute.[32] *Causae*, while it translates the Greek *aitia* of Callimachus, can also, like *lis*/*lites*, have a legal meaning.[33] And like the

29 See *Fast*. 1.19 (*docti … principis*) and 1.25 (*vates*).

30 Ovid's submission of his poem to Germanicus's judgment and other gestures of deference also function to defuse the threat of rivalry between poet and prince, the potential for which exists not least because Germanicus is himself a poet, especially of an astronomical poem (*Aratea*) modeled, like the *Fasti*, on Aratus's *Phaenomena*, on which see Green 2004, 147–148, with Siwicki in this volume on potential rivalry between architects and patrons. Ovidian scholars have become increasingly interested in poetry as a space in which poet might compete with *princeps*. See most recently Ziogas 2015. Potential rivalry with rulers is also a theme in Hesiod's *Op*. if we accept the usual interpretation of the famous fable of the hawk and nightingale (*Op*. 202–212), which is addressed to kings, as an allegory for rivalry between king and poet, in which the lesson seems to be that poets should *not* compete with kings; on the fable see, e.g., Clay 2003, 39 with references. I plan to pursue this aspect of the reception of Hesiod's discourse on competition in another paper.

31 This is announced in the opening distich: 'I will sing of the times along with their causes distributed throughout the Latin year, and the constellations' rising and then setting under the earth' (*tempora cum causis Latium digesta per annum* / *lapsaque sub terras ortaque signa canam*, *Fast*. 1.1–2).

32 Gebhardt 2009, 283–303, especially 296–299.

33 *OLD s.v. causa* A.

programmatic *lis* of the Janus-cosmogony, the multiple, competing *causae* are often not settled by the poet or other traditional sources of authority.[34]

In light of this volume's subject, a particularly relevant example of this—and one often adduced in discussions of the poem's multiple explanations[35]—is the poet's list of possible etymologies for the name of the Agonalia festival. The festival was sometimes marked in the calendars by the abbreviation *AGON* (Green 2004, 151–152 *ad* 1.317–318)—which according to the *Fasti*'s poet is apt given the contested nature of its etymology: he encourages us to recall the Greek word *agôn*, 'contest', by offering 'contests' (*agônês*) as one of the potential etymologies (1.329–330). In fact, the poet provides no less than six different etymologies for the festival's name; the last one is declared the victor of this etymological *agôn* by the authority of the poet *qua* judge: 'the speech of old, too, used *agonia* to mean a sheep and this last is the true explanation in my judgment' (*et pecus antiquus dicebat agonia sermo; / veraque iudicio est ultima causa meo*, 1.331–332). But the poet immediately calls his own verdict into question (*non certa est*, 1.333, with Miller 1992, 23). Janus, who is this agonistic festival's presiding deity (1.319), had inaugurated the strategy seen here of offering multiple explanations (P. Hardie 1991, 63); in fact, Janus's first example of multiple explanations concerned *himself*, specifically his name and shape, for which he offers two different accounts (Green 2004, 74 *ad* 1.101–144). We might compare this to Hesiod's explanation of the double birth of Eris in *Works and Days*, which, as I have suggested, sets an early precedent for multiple, competing explanations in the didactic tradition.

This competition in the *Fasti* reaches its climax in the presentation of discordant competition among the traditionally concordant Muses in *Fasti* 5, as Alessandro Barchiesi (1991) has discussed, and its doublet in *Fasti* 6, in which three goddesses—Juno, her daughter Hebe, and the unexpectedly discordant goddess Concordia—offer competing *causae* for each month's name (Barchiesi 1991, 7). It should be noted that in the meeting of the latter three the poet says specifically that goddesses appeared to him, but *not* those that appeared to Hesiod: 'behold! I saw goddesses, although not the ones whom the teacher of plowing had seen, when he was shepherding his Ascraean sheep' (*ecce deas*

34 See Barchiesi 1991, 7–8; Gebhardt 2009, 283–286 and 299–303. Gebhardt demonstrates that the poet in his role as *iudex*, 'judge', becomes increasingly hesistant to issue a final 'verdict' as the poem progresses. This tendency is especially ironic because, as Barchiesi 1991, 7 points out, 'the *Fasti* (4.384) inform us that the most important office that he [*sc.* Ovid] ever held during his not particularly irksome public career was that of *decemuir litibus iudicandis*'.

35 See, e.g., Miller 1992.

vidi, non quas praeceptor arandi / viderat, Ascraeas cum sequeretur oves, 6.13–14).[36] In both instances the poet refuses to adjudicate the competition, leaving it open-ended. In the latter he explains his refusal to judge the dispute by citing the precedent of Paris's judgment in the famous beauty contest, which was instigated by the goddess Eris herself (6.97–100). The Muses are reconciled at the end of *Fasti* 6, but discordant notes have been found there, too;[37] and, in any case, their agreement does not negate the predominance of disagreement and open-ended competition in the preceding books (Gebhardt 2009, 303).

The above-mentioned revision of the role of *lis* in *the Fasti*, where *lis* is a principle that leads to cosmic order rather than impedes it, as it does in the *Metamorphoses*, is essentially reprised in relation to actual legal *lites*, 'lawsuits', within *Fasti* itself, especially the god Janus's encouragement of such 'good' strife. Just before Janus's epiphany the poet urges people not to listen to lawsuits on the Kalends of January, an injunction resembling Hesiod's plea to Perses at the beginning of *Works and Days* (27–32) to cease listening to legal *neikea*: 'Let your ears hear no legal strife and let maddened quarrels be gone at once; put off your work, malicious tongue' (*lite vacent aures, insanaque protinus absint / iurgia: differ opus, livida lingua, tuum*, 1.73–74). As Green (2004, 61) notes in his comment on the passage, 'engagement in lawsuits (*lites*) and other legal wranglings (*iurgia*) was typically forbidden on holy days'. It comes as quite a surprise, then, that less than a hundred lines later the poet, interviewing Janus, says: 'after this I wondered why the first day was not without lawsuits' (*post ea mirabar cur non sine litibus esset / prima dies*, 1.165–166). Janus explains that he has included lawsuits (and other *res agendae*) on the kalends in order that the year not be *iners*, 'idle', immediately glossing the term's etymological meaning (*in—ars* or 'without art or craft') by the mention of *artes*: 'I've assigned the beginning of the year to business lest the entirety be idle from the omen. Each man offers just a taste of his own craft for the same reason …' (*tempora commisi nascentia rebus agendis, / totus ab auspicio ne foret annus iners. / quisque suas artes ob idem delibat agendo*, 1.167–169). Janus's cosmogony, narrated less than a hundred lines earlier, had prepared us for this 'revision' of the role of *lis*/*lites* on the kalends (and in Ovid's poetic year), since it had effected its own revision of the role of *lis* with respect to that in the cosmogony of the *Metamorphoses*. All this hints at the importance of the verbal battles or competition in the poem; holy days may typically be free from *lis* and other legal wrangling,

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36 See Gebhardt 2009, 290 on the passage at the beginning of *Fast.* 6 as the culmination of the poet's refusal to judge among competing explanations.

37 See Newlands 1995, 209–236; A. Hardie 2007, 567–570.

but the holy days of Ovid's poetic year include *lis* in its metaphorical sense of verbal disputes. Ovid thus emphasizes the verbal license and multiple voices or perspectives of his poetic calendar.[38]

In the analogy between Hesiod's two poems and Ovid's own that we have been tracing, it is tempting to see a parallel between the double Eris at the beginning of *Works and Days* and the double Janus at the beginning of *Fasti*.[39] Although Janus's Hesiodic genealogy is complex (he is also the Hesiodic Chaos),[40] the parallels between Hesiod's Erides and Janus are particularly strong.[41] Both the Erides and Janus have been understood as programmatic figures for their respective works.[42] In Hesiod the two Erides 'have thoroughly opposed spirits' (διὰ δ' ἄνδιχα θυμὸν ἔχουσιν, *Op.* 13): the one should be blamed (ἐπιμωμητή, *Op.* 13), 'for it fosters evil war and conflict' (ἡ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμόν τε κακὸν καὶ δῆριν ὀφέλλει, *Op.* 14), but the other is 'good' and to be praised because it inspires productive competition among various craftsmen, including poets (*Op.* 17–26). Janus, in keeping with his duplicitous nature, admits of a similarly bifurcated reading, being associated with both a 'bad' and 'good' strife.

38 The promotion of *lis* in the poem suggests that there are always at least two sides to a story (as in a legal dispute), an idea that is compatible with the suggestion made by P. Hardie 1991, 64 that the programmatic function of Ovid's two-faced Janus may demand a 'bifocal reading' of the poem. On the political implications of the theme of verbal license (or lack thereof) in the *Fasti* see especially Feeney 1992. The 'poetic' *lites* in the *Fasti*, i.e., the competing explanations in the poem, are ultimately left up to the judgment of the audience (cf. *Fast.* 6.1–2), whereas legal judgments in Augustan Rome were increasingly subject to the judgment or influence of the *princeps* and members of his family, of which we perhaps see a token in Ovid's appeal to Germanicus as ideal legal advocate in the *Fasti* proem. Of course, Augustus's relegation of Ovid is poignant testimony to this, as well. See Pieper 2012 for a reading of the excursus on animal-sacrifice in *Fast.* 1 (in the context of the aforementioned Agonalia) as a veiled criticism of the increasing arbitrariness of legal decisions in Augustan Rome.

39 Cf. Barchiesi 1997, 237, where he notes Janus's discordant associations. He observes that Janus's discourse in *Fasti* 1 makes various themes of Augustan propaganda seem 'discordant' and that 'Janus' authority acts as guarantee for a contradictory truth, which brings disorder into the habitual modes of Augustan discourse'.

40 Note, however, that Eris, in genealogical terms, is closely related to Chaos, being the latter's 'granddaughter': Chaos bears Night (*Theog.* 123), who in turn bears Eris (*Theog.* 225).

41 Mezzadri 1989 argues that Hesiod's double Eris has many of the characteristics shared by 'les dieux initiaux' in the Indo-European tradition. In the conclusion he briefly mentions Janus as another initial god who shares certain characteristics with Eris such as doubleness and an association with war, but with no mention of Janus's treatment in the *Fasti*.

42 For the programmatic function of the Erides passage see, e.g., Hamilton 1989, 64 and Nagler 1992, 79; for Janus see Green 2004, 70–71 with references.

Let us begin with the bad, since one could object to attributing to the 'peaceful' Janus any associations at all with the strife designated as 'bad' in *Works and Days*.[43] He says of his function during Saturn's reign, for instance: 'I had nothing to do with war: I guarded peace and doors' (*nil mihi cum bello: pacem postesque tuebar*, 1.253). As Green (2004, 119–120 *ad* 1.253 f.) points out, however, Janus 'cannot dissociate himself from military affairs so easily', a difficulty that 'is also apparent in the poem itself'. Indeed, Janus's statement that he has nothing to do with war appears especially tendentious when we remember that he is the guardian of the 'Gates of War',[44] which, despite Augustus's repeated closing of them during his principate, were open—signaling war—for most of Rome's history.[45] Furthermore, in the ancient sources Janus is identified with war and bellicose deities such as Mars and Juno as often as he is with peace, especially in his guise as Quirinus, an epithet which 'applied to Janus was understood to signify that he was the Lord of War'.[46]

It is therefore difficult for Janus to shed his martial associations, despite the poem's focus on his peaceful and civil aspects (Barchiesi 1997, 231). That the poem de-emphasizes Janus's association with war even strengthens his identification with Hesiod's double Eris: the 'bad' Eris who fosters war is similarly de-emphasized in *Works and Days*, which focuses instead on the 'good' Eris who encourages competition among farmers and others in the more 'peaceful' agricultural milieu of *Works and Days*. At the same time, Janus's characterization as a god of peace is obscured by the fact that his treatment in the poem includes space for 'good' strife: the productive role for *lis* and the establishment

43 On Janus's 'peaceful' associations in the poem see, e.g., Barchiesi 1991, 15–17.

44 Janus reminds readers of his temple's association with war at *Fast.* 1.123–124, on which see Green 2004, 80 *ad* 1.121–124.

45 According to Augustus in *Mon.Anc.* 13 the gates had only been shut two times in all of Roman history before the Senate voted to have the gates closed on three different occasions during his reign.

46 See Herbert-Brown 1994, 194–195, where she also cites Macrob. *Sat.* 1.9.16, who explains Janus's title Quirinus (trans. R.A. Kaster): '[We call him] "Quirinus" as a god of war, from *curis*, the Sabine word for "spear"' (*Quirinum, quasi bellorum potentem, ab hasta quam Sabini curin vocant*). On Janus as Quirinus see Serv. ad *Aen.* 7.610. In the same note Servius says that '[some think that] he [*sc.* Janus] is Mars' (*eumque esse Martem*). Cf. also Luc. 1.61–62, where he applies the epithet *belligerus* to Janus: 'may peace sent throughout the globe keep in check the iron threshold of warlike Janus' (*pax missa per orbem / ferrea belligeri conpescat limina Iani*). On Janus and Juno see Serv. ad *Aen.* 7.610: 'likewise [he is called] Iunonius; hence it is apt that Juno is brought in to open the gates [of Janus's temple]' (*idem Iunonius; inde pulchre Iuno portas aperire inducitur*). On Janus and his temple's association with both peace and war see, e.g., Livy 1.19.1–3 and Plin. *HN* 34.33.

of *lites* and other *artes* on the kalends of the month in order to ensure a productive year, to which we might compare the fostering of productive competition among craftsmen by good Eris (*Op.* 20–26). This bifurcated view of strife is articulated in the proem of *Fasti* 1, in which the poet distances himself from *arma* or the military exploits of Caesar[47] but then praises Germanicus for his wielding of *civica arma*, that is, his use of forensic oratory on behalf of defendants (*Fast.* 1.21–22, with Green 2004, 41–52 ad loc.). Thus, the Ovidian Janus in his ambiguous association with both a destructive martial and a productive civil strife is a version of Hesiod's double Eris, which likewise stands at the beginning of its poem and exhibits a similarly double picture of strife.

4 *Discors concordia*

So far I have used the *Metamorphoses* principally as a foil in articulating the 'discordant poetics' of the *Fasti*, but the concordant and teleological poetics of the demiurge's resolution of *lis* (*Met.* 1.21) or strife at the beginning of the *Metamorphoses*, which is accomplished by binding the warring elements in 'concordant peace' (*concordi pace*, 1.25), is soon countered by another, more discordant model of creation similar to that seen in the cosmogony of *Fasti* 1. After the waters of the catastrophic flood recede, the earth begins to be repopulated through a fecund *discors concordia* of fire and water: 'although fire and water are at war, a moist warmth creates all things and the discordant concord is suited to birth' (*cumque sit ignis aquae pugnax, vapor umidus omnes / res creat et discors concordia fetibus apta est*, 1.432–433). In effect this is a revision of the earlier view of elemental discord (*discordia semina*, 1.9), which had impeded rather than facilitated growth and the emergence of forms of life (Wheeler 2000, 35–36).

The passage that comes right after the post-diluvian *discors concordia* reprises the pattern: an image of the imposition of order is countered by an image of disorder or discord. One of the *nova monstra* created by the *discors concordia* is Python, who is subsequently slain by Apollo—an image of (Olympian) order imposed upon chthonic chaos similar to the demiurge's ordering of the cosmos. But immediately after Apollo defeats one discordant being (Python), another, albeit quite different one, arises: Cupid. The ensuing 'contest' between Apollo and Cupid is on one level a metapoetic one between rival sources of

47 'Let others sing of Caesar's wars' (*Caesaris arma canant alii*, 1.13). On *arma* and the poem's distancing of itself from martial epic see Hinds 1992.

inspiration. This is underscored by the episode's reworking of Ovid's poetic initiation as an elegiac poet in *Amores* 1.1 (Nicoll 1980), in which Cupid usurps the role of divine patron and inspirer of poetry typically occupied by Apollo and the concordant Muses.[48] We can thus see Cupid as a kind of counter-Muse to the traditional Muses, not unlike Eris in *Works and Days* and Janus in the *Fasti*. Indeed, Cupid's competition with (and defeat of) Apollo and the story of the latter's resultant lust for Daphne has a strongly proemial aspect: it marks a new, programmatic beginning in the poem by announcing what will henceforth be one of the poem's main preoccupations, *amor*:[49] 'The first love of Apollo was Peneus's daughter, Daphne, whom not blind chance gave, but the savage wrath of Cupid' (*Primus amor Phoebi Daphne Peneia, quem non / fors ignara dedit, sed saeva Cupidinis ira*, 1.452–453). If in this passage, as in *Amores* 1.1, Cupid defeats and thus displaces Apollo (and indirectly also the Muses) as a source of inspiration for Ovid's poetry, he is largely a *discordant* Muse, performing the function in the *Metamorphoses* of not only *erôs* but also *eris* from Hesiod's *Theogony*.[50] Cupid's embodiment of the principles of both attraction and separation is nicely captured in the *duo tela … diversorum operum* (1.468–469) with which he causes Apollo's pursuit of Daphne, on the one hand, and, on the other, the nymph's flight from the god. In this respect Cupid is a duplicitous figure like Eris in *Works and Days* and Janus in the *Fasti*.

Cupid's role in *Metamorphoses* as a discordant Muse, one 'who turns the divine world upside down' (Miller 2009, 170) but is at the same time a source of poetic energy, is underlined by several allusions to Vergil's *Aeneid* at the beginning of the Daphne-episode, which link Cupid to that poem's principal agent of strife, Juno. The opening lines of the episode describing Apollo's *primus amor* (quoted above) allude to several other literary beginnings, but the *Aeneid* can claim pride of place among these intertexts since *Metamorphoses* 1.452–453 alludes to not just one but *two* beginnings in the *Aeneid* (Miller 2009, 170–171). The *saeva ira* attributed to Cupid at *Met.* 1.453, although it nods to the elegiac topos of the boy-god's *saevitia*,[51] also alludes to the 'mindful wrath of savage Juno' (*saevae memorem Iunonis … iram*, *Aen.* 1.4, with Miller 2009, 170).[52] Juno's wrath was caused by, among other things, the outcome of the judgment

48 Cf. *Am.* 1.1.5–6, 15–16. As Ziogas 2013, 109 n. 171 observes, Ovid also rejects the inspiration of Apollo and the Muses at the beginning of his didactic *Ars Amatoria*.

49 See Miller 2009, 168 with references.

50 Cf. Clay 2003, 19 on the 'inseparable and intertwined' forces of *erôs* and *eris* in *Theog*.

51 Cf. *Am.* 1.1.5: *'quis tibi, **saeve** puer, dedit hoc in carmina iuris?'*

52 Text of the *Aen.* is that of Mynors 1969. Translations are my own.

of Paris and arose, like Cupid's in *Metamorphoses*, in the context of a contest. *Met.* 1.452–453, however, also alludes to a second passage in the *Aeneid* involving Juno, this time the goddess's address in *Aeneid* 7 to the Fury Allecto, who has just returned from fulfilling Juno's order, namely, fomenting war between the Trojans and Italians.[53]

These allusions neatly connect an important new beginning in the *Metamorphoses* to two beginnings in the *Aeneid*, thus also linking Cupid and Juno as major sources of strife in their poems and simultaneously potent sources of poetic energy, capable, in a Muse-like way, of inspiring the poet. Juno's anger is *memor* (*Aen.* 1.4), which connects her explicitly to the Muse invoked just a few lines later: 'Muse, recall to me the causes' (*Musa, mihi causas* ***memora***, 1.8, with A. Hardie 2007, 571). Indeed, one might see Juno as an opponent of the Muses, who traditionally represent the will and plan of Zeus/Jupiter, which Juno opposes throughout most of the poem. Juno's status as a discordant counter-Muse is underlined again in the poem's new beginning in *Aeneid* 7, in which Juno's action of opening the Gates of War (7.620–622) finds a parallel in the poet's request to the Muses that they 'open' Helicon (7.641–642).[54] As Don Fowler (1998, 165) has suggested, Juno resists attempts at 'closure' in the *Aeneid*, never more clearly than in her opening of the Gates of War and, in this respect, 'inspires the poet to further poetry'. In opening the temple of Janus Geminus, Juno is acting as *discordia* incarnate, since the chief literary precedent for this act is the opening of the same gates by *Discordia* herself (a Latin Eris) in Ennius's *Annales* 7.[55]

Juno and her dissenting voice thus provide a parallel for Cupid's contest with Apollo in his function as source of poetic authority.[56] Discordant, competing voices are in fact a pervasive feature of the *Metamorphoses*. The discordant Muses of *Fasti* 5 have a counterpart in the discordant Muses of *Metamorphoses* 5, for instance, who compete in a song contest against a doublet of themselves,

53 Miller 2009, 171 compares *Met.* 1.452–453, *primus amor Phoebi Daphne Peneia, quem non / fors ignara dedit, sed saeva Cupidinis ira*, with *Aen.* 7.554, *quae fors prima dedit sanguis novus imbuit arma*.

54 A. Hardie 2007, 581–582 with references. At page 574 Hardie notes that Juno's opening of the Gates of War also echoes the poet's appeal to the Muses at *Aen.* 1.8–11.

55 A. Hardie 2007, 582 with references.

56 Apollo's authority is also political: as Ziogas 2015, 116 notes, the end of the Daphne-episode, in which we learn of the laurel's use in honoring Augustus, 'foregrounds Apollo's double identity as the god of poetry and the divine patron of the Roman emperor'. See the Introduction to this volume on 'representational competition' (such as fictive competitions within poems), authority, and dissent.

the Pierides.[57] Cupid's competition with Apollo is thus programmatic not only in announcing *amor* as its subject but also in staging competition and strife as sources of (poetic) creativity.

5 Conclusion

Ovid uses the model of Hesiod's *Theogony* and *Works and Days* to help articulate the relationship between his *Metamorphoses* and *Fasti*, initially defining the relationship as an eristic one with competing representations of *lis* based on Hesiod's revision in *Works and Days* of the genealogy of Eris posited in the *Theogony*. At the same time, as Hesiod's discussion of the 'good' Eris suggests, imitation features both close resemblance and difference, so Ovid 'corrects' the Hesiodic presentation of strife and competition by promoting *lis* or 'legal strife' as an example of 'good' strife and by evaluating positively the judgment (*iudicium*) and legal advocacy of the prince Germanicus, whereas Hesiod in *Works and Days* seems largely critical of both legal *eris* and the (legal) acumen of kings. The double god Janus has a central role in this dialog on strife and competition, since he is a descendant of Hesiod's double Eris in *Works and Days* as a representation of both 'bad' and 'good' strife and in his capacity as a programmatic figure at the beginning of Ovid's didactic *Fasti*. However, insofar as Janus is both Chaos and Eris and his opening speech alludes to both the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*, his doubleness can also represent Hesiod's status as the paradigmatic example of a 'double poet', that is, a poet representing two different kinds of poetry—mythological and didactic epic—that treat similar material in sometimes competing or contradictory ways and that can be read to espouse competing systems of literary values.[58] In this respect Hesiod was a rich model for Ovid as he set out to compose the *Metamorphoses* and its elegiac twin, the *Fasti*. As we saw, however, the poetically energizing nature of strife, in spite of the demiurge's initial suppression of *lis* in the *Metamorphoses*, is programmatically encoded in that poem, as well, in which Cupid emerges as a 'discordant' rival to Apollo and the Muses or as an alternative voice to traditional sources of poetic (and political) authority. As Helen Van Noorden (2015, 237) has recently observed, Ovid found in Hesiod 'a legacy of "alternative" storytelling perspectives'; we can see this 'inheritance' reflected in Ovid's promotion

57 Elsewhere the Pierides are simply equated with the Muses: Hinds 1987, 14 and 132 n. 40; Ziogas 2013, 90 n. 19. Hinds 1987, 128–133 is the seminal discussion of the metaliterary aspects of the competition.

58 On Hesiod as a 'double poet' see Rosati 2009, 348–352.

of *lis* as a principle representing alternative or competing arguments. A similar principle in Hesiod's poetics is memorably represented by the double Eris of *Works and Days*, which Ovid adapted in articulating his own view of the poetic fertility of strife.[59]

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CHAPTER 14

Demosthenes versus Cicero: Intercultural Competition in Ancient Literary Criticism

Casper C. de Jonge

1 Introduction: Competition in Ancient Literary Criticism

The notion of competition deeply informs the ancient understanding of the nature, origins, and purpose of literature. Greek and Roman rhetoricians regarded emulation or rivalry (ζῆλος, ζήλωσις, *aemulatio*) as a formative power and an indispensable quality for the production of new texts.[1] Thus Longinus, the author of the treatise *On the Sublime*, argues that the unique quality of Plato's poetic style stems from his desire 'to contest the prize with Homer, like a young competitor (ἀνταγωνιστής) with one who has already won admiration'. As Plato competed with Homer, Longinus's students must emulate the great writers of classical Greece, including both Plato and Homer. Longinus refers to Hesiod's 'good strife' (ἔρις ἀγαθή) as the model for such healthy competition among the writers of literature (*Subl.* 13.4):[2]

> So many of these [great] qualities would never have flourished among Plato's philosophical tenets, nor would he have entered so often into the subjects and language of poetry, had he not striven, with heart and soul, to contest the prize with Homer, like a young competitor with one who already won his spurs, perhaps in too keen emulation, longing as it were to break a lance, and yet always to good purpose; for, as Hesiod says, 'Good is this strife for mortals' (*Op.* 24). The contest for glorious reputation is really a fine thing, and the crown is worthy of the victory, where even to be worsted by those born before you is not without glory.

1 Dion. Hal. *De imit.* fr. 2 Aujac defines μίμησις and ζῆλος. See Russell 1979, esp. 9–11. I wish to thank the participants of the Penn-Leiden Colloquium on Ancient Values IX (2016) in Leiden and audiences in London, Heidelberg, and Tübingen for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this chapter. I am also grateful to Judith Mossman and to the anonymous referee for their helpful suggestions.

2 Translation adapted from Fyfe and Russell 1999. On Hesiod's 'good strife' (*Op.* 24) and its ancient reception see Scodel and Ham in this volume.

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> καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἐπακμάσαι μοι δοκεῖ τηλικαῦτά τινα τοῖς τῆς φιλοσοφίας δόγμασι καὶ εἰς ποιητικὰς ὕλας πολλαχοῦ συνεμβῆναι καὶ φράσεις, εἰ μὴ περὶ πρωτείων νὴ Δία παντὶ θυμῷ πρὸς Ὅμηρον, ὡς ἀνταγωνιστὴς νέος πρὸς ἤδη τεθαυμασμένον, ἴσως μὲν φιλονικότερον καὶ οἱονεὶ διαδορατιζόμενος, οὐκ ἀνωφελῶς δ' ὅμως διηριστεύετο· "ἀγαθὴ" γὰρ κατὰ τὸν Ἡσίοδον "ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσι." καὶ τῷ ὄντι καλὸς οὗτος καὶ ἀξιονικότατος εὐκλείας ἀγών τε καὶ στέφανος, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι τῶν προγενεστέρων οὐκ ἄδοξον.

For Longinus the imitation and emulation of great poets and prose writers is one road that can lead to the sublime (μίμησις τε καὶ ζήλωσις, *Subl.* 13.2, with Russell 1979, 9–10). The literary critic is not only the judge who from a distance evaluates the achievements of other (earlier) competitors; he himself is a competitor as well. Throughout his treatise Longinus presents himself as an active participant in a literary contest that inspires him to emulate Homer, Plato, Hesiod, and all the other exemplary authors whom he cites.[3] As well as competing with the classical writers of the distant past Longinus is also competing with contemporary critics of literature. His main opponent is Caecilius of Caleacte (Augustan period), the author of the first treatise *On the Sublime*, which Longinus frequently criticizes.[4]

Ancient critics may thus be said to be involved in a triple contest. First, they are the judges of fictive competitions between earlier writers, as when Longinus evaluates the contest between Homer and Plato. Second, critics are themselves also competitors, who are emulating the sublime writing of classical authors; thus Longinus emulates both Homer and Plato. And finally they also seek to win the contest of criticism by presenting themselves as better critics than their colleagues, as Longinus does by competing with Caecilius.[5] This chapter will focus primarily on the first type of contest (with ancient critics as judges of fictional literary competitions), but the other two types of competition (with the critics themselves as competitors) will turn out to be highly relevant as well.

When a critic (κριτικός) examines and evaluates the texts written by poets or prose writers, he plays the role of a judge (κριτής).[6] The most obvious paradigm for such a perspective on the evaluation of texts is provided by the theatrical

3 Innes 1995, 117 shows that competition is one of the patterns of imagery that provide unity to the treatise *On the Sublime*. See esp. *Subl.* 35.2: we humans are all born as both 'spectators' and 'the most ambitious competitors' (φιλοτιμοτάτους ἀγωνιστάς).

4 [Longinus], *Subl.* 1.1. On Caecilius see the literature mentioned below (n. 25).

5 For a similar scenario see Zadorojnyi in this volume.

6 See Ford 2002, 273 on the ancient critic as 'judge'.

competition in classical Athens, where poets competed against one another and were ranked by a panel of selected citizens.[7] The competitive aspects of the dithyrambic, comic, and tragic contests of the City Dionysia are echoed in the professional criticism of literature, which takes place in the context of poetry, rhetoric, philology, or philosophy. No surprise, then, that the frame of the contest (ἀγών) is remarkably prominent throughout the history of literary criticism: some of the most familiar examples are the contest of Aeschylus and Euripides in Aristophanes' *Frogs* and the *Certamen* or *Contest of Homer and Hesiod*.[8] Greek and Roman rhetoricians are eager to present rankings of the best writers of each genre, assigning first, second, and third 'prizes' to the best representatives of poetry, history, philosophy, and oratory.[9] Such rankings suggest that writers were actively engaged in a (fictive) contest for victory: Euripides competes with Sophocles and Aeschylus, Xenophon with Herodotus and Thucydides, Lysias with Isocrates and Demosthenes.

The frame of the competition (ἀγών) in ancient literary criticism consists of various distinctive elements. A literary contest typically features competitors, prizes, criteria, a jury, and an audience. Each of these elements can adopt different forms. To begin with, the literary contest itself can be described in various terms and metaphors: it can be presented as a debate (as the contest of Aeschylus and Euripides in Aristophanes' *Frogs*), a race, a man-to-man fight of boxers or gladiators, or a military battle between armies.[10] Poets, orators, and historiographers are presented as the competitors (cf. ἀνταγωνισταί above). There may be two competitors, e.g., Plato and Homer (in the passage cited), or Homer and Hesiod (in the *Certamen*), or three contestants, like the three *Philoctetes* plays

7 Taplin in this volume shows that Aristotle was not very interested in the dramatic competition in Athens, possibly because he was not pleased by the performances of tragedies in his own time. But it is the popular judgment by theatrical audiences, not the notion of judgment itself, that Aristotle despises. In the *Poetics* Aristotle himself takes up the role of a judge and formulates the principles by which poems should be evaluated: his own philosophical criteria are presented as superior to the criterion of popular appeal: see Ford 2002, 286–293.

8 Too 1998, 18–50 examines the relationship between '*krisis* and *agōn*' in ancient literary criticism. Ford 2002, 272–293 discusses 'poetic contests from Homer to Aristotle'. On the contest in Aristophanes' *Frogs* see Dover 1993, 10–37; on the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod* see Heldmann 1982. Pseudo-Lucian's *Encomium of Demosthenes* stages a contest between Demosthenes and Homer.

9 See, e.g., Dion. Hal. *De imit.*, Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.45–124, Dio Chrys. *Or.* 18. On Roman literary canons see Citroni 2006a, 211–227.

10 For some examples see Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.51: Homer left all others far behind (*procul a se reliquit*); 10.1.106: Demosthenes fights with the sword point (*pugnat acumine*); 10.1.107: in wit and pathos 'we (Romans) win' (*vincimus*): the latter two passages are discussed below.

that Dio of Prusa compares in his fifty-second oration, thereby reviving the contest of three competing playwrights at the Athenian festival;[11] or there may be more, like the 'vast army' of Attic orators who are ranked by Quintilian (*Inst.* 10.1.76–80).[12] There is of course no contest without awards (cf. στέφανος above): all authors obviously compete for the first prize (τὰ πρωτεῖα), although in the classicizing context of Longinus's *On the Sublime* even the second prize may be valued as 'not without glory' (οὐκ ἄδοξον), if the first prize goes to Homer.[13] In a similar vein Quintilian points out that the second place awarded to Virgil after Homer is not without merit, since he is 'nearer to the first than to the third place' in the final ranking of epic poetry (*secundus est Vergilius, proprior tamen primo quam tertio, Inst.* 10.1.86, citing Domitius Afer). The prizes are awarded on the basis of criteria that may or may not be made explicit. These criteria can be purely stylistic or content-based, or they can be moral or philosophical categories. In the passage cited above Longinus observes that Plato's emulation of Homer has resulted in great poetic 'subject matter' (ὕλη) and 'expressions' (φράσεις) as well as 'philosophical doctrines' (δόγματα). Finally, the contest must obviously be decided by a judge or a jury. Although it is the profession of the κριτικός (critic) to take up the task of κρίνειν (to choose, to decide, to judge), he will often also invite the audience to perform that role: competitions in ancient literary criticism tend to engage and to involve the readers (in many cases students of rhetoric) in the process of evaluation.

2 Synkrisis

Ancient literary contests are often presented in the form of a σύγκρισις, a systematic comparison. In Greek and Roman historiography one finds comparisons of two politicians, two generals, or two philosophers. In ancient rhetoric and literary criticism the same device is used to compare two poets, two historiographers, or their works. Some famous examples are Dionysius's compar-

11 In Dio Chrys. *Or.* 52 the orator presents himself as a χορηγός producing in his mind the three plays by Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides.

12 Velleius Paterculus argues that emulation (*aemulatio*) explains why great minds are always clustered in one period, e.g., the tragedians Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides in the fifth century BCE, or the comedians Caecilius, Terentius, and Afranius in the second and first centuries BCE. These writers were involved in a competition with their contemporaries (1.17.6): *alit aemulatio ingenia, et nunc invidia, nunc admiratio imitationem accendit* ('Emulation fosters genius, and it is now envy, now admiration that incites imitation').

13 See also *Subl.* 33.4: sublime writers get 'the vote of first place' (τὴν τοῦ πρωτείου ψῆφον).

ison of Herodotus and Thucydides, Plutarch's σύγκρισις of Aristophanes and Menander, and Longinus's comparison of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.[14] But by far the most popular σύγκρισις in ancient rhetoric was that of Demosthenes and Cicero.

Soon after Cicero's death it became a popular exercise to compare the most successful orator of Rome with Demosthenes, who was by now universally considered the greatest model of Greek stylistic writing. Cicero himself had of course stimulated such comparisons by presenting Demosthenes as his primary object of emulation both in his speeches, especially the *Philippics* with their significant title, and in his theoretical works, in particular *Brutus* and *Orator* (46 BCE).[15] Defending himself against the attacks of C. Licinius Calvus and the *Attici*, who favored the pure and relatively simple style of Lysias and Hyperides, Cicero presented the rich and powerful style of Demosthenes as his own source of inspiration. In his rhetorical works Cicero frequently points out that 'Demosthenes surpasses all others' (*praestat omnibus Demosthenes*), so that 'critics have adjudged him the first of orators' (*a doctis oratorum est princeps iudicatus*, *Brut*. 141).[16] In choosing Demosthenes as his primary model of imitation and emulation Cicero consciously presented himself as the 'Roman Demosthenes'.[17] The surviving comparisons of Demosthenes and Cicero in Greek and Roman criticism demonstrate that Cicero succeeded in his plan to be acknowledged as the Roman rival and equivalent of Demosthenes—but did he also achieve his goal of surpassing his Greek counterpart? The latter question was raised by a number of Greek and Roman rhetoricians of the Roman Empire, and they presented different answers, as we will see.

As the two orators were regarded as the unchallenged champions of Greece and Rome, the contest between Demosthenes and Cicero soon acquired overtones of an intercultural competition in cultural superiority, a controversial topic that could easily lead to irritation and misunderstanding and could therefore only be discussed with great care and in veiled language. This chapter will examine four of these comparisons of Demosthenes and Cicero: the fragmentary *synkrisis* of Caecilius of Caleacte (T6 Woerther) and the surviving compar-

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14 Dion. Hal. *Pomp*. 3.2–21; Plut. *Mor. Comp. Ar. et Men.*; [Longinus], *Subl.* 9.11–15.

15 On Demosthenes' *Philippics* as a model for Cicero's *Philippics* see Ramsey 2003, 16–18 and Manuwald 2007, 47–54. The choice of the title 'reflects Cicero's desire to be viewed as Demosthenes' Roman counterpart' (Ramsey 2003, 17).

16 See also *Orator* 26 ('Demosthenes excels all others', *praestitisse ceteris*) and *passim*. On Demosthenes' role in Cicero's rhetorical theory see Dugan 2005, 333–334 and Manuwald 2007, 129–138 with further bibliography.

17 On this well known aspect see recently Manuwald 2007, 130.

isons in Plutarch (*Comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero*), Longinus (*On the Sublime* 12.4–5), and Quintilian (*Institutio oratoria* 10.1.105–112).[18]

The frame of the contest (ἀγών) helps us to understand these passages as negotiating a commentary on the competitive relationship between Greece and Rome and their literary achievements. Three aspects of these passages point particularly to an intercultural competition. Firstly, we will see that in each comparison the audience is encouraged to become an active part of the competition: the reader is not only invited to explore the differences between the two orators but may also be addressed as a supporter who cheers and applauds one of the two teams—either Greece or Rome. Secondly, I will argue that the critics, even when they refuse explicitly to give a clear verdict, employ subtle strategies in order to guide the reader in the direction of their preferred choice: such strategies include *praeteritio*, the use of contrastive particles (μέν … δέ), and the use of the first, second, and third person ('we' versus 'you' or 'we' versus 'they'). Finally, this chapter seeks to demonstrate that, although modern scholars have emphasized the basic correspondences between Greek and Latin treatments of this topic, there are in fact subtle differences between the Greek and the Roman perspectives on the two orators: as we will see, the Greek and Roman critics are themselves involved in a fierce competition of cultural superiority.

In his seminal article on the genre of σύγκρισις Focke (1923) rightly underlines the importance of the ἀγών motif and the accompanying κρίσις (judgment). The popularity of the σύγκρισις in ancient rhetoric and criticism is partly explained by the fact that 'comparison' was one of the *progymnasmata* (preliminary exercises) that prepared students for declamation in the Hellenistic and Roman world. The several surviving ancient accounts of this rhetorical exercise also cast some light on the application of synkrisis in literary criticism.[19] In the first century CE Aelius Theon mentions a comparison of Ajax and Odysseus, an example that illustrates his view that there should not be a great difference between the two persons compared (*Prog.* 10, tr. Kennedy 2003):[20]

> First, let it be specified that syncrises are not comparisons of things having a great difference between them; for someone wondering whether

18 There are also comparisons of Demosthenes and Cicero in Plin. *Ep.* 1.20.4, Hieron. *Ep.* 52.8.3, and Gell. *NA* 15.28.6–7. See Dugan 2005, 315–331.

19 Aelius Theon, *Prog.* 10, Hermog. *Prog.* 8, Aphth. *Prog.* 10, Nicolaus, *Prog.* 9. The texts are edited in Patillon 1997 and Patillon 2008. Kennedy 2003 provides English translations.

20 Spengel, *Rhet.* 112.30–113.2. The text follows Patillon 1997.

> Achilles or Thersites was braver would be laughable. Comparison should be of likes and where we are in doubt which should be preferred because of no evident superiority of one to the other.
>
> πρῶτον δὲ διωρίσθω, ὅτι αἱ συγκρίσεις γίνονται οὐ τῶν μεγάλην πρὸς ἄλληλα διαφορὰν ἐχόντων (γελοῖος γὰρ ὁ ἀπορῶν, πότερον ἀνδρειότερος Ἀχιλλεὺς ἢ Θερσίτης), ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ὁμοίων, καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν πότερον δεῖ προθέσθαι, διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ὁρᾶν τοῦ ἑτέρου πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον ὑπεροχήν.

However, this principle does not mean that the competition must inevitably result in a draw. The rhetorician whom we refer to as Pseudo-Hermogenes points out that a *synkrisis* may in fact have different aims or outcomes (*Prog.* 8.5, tr. Kennedy 2003):[21]

> Now sometimes we introduce comparisons on the basis of equality, showing the subjects we compare as equal, either in all respects or in most; sometimes we prefer one or the other, while also praising what we placed second. Sometimes we blame one thing completely and praise the other …
>
> Ἐνίοτε μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ἴσον προάγομεν τὰς συγκρίσεις, ἴσα δεικνύντες, ἃ παραβάλλομεν, ἢ διὰ πάντων ἢ διὰ πλειόνων· ἐνίοτε δὲ θάτερον προτίθεμεν, ἐγκωμιάζοντες κἀκεῖνο οὗ τοῦτο προτίθεμεν· ἐνίοτε δὲ τὸ μὲν ψέγομεν ὅλως, τὸ δὲ ἐπαινοῦμεν …

Educated Greeks and Romans of the imperial period were deeply familiar with such comparisons from their school training. It is therefore no surprise that *synkriseis* appears in many different forms in ancient Greek and Latin literature. The category that has been studied most frequently is the formal comparison that concludes most of Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*.[22] Plutarch's *synkriseis* have been criticized as rather superficial summaries of the more complex narratives that precede them.[23] Recent scholarship, however, has rightly recognized that a *synkrisis* is not meant to be a summary of the preceding narratives: it empha-

21 Hermog. *Prog.* p. 19 Rabe. The text follows Patillon 2008.
22 On Plutarchan *synkrisis* see Erbse 1956, Swain 1992, Duff 1999, Duff 2000, Pelling 2002, and Larmour 2014.
23 E.g., Moles 1988, 24–25 discusses five 'weaknesses' of Plutarch's comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero.

sizes differences rather than similarities and does so in a pointed and rhetorical way. Timothy Duff has argued that one important function of the Plutarchan *synkrisis* is to engage the audience; in focusing attention on a few basic differences (διάφοραι) between the two protagonists—e.g., Alexander and Caesar, or Demosthenes and Cicero—the *synkrisis* could be seen as a starting point for discussion and debate (Duff 1999, 263–267; 283–286).

If σύγκρισις is indeed a form of competition, then Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* together imply a contest on a greater scale: a competition between Greece and Rome. This intercultural aspect of Plutarch's project has been interpreted in different ways. Some scholars have argued that Plutarch aims to present Greece and Rome as equals, a matched pair that is reconciled in one happy Greco-Roman world (Barigazzi 1984, 284–285). More convincing, however, is the interpretation of those who argue that Plutarch's consistently Greek perspective reaffirms Greek superiority: since the Greek life in each pair precedes the Roman, it sets the standard against which the Roman life is evaluated; the Romans are thus consistently assessed according to Greek norms and categories. The best Romans are therefore those who are portrayed as most Hellenic: a famous example is the Roman Numa, who is praised as 'more Greek' (ἑλληνικώτερον) than the Spartan Lycurgus.[24] This interpretation of Plutarch's project of comparing Greek and Roman identity is also highly relevant to the ancient comparisons of Demosthenes and Cicero. Not only Plutarch's *Comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero* but also the comparisons of the same orators by Caecilius and Longinus are characterized by a Hellenocentric attitude. In Quintilian's comparison of the two orators, on the other hand, Roman norms and categories are leading, and this results in a different outcome for the intercultural contest.

3 Demosthenes versus Cicero I: Caecilius and Plutarch

The first critic to publish a comparison between Demosthenes and Cicero was Caecilius of Caleacte at the end of the first century BCE.[25] His treatise is not extant, but Plutarch criticizes the work in the introduction to his own pair of

24 See Duff 1999, 301–309, esp. 309: 'If [Plutarch's] work has a cultural message, it lies in the imposition, helped along by the device of *synkrisis*, of a Greek perspective onto Roman history'. For Numa see Plut. *Comp. Lyc. Num.* 1.10.

25 On Caecilius see Brzoska 1899, Roberts 1897, Ofenloch 1907, Augello 2006, and Woerther 2015, vii–xvi.

lives of Demosthenes and Cicero. Plutarch states that he himself will concentrate on the actions and political careers of the two orators: unlike his predecessor Caecilius, he will refrain from presenting a stylistic comparison of their speeches. After asserting that his knowledge of Latin is not sufficient for appreciating the 'beauty and quickness of the Roman diction, the figures of speech, the rhythm, and the other embellishments of the language', Plutarch criticizes Caecilius for his bold attempt to assess the style of a Roman orator (*Dem.* 3.1–2 = Caecilius of Caleacte T6 Woerther, tr. Perrin 1919, mod.):[26]

> Therefore, in this fifth book of my *Parallel Lives*, where I write about Demosthenes and Cicero, I shall examine their actions and their political careers to see how their natures and dispositions compare with one another, but I shall make no critical comparison of their speeches, nor try to show which of the two was the more agreeable or the more powerful orator (πότερος ἡδίων ἢ δεινότερος εἰπεῖν). 'For useless,' as Ion [of Chios] says, 'is a dolphin's might upon dry ground,' a maxim which Caecilius, who goes to excess in everything, forgot when he boldly ventured to put forth a comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero.
>
> διὸ καὶ γράφοντες ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ τούτῳ, τῶν παραλλήλων βίων ὄντι πέμπτῳ, περὶ Δημοσθένους καὶ Κικέρωνος, ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν τὰς φύσεις αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς διαθέσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἐπισκεψόμεθα, τὸ δὲ τοὺς λόγους ἀντεξετάζειν καὶ ἀποφαίνεσθαι, πότερος ἡδίων ἢ δεινότερος εἰπεῖν, ἐάσομεν. 'κακὴ' γὰρ ὥς φησιν ὁ Ἴων 'δελφῖνος ἐν χέρσῳ βία' ***[27] ἣν ὁ περιττὸς ἐν ἅπασι Καικίλιος ἀγνοήσας, ἐνεανιεύσατο σύγκρισιν τοῦ Δημοσθένους λόγου καὶ Κικέρωνος ἐξενεγκεῖν.

On the basis of this short testimony it is hard to tell the outcome of the contest between Demosthenes and Cicero in this earliest σύγκρισις. Caecilius's position as an Atticist in Rome would suggest that he preferred Demosthenes, who seems to have been his primary model in many of his rhetorical works: Caecilius also published a *Comparison of Demosthenes and Aeschines* and wrote a treatise *On Figures* in which the examples were taken from Demosthenes' speeches.[28] One often overlooked piece of evidence in the testimony could in

26 For Plutarch's *Demosthenes* see Mossman 1999. For Plutarch's views on literature see Van der Stockt 1992.

27 There seems to be a lacuna after βία. If ἣν is correct, the suppressed antecedent is παροιμίαν ('proverb'). See the apparatus in Ziegler 1959, 282.

28 See Roberts 1897, Brzoska 1899, and the fragments in Woerther 2015 (see also Ofenloch

fact corroborate the idea that Demosthenes defeated Cicero in Caecilius's comparison. Plutarch's formulation suggests that Caecilius asked which of the two orators was the more agreeable (ἡδίων) or the more powerful in speaking (δεινότερος εἰπεῖν). The adjective δεινός ('strong, powerful', but also 'clever, skillful') is a term that is traditionally associated with Demosthenes in ancient criticism, in treatises ranging from Demetrius's *On Style* to Hermogenes' *On Types of Style*.[29] It would therefore be reasonable to suppose that Caecilius presented Demosthenes as the more 'forceful' orator and Cicero as the more 'agreeable' one (Brzoska 1899, 1184). Such a verdict would seem, on the surface, to compliment both orators, but a closer look suggests that it assigns a victory to the Greek orator: although ἡδονή (charm or pleasure) is indeed a virtue of style,[30] rhetoric is obviously a matter of δεινότης (intensity, forcefulness) rather than charm and pleasure. If correct, this interpretation of the fragment would also explain why Caecilius's comparison raised a storm of protest, as the reference in Plutarch seems to indicate: Cicero's supporters in Rome would presumably not appreciate the qualification of Cicero's style as merely pleasant or agreeable.[31] When Plutarch says that his predecessor 'acted like a youth' (ἐνεανιεύσατο) in presenting his stylistic *synkrisis*, this does not indicate that Caecilius composed the work in his younger years (*pace* Woerther 2015, 52–53) but rather that in boldly assessing Cicero's Latin prose style Caecilius, like a hot-headed youth, was inappropriately self-assured. The verb νεανιεύομαι ('act like a youth') in fact recalls a number of highly polemical moments in the history of rhetoric: Demosthenes uses the verb in his attacks on Aeschines, and Socrates chooses the same term to characterize Lysias in Plato's *Phaedrus*.[32]

For Plutarch, Caecilius is a 'dolphin on dry ground'—that is, 'a fish out of water'—a saying that characterizes a Greek critic who wrongly supposes that he is capable of evaluating the quality of Latin texts. Most scholars believe

1907 and Augello 2006). Innes 2002, 277–278 and Dugan 2005, 323 likewise suppose that the Atticist Caecilius preferred Demosthenes to Cicero.

29 Demosthenes is the primary model of the forceful style (χαρακτὴρ δεινός) in Demetr. *Eloc.* 240–304. Hermog. *Id.* pp. 368–380 Rabe presents 'force' (δεινότης) as 'the proper use of all kinds of style'; Demosthenes is the most forceful orator: see Wooten 1987, xvi.

30 See, e.g., Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 3.19. Pleasure and beauty are the aims of composition in Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 10.

31 Quintilian (*Inst.* 10.1.105, cited below) does not mention the name of Caecilius, but his discussion confirms that earlier comparisons of Demosthenes and Cicero (like the one by Caecilius) had resulted in conflict (*pugna*) among the supporters of both orators.

32 Dem. *De falsa legatione* 242; Pl. *Phdr.* 235a6.

Plutarch when he apologizes for his own weak Latin and announces that he himself will avoid making the same mistake as his Greek predecessor:[33] as we saw, Plutarch says that he will focus on the careers and actions of Demosthenes and Cicero while ignoring the styles of their speeches. But the matter is in fact more complex than that. Stadter (2015, 146–148) has argued that Plutarch in rejecting the stylistic perspective seeks to present himself as a philosopher rather than a rhetorician. I would add that Plutarch's statement about his allegedly inadequate appreciation of Latin prose style has a specific function in the context of his lives of Demosthenes and Cicero: his modesty allows him to eschew explicit comments on the prose of a Roman orator from a Greek perspective, thereby avoiding the trouble in which his Greek predecessor Caecilius found himself.[34]

But the rhetorical perspective is not in fact absent from Plutarch's comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero. By alluding critically to Caecilius in the very first chapters of his *Demosthenes* Plutarch introduces the stylistic dimension into his project from the start: even if he distances himself from Caecilius on the verbal level, the stylistic contest between the two orators is immediately evoked, as the reader is invited to think of Demosthenes and Cicero in terms of pleasure and forcefulness. We should also note the verb ἐάσομεν ('I will leave aside'), which signals the rhetorical technique of *praeteritio* (Mossman 1999, 82): 'we will not go into comparing the speeches and demonstrating which of the two orators is more pleasant or more powerful', Plutarch says. But this is precisely the topic that he raises in the actual *synkrisis* following the two lives (*Comp. Dem. Cic.* 1.1–2, tr. Lintott 2013, mod.):[35]

33 E.g., Stadter 2015, 137, Woerther 2015, 52, and Lintott 2013, 3–4 (but contrast p. 48: 'he does discuss and compare some aspects of their oratory'). Mossman 1999, 82 on the other hand rightly observes that 'the apology is a false one'.

34 Many scholars take for granted Plutarch's comments about his limited competence to appreciate 'the figures of speech, the rhythm, and the other embellishments' of Latin (*Dem.* 2.2–3): e.g., Jones 1971, 81–87 and Strobach 1997, 39. But Plutarch's Latin should not be underestimated: he uses Roman sources, cites Latin words, and offers observations on Latin style and language, e.g., *Caes.* 50, *Cat. Mai.* 12.4–5. See also Stadter 2015, 146–148.

35 For reasons of space this chapter concentrates on Plutarch's explicit comments on the styles of Demosthenes and Cicero, which he presents in the concluding comparison of the two lives. It would be worthwhile to extend this investigation and to encompass Plutarch's comments on the rhetorical performance of the two orators in the *Life of Demosthenes* and the *Life of Cicero*.

> Although I have left aside any comparison of the characteristics of their speaking, I do not think that I should leave unsaid the fact that Demosthenes exerted on rhetoric all the ability with words he had from nature or training, surpassing in clarity and force those who competed with him in debates and lawsuits, in weight and impressiveness the epideictic orators, and the sophists in precision and technique. Cicero was both a polymath and many-sided in his literary training: he left behind a number of philosophical compositions of his own in the Academic manner; it is clear even from the speeches he wrote for lawsuits and debates that he wished to display in them some literary skill.
>
> ἀφεικὼς δὲ τὸ συγκρίνειν τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἕξιν αὐτῶν, ἐκεῖνό μοι δοκῶ μὴ παρήσειν ἄρρητον, ὅτι Δημοσθένης μὲν εἰς τὸ ῥητορικὸν ἐνέτεινε πᾶν ὅσον εἶχεν ἐκ φύσεως ἢ ἀσκήσεως λόγιον, ὑπερβαλλόμενος ἐναργείᾳ μὲν καὶ δεινότητι τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγώνων καὶ τῶν δικῶν συνεξεταζομένους, ὄγκῳ δὲ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείᾳ τοὺς ἐπιδεικτικούς, ἀκριβείᾳ δὲ καὶ τέχνῃ τοὺς σοφιστάς· Κικέρων δὲ καὶ πολυμαθὴς καὶ ποικίλος τῇ περὶ τοὺς λόγους σπουδῇ γενόμενος, συντάξεις μὲν ἰδίας φιλοσόφους ἀπολέλοιπεν οὐκ ὀλίγας εἰς τὸν Ἀκαδημαϊκὸν τρόπον, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τῶν πρὸς τὰς δίκας καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας γραφομένων λόγων δῆλός ἐστιν ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ γραμμάτων παρενδείκνυσθαι βουλόμενος.

A superficial reading of this passage might suggest that Demosthenes and Cicero are presented as more or less equal, each orator having his own strengths. But on closer inspection one will see that Plutarch reserves all the rhetorical qualities for Demosthenes. Part of his strategy consists in balancing two sets of qualities in the μέν and δέ clauses of his comparison and mentioning all of the relevant rhetorical qualities in the μέν clause. It is a standard view in ancient rhetorical theory that three factors contribute to good oratory: talent, training, and study. All three items are here assigned to Demosthenes (φύσις, ἄσκησις, and τέχνη), whereas Cicero gets only πολυμάθεια (polymathy, which might even be an ambiguous compliment) and ποικιλία (versatility). Furthermore, Demosthenes is linked with all the essential rhetorical virtues: δεινότης, ἐνάργεια, μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὄγκος, and ἀκρίβεια (forcefulness, vividness, elevation, dignity, and precision); none of these qualities is mentioned for Cicero. Plutarch plays the same trick with the genres of writing: although he admits that both orators excel in their own genres, Demosthenes is connected with the three traditional genres of rhetoric: deliberative and forensic oratory, but also epideictic rhetoric (here associated with declamation and sophistic oratory); Cicero, on the other hand, is praised for his philosophy and his 'letters'

(γράμματα), that is, for 'learning' and 'literature', his fondness for which he even shows in his speeches.[36]

Plutarch goes on to point out that Cicero has more humor and wit than the dry and earnest Demosthenes, a difference also noted by Quintilian (see below); but in Plutarch's discussion Cicero's advantage turns out to be a disadvantage: Cicero is 'carried away' (ἐκφερόμενος) by humor and plays down 'matters deserving serious treatment'. Plutarch therefore concludes that Cicero often transgresses the laws of propriety (τὸ πρέπον): in rhetoric this is perhaps the worst offense one could possibly commit.[37] In terms of rhetoric and style, then, the reader is clearly invited to regard Demosthenes as the winner.

4 Demosthenes versus Cicero II: Longinus

The brief comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero in the treatise *On the Sublime*, whose unknown author I will simply call Longinus, must have pleased its Roman addressee Postumius Terentianus.[38] Cicero is the only Latin author to be included in the Greek treatise. But does Longinus also present Cicero as a model of the sublime (ὕψος), the effect in rhetoric and literature that overwhelms and carries away the audience? A number of modern scholars including Donald Russell, John Dugan, and Jim Porter take it for granted that Longinus does indeed present Cicero as a sublime author.[39] But to be mentioned in a book *On the Sublime* is not the same thing as to be sublime. A careful reading

36 I disagree with Lintott 2013, 211, who understands Plutarch as saying that 'Cicero had a greater variety of styles—prose and poetry, forensic and deliberative oratory, philosophical dialectic'. Plutarch does assign to Cicero a greater variety of genres (not styles), but he also suggests an opposition between rhetoric (Demosthenes) and philosophy and learning (Cicero); the variety of styles is clearly assigned to Demosthenes: Plutarch mentions none of Cicero's qualities of style.

37 Plut. *Comp. Dem. Cic.* 1.3–4. Demosthenes, on the other hand, was called 'morose' (δύσκολος) and 'ill-mannered' (δύστροπος).

38 This section has greatly profited from various conversations with Arjan Nijk. On the date and authorship of *On the Sublime* see Russell 1964, xxii–xxx, Heath 1999, and Porter 2016, 1–5. The date of the treatise of course affects the chronological order of the four *synkriseis* discussed in this chapter. If the traditional attribution to Cassius Longinus (3rd century CE) is correct (as Heath 1999 argues), *Subl.* will postdate Caecilius, Plutarch, and Quintilian. If the treatise belongs to the Augustan period (Mazzucchi 2010, cf. de Jonge 2012), it would come second after Caecilius (who is mentioned in *Subl.*). It is also possible that Longinus, Quintilian (35–100 CE), and Plutarch (46–120 AD) presented their comparisons of Demosthenes and Cicero in roughly the same period, i.e., late first century CE.

39 Russell *apud* Bowersock (1979) 76, Innes 2002, 277–278, Dugan 2005, 316 and 325 ('each possesses a variety of sublimity'), Dugan 2007, 13. See also Porter 2016, 278–279.

of the passage will show that Longinus does not portray Cicero as a model of ὕψος and that Demosthenes and Greece are the winners of this contest in sublimity.[40]

Longinus introduces Cicero after a discussion of Demosthenes and Plato (*Subl.* 12.4):[41]

> It seems to me that it is exactly in this respect, most dear Terentianus (that is, if it is allowed that we too, as Greeks, offer an opinion) that Cicero differs from Demosthenes in the manifestations of their grandeur. Demosthenes displays his grandeur mostly in abrupt sublimity (ὕψος), Cicero in diffusion (χύσις). Our countryman (ὁ μὲν ἡμέτερος), because with his violence, yes, and his speed, force, impressiveness he burns, as it were, and scatters everything at the same time, can be likened to a thunderbolt or a flash of lightning; Cicero, on the other hand, I think, is like a spreading conflagration: rolling everywhere and devouring everything, with the fire always rich and lasting and renewed in various forms from time to time and repeatedly fed with fresh fuel.
>
> οὐ κατ' ἄλλα δέ τινα ἢ ταῦτα, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, φίλτατε Τερεντιανέ, (λέγω δέ, ⟨εἰ⟩ καὶ ἡμῖν ὡς Ἕλλησιν ἐφεῖταί τι γινώσκειν) καὶ ὁ Κικέρων τοῦ Δημοσθένους ἐν τοῖς μεγέθεσι παραλλάττει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὕψει τὸ πλέον ἀποτόμῳ, ὁ δὲ Κικέρων ἐν χύσει, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἡμέτερος διὰ τὸ μετὰ βίας ἕκαστα, ἔτι δὲ τάχους ῥώμης δεινότητος, οἷον καίειν τε ἅμα καὶ διαρπάζειν σκηπτῷ τινι παρεικάζοιτ' ἂν ἢ κεραυνῷ, ὁ δὲ Κικέρων ὡς ἀμφιλαφής τις ἐμπρησμός, οἶμαι, πάντη νέμεται καὶ ἀνειλεῖται, πολὺ ἔχων καὶ ἐπίμονον ἀεὶ τὸ καῖον καὶ διακληρονομούμενον ἄλλοτ' ἀλλοίως ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ διαδοχὰς ἀνατρεφόμενον.

Longinus shows himself aware that the topic he introduces is a controversial one: addressing his Roman friend Terentianus, he asks permission to present a Greek view on Cicero's style.[42] He frames the competition between Demosthenes and Cicero explicitly in the form of a contest between 'we Greeks' and 'you Romans', referring to Demosthenes as 'our man' (ὁ μὲν ἡμέτερος). In the sub-

40 I wish to thank Arjan Nijk for making this point during a seminar that I taught at Leiden University and for his valuable ideas about *Subl.* 12.4–5.

41 I offer my own translation, partly based on Fyfe and Russell 1999.

42 The words καὶ ἡμῖν ('we too') suggest that one or more Roman comparisons of Demosthenes and Cicero had been published before Longinus's Greek discussion. He may be thinking of Cicero himself or Quintilian (if he preceded Longinus), but more treatments of the theme were probably circulating.

sequent passage Longinus (*Subl.* 12.5) adds that 'you Romans (ὑμεῖς) of course can form a better judgment of this question'. The formulation of cultural distance between Greece and Rome ('our Demosthenes' and 'your Cicero'), as Tim Whitmarsh (2001, 68) has noted, fits into Longinus's general strategy of leading his readers away from the Roman present to the great past of classical Greece.

In formulating the comparison Longinus adopts a strategy similar to that of Plutarch. The μέν … δέ contrast at first seems to suggest equality—and many readers have indeed accepted that Demosthenes and Cicero represent two different kinds of the sublime. But on closer inspection we will see that the Greek orator displays his grandeur in 'abrupt sublimity' (ὕψος), whereas Cicero's strength is in 'diffusion' or 'copiousness' (χύσις). It is true that both authors attain greatness (μέγεθος), but Longinus articulates a difference between the sublime greatness of Demosthenes and the expansive greatness of Cicero.[43] The typical sublime presents itself in a moment, the well timed highlight in a speech or narrative, so that it can be compared to a thunderbolt or a flash of lightning. In the opening chapter of his treatise Longinus employs this vivid metaphor to explain the powerful, ecstatic impact of the sublime (ὕψος).[44] In our passage he uses the same metaphor to characterize the style of Demosthenes: he thus makes it clear that the effect of Demosthenes' style is to be identified as the effect of the sublime. Furthermore, in using this metaphor Longinus is perhaps also making a subtle allusion to Cicero's own characterization of Demosthenes: for it was Cicero himself who had praised the vibrant power of Demosthenes' 'famous thunderbolts' (*illa fulmina*) in his *Orator*.[45] In Longinus's emulation of this Ciceronian motif Demosthenes' thunderbolts become the immediate cause and origin of Cicero's spreading fire (ἐμπρησμός); the chronological priority of the Greek orator is emphasized. Longinus attributes to Demosthenes the stylistic qualities of 'violence, speed, force, and impressiveness' (βία, τάχος, ῥώμη, δεινότης): all of these terms are also used to characterize the effect of sublimity in other passages of *On the Sublime*.[46] In short, Longinus's presentation clearly invites the reader to think of the Greek Demosthenes as the real model of the sublime and—at least in this respect—superior to Cicero.

43 It is sometimes supposed that Longinus uses μέγεθος (grandeur) and ὕψος (the sublime) as synonyms: see Russell 1964, xxxi n. 7 and Porter 2016, 278. But Longinus clearly distinguishes between Demosthenes' sublimity and Cicero's copiousness: they are varieties of grandeur, not varieties of the sublime.

44 *Subl.* 1.4: see Porter 2016, 61–62 and 141–147 on the aesthetics of καιρός.

45 Cic. *Orat.* 234. Porter 2016, 280 notes that Longinus's discussion of sublimity echoes *Orat.* 97–99.

46 βία: *Subl.* 1.4; τάχος: *Subl.* 34.4; δεινός and δεινότης: *Subl.* 10.1, 22.3, 34.4.

Longinus stages a contest between Demosthenes and Cicero, but the critic himself can also be seen to participate in a competitive act of emulation. By imitating the styles of Demosthenes and Cicero in his own text he illustrates the differences between the two orators. In his characterization of Demosthenes, Longinus briefly adopts the style of the Greek orator by applying a powerful asyndeton: 'our man' burns everything with his violence, yes, and his speed, force, impressiveness (τάχους ῥώμης δεινότητος); the climactic tricolon ends on the crucial notion of δεινότης. This, it seems, is Longinus's own mimetic attempt at Demosthenic sublimity (Russell 1964, 111). If we now look at Longinus's characterization of Cicero's style, we will see that he plays a similar trick. Longinus seems to imitate and to translate Cicero's style—that is, his perception of Cicero's style—into Greek. While he is explaining that Cicero's rhetorical fire is constantly refreshed, Longinus keeps the fire of his own sentence going with fresh adjectives and participles with similar meanings: πολὺ … καὶ ἐπίμονον … καὶ διακληρονομούμενον … καὶ … ἀνατρεφόμενον. If I am not mistaken, the long and elaborate sentence, which goes on and on without adding new or significant information, represents a kind of Ciceronian period in Greek: Longinus praises this style but does not give it the label of 'sublimity'.

The Greek critic completes his account by explaining that the styles of Demosthenes and Cicero are appropriate in different contexts, a strategy that recalls Plutarch's distinction between Demosthenes' oratory and Cicero's letters and philosophy (*Subl.* 12.5, tr. Fyfe and Russell 1999, mod.):

> You Romans, of course, can form a better judgment on this question. But let me say that the right place for Demosthenic, high-strained sublimity is in passages of great impact, passages of vehement emotion and in general where it is necessary to strike the audience with amazement, whereas a flood may be used where it is necessary to deluge them. The latter is appropriate in the treatment of a commonplace, epilogues, digressions, all descriptive and epideictic passages, historical and scientific contexts, and many other types of writing.
>
> ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὑμεῖς ἂν ἄμεινον ἐπικρίνοιτε, καιρὸς δὲ τοῦ Δημοσθενικοῦ μὲν ὕψους καὶ ὑπερτεταμένου ἔν τε ταῖς δεινώσεσι καὶ τοῖς σφοδροῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἔνθα δεῖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν τὸ σύνολον ἐκπλῆξαι, τῆς δὲ χύσεως ὅπου χρὴ καταντλῆσαι· τοπηγορίαις τε γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλόγοις κατὰ τὸ πλέον καὶ παρεκβάσεσι καὶ τοῖς φραστικοῖς ἅπασι καὶ ἐπιδεικτικοῖς, ἱστορίαις τε καὶ φυσιολογίαις, καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγοις ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἁρμόδιος.

It is unmistakable that Longinus reserves his real enthusiasm for Demosthenes, who is at home in those passages that call for real sublimity. If this interpretation is plausible, Demosthenes is now leading 3–0 against Cicero.

5 Demosthenes versus Cicero III: Quintilian

Quintilian's comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero is part of the extensive reading lists of Greek and Latin literature in *Institutio oratoria* 10.[47] In the context of this general assessment of Greek and Roman achievements in the fields of poetry, history, oratory, and philosophy, the 'contest' framework becomes even more explicit than in the Greek texts discussed above.[48] According to Quintilian, Cicero would measure up to any Greek opponent: 'I would happily pit Cicero against any of the Greeks' (*Ciceronem cuicumque eorum fortiter opposuerim, Inst.* 10.1.105).[49] Like Plutarch and Longinus, Quintilian expects his readers to be familiar with other comparisons—some of them controversial—of Demosthenes and Cicero (ibid.):

> I know of course what a storm of opposition I am raising, especially as it is not part of my plan at present to compare Cicero with Demosthenes—and anyway that is not relevant, since I regard Demosthenes as a primary author to read, or rather to learn by heart.

> nec ignoro quantam mihi concitem pugnam, cum praesertim non id sit propositi, ut eum Demostheni comparem hoc tempore: neque enim attinet, cum Demosthenen in primis legendum vel ediscendum potius putem.

Quintilian's promise not to compare Cicero with Demosthenes turns out to be worth as much as Plutarch's *praeteritio* ἐάσομεν (mentioned above), for comparing the two orators is precisely what Quintilian immediately begins to do (*Inst.* 10.1.105–108). In his *synkrisis* he adopts strategies similar to those of Longinus and Plutarch, including suggestive contrasts, sport and battle metaphors,

47 Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.46–84 (Greek literature) and *Inst.* 10.1.85–131 (Latin literature). On Quintilian's canons of model authors see Tavernini 1953, Steinmetz 1964, and Citroni 2006b. Dugan 2005, 327–332 discusses Quintilian's comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero.

48 On the intercultural competition between Greece and Rome in Roman canons of model authors see Citroni 2006a, 217–220.

49 All translations of Quintilian are by Russell 2001.

and the use of the first person. Quintilian's initial praise of Demosthenes prepares the ground for a balanced summary of the stylistic qualities of both orators, which finally culminates in a much higher praise for Cicero. At the outset Quintilian emphasizes that both orators are to be admired for their *inventio* (10.1.106):

> The excellences of the two are for the most part, I think, very similar: strategy, arrangement, principles of division, preparation, proof—in a word everything that comes under invention.
>
> quorum ego virtutes plerasque arbitror similes, consilium, ordinem, dividendi praeparandi probandi rationem, omnia denique quae sunt inventionis.

But he then observes that there is a divergence (*diversitas*) between the styles of Demosthenes and Cicero (10.1.106–107):

> In their elocution, there is some divergence: the one is more concentrated (*densior*), the other more expansive (*copiosior*); one has shorter periods, the other longer ones; one always fights with the sword point, the other often also puts his weight behind the blow; you cannot take anything away in the one, you cannot expand in the other; one displays more care, the other more nature. In wit and pathos, the two most powerful elements in emotional writing, we certainly win (*vincimus*).
>
> in eloquendo est aliqua diversitas: densior ille, hic copiosior, ille concludit adstrictius, hic latius, pugnat ille acumine semper, hic frequenter et pondere, illic nihil detrahi potest, hic nihil adici, curae plus in illo, in hoc naturae. Salibus certe et commiseratione, quae duo plurimum in adfectibus valent, vincimus.

The contest between Demosthenes and Cicero is described in terms of a boxing fight (*pugna*) and a military battle (*vincimus*).[50] While Quintilian uses different metaphors, he agrees with Longinus about the contrast between Demosthenes' pungency and Cicero's expansiveness (*densior* versus *copiosior*). For this reason Doreen Innes has pointed out that Quintilian and Longinus are 'in basic agree-

50 The fighting and sport metaphors have a long history: see, e.g., Pl. *Prot.* 342d–e (a Spartan speaker like a javelin-thrower); Plut. *Vit. Lyc.* 19.

ment', and other scholars have also emphasized the similarities between the two accounts.[51] I agree that the stylistic categories of the two discussions are similar, but we should not ignore the fact that the outcome of Quintilian's σύγκρισις is completely different from that of the Greek versions discussed above.[52] Although Quintilian considers Demosthenes to be 'a primary author to read, or rather to learn by heart', there can be no doubt about his preference for Cicero.

Let me single out six remarkable differences between Quintilian's discussion and the Greek *synkriseis* discussed above: it is thanks to these small divergences that Cicero finally brings home the victory. (1) Whereas Plutarch reserves φύσις for Demosthenes, Quintilian assigns the indispensable prerequisite of 'talent' or 'nature' (*natura*) to Cicero (10.1.107, contrasted with Demosthenes' *cura*). (2) While Plutarch points to the risks of Cicero's inappropriate jokes, Quintilian simply concludes that 'in wit and pathos we win'—the verb *vincimus* evokes a military conquest of Rome over Greece. (3) Quintilian observes that Demosthenes' epilogues are inferior to those of Cicero: this point is not explicitly mentioned in the extant Greek *synkriseis*, although Longinus (*Subl.* 12.5) praises Cicero's ἐπίλογοι. Quintilian explains Demosthenes' inferior epilogues as resulting from the rhetorical practice of classical Athens. He then adds that the different nature of the Latin language may have robbed Cicero of 'qualities that Attic speakers admire' (*illa quae Attici mirantur*, 10.1.107): we know these objections of the *Attici* against Cicero's style from the *Brutus* and the *Orator* (mentioned above), but it is significant that Quintilian does not specify here the qualities Cicero might be lacking.[53] (4) Whereas Plutarch presents an opposition between Demosthenes' rhetoric and Cicero's treatises and letters, Quintilian introduces the letters and dialogues as an *additional* quality of Cicero, one in which 'there is no contest' (10.1.107):

> In letters (which both of them wrote) and in dialogues (there are none by Demosthenes), there is no contest.
>
> in epistulis quidem, quamquam sunt utriusque, dialogisve, quibus nihil ille, nulla contentio est.

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51 Innes 2002, 278 n. 58. See also Dugan 2005, 328: 'The assessments of Longinus and Quintilian agree in both general outline and in their particulars'. Mazzucchi 2010, 201 notes the similarities between the accounts of Longinus and Quintilian.

52 Tavernini 1953, 71 correctly points out that in *Inst.* 10.1.105–113 'il paragone con Demostene si risolva definitiva con una dichiarazione di preeminenza in favore di Cicerone'.

53 On Quintilian's views on the Latin language (*sermo Latinus*) see Fögen 2000.

(5) Demosthenes is most highly praised for something that neither he nor Cicero could ever change (10.1.108):[54]

> We have to admit that Demosthenes was the earlier and very largely made Cicero the great orator he is.
>
> cedendum vero in hoc, quod et prior fuit ex magna parte Ciceronem quantus est fecit.

The choice of words (*cedendum*) reveals unequivocally on which side Quintilian presents himself as well as his readers. (6) Finally and most importantly, Quintilian's *synkrisis* leads to an extensive and famous praise of Cicero (10.1.108–112): the Roman orator is said to have emulated not only the forcefulness (*vis*) of Demosthenes but also the abundance (*copia*) of Plato and the elegance (*iucunditas*) of Isocrates.[55] The well known conclusion of Quintilian's discussion is that Cicero has become 'not so much the name of a man as a synonym for eloquence itself' (*non hominis nomen sed eloquentiae*). Quintilian ends his account with an exhortation to his readers that contains a clear verdict: Cicero must be the primary model (*exemplum*) of imitation (10.1.112):

> Let us fix our eyes on Cicero, let him be the model we set before ourselves. If a student comes to love Cicero, let him assure himself that he has made progress.
>
> hunc igitur spectemus, hoc propositum nobis sit exemplum, ille se profecisse sciat cui Cicero valde placebit.

6 Conclusion

Like his Greek colleagues Quintilian invites his audience to become an active participant in the contest that he presents: this is not just a contest between Demosthenes and Cicero (*ille* and *hic*), but also one between Greece and Rome, and one between 'they' and 'we'.[56] Having compared four different *synkriseis* we can conclude that they present not only an imaginary competition between

54 Cf. Longinus's suggestion (*Subl.* 12.4–5 above) that Demosthenes' thunderbolts set Cicero on fire.

55 *Inst.* 10.1.108. See Dugan 2005, 329–330.

56 Cf. *vincimus* (*Inst.* 10.1.107), *eorum* (*Inst.* 10.1.105).

Demosthenes and his emulator Cicero but also a vigorous contest between the critics who evaluate the rhetorical achievements of the two orators. The precise chronological and intertextual relations between the four *synkriseis* discussed here are uncertain. What we know for sure, however, is that Caecilius's comparison was the earliest one; it was certainly known to Longinus and Plutarch and most probably also to Quintilian.[57] All of these authors testify that comparing Demosthenes and Cicero had become a popular exercise in rhetorical criticism, one that triggered fierce response and debate. The comparisons are all formulated in a polemical style by which the authors appear to respond to the competing versions presented by their colleagues. Plutarch, Longinus, and Quintilian are thus not just reporting a fictive contest of the past; they are rather reviving that contest of cultural superiority in the present, and they are themselves participating in it, as each of them aims to surpass the others in composing a rhetorically persuasive *synkrisis*.

In presenting his winner Quintilian is more outspoken than Plutarch or Longinus. It is possible that the Greek critics were less direct because they had to be careful not to offend their Roman audiences. As far as we can tell, Caecilius's preference for Demosthenes over Cicero had raised strong protests; his Greek successors seem to have learned from his mistake. Although they agreed with Caecilius on the superiority of Demosthenes, they developed more subtle strategies to communicate their judgment. Quintilian, on the other hand, did not hesitate to oppose the Greeks openly by designating Cicero as his favorite model. Quintilian's response to his Greek colleagues (Caecilius, Plutarch, or other critics) reenacts as it were the imaginary competition between Demosthenes and Cicero. It is the subtle use of linguistic strategies and the engaging involvement of the audience that make this inter-critical and inter-cultural contest into an exciting game that deserves to be watched by attentive spectators.

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57 Plut. *Vit. Dem.* 3.2 (cited above) refers to Caecilius's comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero; [Longinus], *Subl.* 1.1 and *passim* attacks Caecilius, but not for his comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero. Quintilian, too, refers to Caecilius (*Inst.* 9.1.12, 9.3.38, etc.).

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CHAPTER 15

Competition and Competitiveness in Pollux's *Onomasticon*

Alexei V. Zadorojnyi

1 Introduction

The *Onomasticon*[1] is a word-hoard compiled by Julius Pollux (Polydeuces), who held the imperial chair of rhetoric at Athens in the last decades of the second century CE. As a work of lexicography the *Onomasticon* reflects the central agenda of the Second Sophistic, namely, the urge to display and police the verbal resources of elite Hellenic *paideia*.[2] Moreover, recent scholarship has found in this text thematic undercurrents and built-in socio-cultural sensitivities that Pollux expects to be recognized and shared by his target readership.[3] The rationale behind the *Onomasticon* is to provide quality vocabulary that would be, by the same token, relevant to the rhetorical scenarios acted out by the Hellenophone intelligentsia up and down the Roman Empire[4] and, ultimately, suited to their worldview. The aim of this essay is to demonstrate that Pollux's thesaurus embraces as well as refines the ethos of competitive ambition, which runs through pretty much any intellectual project during the Second Sophistic, markedly so in the domain of *Kultursprache*.

1 I am using Erich Bethe's Teubner edition (1900–1937), which is assembled from several versions (epitomes?) of the lexicon. All translations from the *Onomasticon* are my own. Translations from Philostratus's *Lives of the Sophists* are those of Wright 1921, lightly modified for the sake of greater literalness.

2 Strobel 2009 provides a compact discussion; on Atticism as a multiplex and contentious stylistic ideal see generally Kim 2010 and 2017, 41–53. The best introduction to the Second Sophistic is Whitmarsh 2005.

3 See Zecchini 2007; König and Whitmarsh 2007, 32–34; Maudit and Moretti 2010; Nesselrath 2012, 166; Chiron 2013; König 2016; Zadorojnyi 2018.

4 It is noteworthy that each of the ten books of the *Onomasticon* is prefaced with a dedication to Commodus Caesar. On Pollux's aspiration to inform stylistic praxis see, e.g., Chiron 2013, 49–51; Matthaios 2013, 80 and 126. It is of fundamental importance that the notion of 'usage' (χρῆσις) in the *Onomasticon* bestrides classicizing lexical choices but also, crucially, contemporary language: Valente 2013; further Matthaios 2013, 80–129; Matthaios 2015.

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2 Words Compounded with φιλο- and μισο-

Pollux's clusters of compound words beginning with φιλο- and μισο- (6.166–168 and 6.172) map out the range of culturally operative likes and dislikes within his discursive universe:

> The following are combinable with 'fond of': the people, city, soldier, greeting, strife, wisdom, beauty, comrade, barbarian, Greek, discourse, sound, Athens, money, gold, silver, wine, drink, god, litigation, truth, business, travel, joke, war, blame, reproach, quarrel (Alexis uses the form with the suffix *-stês*), laughter, danger, work, expenditure, tyrant, enmity, show ('spectacle' in Alexis), scolding, human, profit, gift, boy, child, family love, woman, hunt, Muse, body, soul, visitor, pity, wealth, sleep, dog-hunt, farming, dice, place, horse, cordiality (from which 'kindly-minded', maybe), and locale (so perhaps 'fond of place'), skill ('fond of skill'); in Aristophanes somewhere there is 'heedful speech'; in Aristomenes the comic playwright there is 'the keen hanger-on leads'; reputation, from which 'fond of reputation'. The poets also used to call the changeable person 'fond-of-turns', also 'fond-of-rascality' in Deinarchus, or in Philonides 'fond-of-low-life' … But 'female-fond' in the *Birth of the Muses* by Polyzelus is not particularly acceptable.
>
> ἐκ δὲ τοῦ φιλο τάδε σύνθετα· φιλόδημος φιλόπολις, φιλοστρατιώτης, φιλοπροσήγορος, φιλόνεικος, φιλόσοφος, φιλόκαλος, φιλέταιρος, φιλοβάρβαρος φιλέλλην, φιλολόγος φιλήκοος, φιλαθήναιος, φιλοχρήματος φιλόχρυσος φιλάργυρος, φίλοινος φιλοπότης, φιλόθεος, φιλόδικος, φιλαλήθης, φιλοπράγμων, φιλαπόδημος, φιλοσκώμμων, φιλοπόλεμος, φιλαίτιος, φιλεγκλήμων, φίλερις, Ἄλεξις δὲ καὶ φιλεριστὴν εἶπεν, φιλογέλως, φιλοκίνδυνος, φίλεργος, φιλαναλώτης, φιλοτύραννος, φιλαπεχθήμων, φιλοθεάμον, φιλοθέωρον δ' αὐτὸν Ἄλεξις εἴρηκεν. φιλολοίδορος, φιλάνθρωπος, φιλοκερδής, φιλόδωρος, φιλόπαις φιλότεκνος φιλόστοργος φιλογύνης, φιλόθηρος φιλόμουσος, φιλοσώματος φιλόψυχος, φιλόξενος φιλοικτίρμων φιλόπλουτος, φίλυπνος, φιλοκυνηγέτης, φιλογεωργός, φιλόκυβος, φιλοχωρῶν, φίλιππος, φιλοφροσύνη, τάχα καὶ φιλόφρων ἀπ' αὐτῆς, καὶ φιλοχωρία, ἴσως καὶ φιλόχωρος, φιλοτεχνία φιλότεχνος. Ἀριστοφάνης δέ που φησὶ καὶ φιλοκηδῆ λόγον, Ἀριστομένης δ' ὁ κωμικὸς 'φιλακόλουθος ἄρχεται.' φιλοδοξία, ἐκ δ' αὐτῆς ὁ φιλόδοξος. ἔλεγον δ' οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ φιλόστροφον τὸν εὐμετάβολον, Δείναρχος δὲ καὶ φιλοπόνηρον, ἢ ὡς Φιλωνίδης φιλομόχθηρον … ὁ γὰρ γυναικοφιλὴς ἐν ταῖς Πολυζήλου Μουσῶν γοναῖς οὐ πάνυ ἀνεκτόν.

Combinable with ‘hating’: the people, city, discourse, rascality, work, human, god, woman, child, horse, hunt, Philip, Alexander, Athens, tyrant, comrade, visitor, barbarian, Greek, greeting, travel, Persian (so in Xenophon).

ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μισο σύνθετα· μισόδημος μισόπολις, μισολόγος, μισοπόνηρος, μίσεργος, μισάνθρωπος μισόθεος, μισογύνης, μισότεκνος, μίσιππος, μισόθηρος, μισοφίλιππος, μισαλέξανδρος, μισαθήναιος, μισοτύραννος, μισέταιρος, μισόξενος, μισοβάρβαρος μισέλλην, μισοπροσήγορος, μισαπόδημος, μισοπέρσης ὡς Ξενοφῶν.

The cited passages showcase the *Onomasticon*'s methods and goals in more than one way. While listing compound adjectives and nouns the lexicographer also parades his knowledge of classical (Athenian) literature: he refers by name to Aristophanes (= fr. 752 Kassel-Austin), Xenophon (*Ages*. 7.7), the fourth-century rhetor Deinarchus, and several further authors of comedies.[5] What is more, out of these deadpan and seemingly random (as well as clearly incomplete, when compared to *LSJ*) word-lists there seems to be crystallizing a matrix of coordinates for the axiological landscape of the Second Sophistic. Pollux's text conveys implicit priorities with regard to, for example, pastimes (wine, hunting, dice) or familial relationships. The need to articulate political attitudes is acknowledged, too: saliently, both lists open with ‘the people’ and ‘the city-state’ (φιλόδημος φιλόπολις, 6.166; μισόδημος μισόπολις, 6.172; cf. Russell 1983, 21–37). The only real-life city on the horizon, however, is Athens (φιλαθήναιος, 6.166; μισαθήναιος, 6.172). The dichotomy between Greeks and barbarians is palpably alive, yet the generic tyrant (in both passages) and the presence of Philip, Alexander, and the Persians in the shorter list of hateables[6] cannot help suggesting declamations set in the historical past—a thriving genre during the Second Sophistic era.[7] Last but not least, Pollux's didactic strategies

5 Philonides, Aristomenes, and Polyzelus are datable as contemporaries of Aristophanes, yet Philonides belongs firmly in the fifth century BCE, whereas the literary activity of Aristomenes and Polyzelus stretches into the early decades of the fourth century BCE. Alexis (ca. 375–275 BCE) is a major author of Middle Comedy.

6 A useful inventory of the μισο-compounds in Greek poetry and prose to the end of fourth century BCE is found (somewhat unexpectedly) in Allen 2010, 158–160, with brief overviews at 120 and 201.

7 See, e.g., Bowie 1970; Russell 1983, 106–128; Anderson 1993, 62–64, 103–126; Schmitz 1999; Heath 2004, 244–253; Whitmarsh 2005, 66–70.

reveal themselves. While referencing classical precedents he reserves the right to query even words attested in classical authors: a form found in Polyzelus's play is judged to be 'not particularly acceptable' (οὐ πάνυ ἀνεκτόν, 6.168).[8]

3 Sophistic φιλοτιμία

Pollux's φιλο-list features a handful of epithets resonating with the idea of competitive conflict and confrontation (φιλόνεικος, φιλεγκλήμων, φίλερις, φιλολοίδορος, φιλαπεχθήμων), yet conspicuously absent are φιλότιμος and φιλοτιμία. This is deeply ironic, considering how central φιλοτιμία, 'love of honour', was to the ideological dynamics of the Second Sophistic. Two major trajectories of φιλοτιμία during this period can be singled out. On the one hand members of the educated Greek elite witness and are likely to be involved in civic munificence and honourific awards for benefactors.[9] The other and no less vital dimension, which has been addressed extensively by leading scholars over the last thirty years,[10] is competitive rivalry between the sophists through (extemporized) performances and other forms of verbal sparring. Flavius Philostratus's *Lives of the Sophists*, notwithstanding its selectivity and biases, offers numerous episodes of ambition-driven clashes between the eminent insiders of sophistic *paideia*. It is worth stressing that among these virtuosos and their audiences lexical competence is always the foremost factor—or better, fault-line—of competitive self-presentation. Mastery of demonstrably classical vocabulary is at the heart of intertextual recall and therefore constitutes a key requirement of cultural endorsement by the observers who lay claim to similar or superior erudition.[11] Hence Lucian in his *Apology for a Mistake in Greeting* sweats to come up with reputable precedents, literary and anecdotal, that would help legitimize the form of salutation he happened to have used (*Pro lapsu* 5–11); the cheeky recipe in another Lucianic piece is to bluff it by making up

8 Pollux's criteria cannot be simply chronological here, as he is happy to bring up the diction of Alexis and Deinarchus, who are both considerably later that Polyzelus. Polyzelus is quoted as a completely unproblematic authority on three occasions in the *Onomasticon* (2.118; 10.76; 10.109).

9 See generally Zuiderhoek 2009, 117–133.

10 E.g., Anderson 1993, esp. 35–39; Whitmarsh 2005, 37–40; Schmitz 1997, esp. 97–135; Schmitz 2009 and 2012; Demoen 2012; Bowie 2012; Fron 2017.

11 Cf. Anderson 1993, 36: 'The sophist trod a verbal tightrope, and there were always critics and connoisseurs waiting for him to fall off'. On the intense negotiation of 'inclusion' in the prestigious (and highly sectarian) intellectual community of *pepaideumenoi* see further Eshleman 2012, 67–90 and 125–148; Schmitz 2017, 174–176.

one's sources.[12] Philostratus writes about a memorable encounter between the sophist Philagrus of Cilicia and a member of Herodes Atticus's clique (*VS* 578–579):

> An alien word escaped him [*sc.* Philagrus] in anger. Amphicles seized upon it, for he was actually the most distinguished of the associates of Herodes, and asked: 'In what reputable authors is that word to be found?' 'In Philagrus!' was the answer.
>
> ἐκφύλου δὲ αὐτὸν ῥήματος ὡς ἐν ὀργῇ διαφυγόντος λαβόμενος ὁ Ἀμφικλῆς, καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἐτύγχανε τῶν Ἡρώδου γνωρίμων τὴν πρώτην φερόμενος, "παρὰ τίνι τῶν ἐλλογίμων" ἔφη "τοῦτο εἴρηται;" καὶ ὅς "παρὰ Φιλάγρῳ."[13]

There is much as stake here: professional success and acceptance (Eshleman 2012, 7–10), literary canonicity, and Hellenicity itself—ἔκφυλον, 'alien', is a loaded word in Philostratus.[14]

In his most overt rumination on φιλοτιμία Philostratus takes the view that, although the competitive mood among the sophists is natural and indeed culturally endemic, it is something to be wary of because its counterpart is outrageous squabbling (*VS* 491):

> Still, they [*sc.* Polemo and Favorinus] may be forgiven for that rivalry, since human nature holds that the love of glory never grows old. But they are to be blamed for the speeches they composed assailing one another, because personal abuse is brutal, and even if it be true, that does not acquit of disgrace even the man who speaks about such things. And so when people called Favorinus a sophist the mere fact that he had quarrelled with a sophist was evidence enough; for that spirit of rivalry of which I spoke is always directed against one's competitors in the same craft.
>
> συγγνωστοὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς φιλοτιμίας, τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως τὸ φιλότιμον ἀγήρων ἡγουμένης, μεμπτέοι δὲ τῶν λόγων, οὓς ἐπ' ἀλλήλους ξυνέθεσαν· ἀσελγὴς

12 'If you commit a solecism or a barbarism, … be ready with a name of a poet or writer (who never existed), an expert and skillful master of language who approved of this manner of utterance' (ἂν σολοικίσῃς δὲ ἢ βαρβαρίσῃς … πρόχειρον εὐθὺς ὄνομα οὔτε ὄντος τινὸς οὔτε γενομένου ποτέ, ἢ ποιητοῦ ἢ συγγραφέως, ὃς οὕτω λέγειν ἐδοκίμαζε σοφὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ τὴν φωνὴν εἰς τὸ ἀκρότατον ἀπηκριβωμένος, Lucian, *Rhet. praec.* 17). Translation adapted from that of Harmon 1925.

13 The Greek text of *VS* is cited from Stefec 2016.

14 Rothe 1989, 72; König 2014, 258–259 and 264–265. See also below on 'The Hellenes'.

> γὰρ λοιδορία, κἂν ἀληθὴς τύχῃ, οὐκ ἀφίησιν αἰσχύνης οὐδὲ τὸν ὑπὲρ τοιούτων εἰπόντα. τοῖς μὲν οὖν σοφιστὴν τὸν Φαβωρῖνον καλοῦσιν ἀπέχρη ἐς ἀπόδειξιν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ σοφιστῇ διενεχθῆναι αὐτόν· τὸ γὰρ φιλότιμον, οὗ ἐπεμνήσθην, ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀντιτέχνους φοιτᾷ.

Kristoffel Demoen and, in a more focused argument, Jason König have argued independently that Philostratus in *Sophists* is not altogether celebrating the sophistic φιλοτιμία:[15] he is uneasy about abusive strife and generally 'the potential for incongruity between sophistic and civic virtues' (König 2011, 285). Philostratus prefers to see the powers of φιλοτιμία harnessed and used tactically, within the constraints of civilised practice. An attractive and effective alternative to barefaced contentiousness is the posture of non-bellicose, quietly confident superiority, and König asks, if I read him correctly, whether this might in fact be the 'deep' authorial policy of Philostratus himself.

4 The *Onomasticon* on Competitiveness

Against this background the *Onomasticon* reads as a multi-layered response to contemporary concerns about φιλοτιμία. Sophistic competitiveness is certainly on Pollux's radar. In the preface to *Onomasticon* 8 he draws attention to the duties he had to juggle while composing the work. He had no respite from teaching ('never suspending … the sessions with the young men', οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε ἀποστὰς … τῆς συνουσίας τῆς πρὸς τοὺς νέους), but he also continued to be creative as a sophist (8 pr.):

> … and of the customary contests I delivered each day two declamations, one seated on the high chair, another one standing up.

> … τῶν δι' ἔθους ἀγώνων ὁσημέραι δύο λόγους ἐξειργασάμην τὸν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου λέγων, τὸν δὲ ὀρθοστάδην.

Pollux is busy portraying himself as an active contributor to competitive sophistic performances (τῶν … ἀγώνων).[16] Furthermore, the world invoked by the *Onomasticon* is rife with competitive activities and attitudes. At 3.140–155

15 Demoen 2012; König 2011 and 2017, 19–22; cf. Eshleman 2012, 137–138.

16 Philostratus (*VS* 592–593) cites a few samples from Pollux's declamations, although his overall opinion of Pollux as Atticist and sophist is quite lukewarm. See Butler 2015, 32–36.

Pollux offers a long treatment of athletic and music festivals (ἀγῶνες).[17] A lawsuit is of course an ἀγών, 'contest' (8.143). Participants in a ball game try to prevent the ball falling to the ground in a mood of φιλοτιμία (9.106). Hunting (a prized component of elite identity, for sure) is construed as antagonism between the hunter and his prey: Pollux includes ἀντίπαλος, 'rival', with words suitable for describing a hunter (5.9); he takes his cue, one suspects, from Xenophon's treatise *On Hunting* (13.14), where the beasts are called τὰ ἀντίπαλα, 'antagonists'.

Next, the behaviour of citizens is permeated by φιλοτιμία. The section on the πολίτης, 'citizen', lists words that denote communal belonging (3.51), then concentrates on the notion of the (Athenian) phratry and the ritual of enrolment of children into the phratry. According to Pollux a possible reason why the sacrificial animal at that ritual is called μεῖον, 'the Lesser', might be to adumbrate the need to check the disorder into which the competing participants might otherwise be driven—the whole process becomes a sort of exercise in brinkmanship of consumption and civic φιλοτιμία alike (3.53):

> ... so that they would not vie with each other and not lapse into strife and turmoil. Nevertheless they behaved competitively, whereas the others shouted 'less!', as if they [*sc.* the sacrificers] were not exceeding the legal limit.
>
> ... ὡς μὴ ἁμιλλῷντο μηδ' ἐμπίπτοιεν εἰς ἔριν καὶ ταραχήν, οἱ μὲν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐφιλοτιμοῦντο, οἱ δ' ἐπεβόων μεῖον ὡς οὐχ ὑπερβαινόντων αὐτῶν τοῦ νόμου τὸ μέτρον.

Here the lexicographer apparently concurs with the ideological misgivings about φιλοτιμία as disruptive energy within the community.[18] But Pollux also happily includes φιλοτιμία and various derivatives under commendable generosity in the civic setting—in other words, euergetism (3.65–66):

> [The man:] Fond of the city, fond of the people, democratic, humane, equitable, benevolent towards the city, enthusiastic about the city, honour-loving, high-minded, lover of the people, magnificent towards

17 See the brilliant recent discussion in König 2016; also Franciò 2000, esp. 170–171.

18 The more plausible explanation is that the crowd shouted μεῖον to mean 'not enough!', 'more lamb!': see Lambert 1998, 168–169. This line of interpretation is only briefly considered by Pollux: 'there was ridicule because it (*sc.* the victim) was less than was necessary' (ἔσκωπτον ὡς μεῖον τοῦ δέοντος, 3.53).

the commonwealth. And about one's character: fond of the city, fond of the people, democratic, humane, equitable, well-disposed, enthusiastic, honourable, magnificent. And: love of the people, fondness of the people, humanity, equitability, goodwill, love of honour, magnificence. And: democratically, humanely, equitably, enthusiastically, honourably, populistically, magnificently, with goodwill.

φιλόπολις, φιλόδημος, δημοτικός, πρᾶος, ἐπιεικής, εὔνως ἔχων πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, πρόθυμος περὶ τὴν πόλιν, φιλότιμος, μεγαλογνώμων, δημεραστής, μεγαλοπρεπὴς πρὸς τὸ δημόσιον. καὶ ἦθος φιλόπολι, φιλόδημον, δημοτικόν, πρᾶον, ἐπιεικές, εὔνουν, πρόθυμον, φιλότιμον, μεγαλοπρεπές. καὶ δημεραστία, φιλοδημία, πραότης, ἐπιείκεια, εὔνοια, προθυμία, φιλοτιμία, μεγαλοπρέπεια. καὶ δημοτικῶς, πράως, ἐπιεικῶς, προθύμως, φιλοτίμως, φιλοδήμως, μεγαλοπρεπῶς, εὔνως.[19]

So the social connotations of φιλοτιμία are fully acknowledged by the *Onomasticon*. The benign φιλοτιμία of the individual[20] who can afford to be generous benefits the *polis*, the common people, and the poor. But at the end of the day competitiveness is embedded in the very algorithm of reciprocity: to repay a benefaction is ἀντιφιλοτιμεῖσθαι, 'to be ambitious in return' (5.142).

19 Cf. 3.118–119: 'The positive antonyms of "thrifty" are: expansive, abundant, splendid, unsparing, honourable, liberal, philanthropic, bountiful, munificent, much-giving, helper of the indigent, sharer of one's estate, magnificent, noble. About the acts: abundance, splendor, unsparing treatment, plenty, magnificence, honourableness, bountifulness, munificence, generous giving, liberality … The adverbs: abundantly, expansively, unsparingly, magnificently, without restraint, profusely, nobly, liberally, honourably, philanthropically, bountifully, munificently, splendidly. The verbs: to make oneself splendid, to bestow freely, to champion humanity, to give to the indigent, to relieve those in need, to behave honourably' (τῷ δὲ φειδωλῷ μετ' ἐπαίνου ἀντίκειται ἐκτενής, δαψιλής, λαμπρός, ἄφθονος, φιλότιμος, ἐλευθέριος, φιλάνθρωπος, φιλόδωρος μεγαλόδωρος πολύδωρος, τοῖς δεομένοις ἐπαρκῶν, τῶν ὄντων μεταδιδούς, μεγαλοπρεπής, ἐλευθεροπρεπής. τὰ δὲ πράγματα δαψίλεια, λαμπρότης, ἀφειδία, ἀφθονία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, φιλοτιμία, φιλοδωρία μεγαλοδωρία πολυδωρία, ἐλευθεριότης … τὰ δ' ἐπιρρήματα δαψιλῶς, ἐκτενῶς ἀφθόνως, μεγαλοπρεπῶς, ἀνέδην, χύδην, ἐλευθεροπρεπῶς, ἐλευθερίως, φιλοτίμως, φιλανθρώπως, φιλοδώρως μεγαλοδώρως, λαμπρῶς, ῥήματα δὲ λαμπρύνεσθαι, ἐπιδαψιλεύεσθαι, φιλανθρωπεύεσθαι, ἐπιδιδόναι τοῖς χρῄζουσιν, ἐπικουρεῖν τοῖς δεομένοις, φιλοτιμεῖσθαι).

20 The default masculine gender of Pollux's adjectives is simultaneously predictable and telling.

5 Competition in the *Onomasticon*

We have seen that Pollux registers a great deal of competitiveness in the world outside the *Onomasticon*, notably sophistic contests (in which he is a stakeholder) and euergetism. But competitiveness is also a paramount element of his authorial persona. He repeatedly invites the reader to appreciate the competitive excellence of the *Onomasticon* itself. The *Onomasticon* is introduced as an ambitious exercise in linguistic aesthetics (1.2): Pollux says that his book 'was zealous ... with respect to the selection of what is beautiful' (πεφιλοτίμηται ... εἰς κάλλους ἐκλογήν). The section on the festivals ends (3.155) with an assimilation of the book to a contest by way of a Homeric vignette ('the contest was over', λῦτο δ' ἀγών ~ *Iliad* 24.1).[21] In several of the prefaces there is intensely competitive promotion of the book and its author.[22] The preface to *Onomasticon* 4 builds up from excuses to asserting that the work is a truly unique achievement (4 pr.):

> If a word occurs to you as an omission, do not be too shocked. I might have left it out with full knowledge, as I do not approve it. And if it escaped me—well, it is a fact that at times certain things we absolutely know do not come to mind, just as sometimes the names of our slaves, which we cannot say we don't know, escape us when we wish to summon them. ... But consider whether any other man among the Hellenes discovered so much in such a mass of material.
>
> ἂν δέ τί σε ὄνομα ὡς παρειμένον ἐπέλθῃ, μὴ πάνυ θαυμάσῃς. ἴσως μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ κἂν εἰδὼς εἴην παρεικώς, ἀλλ' ὡς οὐκ ἐπαινῶν· εἰ δὲ καὶ διέλαθέ με, εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ὧν πάνυ ἴσμεν, ἔστιν ὅτ' ἐπὶ τὴν μνήμην οὐκ ἀπαντᾷ, ὅπου καὶ τὰ τῶν οἰκετῶν ὀνόματα, ἃ οὐκ ἂν φαῖμεν ὡς οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐκπίπτει πολλάκις χρῄζόντων καλεῖν. ... ὅρα δὴ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν νῦν Ἑλλήνων εὗρε τοσαῦτα καὶ ἐν τοσούτοις.

'Hellenes' here must refer not to the Greeks en masse but specifically to the stakeholders in elite literary and sophistic *paideia*; the circle of the wealthy Athenian sophist Herodes Atticus famously designated themselves 'The Hellenes'.[23] Pollux challenges his dedicatee Commodus, and the readers at large,

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21 See the remarks by König 2016, 307 and 310.

22 On Pollux's prefaces see Radici Colace 2013; Amaraschi 2015, 168–171; especially Tribulato 2018.

23 See Follet 1991; Kemezis 2014, 210.

to compare his scholarship with that of the competition. He also reminds us that acceptance and exclusion of words from the roster of quality is *his* intellectual prerogative.

In the preface to *Onomasticon* 7 emphasis is placed directly on the author's qualities. Pollux talks about his own extensive reading (framed by way of a Platonic flourish) as prerequisite for the existence of the *Onomasticon*, and his skills of evaluating and arranging the material without any assistance (7 pr.):

> The man who complied these books had not only to familiarize himself with numerous poetic and prose texts—as Plato would say, 'in verse and free-flowing' [*Leg.* 811d2–3]—but also to impose on them some compositional structure and uniformity out of diversity, as well as to have a certain discipline in the soul in order to cross-examine and pass judgement. That is why I was unable to find myself a colleague in this whole affair, for there was no likely candidate I could rely upon, and any such person would have had to be of the same mind as myself, always.
>
> τὸν ταῦτα συντιθέντα τὰ βιβλία οὐ πολλοῖς ὡμιληκέναι μόνον ἐχρῆν ἐμμέτροις τε καὶ ἀμέτροις λόγοις, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴποι ὁ Πλάτων 'ἔν τε ποιήμασι καὶ χύδην,' ἀλλὰ προσθεῖναί τι αὐτοῖς καὶ συντάξεως σχῆμα καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνομοίοις ὅμοιον, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀκρίβειάν τινα ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχειν εἰς βασάνου κρίσιν. τοῦδε εἵνεκα οὐδὲ συνεργὸν ἐδυνάμην εἰς πάντα παραλαβεῖν οὐδένα· οὔτε γὰρ εἶχον ὅτῳ πιστεύσαιμι ἐοικότι, καὶ ἔδει πάντως ἑκάστῳ προσεῖναι τὸ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν.

A nice cluster of competitive claims: Pollux markets himself as hard-working, supremely knowledgeable, and utterly special.[24]

In the preface to *Onomasticon* 9 self-praise is arrived at through polemical literary interaction (9 pr.):

> There is a book called *Onomasticon* produced by the sophist Gorgias. It is educational for the amateur reader but for the critical expert it has little worth. I had not come across this text before, but having read it recently I started to think that this book of mine has some value. I trust that it is generally useful, and also that the rosters of words (which carry some innate boredom) are ingeniously arranged so as not to aggravate on the level of composition. Thus no one would grow weary of what has been learned, before craving to read the next portion.

24 On similar strategies of self-fashioning see Rosen in this volume.

ὀνομαστικόν τι βιβλίον πεποίηται Γοργίᾳ τῷ σοφιστῇ, οὑτωσὶ μὲν ἀκοῦσαι παιδευτικόν, εἰς δὲ πεῖραν ἐλθεῖν ὀλίγου λόγου. τούτῳ τῷ συγγράμματι πάλαι μὴ προσομιλήσας, ἀλλὰ νῦν ἐντυχὼν ἠρξάμην περὶ τούτων τῶν βιβλίων ὥς τι ὄντων φρονεῖν· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα τὴν χρείαν αὐτῶν ἀποδέχομαι, καὶ ὅτι τὸν τῶν ὀνομάτων κατάλογον, ἔχοντά τι τῇ φύσει προσκορές, τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς διαθέσεως σεσόφισται πρὸς τὸ ἄλυπον ἐν τῷ τῆς συντάξεως σχήματι, ὡς μηδένα θᾶττον τῷ γνωσθέντι προκαμεῖν, τῷ τὸ μέλλον ἀκοῦσαι ποθεῖν.

The calculated juxtaposition of the two books with the same title echoes the competitive climate of oral sophistic performances. In making a lunge at Gorgias, whose name recalls the arch-sophist of classical Greece,[25] Pollux gains a stronger position from which to celebrate the merits of his own *Onomasticon*, both in terms of contents and literary design. And it is difficult not to hear writerly self-assurance behind the coyly litotic phrase ὥς τι ὄντων, 'has some value'—literally, 'is *something*'.

The prefaces are naturally hotspots for claiming intellectual authority, with competitive overtones. But the whole *Onomasticon* is suffused with Pollux's authority. When rejecting a word he can be firm and even snappish,[26] yet he rarely sounds aggressively polemical. On the whole his approach to self-promotion is that of quietly confident assertiveness, which is close to the posture of non-militant, take-it-for-granted superiority outlined in König 2011.[27] Yet there can be more or less caustic wit, too. Consider, for example, how Plato is treated at 2.112:

> You could form an action noun 'insolentese'. This is no more disagreeable than Plato's 'insolence by a foreigner'. (*Leg.* 879e4)
>
> ὥσπερ καὶ θρασυφωνίαν τὸ μὲν πρᾶγμα εἴποις ἄν, οὐκ ὂν τῆς Πλάτωνος θρασυξενίας ἀηδέστερον.[28]

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25 Pollux presumably refers to the shadowy first-century BCE sophist Gorgias of Athens, on whom see *Brill's New Jacoby*, no. 351; Tribulato 2018, ad loc. Yet the homonymity is serendipitous; Philostratus views the fifth-century BCE Gorgias as the literary father of the sophistic art and the pioneer of declamatory improvisation (*VS* 481–482).

26 E.g., 'not particularly acceptable' (6.168) and, on a word attested in the early fourth-century BCE Athenian orator Isaeus, 'but I don't like it' (ἐμὲ δ' οὐκ ἀρέσκει, 2.8). On the vocabulary of repudiation in Atticist lexicography see further Matthaios 2010, 187.

27 See also the more panoramic discussion in König 2017, 7–26.

28 At 3.58 θρασυξενία is glossed neutrally.

Plato is still the benchmark of lexical usage, but Pollux sets him at the boundary between elegant and ugly diction; it is clear who has the better stylistic acumen. Or there can be a sprinkling of donnish humour: the caveat 'lest we appear to be neglectful towards the books' (ἵνα δὲ μηδὲ τῶν βιβλίων ἀμελεῖν δοκῶμεν), which ushers in a list of terms for book-rolls (7.210), is a tongue-in-cheek reminder of Pollux's formidable literary erudition.

6 Lexical φιλοτιμία

So far we have been looking at how Pollux promulgates his own scholarly and aesthetic supremacy. It is equally if not more interesting to examine the *Onomasticon*'s tendency to view the high end of lexical prowess through the lens of φιλοτιμία. Pollux explicitly marks up certain words or phrases as the 'more ambitious' (φιλοτιμότερον) verbal choice. In the entry on ship-builders (1.84) several words are tagged as 'more ambitious' (φιλοτιμότερον); it is φιλοτιμότερον to use the preposition εἰς when talking about tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, and so on (1.66); some terms for 'taxable' are what 'you would perhaps say … in the ambitious mode' (φιλοτιμούμενος τάχα … ἐρεῖς, 9.31); likewise, when going through possible designations for temple-builders (1.12), Pollux adds terms that would befit an 'ambitious' speaker (εἴποις ἄν, φιλοτιμούμενος δὲ καὶ …).

In the entry on 'master of the household/landowner' (10.20) Pollux's negotiation of language-centred φιλοτιμία is given a revealing twist. He zooms in on the quirky, nonmainstream noun σταθμοῦχος, 'site-keeper', and explains the opportunities this word contains for astutely showing off one's philological virtuosity:

> In jest you might wish to call him 'site-keeper' when you are teasing or testing someone. The expert user of vocabulary would pounce on the word as not a reputable one. Nor should you consider it altogether reputable, yet not completely disreputable either. If you point out that it is attested, you will make an impression of being φιλότιμος.
>
> παίζων δ' εἰ καὶ σταθμοῦχον ἐθέλοις αὐτὸν καλεῖν, ἐρεσχηλῶν τινὰ ἢ ἐκπειρώμενος, ὁ δὲ δεινὸς ὢν εἰς ὀνομάτων χρῆσιν λαμβάνοιτο τοῦ ῥήματος ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη δόκιμον, οὐδὲ σὺ μὲν ἂν αὐτὸ πάντῃ δόκιμον εἶναι νομίζοις, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ παντελῶς ἀδόκιμον· ὅτι δὲ ἔστιν εἰρημένον εἰ γνωρίζοις, φιλότιμος εἶναι δόξεις.

References to Aeschylus (fr. 226 Radt) and the fourth-century BCE comic poet Antiphanes (fr. 169 Kassel-Austin) duly follow. So in the last sentence quoted

above γνωρίζω must be understood in the active, transitive sense 'I point out that', 'I make known that' (cf. 6.207). But what about the meaning of φιλότιμος in the context? It seems safe to assume that it is intended as a positive not a negative quality. Pollux equips his reader with lexical and intertextual knowledge that would make him come across as φιλότιμος—which is, in effect, a level of cultural attainment. No qualms about ungentlemanly strife, then. Still, translating φιλότιμος here (and probably elsewhere in the *Onomasticon* and in imperial Greek literature and inscriptions) as 'ambitious' or 'honour-loving' may not be entirely appropriate. A recent and far-reaching article by Ewen Bowie charts the semantic nuances of φιλοτιμία, suggesting that the word often has to mean 'retrospective pride about one's achievement' or 'lavish generosity' rather than simply 'ambition' (Bowie 2012, 239–251). The idea of achievement should help to frame the thrust of Pollux's sentence in 10.20. It is hardly accidental that φιλότιμος in the *Onomasticon* appears among the synonyms for 'keen', 'zealous' (1.155, cf. 1.178);[29] even more pertinently, φιλοτιμηθείς belongs with epithets for author-cum-performer of a well-wrought speech (6.139).[30] So in 10.20 Pollux is saying that the reader who is able to point out the classical passages (and Professor Pollux is here to assist with those) will be perceived—and can rightly regard himself—as a keen scholar, the alpha-boy. Even so, the aura of competitive ambition is rarely absent, since in the Second Sophistic it is hardly ever absent from the discourse of munificence or from reportage about conflicting sophists. After all, Pollux in 10.20 provides a mischievous recipe for one-upping a rival pundit.[31] A rare, borderline word serves to trap this notional opponent into a position of intellectual vulnerability—he will end up receiving the broadside of references from Pollux's trainee.

It is self-evident that mastery of classical precedents is key to Pollux's pedagogical and cultural game plan. We may be forgiven for believing that he champions classical vocabulary[32] *especially* when he recommends the 'more ambitious' usage—or should we say, 'the more competitive' and prestigious usage. Yet things are not always straightforward. In the entry on mystery rites (1.35) τὸ τελεσιουργεῖν, 'to perform the initiation rituals', and the related noun τελεσιουργία are highlighted as φιλοτιμότερον τῇ χρήσει, 'more ambitious usage'; in the entry on seasons (1.60) Pollux groups under the category of φιλοτιμότερον 'the peak of summer' (θέρους ἀκμή), 'the dawning of spring' (ἦρος ὑπολάμπον-

29 Nesselrath 2012, 166 links these passages to 3.155 on euergetic φιλοτιμία.

30 Note, however, that the entry's lemma is pointedly litotic: 'About the man who seems to speak not thoughtlessly' (εἰς μὲν δὴ τὸν οὐκ ἀφροντίστως δοκοῦντα λέγειν).

31 Schmitz 1997, 117.

32 Although he is not a very strict Atticist: see Tosi 2007 and note 4 above.

τος), 'the budding of spring' (ἦρος ὑπανθοῦντος), and a few temporal idioms from Thucydides. On closer reading, in both 1.35 and 1.60 Pollux's advice seems to test the limits of loyalty to the classical textual heritage. One has to proceed with caution, as there were obviously texts available to Pollux that are no longer available to us. And yet it is curious that 'the budding of spring' (ἦρος ὑπανθοῦντος, 1.60) is not attested anywhere but the *Onomasticon*. The verb τελεσιουργεῖν has a solid pedigree in Greek philosophical and scientific literature, where it means 'to accomplish, bring to completion or fruition' (as it does in Pollux, 9.156–157), but TLG cannot locate it in the sense of 'performing esoteric rituals' earlier than Lucian (*Philopseud.* 14).[33] 'The dawning of spring' (ἦρος ὑπολάμποντος) and 'the peak of summer' (θέρους ἀκμή), on the other hand, are modelled on classical precedents with small changes to the syntax. In Herodotus spring 'dawns forth' in the indicative (τὸ … ἔαρ ὑπέλαμπε, 1.190.1). It is only in Claudius Aelian's *History of Animals* (8.22, 15.5) that the expression is found in the genitive absolute, and Aelian was writing more than a generation after Pollux.[34] With 'the peak of summer' it is the other way round: Thucydides uses the genitive absolute (θέρους … ἀκμάζοντος, 2.19.1), and quite a few later writers follow suit,[35] but θέρους ἀκμή is found only in Plutarch (*Dion* 23.3, cf. ἀκμή θέρους in *Brut.* 4.7). What I am tentatively contending here is that Pollux's idea of a 'more competitive' lexical deployment may entail the resuscitation of words that had remained dormant for a long time (10.20) or had made a comeback to quality prose fairly recently (Plutarch's *Lives*); there may be adaptation of syntax ('the dawning of spring'), possibly a bit of innovation ('the budding of spring'). Pollux is thus not transcribing but rather actively shaping the canon of verbal Hellenicity. He pushes the reader towards creative mini-experiments with traditional material.[36] At the level of the φιλοτιμότερον a sophist has to take risks.

My next example (9.32–33) comes from a long list of derogatory epithets that could be mobilized when 'speaking ill' of a tax-collector (κακίζων μὲν τελώνην

33 The perfect passive participle τῷ τετελεσιουργημένῳ, 'to the fully initiated', is used metaphorically by Epicurus in Diog. Laert. 10.36, yet the reading is uncertain; in the genitive case preferred by authoritative editors the metaphor would be lost.

34 Also in the Byzantine epitome of the *History of Animals* (2.406) by the Alexandrian scholar Aristophanes of Byzantium, but this is not a strong testimony.

35 Philo *De vita Mos.* 1.6, 1.226, *De fuga* 180, *De prov.* 2.23; Plut. *Vit. Sert.* 17.7, *Luc.* 31.1, *Mor. De fac.* 938E, 939D; cf. Herodian 5.6.6 ἀκμάζοντος θέρους, Gal. *Bon. mal. suc.* 13, VI p. 813 K θέρους … ἀκμαίου.

36 Cf., again, Lucian, *Rhet. praec.* 17, quoted above. The parallel does not have to be grafted onto the allegation in the Lucianic scholia (p. 174 Rabe) that Lucian's Professor is a caricature of Pollux; references to modern literature on the question are amassed in Gibson 2012, 109 n. 24; see also Chiron 2013, 50.

εἴποις ἄν); there must have been some demand for this kind of invective. The word-hoard ends with a tip (9.33):

> The aspiring person is allowed to call him 'Salmydessus', 'Caphereus', and other unapproachable and inhospitable maritime locations.
>
> φιλοτιμουμένῳ δὲ ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν Σαλμυδησσός, Καφηρεύς, καὶ ὅσα ἐν θαλάττῃ δύσμικτα καὶ ἄξενα χωρία.

These relatively more recherché references from geography (and, concomitantly, myth[37]) are a move 'allowed' (ἔξεστιν) to the 'competitive' (φιλοτιμουμένῳ) speaker. The phrase captures a crucial aspect of Pollux's outlook as author of the *Onomasticon* and as ideologue of sophistic discourse. To put it bluntly, lexical φιλοτιμία is a prerogative of the master sophist Pollux, who now and again facilitates and authorizes such practice, effectively doling it out to the consumers of his book. In the next passage, from the entry on tables, lexical φιλοτιμία and Pollux's teacherly importance neatly merge (10.69):

> About the table it is allowed …, if one wishes to be competitive with innovative usage, to say 'sideboard'. For I found[38] the noun in this sense in Aristophanes' *Farmers*.
>
> ἔξεστι δὲ τὴν τράπεζαν … καὶ εἴ τις βούλοιτο φιλοτιμεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν καινότητα τῆς χρήσεως, τραπεζοφόρον. [οὐκ] ἐπὶ τούτου μὲν γὰρ εὗρον τοὔνομα ἐν τοῖς Ἀριστοφάνους Γεωργοῖς.

Pollux shares his erudition and stamps his authority on speech that is competitively learned and competitively creative at the same time; pursuing innovation (πρὸς τὴν καινότητα) by means of archaic vocabulary is certainly a good strategy for true maestros of the Second Sophistic.[39]

37 See *Brill's New Pauly s.v.* 'Salmydessus' (vol. 12, 898) and *RE s.v.* 'Kaphereus' (vol. 10, cols. 1893–1894).

38 It is hard to disagree with Bethe's deletion of οὐκ.

39 See also Inger Kuin in this volume, who describes Aristotle's anchoring of political innovation in the past.

7 Conclusion

Behind the pedantic, ironic, and at times cavalier philology of the *Onomasticon* loom some of the uppermost cultural and social preoccupations of the Second Sophistic. The world that jigsaws out of the *Onomasticon* is replete with competitive ambitions and antagonisms. The book itself is energised by the awareness of competition for control over language. As a competitor Pollux opts for the posture of self-assurance rather than overtly aggressive polemics, thus enacting the model of competitive behaviour that König proposes for Philostratus arguably somewhat better than Philostratus. Linguistic competence in the *Onomasticon* is aligned with φιλοτιμία, which I read as a didactic gambit on Pollux's part. He projects his own image as not only a master of words but also a facilitator of the Hellenophone elite's rhetorical φιλοτιμία. It would not be too far-fetched to say that Pollux paints himself into the *Onomasticon* as a kind of intellectual *euergetês*,[40] the benefactor of *pepaideumenoi* who would go on jostling for rhetorical prestige. Sophistic φιλοτιμία and civic φιλοτιμία (think Bowie's 'lavish generosity') mirror each other and potentially amalgamate. Indeed, on one occasion in the *Onomasticon* they are virtually indistinguishable (1.11):

> The more ambitious thing is to enhance the temple with statuary.
>
> φιλοτιμότερον δὲ καὶ τὸ νεὼν περιεργάσασθαι τῷ ἀγάλματι.

Is Pollux offering a more competitive turn of phrase, or is he alluding to real-life euergetism? But perhaps from his perspective such a distinction is altogether unnecessary. And perhaps the omission of φιλότιμος and φιλοτιμία from the list of φιλο-compounds (6.166–168) is not an oversight but rather an ironic test of the reader's attention and overall commitment to φιλοτιμία in scholarship and language.[41]

40 Cf. Wietzke 2017, 350–351 and 362–363.

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